a war than the American State militia, which is not intended for foreign service, and out of which, when war breaks out, an army must first be formed. In spite of all these disadvantages and difficulties, the Americans have set an army on foot in a few weeks which was obliged to take the field under unfavorable circumstances, and, nevertheless, has shown itself therein not merely equal, but superior to its well-trained adversary.

"Almost as instructive as the combats on land have been the sea-fights. . . . As in the battle of the Yalu, between the Chinese and Japanese, superiority in marksmanship decided the fight off Santiago. The Spanish vessels were in part superior in speed to the American; the valor of the Spanish sailors is much praised by the Americans; experienced officers commanded the ships, but, nevertheless, they were defeated without doing much damage worth mentioning to the enemy. It is well known that for years the Americans have kept up industriously target practice, and that they expected good results from this themselves. Good guns without good gunners are useless in a fight. The Spaniards shot poorly and the Americans shot well. The result was that the Spanish vessels caught fire and were therefore compelled to run ashore. How far better armor influenced the outcome of the fight cannot be determined with certainty. One thing, however, is settled. Her speed could not save even the Cristobal Colon from the sure aim of the Americans. Besides this, the American material, missiles as well as armor plate, seems to have shown itself to be much better than the Spanish. American experts, indeed, believe that in this respect they are superior even to the English."

There can be no question of the patriotism and loyalty of the German people, but love of the Fatherland does not blind their intelligence. The German-born citizens of the United States, and their descendants, are strong upholders of American pride. In all their duties as citizens, defenders, soldiers, the German-Americans have proved their devotion whenever the call has been made upon them.

It must be remembered, also, that Germany occupied a peculiar position. She had no alliance with England in the East, while Russia and France (the hereditary enemy), were leagued. The Triple Alliance was serviceable to Germany only in case of continental war, when armies and the possession of the country separating Russia from France would be an advantage. If her diplomacy was intended to remind England that Germany could exert the balance of power in the Eastern Question, and draw from Russia and France satisfactory assurances on their side, it was justifiable in international politics as an act of self-defense.
True, there was Japan still to be reckoned with, the only nation whose army was as convenient for Eastern operations as her navy. The new Oriental power was in the best position for effective decision. She expressed herself openly as the friend of the United States, at the moment her ministers perceived the popular enthusiasm with which the proposition of "Anglo-American alliance" was received. England, at least, had been guilty only of negative unfriendliness. But from Russia, Germany, and France wounds had come. The position of Japan, therefore, operated to hold Germany stiff-necked to the last.
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-FOURTH.

DEWEY, AGUINALDO, AND AUGUSTI.


I.

The victory of Dewey over Montejo, brilliant as it was, fruitful of such great possibilities, arousing such world-wide interest, and causing vast changes in international relations, was enforced by the victory of Sampson’s fleet and Shafter’s army at Santiago. The splendid valor and endurance of the United States army and the unsurpassed skill of Sampson’s squadron swept away, as by a breath, the scornful idea of Europe that Dewey’s great performance was accidental.

In his turn he was to display at Manila the qualities of tenacious courage, endurance, silence, and power, in himself and his officers and sailors, in no less degree than Shafter concentrated and exhibited with his American soldiers before Santiago.

The Germans were only irritating and annoying. Dewey’s great task of dealing with the Spaniards and the Malayan native insurgents was one in which he was to exhibit the highest abilities of statesmanship, diplomacy, generalship, and executive judgment. In destroying the Spanish fleet and capturing Cavité stronghold, he had executed the lightest of his tasks, even though that alone astonished the world.

Without sufficient force to maintain order or secure life and property in Manila, he could neither conquer it nor demand its surrender.
He was 7,500 miles from his nearest home port, and no preparation had been made to reinforce or support him with ships or troops. There was nothing to do but await these aids.

Foreseeing this possibility he had conferred at Hong Kong with the insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, whom he encouraged by the offer of arms, ammunition, and support, to return to the island of Luzon and organize native troops to seal up Manila in the rear, and hold the city in siege until American troops could arrive.

Aguinaldo was at this time the central figure of the revolutionary movement, brave, intelligent, ambitious. The agreement with him must be made without making promises that the United States could not redeem. It was not a part of the character of a man of Admiral Dewey’s mold to deceive. He could only assure Aguinaldo that the United States Government would give protection to the islands and to the people, and that the faith and purposes of the American people were known of all men.

The details of the understanding have not been made known, but Aguinaldo took the field immediately after the naval battle, and organized his army.

Thus, Admiral Dewey, with 2,000 men and his ships, was to hold under control the open enemy and the impenetrable but ostensible friend. The Spaniard and the Malay are opposing extremes of the same type. The Spaniard is the highest development of trained, cultivated, and cold unscrupulousness; the metaphysician of duplicity. The Malay is the most dangerous natural type of superstitious craft and cruelty; without education, he is a fatalist whose purpose never extends beyond the immediate object. The Mestizos, cross-breds of these extremes, may be imagined. With inherited adaptability to the trained guile of one and with the unerring instinct of opportunity and swift action of the other, they possess subtle duplicity and absence of fear are peculiar to them.

From this half-breed race sprang Aguinaldo, the child of a thrifty peasant, ambitious for his son. The stories related of Aguinaldo’s origin, youth, ambitions, and adventures, are numerous; all have the flavor
of superstitious, half-barbarous tradition—stories that, with slight changes, are related of all the heroes of wild and uncontrollable peoples. It seems quite sure, at least, that his father confided him to a benevolent and kindly old Jesuit priest when Emilio was a child, with the hope that the boy might find a place in the religious establishment. He was the servant of this priest, who, observing the unusual intelligence and quickness of the boy, stepped aside from the rule of the government and performed the mission of his sacred office—he gave to the young Aguinaldo the best education he could. The pupil learned rapidly and was eager for knowledge. The old priest thought he saw in his character an instrument of good influence over the wild natives, and continued to teach him, hoping to induct his pupil into orders.

But the church had no place in the dreams of Aguinaldo. He mastered all he could learn in the priest's house and familiarized himself with the clerical offices and manners. When he could learn no more, he concluded to go to Hong Kong and study medicine. There he saw another world, of Europeans and subtle Orientals, of broad and changing ideas and objects. Of pleasing address, agreeable, and open in manner, with ready adaptability to circumstances, he was soon well known and enjoyed excellent opportunities for acquiring the polish as well as the Oriental pretenses of that society.

As there has always been a state of revolution in the Philippines, a Junta was in perpetual existence, with headquarters at Hong Kong. There embittered exiles and hunted leaders met, and from them Aguinaldo became infected with that mysterious brain taint, peculiar to genius and ambition—the restless and boundless desire to do great things and be a leader of men.

He was intellectually superior to the members of the Junta, and was popular with his people because of his attainments. He took the threads of the raveled revolution in hand, knitted them together into a new plan, and was sent to Luzon to set on fire the hearts of the oppressed. His youth, his dauntless courage, his ready wit, his superior knowledge of the world, soon made him the popular idol. The revolution sprang up in every province where Spaniards could be looted
and massacred. Captain-General Augusti offered $20,000 for the head of Aguinaldo. It was usual. The bribe had been offered many times during four hundred years of Spanish rule. It was in the direction of economy. If a native or Mestizo traitor yielded to the temptation and brought in the desired head, it always happened that the claimant was proved guilty of some previous act of treason to Spain. It was more practical to punish treason than to reward treachery. The claimant was usually executed after a rapid trial, and the reward was saved. The families of attainted subjects could not inherit, and the money could not be paid to the dead man. Thus, bookkeeping was simplified, and the treasury profited.

A story is recorded of Aguinaldo’s first revolution that illustrates the character of the government and the natives. It may not be true; it reads very like that fiction of which it is said truth is stranger. Yet, it must be remembered that in China and the Philippines much obviously false in other countries may be peculiarly true.

The story runs that when Aguinaldo and 4,000 or 5,000 of his supporters were hidden in a swampy retreat, the Governor-General, Señor Don Basilio Augusti y Davila, offered his reward for Aguinaldo. Within a week he received a note from the insurgent chief, saying: “I need the sum you offer very much, and will deliver the head myself.”

Ten days later the southeast typhoon was raging. It was raining as it can rain only in the Orient, a sheet of black-water flooding the earth. The two sentinels at the Governor-General’s gate made the usual reverent sign as a priest entered, who asked if his Excellency was within and unengaged. They answered “Yes,” to both questions. Don Basilio did not turn his head as some one entered. It was his secretary, he supposed, come to help prepare an eloquent statement upon the condition of the colonies. It was not the secretary, but a priest, who said: “Peace be with you, my son.”

The cleric locked the door, and dropping his cloak, cried: “Do you know me?”

Don Basilio did not know him. It was Aguinaldo, also a twenty-inch bolo, a native knife—answering to the Cuban machete,—sharp as
a razor, carried by every Malayan in time of trouble. With it he
can lop off an arm with a single stroke.

"I have brought the head of Aguinaldo," the chief said, touching
the edge of his jewel-hilted bolo to ascertain its condition. "and I
claim the reward! Hasten, else I shall have to expedite the matter
myself."

Don Basilio was entrapped. He had to open his desk and count out
the sum in Spanish gold. Aguinaldo punctiliously wrote a receipt,
coolly counted the money, and walked backward toward the door.
He suddenly opened it and dashed out, just ahead of a pistol bullet
that cut his locks on the temple. Captain-General Polavieja offered
Aguinaldo and Atachio, his lieutenant, a pardon and $200,000 each, to
quit the colony. They accepted and got the money, only to learn that
they were both to be assassinated the next night at a fiesta. The two
men who had undertaken the deed were found dead, stabbed to the
heart, in their own beds. On the kris handle was a bit of paper with
a line saying: "Beware of the Malay's vengeance."

Aguinaldo was then twenty-five years old. He and his lieutenant
soon discovered that the revolution was doomed. Such revolutions
are always doomed when the oppressor charges up against and draws
the sinews of war in taxes from the insurgents. In accordance,
therefore, with Oriental custom, the two leaders agreed to accept the
bribe and deprive the insurrection of its leadership. True, they
were leaving their followers by hundreds to cruel execution and the
grind of the taxgatherer; but that was the custom. Four hundred
years of Spanish colonial rule teaches much.

The amount of the bribe offered was variously reported at from
$100,000 to $500,000. In the Orient the nudity of virgin Truth is looked
upon as an impropriety, dangerous to public morality. She is repre-
sented, therefore, as bearing butterfly wings, brilliant with many colors,
draped in a scarf woven from the delicate threads of vivid imagina-
tion, and the great temple of her resort and worship is described as
extending far beyond the municipal limits and even penetrating the
suburban additions of the city of Utica.
The acceptance of the bribe was justified to the faithful by the promise that the sum was to be applied to purchasing arms and munitions to be used when the flame of faith should rise again, when the natives should have saved up fresh means for the struggle.

This, then, was the young revolutionary leader with whom Admiral Dewey was now to deal. Twenty-eight years old, alert, confident, with boundless ambition and the determination to find his way to leadership and power past every obstacle that duplicity could evade or pitiless treachery and cruelty could remove.

He had a personal feud with General Augusti, and could be trusted to seal up Manila inland. He had a great respect for the American Admiral, who had so swiftly destroyed from the face of the ocean the naval power of Spain. But the genuine devotion of his heart was expended upon Don Emilio Aguinaldo, and the honors and fortune he could see awaiting himself. The description of the man—myth or truth, half fact or half fancy, whatever the reports may be—deserves the setting of Italy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when guile and poison went hand in hand with brute mastership and the bloody sword.

II.

The story of the siege of Manila will not be told until some of those who can shall have escaped the consequences of telling it, by death in a natural manner. The mysteries involved in the ostensible jealousies and feuds between Governor-General Augusti, the Archbishop of Manila, and the Vice-Governor Jaudenes, the negotiations between Spaniards and Aguinaldo’s emissaries, the secret arrangements with the German Admiral, the miraculous restoration of Augusti’s family by the insurgent leader,—apparently through motives of humanity,—these are incidents that can, in narration, produce only the effect which one who is stone deaf must experience as he views the passing scenes of an acted drama.

It was about two weeks after the naval battle when Aguinaldo landed on Luzon and issued a proclamation to the natives, admitting
that he had surrendered two years previously because all resources were exhausted; but he had returned now to punish Spain for failing to keep her promises to him; that he brought aid and arms for the struggle.

All the provinces around Manila at once rose in insurrection and joined Aguinaldo. Governor-General Augusti issued a proclamation offering $25,000 reward for the head of Aguinaldo.

Within two weeks the insurgent army had flocked into the country around the capital, and, acting under Aguinaldo's shrewd plans, began, on May 28, a simultaneous assault upon Imus, Cavite province, and Bakoor. The steady advance of the insurgents along the coast was supported by the American gunboat Petrel, and the Spaniards in the outlying districts took refuge in Manila. The insurgents soon held five important positions within ten miles of Manila, and in capturing them killed five hundred Spaniards. The Spanish outposts were reinforced by the addition of 4,000 troops, but on May 31 they were forced back along the whole line by hand-to-hand fighting of the most desperate character, in which the aggregate loss of the enemy was upward of a thousand men. The fighting lasted seventy hours. A typhoon raged fiercely during the whole time and the torrential rain rendered the rifles of the contestants almost useless. The insurgents almost invariably fought at close quarters and used their knives with terrible effect.

Malibon, Tarlac, and Bakoor were in possession of the insurgents, who also made an attack upon Santa Mesa and Malate, on June 1. Aguinaldo, who had been rendered more desperate and daring by the price put upon his head, was most anxious to make a rush upon Manila at once, but Admiral Dewey refused, from a humanitarian point of view, to permit this, fearing that the passions of the semi-civilized natives might lead them to excesses. The Admiral, therefore, insisted that Aguinaldo wait until the arrival of the United States troops. In pursuance of that policy he forbade the insurgents to cross the Malate River, seven miles south of Manila, and Aguinaldo established his headquarters at Cavite, where his prisoners were brought in.

It was expected that troops would arrive from San Francisco not later than June 15, and Aguinaldo was patient in expectation of their
arrival. He adopted the humanitarian policy that Dewey had not only proclaimed but practiced, and issued orders to his army, forbidding them, under pain of severe penalties, to destroy or injure the lives or property of any foreigners, or of Spanish non-combatants. He also indicated his desire to establish a native administration under an American protectorate, holding a dictatorship, with an advisory council, until the islands were conquered. Then a Republican Assembly would be called.

A singular incident of war occurred in the early actions. The swift descent of the insurgents upon the Spanish towns resulted in placing in the hands of Aguinaldo as prisoners the wife and children of General Augusti, who had offered a price for Aguinaldo's head. They were treated with great respect, and held as hostages to secure proper treatment of native prisoners in Spanish hands for a time. Admiral Dewey conveyed to Aguinaldo a suggestion of the moral effect to be produced by returning the helpless captives to Augusti and relieving the distress of all. Accordingly, the Augusti family was conveyed to Manila harbor and placed in the hands of the German Admiral, who took them secretly into the city to the Governor-General. Whatever explanation of their return was made by the Germans or believed by Augusti, the Spanish dispatches declared that the members of the family had succeeded in effecting their escape from the insurgents and, after encountering distressful hardships, were able to board a German war ship and were smuggled into Manila. The Spanish account of any fact affecting their pride is usually surprising to others.

The successes of the insurgents were so complete and rapid that the first week in June saw Manila entirely invested, with constant skirmishing in the suburbs. The water supply fell into insurgent hands, but Dewey gave instructions that it must not be cut off because of the great distress it might cause the helpless non-combatants and foreign residents. Their successes inflamed the insurgents. They leaped to the conclusion that they were masters of the situation. It was boldly declared that the independence of the Philippines was achieved and a republic would be established. At Singapore a delegation of
the Junta called on the American Consul-General and presented an address, thanking him for sending Aguinaldo to the Philippines, congratulating Admiral Dewey, expressing a desire for the establishment of a native government in the Philippines under American protection, deprecating the restoration of the islands to Spain or their transference to any other power, and declaring that the natives were able to govern themselves.

Meanwhile, Augusti had forwarded dispatches to Madrid, declaring that defense was almost hopeless in the absence of supplies and munitions. He asked for plenary powers in dealing with the situation. These were granted to him. The authority meant that he was free to negotiate with the insurgents with boundless promises of autonomy and liberty. Shortly afterwards Augusti reported that his native troops were deserting and even his Spaniards were disheartened and were surrendering themselves under promises made of the security of their lives and safety.

General Prima de Rivera, formerly Governor-General of the Philippines, made a fierce speech in the Cortes, in which he exposed the fact that the Spanish Government had dealt fouly with the colonial government. He declared that when he took charge there was a surplus of $5,000,000 in the treasury. He reported it and asked permission to fortify and strengthen his defenses, because the Americans were preparing at Hong Kong. The government replied to him that there was no prospect of war with the United States and the surplus was dissipated in Spain. He charged the government with abandoning Augusti.

At this time the plenary powers held by Augusti began to affect the situation at Manila seriously.
ADMIRAL DEWEY found himself in a network of Spanish guile, native craft, and foreign hostility. German, French, and Russian vessels were to be distrusted. British and Japanese sympathy existed, but could not be displayed. The backbone of resistance in the city was in the Archbishop of Manila.

It was known that on May 1, after Montejo’s fleet was destroyed, Augusti had hoisted the white flag of surrender in Manila. His soldiers were ordered to be in readiness to march out and lay down their arms. If the white flag was observed by Dewey, he did not dare accept the surrender under the circumstances. His force was too small.

When the Archbishop learned that the white flag was raised, he held a council with the Vice-Governor, Señor Don Ferruní Jaudenes, and deposed Augusti. The yellow flag of Spain was unfurled again, and the Archbishop issued his pastoral appeal against the accursed and savage Americans. But Augusti was restored—though by what process was not understood.

With plenary power bestowed upon him, negotiations now began between Spaniards and insurgents. Advised by the Germans, it was said, encouraged by government promises of assistance from Cervera’s fleet, from Camara’s fleet, from troops, Augusti sought to win Aguinaldo over by warning him that the Americans were only using him to hold the Spaniards in check until their troops could arrive, when he would be worse off than under Spanish autonomy. Or, that, if the Spanish reinforcements arrived first, the Americans would be destroyed and the insurgents abandoned.

Aguinaldo replied that he had guarantees from the Americans. The Archbishop urged him to test the guarantees and see if he were not being deceived. The Americans were conscienceless mercenaries, whose hand would be more remorseless than that of Spain. Augusti warned him that the foreign war ships would not permit the
Americans to land their forces, that Europe had determined not to permit the United States to gain a colony in the East.

Aguinaldo's personal secretary, Legardo, was busily employed in these negotiations, as the go-between. Atachio, the lieutenant of Aguinaldo, who was to share the former bribe, and had charged that it had not been employed for revolutionary purposes, but that Aguinaldo had misused it for personal purposes, was now on the island. He was not a pleasant person to have about if Aguinaldo should conclude to make terms with Spain. Atachio was arrested, charged with a treasonable act, and imprisoned. Sandigo, another insurgent leader, conceded by general consent to be actuated by disinterested patriotism alone, who possessed fine executive ability and true political foresight, was in Atachio's confidence, and distrusted Aguinaldo. He did not hesitate to say that the leader was only looking out for personal wealth, power, and honors. Sandigo, also, was arrested upon a pretense, and sent to prison.

Atachio "disappeared." It was said that he had been shot for treason; that he had escaped and deserted to the enemy; that he had been deported because of his jealousies, and as a benevolent act of his old comrade who did not wish to take his life.

The news came to the Americans. They could not ascertain what had become of Atachio or of his brother, his cousin and two nephews. They discovered Sandigo, imprisoned in a house, awaiting death. They talked with him and visited him daily. Aguinaldo could not risk executing his vengeance under the circumstances. With the hard, impasive, unscrupulous craft of his race, he had removed all the enemies possible on the first days of his occupation. Twenty-three priests in a monastery at Cavité fell into his hands the first day he took possession. They, too, "disappeared."

But Aguinaldo had ostentatiously practiced magnanimity to some foes. Their lives were spared, and he had 4,000 or more Spanish and native volunteer prisoners at Cavité. His army was large and could be greatly augmented. He was credited with having 100,000 guns and some field pieces captured from the Spanish.
He was rendered uneasy by the warnings of future hostility on the part of Americans, and he concluded to test the good faith of Dewey. He declared publicly the independence of the Philippine Islands, announced the intention to organize a republic, and organized a Provisional Government, of which he was President. He was to be distinguished by the privilege of wearing a collar of braided gold, as the Spanish governors were. His proclamation was issued in these words:

Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Faury,
President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines and General-in-Chief of Its Army:

In conformity with the precepts in the decree of this government, dated June 23 ult., and the instructions which accompanied it, I proclaim as follows:

ARTICLE 1. Señor Don Baldomero Aguinaldo is appointed Secretary of War and Public Works; Señor Don Leandro Ibarra, Secretary of the Interior and branches comprehended therein; Señor Don Mariani Trias, Secretary of the Treasury and the annexed branches.

The conduct of the Bureau of Foreign Relations, Marine and Commerce, will be in charge provisionally, for the present, of the Presidency, until there is appointed a Secretary who is considered more apt.

Art. 2. The gentlemen named will assume charge of their respective offices, previously having solemnly taken, on the day designated for that purpose by the President, the following oath: “I swear by God and my honor to carry out the laws and decisions and to fulfill faithfully the duty I voluntarily accept, under the penalties established for the same. So may it be.”

This oath will be taken before the President and the dignitaries who are invited for this solemn act, the interested person placing his right hand on the New Testament.

Art. 3. The directors and chiefs of provinces and villages on receiving their respective titles will take a similar oath before the President and the Secretaries of the government.

The prominent counselors, as well as the delegates and sub-chiefs, will take the oath before the chief of the province and the chiefs of the villages previously invited to the solemn act.

Art. 4. In the reports and similar documents presented to the authorities and in official correspondence, there will be employed before the name of the official the title “Señor” or “Maguñor” (Tagalo), according to the character and importance of the same. When the official is not so addressed the personal title “Usted” will be used when directed to an inferior or to an equal, but when addressed to a superior the title “Xorot ros” will be employed.
ART. 5. The Secretaries are empowered to sign "by order of the President" such resolutions or decisions as are of small importance and those which expediency requires should be put into effect; but final decrees and resolutions will be confirmed by the President and the Secretary.

ART. 6. The chiefs of provinces are permitted to use as distinctive of their office a cane with gold head and silver tassels. On the upper part of the cane there will be engraved a sun and three stars.

The chiefs of villages may carry a similar cane, but with black tassels. The sub-chiefs, also, may carry a cane with silver head and red tassels.

The provincial counselors are authorized to wear a triangular badge of gold, pendent from a collar and a chain of the same metal; on the badge there shall appear an engraved sun and three stars. The delegates will wear a similar badge, but of silver; also the chain.

ART. 7. The President will wear as a distinctive mark a collar of gold from which depends a badge similar to those heretofore described, and also a whistle of gold. The Secretaries will wear a similar collar with the badge, and the directors, also, but of silver.

The President will carry, also, a cane with head and tassels of gold.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

Dated at Bakooh, July 5, 1898.

Aguinaldo had been told that the first American reinforcements would arrive not later than June 15. They did not reach Cavite until June 30, and there was but one brigade of troops under General Anderson. Aguinaldo was suspicious of the strength of the Americans, and was not unwilling to set himself up between the United States, Spain, and Europe as a factor to be reckoned with.

He respected Admiral Dewey, who had not been open to negotiation or discussion and who had made no sign. He had seen what Dewey's squadron could do on the water; and when the Admiral had warned him that if his troops undertook to enter Manila they would be decimated by the guns of the war ships, he had acknowledged the force of the argument. But now that American soldiers were encamped between his lines and the ships he felt easier.

He was invited to attend the Fourth of July celebration by the troops, but replied that he was "indisposed." He sent his military band.
The "indisposition" was, perhaps, the preoccupation of preparing the announcement dated July 5, of the provisional republic of the Philippines.

The Americans were still reticent. He was puzzled by such unresponsiveness to his clearly expressed intention to forestall their purposes.

But Aguinaldo exhibited no lack of confidence, if he felt any. He became haughty, reserved, cautious, as becoming his high office. When the American commissaries and quartermasters asked the natives for supplies, they answered that they could not comply with the request without permission from "the President-General." It was difficult to secure horses, bullock-carts, and wagons, for transporting supplies. Aguinaldo did not inconvenience himself to obtain them.

The patience of Chief-Quartermaster Jones was exhausted. He must prepare quarters for an army division, soon to arrive, and delay was perilous. He visited Aguinaldo's headquarters at Bakoor, whither they had been removed. The orderly announced that the General was "indisposed." Major Jones waited two hours and called again. The orderly politely said the General was asleep and nobody dared awaken him when he was asleep.

Major Jones left abruptly and wrote a terse and very plain letter which he sent to Aguinaldo by an orderly who was instructed to see that it reached the young Dictator. It notified him that if all the transportation and assistance needed was not promptly furnished by the natives, the American soldiers would at once seize everything needed without permission. "We should regret very much," the letter concluded, "to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give a good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight. General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner."
"I will await your reply."

The convenience of the American army was not as important to "the President-General" as was the ultimate American purpose. He sent an aide at once to General Anderson to inquire if the letter of Major Jones was authorized.

General Anderson replied that it was authorized, and, in fact, ordered. He added the remark that when an American commander was indisposed or asleep it was the rule to have some one in authority ready to transact matters of importance.

Then the craft of Aguinaldo was exercised. He formally replied to the letter next day. He expressed surprise that there should have been any suggestion of unwillingness on the part of the Filipinos to aid the Americans, for the Filipinos knew that the Americans "did not desire a colony," and were there only to drive out the Spaniards and turn the islands over to the Filipinos for government. The Filipinos would be only too glad to help the Americans, but they could not furnish so much transportation, because they did not have it. In conclusion, he asked for a definite statement of the American intentions.

The receipt of his letter was acknowledged, with the statement that it would be referred to General Merritt upon his arrival.

Then transportation was furnished, but in many crafty ways Aguinaldo sought to get a definite expression of purpose, and to obtain letters addressed to him as "President." General Anderson informed him that the Americans could give no recognition to his government or his office without authority from the President of the United States.

During these proceedings the insurgents were continually assaulting the fortifications around Manila, and the Spanish garrison was worn out with sleepless guard, poor food, and exposure to the drenching rains. Persons coming out of the city reported famine as fast approaching. Horses were being butchered for food, and the distress was great. There were dissensions in the army over the question of surrendering. The Captain-General, Augusti, was determined to surrender as soon as the Americans advanced. Some of the subordinate
officers who wanted to fight to the last, were reported as having secretly drawn lots to determine which should kill Augusti if he surrendered, and the plan for his assassination was reported complete. The volunteers had refused to leave the walls of the city, and nearly all the regulars had been sent into the trenches and outworks.

IV.

On July 23, Major-General Merritt, Military-Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the United States army for the Philippines, arrived with 4,000 troops. Informing himself at once of the military and political conditions existing, he decided to have no communication with Aguinaldo or his provisional government, but to deal with the Spanish holders of the island and the obstacles in the way of the capture of Manila. He made an inspection of the camps and of the prisons at Cavite, where some of Aguinaldo's prisoners were confined. They were emaciated, wan, and starving. They had sold every button, medal, ornament, and nearly all their clothing, to purchase food. They were served with rations from the United States-commissariat and cared for.

The brigades were moved up nearer to Manila, and the heavy battery, which had been presented to the United States by Mr. John Jacob Astor, of New York, was placed in effective position. The road from Bakoor to Manila was occupied up to the village of Malate on the river of the same name where the Spaniards had thrown up intrenchments.

This movement thrust Aguinaldo's troops aside. They had been occupying the position and carrying on an intermittent artillery and rifle duel with the Spaniards within the walls. The poor marksman-ship of the Spaniards sent their shells and bullets over the insurgents and into the American ranks. General Merritt sent instructions to Aguinaldo to remove his men, or to make them cease the exchange of firing, because it accomplished no object and endangered our
troops. The insurgents were ordered away and the Astor battery was placed within a thousand yards of the walls of Manila.

The country all around Manila was reconnoitered and mapped for use in the event of assault. Preparations advanced rapidly, and with the precision of well-ordered purpose. Aguinaldo grew uneasy. If Manila passed under American control there would be no foothold for an insurgent army. What was to become of Aguinaldo's troops and their arms? He relaxed his pride and practiced the cunning of humility. He wrote to General Merritt and begged the privilege, as a reward for his troops, that on the day of capture or surrender, they be permitted to march through Manila. The triumph of passing through the streets they had assisted in conquering, would repay them for the sacrifices they had made to assist the Americans against the power of Spain.

General Merritt meditated over the political effect of this request, the prestige and glory it would confer upon Aguinaldo, and the possibilities it offered for future troubles, and took it under advisement only.

Aguinaldo was averse to having his men disarmed after Manila should be taken. He made the suggestion that there might be formed several regiments of Filipinos, officered by Americans, and kept as part of the regular force of Americans as long as the United States maintained a military force in the islands. The suggestion brought up vividly the action of the Filipinos in going over by whole regiments to the Spaniards in rebellions. It would be difficult to find American officers who would voluntarily take such a command. They remembered the great Indian Mutiny, and discouraged a repetition of the betrayals and massacres that were practiced by native regiments against their British officers around Calcutta.

In the city Governor Augusti was disheartened. He was constantly urging his government to authorize him to capitulate. The government refused, and replied that Camara's fleet was on its way with succor. But Augusti was a Spaniard, and did not believe the government. He persisted in his demands, and expressed the fear that if he did not
capitulate to the Americans the insurgents would storm the city and loot it with awful massacre.

Spain cared little for such an argument. She was hoping by some trick to save the Philippines in the negotiations for peace, then plainly within political view.

Augusti resigned; or was deposed—which? Jaundes was appointed Governor, with the implacable Archbishop at his back to lend him advice and strength.

At this time great events were occurring on the other side of the world.
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-FIFTH.

THE INVASION OF PORTO RICO.

Yellow and Malarial Fevers Invade the Camps of the United States Troops Near Santiago
—A "Round Robin" and the Protest that Caused the Fighters to Be Brought Home—General Miles, with the Fifth Army Corps, Invades Porto Rico, Landing at Guanica—Yauco and Ponce Welcome Our Soldiers and Are Glad to Be in the United States—The Two Movements that Were to Unite and Capture San Juan, the Capital—Interrupted by the Peace Protocol, but Very Successfully under Way—General Miles Regards the People Favorably—Significance of Porto Rico's Ready Surrender.

1.

The fall of Santiago was to be followed by the fall of Spain. Dewey's victory at Manila had opened vast possibilities of internationalism to the United States and set in motion all the political influences of the world. The victory of Sampson and Shafter at Santiago had confirmed the permanence of American power and put an end to all possible machinations by continental Europe. Just as it had unnerved Augusti at Manila, it had unnerved Captain-General Macias of Porto Rico, and filled Spain with mortal despair.

The surrender of Santiago was obtained none too soon. It was a piece of good fortune. Immediately after the Spaniards turned over their arms, the American troops were sent into camp on the hilltops north of the city where the cool atmosphere, it was hoped, would enable them to recuperate and resist disease. It was too late. Three weeks of fighting and constant exposure in trenches, without tentage and on short rations, followed by the sudden relaxation of nervous tension in inaction, rendered them particularly susceptible to the diseases peculiar to the country and the season. Yellow fever, malarial fever, and other camp maladies began to appear. Nearly 75 per cent. of the army was soon unfit for duty. August 1, nineteen days after the surrender,
General Shafter reported 4,239 cases of sickness and fifteen deaths, while many others of his men were weak and ready to succumb.

A conference was held by the officers at Santiago which resulted in the preparation of a petition or protest called a "Round Robin," addressed to General Shafter, which was as follows: —

We, the undersigned officers commanding the various brigades, divisions, etc., of the army of occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point on the northern seacoast of the United States; that it can be done without danger to the people of the United States; that yellow fever in the army at present is not epidemic; that there are a few sporadic cases; but that the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be practically destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near future.

We know from the reports of competent officers and from personal observations that the army is unable to move into the interior and that there are not facilities for such a move, if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities of the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.

This army must be moved at once or perish. As the army can be safely moved now, the persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation, and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with the army, who understand the situation absolutely.

J. Ford Kent,
Major-General, volunteers, commanding First Division, Fifth Corps.

J. C. Bates,
Major-General, volunteers, commanding Provisional Division.

Adna R. Chaffee,
Major-General, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.

Samuel S. Summer,
Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding First Brigade, cavalry.

William Ludlow,
Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

Adelbert Ames,
Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, First Division.

Leonard Wood,
Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding the city of Santiago.

Theodore Roosevelt,
Colonel, commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.
General Shafter had called the conference, and the "Round Robin" was transmitted to him by Colonel Roosevelt, with the following letter of explanation:

In a meeting of the general and medical officers, called by you at the palace this morning, we were all, as you know, unanimous in view of what should be done with the army. To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer commanding a division or a brigade, will simply involve the destruction of thousands. There is no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire command north at once. Yellow fever cases are very few in the cavalry division, where I command one of the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow fever has occurred in this division, except among the men sent to the hospital at Siboney, where they have, I believe, contracted it. But in this division there have been 1,500 cases of malarial fever. Not a man has died from it, but the whole command is so weakened and so shattered as to be ripe for dying like sheep when a real yellow fever epidemic, instead of a fake epidemic like the present, strikes us, as it is bound to if we stay here at the height of the sickness season, August and the beginning of September.

Quarantine against malarial fever is much like quarantining against the toothache. All of us are certain, as soon as the authorities at Washington fully appreciate the conditions of the army, to be sent home. If we are kept here it will in all human probability mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the sickly season, will die.

This is not only the trouble from the standpoint of the individual lives lost, but it means ruin from the standpoint of the military efficiency of the flower of the American army, for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you. The sick list, large though it is, exceeding 4,000, affords but a faint index of the debilitation of the army. Not ten per cent. are fit for active work. Six weeks on the north Maine coast, for instance, or elsewhere, where the yellow fever germ cannot possibly propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting cocks, able as we are and eager to take a leading part in the great campaign against Havana in the Fall, even if we are not allowed to try Porto Rico.

We can be moved north, if moved at once, with absolute safety to the country, although, of course, it would have been infinitely better if we had been moved north or to Porto Rico two weeks ago. If there were any object in keeping us here, we would face yellow fever with as much indifference as we face bullets. But there is no object in it. The four immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to garrison the city and surrounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing for us to do here, and there has not been since the city surrendered. It is impossible to move into the interior. Every shifting of camp doubles the sick rate in our present weakened condition; and, anyhow, the interior is rather worse than the coast, as I have found by actual reconnaissance. Our present camps are as healthful as any camps at this end of the island can be.
FORTIFICATION, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO
I write only because I cannot see our men, who have fought so bravely, and who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplainingly, go to destruction without striving, so far as lies in me, to avert a doom as fearful as it is unnecessary and undeserved.

The "Round Robin" caused a great deal of excited comment in the United States, owing to the fact that such proceedings are rare in armies, and to the additional fact that the public had not suspected the existence of the conditions exposed. The government gave orders that the official letters must not be permitted to pass outside the United States by cable or telegraph, lest the information give encouragement to Spain.

The cavalry of Wheeler's division at Santiago was immediately ordered to Montauk Point, Long Island, U. S. A., and preparations were at once made to bring the infantry home. Five regiments of "immunes," Southern soldiers that had once suffered from yellow fever, and were considered safe from a second infection, were ordered to Santiago for garrison duty, under command of Brigadier-General Hood, son of the famous Confederate Commander.

The return of the troops from Cuba was attended by many difficulties, and involved much suffering to the sick and wounded.

II.

Swiftly following up the Spanish collapse at Santiago, General Nelson A. Miles, General-in-Chief of the army, sailed with part of the Fifth Army Corps from Santiago to Porto Rico nine days after the surrender. He was accompanied by Major-General James H. Wilson, of volunteers, and was reinforced later with fresh troops from Newport News under Major-General John R. Brooke, U. S. A. No opportunity was to be permitted for Spain to recover the shock of her losses.

The squadron under Commodore Watson, intended to pursue Camara's ships, was now enlarged to a fleet, which Admiral Sampson
was to command, with orders to prepare for immediate attack upon
the Canary Islands and a descent upon the Spanish fortified seaports
to find Camara’s hiding ships and destroy them. The announcement
caused great fear throughout Spain, and once again her cabinet sought
to arouse Europe to combine against the entrance by American ships
upon European waters for war purposes—urging the step as a retaliatory
act against the Monroe Doctrine. But the European Powers did
not display any intention to act after an exchange of notes. The
appearance of a British squadron at Gibraltar was considered ominous
to the proposed interference.

The island of Porto Rico, which was discovered in 1493, and has ever
since been under Spanish rule, is one hundred and eight miles in length
and about forty miles wide. It is a most healthful and delightful coun-
try, with mountain ranges and many streams. Forty of these are navi-
gable for a short distance from the coast. The climate in the interior
is particularly mild and salubrious. It contains an area of about 3,600
square miles and 800,000 inhabitants. It is fourth in rank, according
to size, of the Greater Antilles group, but in prosperity and density
density of population it is first. It is one of the few tropical islands and
countries where the white population outnumbers the black. The
commercial capital and largest city is Ponce, situated three miles
inland from the port of the same name on the southern coast. The
city rests on a rich plain, surrounded by gardens and plantations.
There are hot springs in the vicinity, which are much frequented by
invalids. Along the beach in front of the port are extensive depots,
in which the products of the interior, forwarded through Ponce, are
stored for shipment. The last enumeration gave to Ponce a popula-
tion of 37,545, while San Juan, the capital on the north coast, had
only 23,414 inhabitants. Ponce has a number of fine buildings, among
which are the town hall, the theatre, two churches, the Charity and
the Women’s asylums, the barracks, the Cuban House, and the market.
The road between the city and the seaside is a beautiful prom-
enade. Cuba is thirteen times larger than Porto Rico, but its popula-
tion was not more than double the latter before Weyler exterminated
a third of the native Cubans. Besides Ponce and San Juan, the largest
towns on the island, are Arecibo (30,000 inhabitants), Utuado (31,000),
Mayaguez (28,000), San German (20,000), Yauco (25,000), Juana Diaz
(21,000), and there are some ten other towns with a population of
15,000 or over. In the past fifty years about half the population has
gravitated into and about the towns, particularly those of the seaboard.
The inhabitants live in comfortable houses, and many have sufficient
means to purchase all the comforts of the world.

Porto Rico has always been lightly touched by the blighting hand
of Spain. It has been regarded as a part of Spain, rather than a
colony, and for the past twenty years it has been politically a prov-
ince of the Spanish Kingdom. The Spanish Government has had little
to do directly with internal improvements in the island, and kept her
heavy hand off the people, so that there was opportunity for the spirit
of enterprise to develop. As a consequence Porto Rico has about one
hundred and fifty miles of railroad, and as much more under con-
struction; and a system of wagon roads leading to all the important
trading centers that surpasses anything of the sort seen in most parts
of Spain itself. The portions of railroad parallel to the coasts are
long sections of a line that will ultimately make the entire circuit of
the island, with short branches to all the seaports and the inland
market towns.

This beautiful island abounds in sugar, coffee, tobacco, honey, and
wax, which have enriched the people. A very large part of the
trade has been with the United States, whose corn, flour, salt meat,
fish, and lumber were imported in return for sugar, molasses, and
coffee. The natives have little taste for the sea and most of the
foreign trade has been carried in foreign bottoms. Porto Rico is
rich in natural blessings, and, for a tropical region, very healthful.

The capital, San Juan, was the best fortified city of Porto Rico,
occupying there the relative position that Havana occupied in Cuba.
When General Miles started his expedition the expectation was that
it would effect a landing at Fajardo, on the northeastern coast.
After this ostensible purpose had been well published, his convoys
and transports suddenly arrived off the harbor of Guanica on the southwestern coast at daylight on the morning of July 25.

The small Spanish garrison in a blockhouse on the beach was utterly surprised when Commander Wainwright of the *Gloucester* ran into the harbor and with his small guns opened fire. The Spaniards attempted to reply but were soon driven off and a party of marines landed and hoisted the American flag over the blockhouse. None of the Americans was injured, but the Spanish lost several killed and wounded.

The troops of the expedition, numbering some 3,500, were disembarked in the afternoon without difficulty or opposition. The harbor is the best in the island, although the country about is low and swampy. Guanica is the port outlet for several towns near the coast. That part of Porto Rico has never been entirely loyal to Spain, perhaps because it was in sympathy with the eastern province of Cuba. East of Guanica are the towns of Yauco and Ponce, the former not more than five miles distant, and thence a railroad leads to Ponce.

Marching towards Yauco on the 26th there was a skirmish with the enemy, in which the Americans had four men wounded, and the Spaniards lost sixteen killed and wounded. When our troops entered Yauco they were received with enthusiasm and joy, not wholly unmixed, however, with some anxiety. Francisco Megía, *alcaldé*, or mayor, of the town, had issued in advance a proclamation to the public, to prepare the population for the crisis. It was in these terms, which accepted annexation as an accomplished fact:

*Citizens*:—To-day the citizens of Porto Rico assist in one of her most beautiful festivals. The sun of America shines upon our mountains and valleys this day of July, 1898. It is a day of glorious remembrance for each son of this beloved isle, because for the first time there waves over it the flag of the Stars, planted in the name of the government of the United States of America by the Major-General of the American army, General Miles.

Porto Ricans, we are, by the miraculous intervention of the God of the just, given back to the bosom of our mother America, in whose waters nature placed us as people of America. To her we are given back, in the name of her government, by General Miles, and we must send her our most expressive salutation of generous
affection through our conduct toward the valiant troops represented by distinguished officers and commanded by the illustrious General Miles.

Citizens: Long live the government of the United States of America! Hail to their valiant troops! Hail Porto Rico, always American!

YAUCA, Porto Rico, United States of America.

On the same day the Massachusetts, Dixie, Annapolis, Wasp, and Gloucester had appeared before Ponce to blockade the port and prepare to bombard it when the troops arrived from Guanica, ten miles west. Instead of meeting with resistance, the city authorities sent a delegation to call on Commander Higginson of the Massachusetts, and welcome the American forces to peaceful occupation. The population was enthusiastic over the Americans, and when General Miles and his soldiers arrived by rail from Guanica, he entered an American city from which the Spanish garrison had fled without stopping to look back. In the streets the whole population had assembled as for a patriotic celebration. The buildings were decorated with the flags of all nations except Spain. The ceremony of welcoming the conquerors was interesting and unusual.

General Miles, who had come with the army from Guanica, and General Wilson, who had come on the war ships, were met at Ponce port by arrangement, and a delegated escort drove them in carriages into the city proper, to the Casa del Rey, where the civil governor, Toro, and the mayor, Ulpiano Colon, awaited them. A guard in front of the building forced a way for the American Generals, and through the cheering crowd they walked into the building, where they were presented to the local officials.

Governor Toro said the citizens of Ponce were anxious to know if the municipal officers and system that had been in vogue would be continued temporarily. He was assured that municipal affairs would not be disturbed for the time being, and that the same local officers would serve. But it was explained that the local authorities would be responsible to General Wilson as Military Governor, who would keep the city under a form of martial law oppressive to none.
After the conference Mayor Colon said he was glad the Americans had come, because the island would now enjoy prosperity and peace, and the best citizens wanted the Americans to take possession.

The political prisoners were released at once. Redolf Figeroa was saved in the nick of time from being shot by the Spaniards. He was charged with having cut the telegraph wire between Ponce and San Juan the previous night. His purpose was to prevent the authorities in Ponce from sending to San Juan for reinforcements. He had been led from his cell to be executed, but when our ships entered the harbor, the Spaniards, in their excitement, let him go, and Figeroa escaped. Some men who had been political prisoners for years were released.

The popular demonstrations continued all day. The natives were all in gala dress, and “open house” was kept for all Americans. Kindness and hospitality were unbounded. This outburst was not entirely the artifice of fear.

Three days before, Captain-General Macias, the Spanish Commander-in-Chief, had cabled to the Madrid cabinet that Porto Rico could not be defended. He said the populace was inclined to the Americans and could not be depended upon, and that his handful of 12,000 or 15,000 troops could not make an effective resistance.

This information caused the Sagasta government’s pretenses of war to collapse. Its most favored possession, Porto Rico, favorable to the enemy, Cuba inevitably lost, its fleet destroyed, its treasury bankrupt, and its expected friends in Europe unable to take a step, there was but one thing to do, if the Philippines were to be saved by hook or crook. That one thing necessary was to sue for peace.

On the 26th of July, therefore, the Spanish Government made overtures for peace. While General Miles was waiting in Ponce peace negotiations were pending, but there was to be no halt in the prosecution of his campaign.

The great central trans-Porto Rico highway runs from Ponce north-easterly to San Juan, through the towns of Juan Diaz, Coamo, and Aybонito, where it goes almost eastward to Cayey, there to take a winding course to the north as far as Caguas, where it turns west to Agua
Buenas, and then goes decidedly north to San Juan through Guayanabo and Rio Piedras, making in all a distance of about eighty-five miles. The distance from Ponce to San Juan in a straight line is only forty-five miles. The highway is a fine military road. Major-General Wilson was appointed Governor of Ponce, and the troops started next day for Juana Diaz. In two days, under American tariffs, the custom-house at Ponce yielded a revenue of $14,000. The natives were asking for American flags to hoist over the large buildings, a clear indication of the state of settled feeling about the new relations.

The campaign in Cuba lasted nineteen days, and was conducted upon military lines which were impossible at Santiago. When the Spaniards withdrew along the line of the great military road between Ponce and San Juan they destroyed the bridges, obstructed the roads, and fortified strong positions in the mountain passage, and then were surprised to find that one column of our army was sweeping around the west end of the island, capturing the principalities and towns, while another had passed over the mountains by a trail which the Spaniards had supposed impassable, and, therefore, had not fortified or guarded. The first the Spanish knew of the march of the American army was the appearance of a strong brigade within twenty miles of the northern coast, at the terminus of the railroad connecting San Juan with Arecibo. The actual objective of both movements was to capture San Juan, where the greatest force of the enemy gathered by retreat. There were not more than half a dozen encounters with the enemy, all mere skirmishes. The troops on the west coast, under General Brooke, were all regulars, while the main column that moved along the military road was composed of volunteers. These acted with courage and spirit throughout the whole march, and displayed the temper that would quickly convert them into veteran soldiers.

The campaign was ended without either movement being completed. But both were well in hand, and there is no doubt that they would have been thoroughly carried out to success. A few days more and General Schwan and General Henry, with their divisions, would have effected junction at Arecibo, ready for a flank movement on the
capital in rear of the Spanish forces operating around Aybonito. These would have been driven from the latter position by General Wilson; and while there might have been found many points for a stand by the enemy, the only possible outcome would have been precipitate retreat by the Spanish to San Juan, or their capture.

"The island of Porto Rico," said General Miles, on his return, "was fairly won by the right of conquest, and became a part of the United States. The sentiment of the people was in no sense outraged by the invaders, but, on the contrary, was successfully propitiated. A people who have endured the severity of Spanish rule for four centuries hail with joy the protection of the Great Republic. One of the richest sections of country over which our flag now floats has been added and will be of lasting value to our nation, politically, commercially, and from a military or strategic point of view. The possession of that island also rendered any further resistance of the Spanish forces in Cuba hopeless."

General Miles remained in Porto Rico as long as he deemed his presence necessary for carrying out his instructions, and returned bringing with him nearly 5,000 troops no longer required. There were about 12,000 troops left on the island for garrison purpose, a number considered ample for the duty.

The remarkable welcome given to Americans in this island might well be considered the deathblow to Spanish colonial rule. The least harassed of all Spain's possessions, the people were glad to escape her clutches. It was not surprising that Spanish soldiers in Cuba were eager to surrender and autonomist officials in some towns begged to have their municipalities included in Toral's surrender. At Manila it was not so much surrender to Americans that was dreaded, as the expectation of terrible retaliations from the insurgent natives who had been so cruelly oppressed. There had been no Porto Rican revolutions in recent times. But Cuba and the Philippines had written their histories in their own blood.
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-SIXTH.

PEACE.

Spain at last begs for terms upon which peace may be reached—The United States demands the freedom of Cuba, cession of Porto Rico and all Spanish islands in the Western Hemisphere, one of the Ladrones, and reserves the right to decide what shall be done with the Philippines—Spain requires delay, of course, but accepts the terms—Peace protocol signed August 12—Manzanillo, Cuba, bombarded the same day and a skirmish in Porto Rico.

For several weeks Spain had been seeking peace by every means but the proper one. She had appealed to Europe for a mediator, but the continental countries had no stomach for the business and coldly advised her to turn to the United States. The American Ambassadors at Paris and London were unofficially sounded, and they returned the answer that the President would not permit any intervention or mediation for peace through any third nation, and that the only channel of communication was between Madrid and Washington. Spain’s guile was exhausted. The United States had kept to a straight line of conduct that permitted no complication.

When war opened Spain requested the French Ambassador and the Austrian Minister to take charge of the interests of Spanish subjects resident in the United States. When these diplomats reported the arrangement for approval, the President replied that it would give him great pleasure to receive either of those gentlemen, but he could not consent that both might act. It was an opening wedge through which misunderstanding might arise and thus permit protest and appeal. He begged them to arrange for a single representative. It was finally arranged that M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, should act,
and that Austrian consuls should represent the interests of Spanish subjects at points only where no French consuls were stationed, but that their representations should come through the hands of the French Ambassador.

The American Ambassador at London, Colonel John Hay, was instructed to inform the Spanish authorities that it was the intention of this government not to recognize in any manner the right of Europe to mediate or interfere in the affairs of the United States, and that the only proposal for peace which could be received must come from Spain direct through any agent the Spanish Government would designate and furnish with the necessary authority.

The "honor of Spain" could find no means of escape from the path of honesty. Porto Rico was slipping away; a great fleet of battle-ships, cruisers, torpedo destroyers, scouts, and a dynamite engine was ready to set sail under Sampson, to invade her home ports. The game was up.

On July 26 the French Ambassador called on the Secretary of State at Washington and presented a note from the Spanish Foreign Minister embodying overtures for peace. He was conducted to the Executive Office and had a conference with the President. The proposition was a surprise, not because it was unexpected, but because it came so soon. Spanish dilatoriness is so well known that speedy action in this instance was an indication of acute distress.

The overture did not embrace any distinct proposition but asked the United States for a statement of the terms upon which it would be willing to cease hostilities. Instead of suggesting terms the Spaniard was attempting to place the United States in the embarrassing position of taking the first steps to obtain peace. Moreover, it would force our government to show its purpose concerning the territory already conquered or under process of seizure, and permit Europe to ponder the terms and estimate the consequences upon its various interests. Under the circumstances the President informed M. Cambon that he would not reply to the note until he could consult with his cabinet.
M. Jules Cambon

The French Minister who conducted the peace negotiations for France.
Only the day before our troops had landed in Porto Rico, and the delay would not affect United States action. The Spanish note said the first thing hoped for was a cessation of hostilities. But the army operations and naval preparations went on vigorously.

The cabinet conferred upon the terms to be offered. There was no variance of opinion upon demanding the evacuation of Cuba, the cession to the United States of the island of Porto Rico and all other Spanish islands in the Western Hemisphere, and the holding of one of the Ladrone Islands. It was quickly determined to ask no indemnity in money for the cost of war, since it was obvious that Spain could not pay, and it was useless to waste time over an empty clause.

The whole interest centered upon what disposition was to be made of the Philippines. The sentiment of the United States was not definitely known, and the President frankly announced that he was desirous of having popular opinion. He was determined to reserve a coaling station, at least, and perhaps the bay and city of Manila and its province. His purpose was to make a statement of demands to Spain that would be unequivocal and which would not be modified. The cabinet, it was understood, was divided upon the desirability of holding all the Philippines.

The answer to Spain's inquiry was handed to the French Ambassador on Saturday, July 30. Its terms were not made known in form to the public, but were fairly outlined. The most important feature in the communication was the demand that Spain must signify acceptance or rejection of the terms offered without delay. It was the firm determination of our government that the propositions should not be used for the purpose of inciting European suggestion or international political activity. It was intimated that failure to answer affirmatively within a reasonable length of time, or an attempt to temporize in the hope of securing a modification of the demands, would be accepted by the government as sufficient cause for declining to continue the negotiations.

The demands were substantially as follows: The withdrawal of all Spanish military and naval forces from Cuba, and the relinquishment
of Spanish sovereignty in that island; similar action with regard to Porto Rico, with the additional provision that Spain should cede that island to the United States; no responsibility to be imposed on the United States for financial obligations contracted by Spain on behalf of Cuba and Porto Rico, which are to be held to include all outlying possessions of Spain in the Western Hemisphere; the United States to maintain control over all other territory where the American flag has been raised; the city and harbor of Manila to be occupied by the United States until a peace commission should decide upon the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. The immediate acceptance of these terms would be construed by the United States as sufficient guarantee of Spain's good faith in proposing an arrangement of peace terms, and would authorize the President to appoint commissioners to treat with commissioners designated by Spain to consider and arrange a treaty of peace, reserving all rights to make demands of any character. In substance the United States demanded that before any terms of peace should be considered, Spanish authority in the Western Hemisphere should be relinquished, leaving Cuba in the hands of this government as a trustee, and absolutely ceding Porto Rico, Manila, and one of the Ladrone Islands. The United States did not agree to let Spain have any part of the Philippines, nor make any promises whatsoever.

These demands were received by the Sagasta government with expressions of disappointment. They claimed that too much was demanded, in spite of the fact that everything had been lost. They wanted the Cuban and Porto Rican bonds saddled upon the islands, or, at least, a part of them. Spain had also guaranteed $40,000,000 of Philippine bonds in 1897. There were more than $500,000,000 of securities guaranteed by Spain involved in the alienation of her colonies under the terms. Still, as these bonds had been issued for the benefit of Spain and not for the advantage of the colonies, it was but the return of her own selfishness to punish her.

The Sagasta cabinet had, also, to take notice of Spanish opinion of the demands. Spain was lifeless, and the public was apparently
prepared to have peace accepted at any price. But the political leaders
must be appeased and committed, since Spain was in throes that
might provoke a revolution of terrible proportions. All the leaders,
except General Weyler, conferred with Señor Sagasta. Weyler wrote
a curt note in reply to the invitation, saying he was surprised that
Señor Sagasta desired to consult with him concerning peace when he
had not been consulted regarding war. He added that the nation
had been disappointed in what it was entitled to expect in its leaders,
namely, success in war.

There was some reason to believe that the American demands
were communicated to the Pope as the basis for requesting his offices
and power in restraining the Spanish clergy from assisting Don Carlos,
if the pretender should attempt to lead a revolution upon the pre-
tence that the Alfonsine dynasty would dishonor Spain by the con-
cessions.

After much delay and distress the Spanish cabinet agreed on Au-
 gust 7, to accept the demands of the United States, the agreement
containing an expression of protest against the cession of Porto Rico, as
being largely in excess in value of any money indemnity that could
be reasonably expected, and against any final demand that Spain must
yield the Philippines. These two colonies now suddenly appeared to be
of vast importance.* The expression was not, however, contentious
in tone.

*If the French people are gratified at the arrangement they are helping to promote,
by which the United States will secure Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, the nation
is very easy to please. Cuba might have belonged to France. It did not become an ac-
complished fact mainly owing to the greed and the irresistible desire on all occasions of
Louis Philippe to drive a hard bargain. The proceedings were throughout kept a secret.
The affair happened as long as sixty-one years ago; in January, 1837. At the beginning of
that month, Aguado, the well-known Spanish banker, requested a strictly private and
absolutely secret interview of Talleyrand, which was granted. Aguado, it turned out, pro-
posed to introduce a secret envoy from Queen Cristina, the great-grandmother of the present
King, Alfonso XIII. Cristina was in greater money difficulties than usual, and offered to
sign away Cuba for the sum of thirty millions of reals [About $8,000,000, a sum that seems
absurd. —Author], with Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands thrown in for another ten
millions. After comparatively short negotiations, the King, Talleyrand, and Señor Camp-
uzano, Cristina's unwilling envoy, it should be said, met in private conference in a small
apartment at the Tuileries. Only Talleyrand's secretary and Aguado were admitted to
On the 9th of August, the Spanish Government had cabled its acceptance of the terms to the French Ambassador at Washington, but the text of the document was not given to the public. M. Cambon presented it to the President, who ordered the preparation of a peace protocol to be signed by both governments. When this was drawn up, the French Ambassador transmitted it to Madrid, where it was accepted as satisfactory.

It was twenty-three minutes past four o'clock on the afternoon of Friday, August 12, 1898, one hundred and twelve days since the first act of war, on April 21, when the Honorable William R. Day, Secretary of State, and M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, authorized by his own government to act for the government of Spain upon official request, signed the protocol, under which hostilities were to cease, pending the final results of peace negotiations.

witness the signing of the deeds, for it had already come to that, in the hurry imposed by the dread of the whole affair leaking out and coming to the knowledge of Lord Palmerston, at that time the only European statesman of whom both Talleyrand and his royal master stood in awe.

The provisions of the contract were read over by Señor Campuzano, who looked absolutely grief-stricken, and at the end of each article or clause there was a short interval, during which the club-footed diplomatist and the citizen-king conferred in whispers. The cession of Cuba led, however, to few observations; it was practically smooth sailing; the price had been debated and settled beforehand; and, finally, the signatures were all duly appended. Not so smooth was the discussion of the articles relating to the cession of Porto Rico and the Philippines. Louis Philippe, on the pretext that the transfer of the latter islands would be so obnoxious to England as possibly to lead to a war, demanded a reduction of three millions of reals on the purchase money. "Seven millions of reals is my final offer; if it be not accepted the contract had better be flung into the fire." he said somewhat peremptorily, pushing the document across the table.

Talleyrand was about to interfere, for he liked neither haste nor violence, but, before he could open his lips, the Spanish envoy sprang to his feet so suddenly as to overturn the chair on which he was seated, which rolled across the floor. Oblivious or indifferent at that moment to the presence of majesty, he leant forward, seized both the documents, twisted them together, and, looking Louis Philippe straight in the face, said deliberately: "Your Majesty is right, the contract is of no use; it is only fit to be thrown into the fire." And, suit ing the action to the words, he strode across the apartment, kicked the burning logs on the hearth with his boot, forced the papers between the incandescent embers, and stood stock-still until the charred wisps told him that all the documentary evidence of the proposed nefarious transaction had forever vanished. — Mr. A. D. Vandam (author of "An Englishman in Paris"), in Illustrated London News, September 10, 1898.
The text of the agreement, for diplomatic reasons, was reserved. The substance made public by the State Department, was as follows:

**SUBSTANCE OF THE PROTOCOL.**

*Article 1.* That Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

*Article 2.* That Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and an island in the Ladrone, to be selected by the United States, shall be ceded to the latter.

*Article 3.* That the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

*Article 4.* That Cuba, Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies shall be immediately evacuated, and that commissioners, to be appointed within ten days, shall, within thirty days from the signing of the protocol, meet at Havana and San Juan, respectively, to arrange and execute the details of the evacuation.

*Article 5.* That the United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace. The commissioners are to meet at Paris not later than October 1.

*Article 6.* On the signing of the protocol, hostilities will be suspended and notice to that effect will be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

There was ready, awaiting the President's signature, a proclamation directing immediate cessation of hostilities by the army and navy of the United States against Spain. Cable messages were at once dispatched to every commanding officer of the army and navy, in the field and on the sea, conveying the necessary orders, with instructions, also, to make it known to Spanish forces not in position to learn the fact otherwise.
II.

Peace was proclaimed, but the war was not over. While the signatures were attaching to the protocol, Captain Goodrich of the United States cruiser *Newark*, supported by the *Swaranee, Osceola, Hist*, and the converted Spanish gunboat *Alvarado*, was opening a bombardment of Manzanillo, which Commander Todd of the *Wilmingston* had attacked a short time before. He had demanded the unconditional surrender of the town, which was refused.

At 3:45 P. M. the bombardment began and was maintained for half an hour, when the Americans saw a white flag on a Spanish gunboat lying at the wharf. The *Swaranee* was sent in under a truce flag and firing ceased. The *Swaranee* grounded on her way into the harbor, when within five hundred yards of shore. Suddenly the whole water front was ablaze with the fire from the Spaniards, and a number of shots were fired from the blockhouses. The Americans answered fiercely, and after about fifteen minutes slowly drew off. The Spanish fire then slackened, but followed the gunboats out. No one was hurt on our gunboats, but much indignation was expressed because of the firing upon a truce flag. One shot went through the *Swaranee's* flag.

Meantime, the Cubans in the rear of the town began to fire on the Spaniards from the north. They had no artillery, but their rifle fire finally grew so annoying to the enemy that they answered it with field pieces, which soon caused the Cubans to cease firing. At six o'clock the American war ships anchored for the night, but the *Newark* continued to harass the Spaniards through the darkness. It was the intention to renew the bombardment the next morning; but before the firing was begun the Spaniards sent off two officers in a small boat, under a flag of truce, to announce to Captain Goodrich that the peace protocol had been signed. They bore a dispatch for Captain Goodrich from General Greely, Chief of the Signal Service. The Spaniards made an effort to send it off to the *Newark* during the previous night, using a
white light instead of a white flag in the darkness. Not understanding
the meaning of the light, the boat was fired upon and returned to the
shore as quickly as possible. As soon as it was light enough in the
morning to see the flag of truce, the message was again sent off.

An artillery engagement occurred on the same day at Aybonito,
Porto Rico, in which one American officer was killed and four privates
were wounded.
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-SEVENTH.

ASSAULT AND CAPTURE OF MANILA.

Electricity Not Quick Enough to Stop Admiral Dewey from Taking Manila—Military Advances upon the City Walls—Three Nights’ Battle before Malate, in which Spaniards Are Repulsed with Heavy Losses by Our Volunteers—Dewey and Merritt Demand Its Surrender and Make a Theatrical Assault on August 13, in Order to Appease the “Honor of Spain”—The Authorities Anxious to Surrender—Escape of General Augusti on a German Ship—Americans Occupy the City—The Articles of Capitulation—The Glorious Record of Admiral Dewey Reviewed—Death of Captain Gridley of the “Olympia.”

I.

When the peace protocol was signed at Washington on Friday, August 12, at 4:23 o’clock, p. m., the time at Manila was a few minutes past midnight Friday morning. The cable messages instantly hurried to Admiral Dewey and Major-General Merritt might reach Hong Kong cable office within a few hours, before noon, Friday, at Hong Kong. But Manila was more than 700 miles distant, three days, by steamer. The Spanish Government had arranged for a fast steamer to be in waiting at Hong Kong, for the purpose of receiving the proclamation of peace and hurrying with it to Manila at utmost speed. If this programme was perfectly executed, the Spanish steamer might reach Manila about noon on Monday, August 15. But even in that event it would discover that Manila had surrendered unconditionally to the American army and navy on the previous Saturday, at half-past two o’clock in the afternoon. The electric telegraph, united with Spanish steam power, was not equal to the task of fore-stalling Dewey.

The arrival of General Merritt, the increasing uncertainty of Aguinaldo’s final purpose, the good condition of our troops, and the desire
to conquer the city as soon as good order could be preserved and the growing distresses of non-combatants alleviated, had resulted in moving our soldiers nearer to the city. They had intrenched themselves along the beach on the highway from Bakoor to Manila. There was an old Capuchin chapel in the center of the line, situated upon a knoll. Two field guns were planted on each side of the chapel. Our soldiers were only seven hundred and fifty yards from the Spanish trenches.

Malate is three miles south of Manila. The dotted line shows the outer investment of the city by the insurgents. The black line from Malate to Manila is the highroad to the city, along which our line was extending when attacked.

At ten o'clock in the night of July 31, a heavy fire from the Spanish line opened upon the Americans, who were taken by surprise, since the enemy had not actively resisted any of our operations theretofore.

Our trenches were occupied that night by the Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers and Utah Artillery Company Volunteers. The Spanish firing was surprisingly accurate, and a hail of bullets fell among the Americans. Our pickets on the right were driven in and reported
that the enemy was advancing to flank us along the road, at which point the trenches ended. There were trees, bushes, and high grass about the right extreme of the line, however. The Spaniards advanced down the road swiftly, pouring in a continuous fire, and finally getting in position to flank and enfilade the American line. The Pennsylvanians, as all volunteers are prone to do before the baptism of experience, had gone into trench duty with light ammunition. Their cartridge belts were emptying rapidly, and a courier was hurried to General Greene asking for reënforcements and ammunition.

The Utah battery was at work with veteran coolness and precision. The Pennsylvania reserves were ordered up and went to the right of the line to repel the attack. They had to cross an open field, swept by Spanish fire. It was the only way of going to the objective point, and the brave volunteers crossed the death trap with unflinching courage.

At this time, also, two platoons of Battery K, Third Artillery, regulars, under Lieutenant Krayerbuhl and Lieutenant Kessler, all acting as infantry, came up to the rescue. The Pennsylvanians, with ammunition almost exhausted, were firing at will, irregularly. Lieutenant Krayerbuhl drew his revolver and gave warning that he would kill the first man who fired without orders.

That was the stern action needed to steady the volunteers. The regulars began their volley firing with perfect discipline, and the Pennsylvanians quieted into steady fighting.

Reënforcements came rushing up. Battery H, of the Third Regulars came flying up to the trenches along the road which the Spanish occupied. The Americans ran in double column and sprang into the trenches.

Private McClrath of Battery H, hoping to encourage steadiness among the volunteers, leaped on the parapet of sand bags and walked up and down, encouraging them. He was shot in the head, fatally. Captain Hobbs took his place, and the Americans were soon steadied down to deliberate, hard fighting.
The Spanish guns at Malate were doing much damage, and in the confusion of the night it was thought at headquarters, in the rear, that our advance would be driven in. General Greene sent two battalions of the First California Volunteers to the front at double-quick. As they had not before been to the new trenches, they dropped into the old Spanish trench and began to pour volleys into our own troops ahead. There was no casualty, but a great disaster was barely averted.

As soon as the mistake was discovered, the Californians dashed ahead into the fight with all the more purpose to drive back the real enemy. Private J. F. Finly, of Company C, of the Californians, especially distinguished himself. He took eight cart loads of ammunition through a terrific fire in the open fields to the Pennsylvanians. One native driver was shot in the leg, and a pony was killed. The cart tops were riddled. When the pony was killed, Finly pulled the cart himself and delivered the ammunition. As he returned across the field, he found two wounded men and took them in the cart to the hospital. Then he returned to the front with ten carts for the wounded.

The Spaniards were beaten back to Malate with considerable loss. The Americans lost about eighteen killed and forty-five wounded.

Fighting was resumed the next night and the third, but the Americans were now prepared and reserved their fire. Several were lost in the second and third skirmishes. A correspondent of the London Times, who was present in these engagements, cabled to his paper: "I was impressed by the nonchalant demeanor of the Americans on the fighting lines. They were like high-spirited youths picnicking, while groups were lying on the second line playing cards. Had the Spaniards, who were unaccountably non-aggressive during the American landing and advance, dropped shrapnel from the Malate fort they would have wrought terrible havoc, one house, forming a conspicuous mark, being within easy gun range."

The insurgents were now forced inland on the right of the American lines. They opened fire on the Spaniards, and the latter replied
briskly. Aguinaldo's men caused the Americans considerable trouble. Information was received that a party of California volunteers engaged in felling timber had been arrested by insurgents. Under General Greene's instructions Colonel Smith ordered out an armed detachment, which released the prisoners and brought the offending insurgents to Camp Dewey. General Greene sent a message to Aguinaldo saying that if the Americans were further molested he would disarm all the Filipinos.

There was some belief that in the night firing the insurgents had turned their weapons against our troops, but the fact was not established.

On July 31 five transports arrived with more troops from San Francisco, and on August 4 the monitor Monterey arrived in the bay as a benediction to the American war ships.

II.

There were now troops sufficient, together with the guns of our fleet and the marines, to justify Admiral Dewey and General Merritt in preparing to attack Manila itself. A week after the new troops had disembarked, Dewey and Merritt united in a demand upon the authorities to surrender. General Augusti, singularly enough, answered the demand, and declined. It was on that day, according to Spanish authorities, he was deposed or had resigned.

Manila was invested in the rear by insurgents, south by United States troops and heavy field guns, and the fleet formed in the harbor. Although the Spanish authorities asked and expected the Americans to protect them from the insurgent rabble, the “honor of Spain” demanded a sacrifice of lives. Destitution and distress prevailed, and resistance was hopeless; but the “honor of Spain” must again be sealed in blood. The American troops were scarcely in condition to attack, and not much resistance was looked for. Neither Dewey nor Merritt expected the Spanish to fight. Their information was to
the effect that there was a division in Manila, one faction ready to surrender, the other in favor of holding out. The American commanders believed that a perfunctory resistance only would be made, but both were prepared to make a strong assault, if necessary. The ultimatum expired at noon on Tuesday, August 9.

Monday afternoon the Spanish requested, through the Belgian consul, another day to remove the non-combatants and the sick and wounded. This was granted. The Belgian consul had been active in endeavoring to effect an arrangement between the Americans and Spanish, to prevent further fighting and bloodshed. As soon as he delivered the ultimatum he removed his family to a supply ship, and remained on board with them. He reported on Tuesday afternoon that the Spaniards were determined to make, at least, a show of resistance. Accordingly, the fleet prepared to begin a bombardment at noon on Wednesday.

Tuesday morning the war ships of the neutral countries began to take positions to observe the assault. The arrangement exhibited the national sympathies clearly. Four British ships, then on the station, the *Immortalité*, flagship, *Iphigenia*, *Linet*, and *Swift*, and the Japanese cruiser *Naniwa*, came across the bay and anchored beside the American ships. The German cruisers, *Irene* and *Cormoran*, went to Mariveles with the ships on board which the foreign residents had taken refuge. The other German war ships, the flagship *Kaiser*, the *Kaiserin Augusta*, and the *Prinz Wilhelm*, with the French flagship *Bayard* and cruiser *Pascal*, moved a little north of their former positions and anchored together. These manoeuvres caused general comment throughout the fleets.

Our ships were stripped and cleared for action on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday morning, and the crews were called to general quarters.* Suddenly the Admiral signaled “Action postponed.”

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*And then occurred a wonderful sight, which the world had not seen and may not see again. The smaller British vessels steamed away, but the big, white *Immortalité*, said to be the largest armored cruiser in the world, headed down the bay and came within two or three blocks of the flagship, the *Olympia*, and stopped. Then her flag was dipped and from her deck, loud and clear, her band played “The Star Spangled Banner.” — Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Charles L. Jewett, Judge Advocate General.
It was explained that General Merritt had declared the army not ready, for lack of preparation. This was mere pretense, however. M. André, the Belgian consul, anxious to prevent useless loss of life, had been permitted to negotiate with the Spanish authorities, and succeeded in arranging a plan under which the resistance would be so slight that hard fighting would be unnecessary.

Flag-Lieutenant Brumby carried an order to the Concord and Petrel, lying before the Pasig batteries, that they were not to fire unless attacked. The Spanish wished to have a theatrical exhibition, surrender to the Americans, and be saved from the insurgents. Dewey and Merritt were not averse to saving life, and it was ordered that no damage should be done to the city, but that the shots should be confined to outer military positions alone.

Such was the position on Saturday morning, August 13. The day was hazy and misty, with frequent downpours of squally rain.

At 9:30 the American ships, with battle flags flying, received the signal for attack from the Olympia, from which two puffs of smoke shot out, sending two shells at Malate. They fell short on the beach. These were followed by two great roars from the Monterey, and cheers sprang up from all the ships. All the ships then joined in and all the shots were directed against Malate, and all fell short. There were no signs of surrender. The "honor of Spain" was not to be appeased with smoke. Yet no Spanish guns made reply.

The Monterey, a mere plank on the water, with no freeboard, steamed in under the very guns of the shore batteries, tempting a shot, but none came. Rain was falling so mistily as to cloud the bay.

The ships now tried for the Malate fort in good faith, and the clouds of dust and dirt that arose were proof that our gunners were as skillful as ever. Then they ceased for awhile, but the Spanish flags still flew over the city, especially from the lofty spire of the Archbishop's cathedral.

In the meantime, the American army on shore advanced two brigades against the Malate fort. It was captured with the loss of eleven Americans killed and thirty-nine wounded. Capturing the fort, they
drove the Spaniards back along the beach into the city, and finally occupied the deserted places of the enemy on the Lunetta parade.

At about 11 o'clock the *Olympia* signaled "cease firing," and then set the international signal for the enemy demanding surrender. The Spaniards made no reply from Manila, and Admiral Dewey grew suspicious of Spanish treachery. He signaled his ships to "close in," and there was prospect of serious work ahead. M. André, the Belgian consul, had been trusted by both sides, and his communications had all been verbal. The question arose whether there was misunderstanding or Spanish treachery. M. André was called on board the *Olympia*, and declared that there might be misunderstanding, but he did not believe there was treachery.

Again the signal was made, "Do you surrender?" but no reply came. Then a launch, bearing a flag of truce and the Belgian flag, went toward Manila with M. André, Lieutenant Brumby, and Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier on board to consult the Spanish authorities. They were gone a long time, during which the Admiral signaled the fleet to eat dinner. As he had breakfasted in Cavité he was now dining at Manila.

The launch returned from the city at 2 o'clock, and half an hour later the *Olympia* signaled, "The enemy surrenders." The harbor was filled with the cheers of the sailors.

Two battalions of the Second Oregon Regiment, who were on a steamer, now started ashore. The steamer went in beside the breakwater, on which the troops landed, and marched on land. General Merritt had already gone on shore in a small boat. Flag-Lieutenant Brumby, with a great flag, went in a small boat to haul down the Spanish colors. He took with him two apprentice boys.

When they reached the staff in front of the cathedral, a great crowd of Spaniards gathered around them. As the Spanish flag came down, many men and women in the great crowd assembled and shed tears. Just as the Stars and Stripes were hoisted in place of the red and yellow flag of Spain, a regimental band at the head of our troops, marching from Camp Dewey, started "The Star Spangled Banner." It was a coincidence, for the band was around a corner and could not
see the flag-raising. There was tremendous cheering by the Americans when the flag rose over the building, and a burst of delight could be heard aboard the ships in the bay from which they were echoed. Then the guns on the Olympia boomed out a national salute to the new sovereignty in the Philippines. The Charleston followed, and then all the American fleet followed in order, even the Callao, that three months before boasted allegiance to the flag now replaced by a better. The clouds cleared away, and the sun set in a burst of brilliant beauty.

Major-General Merritt had landed with an Oregon company for escort. They saluted the flag when it was hoisted, and the Oregon volunteers guarded the streets all night and received the surrender of the Spanish arms. The enemy was permitted to surrender with the honors of war, the officers retaining their side arms. When the Oregon troops reached the Captain-General's palace, where General Merritt made his headquarters, they found the plaza filled with Spaniards. Between 6,000 and 7,000 soldiers gave up their arms, which consisted mostly of Mauser rifles. Twelve thousand stands of arms were taken and millions of rounds of ammunition. Enough new Mauser rifles were captured to arm nearly all the American regiments. Three magazines were found stored with powder.

Despite the promises made, Spanish treachery could not entirely renounce its opportunity. After retreating from their lines they made a cowardly guerilla fight, hiding in the brush and in gardens, and shot at Americans as they advanced. The two American brigades advanced together, General Greene's moving along the beach and main road against Malate, while General McArthur advanced along the Cingalon road from Pasai. General McArthur had a hot fight at Cingalon. The Astor battery distinguished itself by its bravery. It lost two men killed and several wounded. The batteries shelled the Spanish out of a blockhouse on the outer line. The Spaniards then retreated to Cingalon, where they hid in houses and behind a barricade, making a stubborn resistance. The Astor battery advanced two guns, to within seventy-five yards of the barricade, and then charged the Spaniards with pistols.
THAT night Manila was under martial law. The California Red Cross Society was permitted to care for the sick and wounded of both sides. The troops marched in with perfect order in the afternoon, and guards were placed before the house of every foreign resident to prevent looting by disorderly mobs. General Merritt had refused to permit Aguinaldo's army to take part in the assault, in order that no lives might be sacrificed to rage. No insurgent was permitted to enter after the surrender, without first delivering up all his weapons.

These were the acts of protection accorded by Americans, whom the Archbishop had described as heartless, immoral, cruel, and treacherous people.

General Merritt issued next day a proclamation, announcing the establishment of a military government in Manila. It was printed in Spanish and English. After setting forth the progress of the war, it announced that the United States Government had directed him, as Governor, to declare that Americans had not come to wage war on the people, but to protect all in their personal and religious rights. There would be a military occupation of the island of Luzon, but, until further notice, all laws would continue in effect, as relating to personal rights, local societies, and crime, unless they conflicted with the necessary military laws as might be determined by the General commanding.

The laws would be administered by the ordinary tribunals and officers who would accept the authority of the United States. Churches and places of religious worship would be protected, and all public properties, works of art, and libraries. The people would not be interfered with as long as they preserved the peace. All ports would be held by the land or naval forces until the United States declared them open for the trade of neutral nations on payment of the prescribed rates of duty.
The same day the commissioners selected to draw up the articles of capitulation met. They were, on the part of the United States, Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, Captain B. L. Lamberton, U. S. N., Lieutenant-Colonels Charles A. Whittier and V. E. H. Crowden. For Spain, Nicolas de la Pena, Auditor-General, Colonel Carlos Reyes, and Major José Maria Olaguen. The articles follow:—

1. The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate, with the city and defenses, with all honors of war, depositing their arms in the places designated by the authorities of the United States and remaining in the quarters designated and under the orders of their officers and subject to control of the aforesaid United States authorities until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations. All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the officers remaining in their respective homes, which shall be respected as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force.

2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property. All public horses and public property of all kinds shall be turned over to staff officers designated by the United States.

3. Complete returns in duplicate of men by organization, and full lists of public property and stores, shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from this date.

4. All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces, and of their families, and of the expenses which said repatriation may occasion, shall be referred to the government of the United States at Washington. Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them. The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city, or when the American army evacuates.

5. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by the United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid, as though they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain. All the funds of the Spanish treasury and all other public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.

6. This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.

The articles were authorized on behalf of Spain by General Jaudenes, "acting General-in-Chief of the Spanish army in the Philippines." Augusti had disappeared. He had been reported as deposed and as having resigned. The Spanish Government declared that he had been
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removed on August 8, for being averse to holding out until the protocol was signed. The government had made desperate efforts to prevent American possession, its dispatches reaching Augusti through German channels, it was said. Augusti did not know the protocol had been signed when the city surrendered, and, perhaps, not daring to assume the authority of the capitulation, he fled.

Then Spain claimed that Augusti had sent in his resignation, but denied that it had been accepted; Jaundes, therefore, had no right to surrender any territory except that of Manila, of which, alone, he was Military Governor.

The "honor of Spain" was displaying itself brilliantly in the final episode of war.

The United States did not contend that the surrender included more than the city and its suburbs. The whole Philippines question was open. Besides, the capture had been accomplished after the signing of the peace agreement, which ceded the occupation and holding of Manila and the harbor until otherwise determined upon.

The American losses in the fighting amounted to about forty killed and one hundred and fifty wounded, the wounds being slight. The Spanish losses were very heavy, and the prisoners were found to be emaciated with hunger and worn out with sleepless nights in the trenches deluged with rain.

IV.

It was one hundred and five days after Admiral Dewey destroyed the fleet off Cavite that Flag-Lieutenant Brumby broke out the Stars and Stripes over Manila. Although the capture of Manila was merely an exhibition, Dewey's ships had spent only twelve hours in conquering the key of the East. It was a record of glory and of duty well done, besides an exhibition of pluck, sound capacity, and judgment, that no naval officer has ever surpassed. He had fought the Germans and the insurgents with firm
diplomacy and courage, and the Spaniards with metal. He had defeated all of them equally.

There was one incident, however, which could not be foreseen. Before the white flag of surrender was hoisted, General Augusti went to a launch of the German war ship *Kaiserin Augusta* and was taken aboard, the vessel sailing for Hong Kong before the bombardment concluded. Augusti escaped under cover of the mist. The United States paid no attention to him nor to the Germans. One Spaniard more or less was not significant, and one incivility more or less from the German fleet was not a matter for surprise or comment.*

Our fleet had not lost a man killed during the whole period of blockade and battle.

But there was one deeply regretted loss. Captain Charles Vernon Gridley, of the *Olympia*, who fought his ship so splendidly at Cavité, did his duty at the cost of his life. He was dangerously ill at the time, but determined to take his part against the advice of his physician. He went through the long preliminary voyage to Manila and fought the good fight, when he ought to have been in bed.

*During the blockade, the American ships were furnished with fresh meat from a refrigerating steamer chartered by the government in Australia. The American sailors, therefore, fared much better than their brothers of the foreign fleets lying off Manila. These had to get their supplies from the city, and as provisions were rather low toward the end of the blockade, they did not fare very well, having to live on buffalo meat, at a dollar a pound. As soon as our flag was raised, the English gave it a national salute, while the Germans, French, and Russians have not yet done so, as they are waiting for instructions from their governments. Immediately after the English fired the salute, our Admiral hoisted an international signal with an English flag, meaning, “Send for fresh meat.” The signal was immediately answered by the foreign fleets, and it was some moments before the Germans, French, and Russians found that the signal was to the English only. They were very angry when they found their mistake, and are sorry they did not salute the flag, as they are still living on buffalo meat, while the English are enjoying mutton and fresh beef.—*Letter from an officer at Manila.*

The Germans have never given the ordinary courtesies of salutation, while the English recognize Manila Bay as an American port, and put up the Stars and Stripes on the foremast as they come in. One of the latest incidents that struck me at Manila was the salute fired by Admiral Dewey in acknowledgment of the courtesy of an Englishman just coming in. The flagship then was the *Baltimore*, and she raised a great white thunder cloud, through which the red flashes of the guns played like the lightning.—*Remark credited to Mr. Murat Halstead, in an interview.*
After the destruction of the Spanish fleet he collapsed and was invalidated home, by way of Hong Kong. He died at sea, returning to San Francisco, less than a week after he had started. Captain Gridley was buried at Erie, Pennsylvania, his home, on July 13, with the honors of war. He was a native of Indiana and had been thirty-eight years in the navy at the time of his death. He had nearly reached the rank of Commodore. He was the first and only naval officer of high rank whose death was the actual result of war. He was fifty-three years old, and a very handsome, agreeable, and courageous officer.

To a friend in Hong Kong he said, "I think I am in for it; but I could not leave my ship on the eve of battle, after waiting all these years to serve my country as well as it deserved. And, knowing what will soon happen, I would do it again to-morrow without hesitation." These are heroic words. It was the presence of such men in his fleet that made Admiral Dewey, in his report, speak so highly of the patriotism and courage of his officers and crew.

It is no wonder that George Dewey came out of the war the popular hero of the United States, his name lustrous with glory; that glory fixed by his modesty and quiet reserve. No naval officer has ever written his name higher on the roll of honor in the history of any country or impressed himself so deeply in the hearts and upon the memories of his own people.
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-EIGHTH.

FIGHTING LEADERS OF THE NAVY.


I.

Our fighting leaders in the Spanish-American War were past the prime of middle age. Fighting Generals and fighting Admirals have usually been young men in all the wars of history — Alexander and Caesar; Napoleon, triumphant at twenty-five, established at thirty-one, and master of Europe at thirty-seven; Washington, commanding the American armies at forty-four; Wellington defeating Napoleon when both were forty-four; Nelson winning Trafalgar and death at forty-seven; Grant Commander-in-Chief of the Federal millions at forty-one. Opposite the list is the single name, in modern times, of von Moltke, who was seventy when he led the German hosts against France, yet who was considered too old for the task which he so splendidly accomplished. Of the leaders of the Spanish-American War not one was under fifty-eight, and none more than sixty-three. At the latter age those in the regular service are usually retired as "superannuated." Among the seven in active command of fighting forces there was little of the spirit of superannuation, but more the dash and intrepidity of vigorous youth. Dewey, Sampson, and Schley; Miles, Shafter, Wheeler, and Merritt; these were seasoned veterans of a previous war who proved to be young enough to carry a world-covering war impetuously to a.
triumphant close in a little more than a hundred days. There were young heroes, but they were not commanders. There were Hobson and Blue and Gridley, and in the ranks hundreds of young men of the stuff of which great leaders are made.

II.

Admiral George Dewey's conduct in battle and blockade, his unflinching courage and coolness amidst the encompassing perils of diplomatic treachery and the ceaseless provocations of the German fleet at Manila, made him the undisputed hero of the war, and will give him brilliant and lasting fame in history. As has been recorded elsewhere, he is of good Puritan stock, of the strong and persistent old Dewey family of Vermont, the members of which have been successful in professions, scholarship, business, and finance, for generations. The Admiral's brothers are excellent representatives of the family traits, as were their father and their grandfather. It is a typical American family of moderate competence, plain habits, and strong nature. It is a stock worthy to have produced Admiral Dewey.

Nobody has ever written better history than Plutarch and Herodotus, and they wrote theirs in anecdote. The earliest anecdote we have of Admiral Dewey is related by Major Pangborn, for many years a well-known journalist in New Jersey, but who was in early life a school-teacher. Upon graduating from college he undertook the management of a district school, at Montpelier, that had been in rebellion against all teachers for some time. Young Dewey was the ring-leader of the "irreconcilables." At the head of his boyish insurgents he had driven away several teachers, and had stood one on his head in a snowbank. The school seemed unmanageable.

When Major Pangborn appeared on the first day of the new session, the first scene that met his eyes was young Dewey, perched up in a tree, throwing stones at small boys. The teacher ordered him to come down. Dewey's reply was that the teacher could himself go down
to a certain tropical climate unmentionable, and he remained in the tree. School went on smoothly that day, but there were indications that trouble was coming. The teacher provided himself with a nice rawhide whip, which he tucked away over the door, and then placed several sticks of good hickory on the top of the pile in the old woodbox.

Next day another boy who was disorderly was told to take his seat. He did so, and seven of the big boys joined him on his bench. Then Dewey stepped up and coolly informed the teacher that they were "going to give him the best licking he ever had."

"Go to your seat!" commanded the teacher, who was not so big physically as either of the two boys mentioned.

Dewey struck out, and the next instant the rawhide was playing catch-and-go all over him. The other "biggest boy" entered the fight, and was promptly laid low by a blow from one of the hickories.

Dewey by this time was lying on the floor, howling with pain, but sensibly ready to make peace. The other boy was unconscious. Major Pangborn had quelled the mutiny and conquered the school. He took Dewey home to his father, and reported that he had brought him his son, "somewhat the worse for wear, but ready for school work."

"Thank you," replied Dr. Dewey; "I think George will not give you any more trouble. He will be at school to-morrow."

The father of the other boy tried to get a warrant for the arrest of the schoolmaster, but there was not a magistrate in the county who would issue one. They agreed that if anybody had been found who could govern that school, he was the man for the place.

Young Dewey remained at school. He soon became a good scholar, and, under his friend's tuition, fitted for the Annapolis Academy. Years after these events he often visited Major Pangborn at his home in Boston. On one of these visits, Dewey, then a naval lieutenant, said to him: "I shall never cease to be grateful to you. You made a man of me. But for that thrashing you gave me I should probably now be of very little account." The swiftness and irresistible
force of Major Pangborn’s attack may have had its influence upon the famous pupil at Manila.

Dewey was a Lieutenant in the Federal navy during the Civil War, and during that period received the actual training for hostile operations that he could not exhibit until thirty-three years later. He was on the Mississippi when New Orleans was captured. The vessel sank the Confederate ram Manassas, and met the same fate shortly after. In attempting to run past the batteries at Port Hudson, March 15, 1863, she was thrown aground by an accident to the leading ship. The batteries had her under direct range and riddled her with shot. Seeing that the ship could not be saved, her commander ordered the crew to abandon her. Captain Smith and his chief subordinate, Lieutenant Dewey, displayed true courage throughout, and were the last to leave the ship. “It is in such trying moments,” said Admiral Porter, in his official report, “that men show of what mettle they are made, and in this instance the mettle was of the best.” But there was more than “mettle” in Dewey. One of the crew of the Mississippi called attention to one incident that he believed was an innovation in fighting a man-of-war at night. “Dewey gave orders,” he said, “before we went into action, that the decks of the Mississippi should be whitewashed (see the smartness); that gave the guns’ crews a chance to see the running gear of the guns—8-inch. It was all lights out that night.”

He was with Farragut at Mobile, and bore himself always with perfect courage and quiet modesty.

After the war, there came thirty-three years of humdrum duty, which tires the temper and nature of men more than dangerous action. In the navy he was greatly admired by his men; and his common sense, natural sense of justice and fairness “between man and man,” won their affection. He was always kindly to the sailors “forward,” and it was said of him that he could get along with any man except a liar. He could see or hear what he thought he ought to see and hear, but was generally unobservant of petty, natural irregularities.
Here are some newspaper anecdotes of him taken from the gossip that followed his victory at Manila, which convey a sense of personal portraiture of a man such as Dewey of Manila might naturally be:

"Dewey is a man with big, piercing eyes," said a messenger in the Navy Department, at Washington, who made a cruise with him. "He's what I'd call a little fellow as to height, but he surely looked bigger'n a Dutch frigate when he stood on his side of the mast and you were up in front of him. But he was a tender-hearted man on the cruise when he and I were shipmates. He'd try not to see or hear things that he didn't want to see or hear. None of us knew him, 'up forward,' I mean as a commander. Some of us had been shipmates with him when he was a deck officer, and had never got the worst of it at his hands. But we weren't sure how he'd stack up as a skipper. We weren't long in finding out. We had to sailorize all right, but there wasn't much brigging with Dewey. He didn't like to see a man in double irons on his tours of inspection. We hadn't been to sea with him very long before we got next to how he despised a liar. One of the petty officers went ashore at Gibraltar, got mixed up with the soldiers in the canteens up on the hill and came off to the ship paralyzed with drink. He went before Dewey at the mast next morning, and gave him the 'two-beers-and-sunstruck' yarn.

"'You're lying, my man,' said Dewey. 'You were very drunk. I, myself, heard you aft in my cabin. I will not have my men lie to me. I don't expect to find total abstinence in a man-of-war crew. But I do expect them to tell me the truth, and I am going to have them tell me the truth. Had you told me candidly that you took the drop too much on your liberty, you'd have been forward by this time, for you at least returned to the ship. For lying, you get ten days in irons. Let me have the truth hereafter. I am told you are a good seaman. A good seaman has no business lying.'

"After that there were few men aboard who didn't throw themselves on the mercy of the court, and none of us ever lost anything by it. He'd have to punish us in accordance with regulations, but he
had a great way of ordering the release of men he had to sentence before their sentences were half worked out.

"Dewey was the best liberty-granting skipper I was ever shipmates with. He hated to keep quarantined men aboard when the good-conduct men were flocking off to the beach. One fine Christmas day in Genoa harbor all the men entitled to shore liberty lined up at ten o'clock in the morning to answer muster before taking the running boats for the shore. There were about forty of us, myself among the number, who were quarantined aboard for having raised Cain ashore,

How Dewey Won at Manila.—A veracious newspaper of Ross County, Ohio, published an explanation of the battle of Manilla that may prove of interest to those who are not experts in naval tactics and construction. "On Saturday night," said this veracious historian, "John Bridge's store was crowded with men who wanted to hear a description of the battle, by Daniel Doble, and an explanation of some things that were not understood.

"What I can't git through my noodle," said Pontius Anderson, "is how none o' th' Spanish cannon balls didn't go right through our boats jest th' same as our balls went through theirs.

"Simple enough," said Daniel Doble. "'Cause our boats is made o' soft metal an' theirs's made o' brittle. Ev'ry time old Dewey hit a Spanish boat her sides cracked jest like they wuz glass, but when a ball hit Dewey's it was diff'rent. Th' metal bein' soft, it closed over th' balls when they struck, not leavin' a hole, jest th' same uz ef you threw a marble int' a pan o' dough.

"Them Spaniards is sharp, though, an' they ketched out' th' thing, an' ef they'd ketched on sooner maybe Dewey'd had a hard time. They seen th' soft metal was th' best, so they het up their boat, th' last one they had. Th' hotter it got th' better it wuz, an' they het 'er way up. Old Dewey seen th' balls from his boats wasn't doin' no hurt, an' he seen th' trick, so he yelled out this Captains, "Don't shoot nothin' but heavy balls!" They kept pepperin' away with big balls till th' Spanish boat wuz so full o' lead she sunk uv'rr own weight.

"Them Vermont fellers is great for tricks, I tell you. Dewey's sailors waded t' shore an' got in single rank, Indian file. Th' Spanish General seen what Dewey wuz doin' an' he sez: 'What's good for Yanks is good for Spanish,' an' he drew his men up in Indian file th' same way. Thot was jest what old Dewey was waitin' for; there was twixt twelve an' fifteen thousand Spaniards, an' they made a line more'n six miles long. 'Fire!' sez Dewey, when he seen 'em, an' bang went 'is gun, th' biggest one he had with 'im, one th' carried twelve miles. Thot ball went chasin' down the line, knockin' them Spaniards over like they was tempins. Th' first three seconds a mile o' Spaniards fell. Th' heads was knocked clean off'n ev'ry one o' them. Course th' ball was gittin' weaker ev'ry minute, an' when it struck th' second mile it had dropped till it ketched 'em in necks. Th' third mile o' Spaniards got hit in th' breast, an' th' fourth mile right in th' stummicks. Thot th' Spanish seen what was goin' on, an' they begun t' drap t' th' ground, but it didn't do no good, fer th' ball wuz gittin' spent an' dropped too. It mowed down close an' killed ev'ry Spaniard leader'n a last year's bird's nest, whereas, ef they hadn't dropped they'd only lost their legs an' feet."
in Nice, a few weeks before. Our quarantine was for three months, and it wasn’t half run out on this Christmas day. Dewey stood at the break of the poop, with his hands on his hips, watching the liberty party line up. We fellows that couldn’t go were standing around the gangway, smoking our pipes, and looking pretty down in the mouth, I guess. The big liberty party—there were a couple of hundred men in the batch—finally got away, and the ship was practically deserted, except for us quarantined fellows. Dewey watched us for a while out of the tail of his eye. We were leaning over the side, watching the receding running boats with the big liberty party. Dewey went up on the poop and walked up and down, chewing his mustache, and every once in a while shooting a look at us men up forward. Finally, he walked down the poop ladder and straight forward to where we were grouped.

“You, boys, hop into your mustering clothes and go on off to the beach. I’ll let you have a couple of the running boats when they return. Come back with the other men when you get ready. Don’t raise any more trouble ashore than you can help.’

“‘There wasn’t a man in the gang of us that didn’t want to hug little Dewey for that, and you can gamble that we gave him a ‘cheer ship’ that rang around the harbor of Genoa. We all got marked in the log as ‘clean and sober,’ too, when we got back to the ship, for we weren’t going to do any cutting up on Dewey after the way he’d treated us.”

From a bandmaster on board the Pensacola, in 1887, when she was lying at Manila, with Dewey in command, comes another anecdote illustrating the same quiet trait of kindliness for his men and the dauntless patriotic courage displayed in his attitude toward Prince Henry of Prussia, for discourtesy to the United States. While the Pensacola gunboat was at Manila, a number of sailors went on shore and engaged in a street brawl. An alarm was turned in, but the sailors succeeded in escaping to their ships. The next morning the Spanish Captain of the port came out to the Pensacola to complain to Captain Dewey of the action of his sailors.

“What can I do?” asked Dewey.
"Why, your men raised a riot on shore, and you can assist me in arresting and punishing them," was the reply.

The American Captain was very courteous in the expression of regret that sailors of the Pensacola should be lawless while on shore leave, but could see no way in which he might assist his visitor in searching out the guilty ones.

The reply of Dewey angered the port Captain, who said, somewhat peremptorily: "You certainly can parade your crew before me, in order that the rioters may be identified."

Looking aloft, and pointing to the Stars and Stripes waving at the masthead, Dewey made reply: "The deck of this vessel is United States territory, and I'll parade my men for no foreigner that ever drew breath."

The man described in these anecdotes, from boyhood to maturity, can be easily understood in the incident attending the fate of Captain C. V. Gridley of the Olympia, who went into action at Manila a sick man, and died a month later. Before the squadron sailed, every officer and man was examined as usual for his physical fitness. The surgeons "condemned" Captain Gridley, who was in very poor health. Commander Lambert was assigned to his place, but Captain Gridley pleaded with Dewey against being relieved on the eve of battle. He succeeded, and Lambert was made Chief-of-Staff to the Admiral. When the battle opened Captain Gridley wanted to stay on the bridge with Dewey, but the Admiral ordered him to the safer position in the conning tower, on the ground that it would be inexcusable if both commanders of the ship should be killed. And Dewey remained on the bridge, while, from the conning tower, Gridley fought ship for the last time, and came home a corpse, but leaving a splendid memory to his family and his country.

The part that good fortune plays in the lives of the best of men is well illustrated in Admiral Dewey's service record. When the irreconcilable differences with Spain were growing rapidly, the command of the Asiatic squadron lay between Commodore Howell and (then) Commodore Dewey. Both made efforts to avoid selection for the good
professional reason that the Atlantic Ocean and Cuban waters seemed to offer the best opportunities for service in war. Commodore Howell, by seniority, received the command of the European station, and Dewey went unwillingly to Hong Kong. It was difficult to secure a staff to accompany him, not because officers were not glad to serve under him, but because the service was believed to be out of the way of glory. But, once there, Dewey saw the importance of seizing and holding Manila, and, with one blow won immortality, and with a second closed the war so gloriously begun.

It is also interesting to know that a man of such kindly, firm, and sensible character, who endears himself to rough sailors and the great world alike, does not look the portrait drawn. Never did so dauntless a fighter look less one; never did such a sailor’s “shipmate” look so unlike one. Naval officers, spending much time abroad, where the details of uniform dress, of scrupulous observance of etiquette, and niceties of manner and address are official formulas, have been looked upon as smartly-dressed idlers, mainly of that much-abused yet harmless type of man described as a “dude.” But Dewey, in respect to his apparel, his precise manners and scrupulous perfection of address and “good form,” was the dude of dudes. One who writes of him as from personal knowledge,* says: “In person Dewey is not the naval hero of popular imagination. He is slight, of medium height, with finely chiseled face, and hair sprinkled with gray, while his firmly set lips and clear eye would mark him as a gentleman and a man of the world. While in service at Washington he was a club man and fond of society, one of those who rarely appeared after dinner except in evening dress; just the kind of a fellow, in short, that the agitator has in mind when he inveighs against the ‘dudes’ of the navy who are pensioned on the government and haunt the drawing-rooms of the capital. He is quiet in manner, sparing and incisive in speech, courteous in bearing, and decisive in action. In all these qualities he does not differ greatly from other naval officers who have

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been trained in the same school.” It is said of him that in the Civil War he always went into action in full dress, wearing kid gloves.

Finally, it must be said, that he was sixty-one when he became so famous; that he deserved his fame by his work; that he bore it with modesty; and to such men Americans yield unstinted honor and admiration.

III.

Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, who stepped from a Captaincy to his Rear-Admiralship at Santiago, is the son of a small farmer of New York, and was entered at Annapolis Academy and maintained by the sacrifices of his father—sacrifices most nobly justified and rewarded in the character and achievements of the son. He was graduated at the beginning of the Civil War, and was a Lieutenant when the war ended. He was second officer on the monitor Putapasco, when that vessel was blown up by a torpedo in January, 1865, in Charleston harbor. He was commended by his superior officer as deserving “highest praise” for his “cool intrepidity.” He has been known in the navy as a thorough master of ordnance, possessing the highest executive capacity, great courage, and patience. He is described as being a serious and stern man, lacking in suavity and therefore in popularity; but, as all naval officers usually are, a gentleman, unassuming, and possessing sagacity and excellent judgment. He was always scrupulous to avoid mere courtesy honors, and while a bureau chief in the Navy Department (in the temporary occupancy of which every officer is usually addressed as “Commodore”) he was careful to remind callers that he was a captain only and preferred to be so addressed. It was such accurate distinction between fact and figment that gave to his insistence that it was the fleet under his command which won the battle off Santiago the immediate support of all high authorities. His lack of popularity was apparent in the lack of responsive applause, but that it was Sampson’s victory will be the undoubted verdict of history.
IV.

Commodore (now Rear-Admiral) Winfield Scott Schley, commanding the Flying Squadron, whose admirable gallantry in the battle off Santiago was conspicuous, was born in Maryland, and graduated from Annapolis about the same time that Dewey and Sampson did, and saw service in the Civil War. His intrepidity and dash were tested in many engagements and skirmishes, and he became known as an officer who loved fighting. He is one of the few who have seen actual service between 1865 and 1895. He was Lieutenant-Commander of the United States ship Benicia when, in 1871, she attacked a fort on Salee River in Korea, for the purpose of chastising the Koreans for the mistreatment of Americans. In 1884 he was commander of the expedition sent to the Arctic regions to attempt a rescue of the Greely exploring party. The selection was determined by his fearlessness and resourcefulness. He set out on one day's notice, and arrived at Sabine Point in time to rescue the seven survivors, who would have been dead twenty-four hours later. He was also in Valparaiso harbor, Chili, in 1891, when some of his sailors ashore were set upon by a mob, and one was killed and five injured. The American bluejackets were arrested, and Schley demanded their release. Upon this being refused, he sent word to the authorities that if the men were not released at the dock within a specified time, he would open fire on the city. He immediately cleared decks for action, and notified the foreign ships of his purpose, and requested their withdrawal out of range. It is a coincidence that all but the Captain of a German war vessel promptly complied. The German sent the surly reply that he would not move. Schley instantly returned the warning that if his demand on the Valparaiso authorities was not complied with, he intended to bombard; that there remained less than an hour of time, and if the German chose to maintain his position he was at liberty to do so, but if he chanced to find himself between the American and the shore batteries during hostilities, he must be prepared to accept all the shots that the position might
REAR-ADMIRAL W. S. SCHLEY, U. S. N.
render it necessary to stop.* Then the German moved out; and Schley’s bluejackets were returned to him in safety. It was a year later that some Chilian revolutionists sought refuge on the _Baltimore_, Captain Robley D. Evans’s ship, at Valparaiso. There were three Chilian men-of-war in the harbor. The Admiral came on board the _Baltimore_, and notified Captain Evans that if the refugees were not surrendered, his three ships would follow the _Baltimore_ out of the harbor and sink her. Captain Evans conveyed the warning to his guests, and told them to decide for themselves—he was ready to protect them at all hazards. They concluded to remain with him, and Captain Evans so informed the Chilian Admiral, adding that as long as they chose to stay he would protect them.

“Very well.” replied the Admiral; “your ship will be sunk half an hour after you leave the harbor.”

“That may be true,” Captain Evans is reported to have calmly answered, “but the _Baltimore_ will make you a h--l of a lot of trouble for half an hour.”

And he, too, had his way, and kept his refugees.

V.

To measure out the merit of individuals in the war is an impossible task, but among the men who went in unknown to the public and came out resplendent in heroism for duty well done, Captain Clark of the _Oregon_ stands boldly out. She was the greatest ship of the seas, the best sailor, the hardest fighter. And Captain Clark was worthy to command the great

*DeWey sent a similar message to Von Diederichs at Manila, requesting the Germans to arrange their anchorage in such manner that they would not interfere with firing, if necessary. He received a similarly surly answer, to which DeWey made reply that it was of little consequence to himself if the Germans got in the way, but if they persisted they must expect to receive all shots, accidental or otherwise, that the Americans might find necessary to direct assault, if one were made. The Germans moved away. The German people are most courteous and kindly, but the autocracy created by militarism has made German army and naval officers the most insolent in the world. They usually yield to force and determination, however.
vessel whose journey of 15,000 miles to enter battle startled the world. Captain Gridley of the Olympia is another. Captain Evans of the Iowa, Commodore Phillip of the Texas, Lieutenant Wainwright of the Gloucester, Commander Todd of the Wilmington, and Lieutenant Gleave of the Cushing, proved to be men of independent resources and undoubted bravery. The American naval officer in the war proved to be a man of uniform high ability. Not one turned back from his duty or evaded any post of danger. The personnel of our navy is to-day not surpassed in any navy of the world. And the men behind the guns were the best yet shown in modern naval warfare.

A month after Manila the world was amused by an article in an English review, from the pen of a member of Parliament more celebrated for sensational eccentricities of opinion than for good sense, in which the assertion was made that Dewey's ships were manned with English gunners who were promised five hundred dollars per month each to enlist, because American gunners were notoriously incompetent. The Navy Department gave out an analysis of the muster rolls showing that there were but eight English-born men on Dewey's ships, and not one a gunner. Further, that the muster roll of the sailors of the American navy proved that ninety-five per cent. were native-born Americans. The writer of the article seemed to be entirely ignorant of the fact that in every sea fight between America and England, the Yankee had proved to be superior to his British cousin in marksman-ship.

Writers on the subject attribute our superiority to target practice, of which the American gunner gets more than in any other navy. Two kinds of target practice are required, sea practice and record practice. Sea practice is carried on six times each year and record practice once. Every vessel is required to carry out these instructions. This refers to normal times, for in the past year there has been three times the amount of target practice called for. This was because the government anticipated trouble with Spain. For purposes of sea practice a regulation target, anchored or not, or any suitable mark not smaller than a regulation target, may be used. Target practice may range between
eight hundred yards and three thousand yards or even higher, but is seldom beyond three thousand yards, and it is required that the speed of the ship shall not be less than eight knots when her batteries are opening fire. Sea practice is intended to simulate as nearly as practicable the conditions of actual battle, and the work of observing the fall of shots is not allowed to interfere unduly with a spirited and continuous fire. The ships are stripped, battle hatches are down, and sometimes forced draught is put on in order to simulate a chase, during which the batteries of some vessel are opened at the little target. At night there is frequently target practice with the aid of searchlights, but this is required only once a year.

At two sea practices annually the ship is cleared for action, and the men stationed as in actual battle, with necessary officers, aids, and quartermasters in conning tower, and all other officers at their stations. Ammunition is supplied in the manner that would actually be necessary in battle, and, except in case of emergency, orders are given by the means that would be employed in battle. Inducements, in the shape of prizes, are offered by the department to enlisted men to become expert gunners. In proportion to the extent of the navy the United States spends more money annually on target practice than any other service. Great Britain devotes a great deal of attention to it, but France and Germany give comparatively little. The Spanish have never spent much time at target practice because, their officers said, “it was simply throwing money in the sea.” But their real shooting threw a great deal more “into the sea.”
CHAPTER THE TWENTY NINTH.

FIGHTING LEADERS OF THE ARMY.

THE ALMOST ROMANTIC CAREER OF GENERAL NELSON A. MILES, COMMANDING THE ARMY—
FROM A LIEUTENANT AT TWENTY-TWO TO A MAJOR-GENERAL AT TWENTY-FIVE—
GENERAL MERRITT'S RAPID RISE IN THE CAVALRY ARM AT THE SAME TIME—
THE SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY AS DESCRIBED BY FOREIGNERS—A
VIVID DESCRIPTION OF THE CHARGE AT SAN JUAN—THE
LONDON "TIMES'S" DESCRIPTION OF OUR MEN.

I.

THE biography of Major-General Nelson A. Miles, commanding the army of the United States, when it shall be written, will be one as striking as a page of romance. Especially so will it be to Americans, who honor their free institutions, because they provide no royal road to success, but maintain a free highway along which natural capacity may find its way to all the honor it can achieve. General Miles's life is the romance of free democracy. When the Civil War began Nelson A. Miles was a clerk in a Boston business house, and twenty-two years old. At his own expense he recruited a company of volunteers, and offered their services to the government. The offer was accepted, but he was thought too young to be commissioned as their Captain, and was, instead, appointed a Lieutenant. Without protest he went to the front in that capacity. In three months the Lieutenant of twenty-two was Colonel of a regiment, a post he had won by gallantry and capacity; in three years the young man, then twenty-five, was Major-General, commanding a corps of 25,000 men, forming part of the line besieging Richmond, and it was to him that General Lee communicated his purpose to arrange for a surrender of the Confederate forces.

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General Miles was not a West Point graduate, but he was a graduate of the university of experience—studied in the tents and trenches and demonstrated his problems on the field of battle. In the Civil War he was three times wounded, four times brevetted for personal bravery in action. He had fought Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson, and was in every battle fought by the Army of the Potomac, but one, and a wound restrained him on that occasion. In every action he distinguished himself as a commander. There are few careers more suggestive of the glamour of romance than that of this young man who between his twenty-second and twenty-fifth year was rejected as a Captain because of his youth, and became a Major-General of the largest and most active army corps in the Richmond campaign, and to whom the fortune of war brought the offer of surrender of the Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate armies.

After the war was over General Miles was transferred to the regular army, and was sent to what was then the Far West, to subdue the hostile Indians. There he earned great renown as “the Indian Fighter” against the Comanches, Sioux, Nez Perces, Apaches, and other tribes, led by such Chiefs as Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Spotted Tail, Chief Joseph, and Geronimo, all daring fighters and skillful in tactics.

No man in the army of the United States has won and deserved more commissions than General Miles. They represent every grade from Lieutenant of Volunteers to Major-General in the regular establishment commanding all the armies of the United States. He has received votes of thanks of four legislatures, State and Territorial. In addition to a congressional medal of honor, the people of Arizona gave him a jeweled sword; for General Miles finally subdued the Indian tribes and retired them to their reservations, where they now live in peace and quiet, whereas they had been a continual menace to our frontier ever since the settlement of the West began.

General Miles has been called “The Winner of Bloodless Victories.” It is used to his honor by those who know him, and his record of preserving the life and health of his troops, and in derision by his enemies. In the Cuban invasion, as one of the war board, he insisted
upon disregarding the mere theatrical idea of assaulting Havana, where great loss of life must inevitably follow, and proposed the Santiago campaign; that is, he suggested the southern coast as the most healthful point for the first foothold and to let Havana wait for a cooler and more propitious season. These tactics he pursued in Porto Rico, and his orders have always been to preserve the health of troops, and to make war by the tactics that will result in least sacrifice of life.

He is a member of the International Peace Society and, like all good soldiers, regards war as the last resort when nothing can be used but force. He is about sixty years old, a gentleman in education, manner, taste, and habit, as well as by birth. He represented the United States army at the Jubilee of Victoria, and in the Greco-Turkish War.

Personally, General Miles is a very agreeable and unassuming gentleman; as an officer of the army he is celebrated for his careful observance of appearances, and in all aspects of his official position he looks as he is the General commanding the American army.

II.

A graduate of West Point Military Academy, Major-General Wesley Merritt was distinguished during the Civil War as a most successful cavalry leader. He, like General Miles, became a corps-commander before he was twenty-seven. He was graduated a year later than General Joseph Wheeler, and the two men were on opposing sides and of opposing temperaments. General Wheeler, ardent, fiery, yet tenacious, quick to pursue advantage or to retreat from error; General Merritt cool, contemplative, and working out the problem carefully before achieving his task. General Merritt served with Generals Sheridan and Custer. He has won all his honors by courage and ability, and possesses the temperament that inspires confidence in his troops.

It was the possession of the faculties of order, fine regulation, and coolness that singled him out to command the Philippines' army of invasion, and to be Military Governor of the conquered territory.
MAJOR-GENERAL WESLEY MERRITT
COMMANDING THE U.S. FORCES AT MANILA
For the same reason he had hardly secured a foothold before he was instructed to proceed to Paris to advise the United States peace commissioners respecting the Filipinos and the problems of government affecting the Philippine Islands. General Merritt was about sixty years old when he was sent on these important missions.

III

Among the leaders who were expected to fight in Cuba, none was more conspicuous than Major-General Fitzhugh Lee, of Virginia, who was commissioned to command the seventh army corps at the beginning of the war. General Lee had attracted national attention to himself by the courageous manner in which he bore himself toward Captain-General Weyler and afterwards toward Captain-General Blanco, while serving as Consul General of the United States at Havana. A graduate of West Point Academy, a cavalry leader of distinction in the Confederate army during the Civil War, a member of Congress, Governor of Virginia,—he had borne distinguished honors with credit to himself and his State. He was appointed Consul General by President Cleveland and had so emphasized the quality of his ability that he was continued at the post by President McKinley. It may be said, in fact, that General Lee's position at Havana transcended in importance that of a minister, and it was his open, brave and determined stand that put an end to the oppression laid upon American citizens in Cuba. It was intended that General Lee should lead the assault against the city of Havana in the autumn; but the sudden collapse of the war, following upon the splendid actions of the navy, rendered assault upon Havana unnecessary. There could be no doubt, however, that if opportunity had come to him, General Lee would have distinguished himself as he had in all other positions of responsibility.

Accounts of General Shafter and General Wheeler have been given in a previous chapter on the surrender of Santiago, as well as of other
brave and courageous leaders, such as Kent, Hawkins, Lawton, Chaffee, Wood, and Roosevelt. The men they led were worthy of the leaders. Descriptions of them by English correspondents will be interesting.

A correspondent of the London Daily Mail, who witnessed the charge at El Caney, thus described it: “When the afternoon came,—I lost exact count of time,—there was still a jumble of volleysing over by Caney. But in front our men were away out of sight behind a ridge far ahead. Beyond there arose a long, steepish ascent, crowned by the blockhouse upon which the artillery had opened fire in the morning.

“Suddenly, as we looked through our glasses, we saw a little black ant go scrambling quickly up this hill, and an inch or two behind him a ragged line of other little ants, and then another line of ants at another part of the hill, and then another, until it seemed as if somebody had dug a stick into a great ants’ nest down in the valley, and all the ants were scrambling away up hill. Then the volley firing began ten times more furiously than before; from the right beyond the top of the ridge burst upon the ants a terrific fire of shells; from the blockhouse in front of them machine guns sounded their continuous rattle. But the ants swept up the hill. They seemed to us to thin out as they went forward; but they still went forward. It was incredible, but it was grand. The boys were storming the hill. The military authorities were most surprised. They were not surprised at these splendid athletic daredevils of ours doing it. But that a military commander should have allowed a fortified and intrenched position to be assailed by an infantry charge up the side of a long exposed hill, swept by a terrible artillery fire, frightened them, not so much by its audacity as by its terrible cost in human life.

“As they neared the top the different lines came nearer together. One moment they went a little more slowly; then they nearly stopped; then they went on again faster than ever, and then all of us sitting there on the top of the battery cried with excitement. For the ants were scrambling all round the blockhouse on the ridge, and in a moment or two we saw them inside it. But then our hearts swelled
up into our throats, for a fearful fire came from somewhere beyond the blockhouse and from somewhere to the right of it and somewhere to the left of it. Then we saw the ants come scrambling down the hill again. They had taken a position which they had not the force to hold. But a moment or two and up they scrambled again, more of them, and more quickly than before, and up the other face of the hill to the left went other lines, and the ridge was taken, and the blockhouse was ours, and the trenches were full of dead Spaniards.

"It was a grand achievement—for the soldiers who shared it—this storming of the hill leading up from St. Juan River to the ridge before the main fort. We could tell so much at 2,560 yards. But we also knew that it had cost them dearly."

A correspondent of the London Times thus described the American soldier's outfit as compared with others:—

"In the way of clothing the American private carries a complete change of underdrawers, undershirts, socks, laced boots, and uniform trousers. My particular private was carrying a double allowance of socks, handkerchiefs, and underwear. He had a toothbrush and comb. That is the heavy marching order knapsack. For light marching, which is the usual manner, the man begins by spreading on the ground his half tent, which is about half the size of a traveling rug. On this he spreads his blanket, rolls it up tightly into a long, narrow sausage, having first distributed along its length a pair of socks, a change of underwear, and the two sticks of his one tent pole. Then he brings the ends of this canvas roll together, not closely, as in the German army, but more like the ends of a horseshoe held by a rope, which at the same time stops the ends of the roll tightly. When this horseshoe is slung over the man's shoulder it does not press uncomfortably upon his chest. The total weight is distributed in the most convenient manner for marching.

"The packing of the man's things is strictly according to regulation, excepting only the single pocket in his knapsack, where he may carry what he chooses, as he chooses. His light canvas haversack is much like the English one, and his round, rather flat water
flask is covered with canvas. It is made of tin, and the one I inspected was rusty inside. It would be better if of aluminum. In the haversack is a pannikin with a hinged handle that may be used as a saucepan. Over this fits a tin plate, and when the two are covering each other the handle of the pannikin fits over both by way of handle. It is an excellent arrangement, but should be of aluminum instead of a metal liable to rust. The most valuable part of this haversack is a big tin cup that can be used for a great variety of purposes, including cooking coffee. It is hung loose at the strap of the haversack. Of course, each man has knife, fork, and spoon, each in a leather case.

"The cartridge belt contains one hundred rounds, which are distributed all the way around the waist, there being a double row of them. The belt is remarkably light, being woven all in one operation. It is of cotton and another material, which prevents shrinking or loosening. The belts have stood admirably the test put upon them for the last six days, when it has rained every day, on top of the ordinary heavy moisture usual at sea in the tropics. The test is the more interesting from their having been previously in a very dry country. Officers and men alike unite in praise of this cartridge belt. The particular private whom I was inspecting said he now carried one hundred as easily as he formerly carried fifty. This belt rests loosely on the hips, without any straps over the shoulders. It is eminently business-like in appearance. The hat is the gray felt of South Africa, Australia, and every other part of the world where comfort and cost are consulted. No boots are blacked on expeditions of this kind. The men who form in line for guard duty have their tunics well brushed, but that may be due to extraneous assistance.

"For fighting purposes, then, the United States private has nothing to keep clean excepting his rifle and bayonet. He carries no contrivances for polishing buttons, boots, or the dozens of bits of accoutrement deemed essential to a good soldier in Europe. In Spain, for instance, the private, though he may have nothing in his
haversack, will, nevertheless, carry a clumsy outfit of tools for making his uniform look imposing.

"Now, as to discipline in the American army, I cannot speak at present, for the war is yet too young. It may, however, be worth noting that in this particular regiment, while most complete liberty was allowed the men all the twelve days of the rail journey from San Francisco to Tampa, not a single case of drunkenness or any other breach of discipline was reported. Among the one hundred and five men on this boat there has not in the past seven days been a single case of sickness of any kind, or any occasion for punishing. The firing discipline during the three times we have been under fire has been excellent, the obedience of soldiers to their officers has been as prompt and intelligent as anything I have seen in Europe; and as to coolness under fire and accuracy of aim, what I have seen is most satisfactory. The men evidently regard their officers as soldiers of equal courage and superior technical knowledge. To the Yankee private 'West Pointer' means what to the soldier of Prussia is conveyed by noble rank. In my intimate intercourse with officers and men aboard this ship I cannot recall an instance of an officer addressing a private otherwise than is usual when a gentleman issues an order. I have never heard an officer or non-commissioned officer curse a man. During the engagement of Cabañas the orders were issued as quietly as at any other time, and the men went about their work as steadily as bluejackets on a man-of-war."
CHAPTER THE THIRTIETH.

INTERESTING FACTS ABOUT WAR.

The Naval Lessons of the War with Spain, as Summed Up by a Naval Expert—Value of Armor and Guns, and the Danger of Wood—Torpedo Boats Proved to Be of Much Less Efficiency than Expected—Above All, Only the Best of Men Must Form Fighting Crews—Cost of Many Modern Wars in Treasure and Blood—Indemnities Paid by the Conquered Nation.

I.*

This battle [of Santiago] will be accepted by some naval experts as the only modern one that can be counted on for theoretical conclusions of value to the builders of war ships. In the Yalu River the inequality of the two sides in character caused students to hesitate about drawing many inferences from it. It is true we have only emphasized the Yalu lessons in many respects, but I think we can go ahead with the two together, one checking the other, to say positively that we have learned something.

To go back a bit, the ineffectiveness of a fleet against land batteries is demonstrated, I think, by our bombardment of San Juan and Santiago. We failed to reduce their works. We silenced them all right enough. As we gained in skill we were able to drive the gunners away very quickly. But their silence was only temporary, even when the batteries were weak and the conditions all favorable to our ships; when our guns numbered twenty to one.

Everybody knows by this time that the batteries guarding Santiago harbor are on the cliffs, some of them two hundred feet above the water line. This unquestionably makes them harder to hit, but it likewise increases the difficulty of their aim. We found out the

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*The entire article from the New York Commercial Advertiser, July 16, 1868, by an officer of the battleship Iowa.
difference in the latter respect when the same gunners (probably) came out in the ships. The first broadside from Cervera's squadron was much more effective than the fire of the shore batteries, and this, despite the fact that the range during the bombardment was often less than at the opening of the sea fight, when the Spaniards fired so well.

The ability of a watchful and efficient fleet to ward off hostile torpedo boats has been fully brought out. Here we have remained for months blockading a port in which there were always two torpedo boats. Our ships lay sometimes as close in as a mile off the entrance. And several attempts were made by the destroyers to attack us. None of them got out without being seen, and always they were driven back. Our readiness was the thing. In South American wars torpedo attacks have been successful several times, and the torpedo boats were nowhere near as swift and powerful as the Spanish destroyers *Furor* and *Pluton*. It is safe to say that we have shown that if a man-of-war is ready at all times to open up instantly an efficient rapid fire, that ship has little or nothing to fear from torpedo boats.

With the rapid-fire guns a modern vessel can throw a storm of shell into an enemy. A torpedo boat with her “paper” sides might as well sink herself before starting, so certain is she of destruction. There must be swarms of these boats to have any prospect of success against a modern ship of any size, even when the circumstances are most favorable for the attack. Searchlight tactics and the great service that they can do were well brought out off the blockade. Without the searchlights our fleet could not have kept the Spaniards penned up. Illuminating as we did, night after night, the entrance of the harbor, by swinging the lights slowly from side to side over all the water, nothing could have escaped unseen by the picket boats. Then, too, the light was of great service in indicating to the crews manning the guns just where to direct the fire. Since it was an invariable rule never to throw the beam of a searchlight on one of our own vessels, there could be no doubt left in the mind of the gun pointer as to the hostile character of the approaching vessel. It eliminated
all the delay and liability of error to which any verbal orders are so liable.

The necessity of a secondary fleet, as it might be called, was also shown. The number of important and hazardous missions was so great for these smaller vessels that they were more constantly on the go than the proverbial fashion butterfly in the height of the season. The work of these dispatch boats was most exhausting, and care should be taken that they be given great credit for their efficient and valuable services. Indeed, these smaller craft are noted for the lack of space aboard for "idlers."

It is obvious, of course, that a large supply fleet is indispensable. A ship cannot run without fuel, and in war times the boilers seem to eat up coal. Nor can a crew, no matter how brave, fight as well hungry as they can on a full stomach. "It is hard work fighting on cracker hash," so let there be plenty of supply ships. Our repair ship Vulcan was an indispensable adjunct, and so, of course, was the ammunition supply ship. After each engagement every ship brought her ammunition supply up to the limit, no matter how little she had used. The hospital ship possesses to a fleet not only the obvious use that makes it a necessity; it gets out of sight the wounded men, and it is a comforting thing to know it is near at hand.

Perhaps one of the most important lessons is the advantage of smokeless powder. With the incessant firing of our ships there was always smoke hanging round some part of the ship's batteries, though we had a gentle breeze, and the enemy was to windward of us. Fire from the guns had to be slackened again and again, and I doubt if the Colon could have escaped with so little punishment if the smoke from the few minutes of firing at the leading ships had not left a cloud which, combined with the firing of the smaller quick-fire guns, prevented the pointing of the heavier guns. Of course, with a quick-fire gun, any temporary lifting of the smoke will give plenty of time to deliver a fire, but with the slower firing turret guns the view must be unimpeded for some time. The smoke from our guns did the enemy no harm either, as some part of the ship was almost bound
to protrude, and with this assistance his guns could be laid. Both sides were even in this, however, since, with the exception of the Colon, none of the Spanish ships had smokeless powder. The Colon did not have any heavy guns in her turrets, as they had not been completed. Wash deck gear, it is said, filled up their turrets, but the turrets could not have been so small as that would imply.

The teachings of Mahan about men were fully borne out. The great lesson of the war is the importance of the personnel. Poor men make poor ships. No matter how brave and efficient the officers may be, they cannot fight well with a poor crew. Thirty men, however alive, cannot infuse their knowledge and enthusiasm into five hundred others. The officers may make the men stand up at the guns and prevent them from jumping overboard, by closing the half-ports, and by other means, but they cannot cause other than real men-of-war's men to put up a good fight. No wonder that the crews of some of the Spanish ships wanted to jump overboard on coming out of the harbor. All the men were conscripts, and six hundred had been impressed just before the departure of the fleet from the Canaries. It is said that all the jails there were opened and the male factors taken aboard the Spanish ships. You can force a man aboard a ship, but you can’t force him to fight.

Our men had another advantage. They had had gun practice. Most of the gunners were on personally affectionate terms with their guns, had made bull’s-eyes with them, and not only ached to train them on the enemy, but had such confidence in their marksmanship that fear was out of the question. The crews simply knew they could lick the other fellows, and their whole interest was in their own ships, not in those of the enemy. The Spaniards are not cowards, yet their impulse from the first was to dive out of their ships. They felt sure of defeat.

I value, too, the moral effect on the men of large ships. That also gives confidence. The resistance of thick armor was illustrated in some instances. Battle is a better test than the conditions of the proving ground. On the Colon’s 6-inch armor the nose of quite a good-sized projectile was found sticking, and a large 12-inch common
shell had exploded on it without doing any damage. However, on the *Vizcaya* a large shell had entered well aft in the cabin and had passed right through, tearing off a plate on the other side; she was not armored. On the *Iowa* two large shells struck well forward at the water line, but on the unarmored part of the ship. The first, a 6-inch, did not even perforate the cofferdam, but, though it pulverized the cellulose, it is still in the cofferdam, the inner side of which it did not penetrate. Moreover, as it did not explode, the rotating band being recovered entire, though separated from the shell, it presumably was an armor-piercing shell. Surely it must have had little velocity. This is the more surprising, as the Spanish ships all had the long, high-power English guns. Still the blow probably was an oblique one. The other big shell also struck the water line, just a few feet aft of the first one, and made a clean hole in the cofferdam. Striking a hatch well amidships, it exploded, but the pieces seem to have been carried along, most of them going through the chain locker, which is right abreast the hatch. There are seven good-sized holes through it, besides any number of dents. The chain locker happened to be empty, so the pieces passed through into the midship chain locker, where they were caught by the chain. One of them passed through the after side of the chain locker and struck the base of the turret. Most of the pieces were picked up around the deck in the immediate vicinity and in the chain locker, showing that the force of the bursting charge must have been slight. One of the pieces gave the arc of the base of the shell, which proved to be a 12-inch. The ship was struck by a number of other smaller shells, once on a stanchion aft, probably any number of times on the armor, and scars made by two small-arm bullets were discovered on the muzzle face of one of the after 12-inch guns. Everything would tend to emphasize the superiority of armored ships over unarmored ones. Such a riddling as some of the Spanish ships received could not have been inflicted on any of our ships that were engaged.

Everything goes to prove the value of the battleship. The power it has to keep off torpedo boats and rapid-fire fusilade, and the
confidence a battleship inspires in the crew, all go to show the value of the type.

The importance of having no woodwork aboard, and making the most perfect provisions against fire, cannot be overestimated. Fire was what destroyed the Spanish fleet, and not only the fire from our ships but that aboard their own. Now, they had little wood aboard any of the vessels, yet no one of them was under fire more than a few minutes (about fifteen) before smoke could be seen rising from the decks. It seems even the cork paint burned. One fire on the Vizcaya was extinguished, but others started quickly, both forward and aft. The water mains were shot away, and the fight had to be given up. Something must be done to protect these mains hereafter in every fighting ship. Fire and smoke always have the worst possible effect on the crew, and, owing to the great number of hatches and compartments on the ship, flames are the harder to discover and fight. It was found simply impossible to keep fighting both the fire and the ship, the gunfire slackening up immediately the alarm was given. So clear did this become that whenever the flame and smoke could be seen from our fleet it was felt that all was up with that ship, and the tendency was to direct our gun fire on some other ship. Without an exception every ship that was on fire was soon headed in for the beach. It is a fallacy to think that fire drill is all a matter of form on a steel ship. So quickly and rapidly does the fire spread that it seems that even the steel itself must be burning. The importance, also, of keeping watch in every compartment for fire was shown.

There was the greatest difficulty during all the action in getting messages to and from the different parts of the ship. The noise and concussions were too great to allow of the use of any kind of voice tubes, and messengers are slow and unreliable, and in danger of being killed. A serious error was made by the messengers on one ship. An order which was intended for the secondary battery only was taken to the turret. The messenger told the officer in one of the 12-inch turrets to point on the torpedo boats, and a chance at the Colon was missed. Unless some better means of communication is invented,
officers shut off as they are from any direct orders must be left to act largely at their own discretion. This, at times, would be most unfortunate, as in the sighting hoods of the turrets, especially, the view is so limited that it is often difficult to keep even the target in sight, much less to have the complete range over the horizon that is so necessary for proper gun control. Then, too, in case of accident, some method of reporting promptly to the Captain is needed.

This fight probably gave a severe blow to the use of conning towers. So far, I can learn of no case where they were used during the engagement, the Captain preferring not to cramp himself and be confined in such narrow quarters, where he could see so little of what is occurring. Every one has to rely chiefly on his eyes for a knowledge of how the fight is going, and in the conning tower the range of view is about as limited as in the sighting hood.

It was also shown that a practical battle range finder has yet to be introduced. Those in use are so delicate that they cannot withstand the discharge of the guns. They get out of order in action, so that the old method of angling on the masthead height of the enemy has to be relied on. Even the range indicators, simple as they seem to be, were completely thrown out by the gun blasts, and every one, to a greater or lesser extent, had to use his own judgment in giving the range, and without smokeless powder the opportunities for a prompt correction of range were rare. I do not think the old fork system of establishing the range has gone out for good.

A full knowledge of the nature of the blasts from the different guns is valuable to the crew, and to the designers of the ships it will be all-important. Some of the rapid-fire guns suffered so from the blasts of the turret guns that the gun crews were actually blown away from their stations. In other cases the smoke of the firing was so great that the gun pointers were blinded by it. The taste and the smell of the gunpowder was so objectionable that many of the gun crews found it necessary to wrap towels about their mouths. If this is the case with ordinary old brown cocoa powder, it must be much worse with the smokeless. Indeed, it would be a necessity to
have the fumes from the smokeless powder made harmless in some way, otherwise it will be impossible to keep any of the guns manned during a rapid fire. This suggests the use in the shells of some explosive giving forth poisonous fumes.

Another interesting thing brought out by the action was the extremely short time the Spanish ships were under our fire before something happened that demoralized the crews. It would show that every man on the ship must be so trained in his duties that he knows exactly what to do in case of accident, for there will be no time to wait and summon assistance.

The value of cofferdams was conclusively shown by the swelling up of the cellulose so that it closed the 6-inch hole. To be sure the hole was only occasionally submerged, and the cofferdam itself was not penetrated.

One of the great dangers to be avoided was shown to be splinters. A great number of the wounded was laid out by splinters rather than by the fragments of shot or shell. Steel splinters are very bad. If one could get a ship that was absolutely splinter-proof and fire-proof, it would be a long stride in the direction of the ideal—something "unsinkable and unlickable."

II.*

In the earlier wars of the century some notable precedents have been made from which an idea may be formed of the size of the bill shortly to be made out by the United States against Spain. The principle followed has been that, both in territory and in cash, the defeated nation is liable to pay for its experience. A far-off but famous illustration of this principle is found in the terms of peace dictated by the allied powers of Europe to France, after the fall of Napoleon at Waterloo. Not only were

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*Entire article from the New York Sun, July 24, 1898.
various pieces of French territory appropriated, but her important frontier fortresses were held for five years by an “army of occupation,” which the French treasury was made to pay and support.

As a result of the three wars between Great Britain and China, (1840, 1857, and 1860), the Chinese government, besides ceding Hong Kong to the victorious British, and opening several of her ports to trade, was made to pay an indemnity amounting in all to about $35,-000,000. In the case of the war between the United States and Mexico, when the terms of peace were dictated by our government, compensation was taken wholly in territory. Mexico was too poor at that time to have paid a cash indemnity equivalent to the cost of the war, which was about $100,000,000. So we took California and New Mexico instead of money, and considered the bargain so good that we paid $15,000,000 to the Mexican Government, as an additional consideration for the transfer.

Although not strictly a war indemnity, that paid by Great Britain on account of the depredations of the Alabama during our Civil War, is of timely interest as exemplifying the extent to which claims for compensation may be built up and cut down. As originally put forward, the American claims practically comprised every item in the expense of the war from the day on which the Alabama put to sea. The prolongation of the war was attributed entirely to her, and she was, therefore, made responsible for this, as well as for the loss suffered by American commerce through its transference to foreign vessels and the increased rates of maritime insurance. The Geneva tribunal, however, decided that such indirect results of the Alabama’s depredations could not be included in the bill, and awarded an indemnity of $15,875,000 as an equivalent for the injury actually done to the United States through the fault or negligence of England.

The recent war between China and Japan was terminated by the peace of Shimonoseki three years ago. By the treaty China agreed to pay Japan a sum equivalent to $175,000,000. In addition, she ceded the island of Formosa to her conquerors, recognized the independence of Korea, and consented to open four new treaty ports.
The war between Prussia and Austria, in 1866, was rounded off by the payment of a notable indemnity by the vanquished Austrians. In addition to the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia and the exclusion of Austria from the German Bund, the treaty of Prague, which terminated the war, provided for the payment by Austria of an indemnity of 40,000,000 Prussian thalers, or about $30,000,000. From this amount, however, deduction was made of 15,000,000 thalers, representing Austrian claims on Schleswig-Holstein, and 5,000,000 thalers as an equivalent for the free maintenance of the Prussian army in Austria, pending the conclusion of peace.

The heaviest war indemnity of modern times was, of course, that paid by France at the close of the war with Germany. The hostilities lasted over eight months, and the total cost of the war was estimated at $1,580,000,000. Besides the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, France had to pay Germany five milliards of francs ($1,000,000,000), in installments, which were allowed to extend over three years. The original demand of Germany was six milliards, or $200,000,000 more. M. Thiers strove in vain to save Metz, but it was to his exertions that the reduction in the amount of the indemnity was due.

The cost of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 has been estimated at $945,000,000. Between the declaration of war by Russia and the treaty of San Stefano near eleven months elapsed. By this treaty the Porte admitted itself indebted to Russia in the sum of 1,410,000,000 rubles (about $725,000,000) as indemnity for the losses and expenses of the war. The items in the account were as follows:—

Four hundred and sixty million dollars for war expenses; $205,000,000 for damage done to the south coast of Russia, her export commerce, industries, and railways; $55,000,000 for injuries caused by the invasion of the Caucasus, and $5,000,000 for injuries suffered by Russian subjects and establishments in Turkey. In consideration of the financial embarrassments of the Ottoman Empire, the Czar consented to accept in substitution for about three-fifths of the total sum the various territorial cessions sanctioned by the treaty of
Berlin. This left a balance of $225,000,000 due to Russia by Turkey, and a part of it is still unpaid.

The latest and most lenient war indemnity was that levied by victorious Turkey on Greece last year. The Sultan was obliged by the Great Powers of Europe to cut it down to $20,000,000, which was not a fourth part of what it actually cost him.

A few comparative figures, taken from official records, will serve to put the great increase in the cost of war as now conducted, with all the modern improvements, in a clear light. Our war for independence lasted eight years, and its cost is officially recorded as $135,000,000, using round figures. There were about 310,000 troops engaged in that war—one-third more than have been called out in the present conflict with Spain. It follows that, accepting Mr. Dingley's estimate of $500,000,000 a year as the cost of the present war, it is going to cost three times as much to fight Spain for one year in 1898 as it cost to fight Great Britain for the eight years from 1775 to 1783. The War of 1812, which lasted two years and eight months, cost the United States a little over $107,000,000, and to carry it on we put in the field 576,000 troops, nearly three times as many as we have now under arms.

The Mexican War, which lasted two years and three months, cost the American people $100,000,000, and 112,000 troops were engaged in it. If the number of the troops who carried our flag victoriously to the capital of Mexico had been doubled they would have about equaled the number of the army now in the field against Spain, and the cost of their two years and three months of operations would have been about $200,000,000. From this it is a plain deduction that, with the same number of men under arms, a year of war in 1898 is about five times as expensive as was a year of war in 1846.

The cost of our great civil conflict has been put down at $6,189,929,909, but that estimate includes all expenses growing out of the war, as well as the actual cost of the military and naval operations. The direct outlay of the United States Government in carrying on the war for four years was $3,400,000,000, and in the course of the struggle
2,859,132 Union troops were engaged. It is estimated that the number of troops actually engaged on the Union side averaged 2,326,168 for three years. Hence, it appears that the direct cost of the war, counting it on this three years' basis, was about $1,466,000,000 a year. But Mr. Dingley has told us that it will cost $500,000,000 to keep 200,000 men fighting Spain for one year, which is more than one-third as much as it cost the government to keep 2,326,000 men fighting the Confederate States for the same length of time.

It is easy to understand why modern warfare is so much more costly than the old-fashioned kind, if we turn to a few of the leading items in the military and naval expenditure of our time. The average cost of a first-class battleship is $3,000,000. The cost of the Maine, which was a battleship of the second class, was $2,500,000. An armored cruiser of the Brooklyn type costs $3,000,000. An armored ram like the Katahdin costs $1,000,000. A double-turreted monitor costs about $1,500,000. A single-turreted monitor costs about $500,000. A protected cruiser costs all the way from $1,000,000 to $2,700,000; the Charleston cost the former, and the Columbia the latter sum. An unprotected cruiser of the Detroit type costs $600,000. An unarmed gunboat like the Concord is worth $500,000. A composite gunboat of the Newport class costs $230,000. A dynamite gunboat like the famous Vesuvius is worth $350,000. A torpedo boat of the Farragut pattern costs $225,000.

We have not lost any of our vessels in the war with Spain. The Maine, destroyed in Havana harbor before the war began, is the only item of this kind that will figure in the coming bill of costs. The Maine cost about $2,500,000 to build. A more serious item will be compensation for the lives of the two hundred and sixty-six American sailors that were destroyed with her. This may well justify a claim of $5,000,000 more, to be distributed among the surviving families of the men who were thus treacherously killed. Other items in the bill will cover our general war expenses of all kinds; for coal used at sea, for transportation of our soldiers by land and by sea, for war supplies of all kinds, for the pay of our soldiers and sailors, and for the losses
sustained by the interruption and disturbance of our trade and commerce, not only with Cuba, but with other parts of the world.

The Quartermaster's department has estimated that $44,000,000 will be needed to pay the transportation charges alone of our armies now engaged in fighting Spain for six months. The Navy Department's latest estimate of the cost of furnishing our fleets in time of peace with all their necessary equipment—of which coal is the leading article—was nearly $1,500,000 a year. The exigencies of war have certainly doubled it. This has nothing to do with the cost of guns or the ammunition or the torpedoes. It covers only such things as coal, hemp, wire, anchors, cables, chains, nautical instruments, lamps, bunting, and other things that come strictly under the head of "ships' equipments."

The high cost of modern ordnance and ammunition will also help swell Spain's indemnity bill. A complete supply of ammunition to fill once all the vessels sent to sea against Spain costs about $4,750,000. One battleship's full supply of shot and shell costs about $400,000. Every time one of our monster 13-inch guns is fired the charge costs $1,500; a great many of these charges are already included in our little account against Spain. The smaller guns are fired at a cost running all the way from $200 up to $1,000 for each charge. The guns themselves are costly, too. The bill for one hundred high-power steel guns for seacoast defenses, built at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, is $3,500,000—averaging $35,000 apiece.

Mr. Dingley's estimate of $500,000,000 as the cost of our war operations against Spain for a year covers all these things, and is probably a calculation well within the actual expenditure. Even though Spain sues for peace quickly, it is not possible for our government to avoid a large portion of this estimated outlay, as the troops have been called out and contracts of all kinds have been made for months ahead.
III.

The cost to the United States of the war with Spain cannot yet be known. The actual expenditures during hostilities and the expenditures in prospect may be estimated with something like accuracy. But there always follows a train of consequential expenditures for the payment of claims, pensions, etc., which cannot be foreseen. The first money appropriated for the war was the $50,000,000 put into the hands of the President for national defense, without debate or a single opposing vote, on March 9. Of this the President gave to the navy nearly $30,000,000, to the War Department nearly $20,000,000. Small sums went to the Treasury and State Departments. New vessels were purchased for the navy, at a total cost of $17,750,000, before war began. The auxiliary cruisers Harvard and Yale were chartered at a rental of $2,000 per day, the St. Louis and St. Paul at $2,500 per day. To fire one 13-inch armor-piercing shell costs $560; to fire an 8-inch shell costs $134. Many thousands of the latter and hundreds of the former were discharged during the war. Secretary Long estimated that the cost of supplying the vessels of our navy with complete ammunition, sufficient for one prolonged battle, would be $6,521,985. All might be fired in one day. Admiral Dewey carried one million dollars' worth of ammunition to Manila when he passed Corregidor Island. Every time his fleet passed before Montejo's squadron, delivering broadsides, it cost the government at least $100,000. In three hours he burned up $500,000 of ammunition, and sunk $10,000,000 of Spanish property. The same amount was expended by Sampson's fleet in sinking Cervera's ships, valued at $16,500,000.

Assistant Secretary of War Vanderlip, in an article in McClure's Magazine,* from which these facts are taken, says:

As a matter of fact, only $98,000,000 was paid out by the Treasury Department, on account of the army and navy, during the actual continuance of the war, from

*October, 1888.
March until August 12, when the Protocol was signed. The following statement will show these expenditures in detail, and will give a graphic idea of the immensely greater expenditure for the army than for the navy, although in the present war the navy accomplished the greater results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>$600,000</td>
<td>$2,400,000</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>$12,000,000</td>
<td>9,800,000</td>
<td>$11,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>$16,500,000</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>$23,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>$29,500,000</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>$35,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12</td>
<td>$5,500,000</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
<td>$7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$65,300,000</td>
<td>$32,700,000</td>
<td>$98,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual Treasury outlay for the war he estimates at about $361,000,000. "The government," he adds, "actually paid out an average of $860,000 for each day of the Spanish-American War. To this must be added, however, an estimate of fifty per cent. of accounts not yet presented for settlement, which will bring the total up to approximately a million and a quarter a day. And this maximum of expense continued for several weeks after the close of the war, the subsistence of troops and their transportation remaining very much the same as if an actual state of hostility still existed. . . . Accepting the statistics of Mulhall as to the National Treasury cost of our own Civil War, each day of that war cost the Federal Government an average of $2,476,760. It will thus be seen that, unless when all accounts are rendered a much different result from that anticipated appears, the daily cost of the Spanish-American War was only about fifty per cent. of that of the Civil War. It must be remembered, however, that there were millions of men in the field during the latter struggle, where only a quarter of a million were engaged in the Spanish-American War, and if actual figures could be given of the cost of the late war based upon the number of men engaged, it would probably be found that the cost of fighting has not been reduced with the introduction of improved arms and ships."

Mr. Charles A. Conant* gives the following interesting table of appropriations on the war account, voted by Congress:

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*Article in the *American Review of Reviews*, September, 1898.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Appropriations Made during the Second Session of the Fifty-Fifth Congress to Meet Expenses Incident to the War with Spain.

For the national defense, act March 3, 1898 .............................................. $50,117,000.00
Army and navy deficiencies, act May 4, 1898 ............................... $4,625,726.71
 Naval appropriation act, May 4, 1898 — amount of increase over preceding naval appropriation act .................................................. 23,055,546.49
Fortification appropriation act, May 7, 1898 — amount of increase over act as passed by House .................................................. 5,222,882.00
 Naval auxiliary act, May 26, 1898 .................................................. 2,000,000.00
Additional clerical force, War Department, auditors’ offices, etc., act May 31, 1898 .................................................. 227,976.45
Life-saving Service act, June 7, 1898 .................................................. 70,000.00
Army and navy deficiencies act, June 8, 1898 ............................... 18,015,000.00
 Appropriations in act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, June 13, 1898 .................................................. 600,000.00
Army, navy, and other war expenses for six months, beginning July 1, 1898, in general deficiency act .................................. 226,604,261.46
 Expenses of bringing home remains of soldiers .................................. 200,000.00

Total ............................................................................. $381,788,055.11

He also prepared a very interesting table showing the difference between army and navy warrants drawn during corresponding months of peace and war, in 1897 and 1898;—

FOR THE ARMY.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>WARRANTS DRAWN IN 1898</th>
<th>WARRANTS DRAWN IN 1897</th>
<th>EXCESS IN 1898</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>$5,159,571</td>
<td>$3,046,103</td>
<td>$2,113,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>6,223,814</td>
<td>4,267,020</td>
<td>1,956,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>17,088,586</td>
<td>4,214,565</td>
<td>12,874,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>19,723,904</td>
<td>2,886,016</td>
<td>16,837,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>34,774,163</td>
<td>10,736,768</td>
<td>24,037,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1-18</td>
<td>14,315,000</td>
<td>2,732,000</td>
<td>11,583,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$97,299,937</td>
<td>$27,952,852</td>
<td>$69,337,085</td>
</tr>
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</table>

FOR THE NAVY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>WARRANTS DRAWN IN 1898</th>
<th>WARRANTS DRAWN IN 1897</th>
<th>EXCESS IN 1898</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>$5,241,443</td>
<td>$2,694,885</td>
<td>$2,546,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>9,083,577</td>
<td>2,637,576</td>
<td>6,446,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>9,506,021</td>
<td>3,683,922</td>
<td>5,823,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>8,514,279</td>
<td>2,988,809</td>
<td>5,525,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>4,460,000</td>
<td>1,788,000</td>
<td>2,672,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1-18</td>
<td>$49,402,252</td>
<td>$16,277,221</td>
<td>$33,125,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$146,682,189</td>
<td>$44,280,073</td>
<td>$102,402,116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*
Mr. Conant estimates the actual cost of the war at between $250,000,000 and $251,000,000 over and above the peace footing.

The United States demanded no money indemnity from Spain. It will receive Porto Rico instead — without counting the Philippines possibility or the eventual contingency of the annexation of Cuba. These would prove sources of large revenue, but would, for a long time, necessitate heavy garrison expenditures.

So, that, counting not lives, nor pensions, or anything future, the cost of our war with Spain will prove to be about $300,000,000.

* The warrants drawn for the War Department in July, 1897, were abnormally large because the sum of $6,047,220 was drawn for river and harbor improvements. The amount thus drawn in July, 1898, was less than $2,000,000, so that the real excess of expenditures on account of the military service is $4,000,000 greater than appears in the table. The drafts for river and harbor improvements are always large in July, because disbursing officers then inaugurate their accounts for the new fiscal year with ample balances.
CHAPTER THE THIRTY-FIRST.

ASPECTS AND INCIDENTS.

THE WORK OF WAR CORRESPONDENTS AND REPORTERS—ENORMOUS COST OF THE SERVICE—
NO WAR IN HISTORY EVER SO PROMPTLY AND FULLY DESCRIBED—MATERIAL FOR HIS-
TORIANS—INCIDENTS AND ANECDOTES OF SOLDIERS IN THE CAMP, IN BATTLE,
AND IN HOSPITALS—HOW SOME HEROES DIED AND OTHERS SUFFERED—
NAVAL ANECDOTES—ACTS OF GREAT BRAVERY—BOWERY MUSIC
AT GUAM—AGUIALDO'S FINE BAND—SPANISH AND
AMERICAN SAILORS CONTRASTED.

Two or three days after Sampson's fleet had moved out of Key
West to blockade Havana, the cable brought from Berlin a re-
port that the German Emperor was "greatly
amused at the idea of a fleet of war ships
going to battle accompanied by a fleet of newspaper
dispatch boats." It is fortunate that amusement, like
happiness, is purely a relative joy. The German Emperor was to
see the fleet of dispatch boats forward reports of the progress of the
war (subsequently confirmed by acknowledgments of his own military
and naval observers), that proved beyond doubt the superiority, in
mettle and capacity, of men reared under the influence of a free
press, over those stunted by the existence of a truckling press, held
in terror by fear of prosecutions for free speech. He was to read in
the leading papers of his own empire—edited by men who were not
afraid to speak the truth, that his own fine standing armies, formed
by conscription and under compulsion, were not better than the
armies of the United States formed by volunteer enlistments, making
up in quick intelligence and initiative what his own soldiers learned
through despotic drill, and long service rendered with indifference.
Also, that his reserves were not better than our volunteers.

The "fleet of dispatch boats," which so amused the Emperor, was
the navy of modern journalism, not less wonderful in its perform-

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ances than the fighting navy. Its land forces, the war correspondents with the army, composed a worthy arm of the great establishment of trained journalism.

It remained for the newspapers of the United States to demonstrate to international journalism, through their employes, the same superior vigor, courage, endurance, and success in the labors on sea and land that our army and navy demonstrated against the antiquated and incompetent mechanisms and ideas of war put forth by a country restrained of free speech and manacled with ignorance.

Never before in the world’s history was the progress of a great war so completely and so promptly described. It seemed as if American journalism, responding to the desire of the enormous clientele it had established, mobilized its forces concurrently with army and navy to make war on all the precedents of journalistic achievement. On land and sea the American newspaper reporter was everywhere. He was an army in himself. He stood on the bridge of the *Olympia* at Manila with Dewey, and was complimented for his accuracy of statement and his courage; he stood by Schley on the *Brooklyn*, raced with Sampson on the *New York*, and watched the battle on the *Oregon*. He went into the fight at Las Guasimas with the cavalry heroes, and stormed El Caney with Lawton, being, in fact, the first man in the fort.

Who can doubt the heroism of Hobson? But was it more, in truth—apart from its setting—than that of Marshall, the correspondent, who, shot through the spine at Las Guasimas, dictated his report of the battle to a colleague, while death seemed to wait on his sentences? Was it more than that of Creelman, who forced the fort at El Caney and met a bullet for his pains, and who, suffering agonies of pain, asked to be kept conscious until he could dictate his notes to his employer? These actions have been equaled by journalists everywhere, but they have never been surpassed.

More than these incidents, which illustrate the courage, audacity, and determination of the reporter, was the extraordinary spectacle of an unfettered press giving news, opinions, and speculations from the front as openly as if it were discussing local news at home. Except
for a short time, and with respect to specific information, there was no censorship. It was the test of a free press. Plans of battle, faults of execution, complaints of every sort were made public. If there remain any secrets of the campaign in Cuba it must be because no experienced correspondent or raw novice thought the affair worth the telling.

Perhaps there was much inaccuracy of detail, errors of judgment in trusting rumor as facts, some mistaken "enterprise," if not, indeed, actual dishonesty in the haste and difficulty of the news service. Even the press harbors its due proportion of incompetents and rascals whose faults intrude everywhere; but the substantial foundations of accurate reports of battles, marches, truces, and casualties, occurring from day to day, were confirmed to the shame of fraud. But were there not also similar errors in official military and naval reporting—more than are known, perhaps, mercifully covered up in the archives at Washington. Generals and Admirals are not more infallible than reporters. But the reporter's mistake is open to the whole world to be tested and revised. His accuracy is measured against all the information the world may possess. Are not General Wheeler and General Kent brave, efficient, and honest leaders? But if the world depended upon their reports of San Juan for knowledge of the battle, the result would be a blank. Five hundred separate persons, perhaps, have described the battles of San Juan and El Caney. There are five hundred very different descriptions in details, but in the essentials the story is the same in all. No American naval officer off Santiago knew in what order the Spanish ships came out of the harbor until five days after the battle, when the Spanish survivors cleared up the confusion. Yet the morning after the great fight the American papers contained all the material facts correctly, the errors being those of mere detail. Nine hours before the President received Admiral Sampson's official dispatch, announcing the victory, the news of the fight was in the hands of every daily newspaper in America.

No war ever left such a wonderful mass of material for historians. It is not only the great newspapers and the news-gathering associations
that are to be considered. These sent experienced correspondents and observers capable of describing and understanding great events, but there was also a real “army” of correspondents of the “home papers.” Every regiment and company had its enlisted reporter or correspondent, whose letters to the town or village paper will lend a new interest to the history of war. And all these reported the opinion of the general movement or the great events. Then, all the newspapers were deluged with private letters from soldiers to their families at home. The intelligence of the United States was writing the history of the war which it was prosecuting. Only the archives of the Navy, War, and State Departments are to be opened to complete the material.

Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, himself a correspondent at the front, in an article describing how war news was reported,* gives these interesting ideas of the difficulty and cost: “When actual war [with Spain] was approaching,” he writes, “a more extended service became necessary, and each of several newspapers acquired a veritable fleet of vessels, three, or four, or five, to patrol the waters of the West Indies. These newspaper dispatch boats were swift-going steamers, capable of making from twelve to fourteen knots an hour, and carrying crews of a dozen men or more, with several correspondents on each. Two dispatch boats, representing New York newspapers, were private yachts, fitted with dynamos, powerful searchlights, and a hundred and one other conveniences. Until war had been declared the whole cargo of these vessels in their trips between Havana and Key West, was a little package of copy that a man might carry in his vest pocket, and yet they were exceedingly expensive, as shipowners exacted from $5,000 to $9,000 a month for the use of each boat, and the newspapers were required to bear the additional expense of fire, marine, accident, and war insurance, which the alarmed underwriters of New York had fixed at the enormous rate of eight per cent. a month. One New York newspaper paid $2,200 a month insurance on

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*McClure’s Magazine, September, 1898.
a single vessel, and it had five boats in service. But besides these expenses the newspapers had to buy their own coal and supplies at war-time prices, and pay the salaries of the correspondents who directed the boats. One managing editor showed a salary list for a single week, including only war correspondents. It amounted to $1,463.51, and the best-paid correspondent hailing from New York is said to have received $10,000 a year.

"Every time a dispatch boat made port in Havana harbor a rapacious Spanish officer swooped down upon it and collected all manner of fees—health-office fees, customhouse fees, and fees for clear water to use in the boilers, to say nothing of pilotage charges—a total of from $70 to $125 a day for this purpose alone. At the Key West end of the voyage there were still further charges, rendered necessary by the inevitable medical certificate and the pilot hire. Expenses were paid in cash, and the correspondents found it necessary to go loaded down with all they could carry."

Sometimes a single paper received 5,000 words a day by cable from Key West, and as the rate from Key West to New York is five cents a word, this made an additional expense of $250 a day for this single item. This in the face of the fact that after a dispatch was received it was often crowded out by more important news. Every message received by cable from Hong Kong cost $1.60 per word.

The result of all this vast expenditure, of the labors of reporters, whose perils, exposures, hardships, and endurance were not less than those of the fighting forces, was that the American people knew the progress of the war by the hour. The newspapers kept the government itself informed far in advance of its own sources of information, in many instances.

The newspaper press came out of the war not less broadened than the nation itself.
II.

The newspapers were filled with anecdotes and personal incidents, pathetic and humorous, both of the army and navy. They impart the true color of life to the game of war and illustrate the heroism of the obscure as well as of the leaders. A Red Cross nurse in the hospital at Siboney during the battle of Santiago wrote: "A striking feature of the first day's engagement was the number of men wounded in the head, arms, and upper part of the body—the unerring aim of Spanish sharpshooters concealed in trees. Some of these cases—the most severely wounded—were taken into the Red Cross hospital, where they would receive the most skillful and gentle nursing. Two days of steady strain began to show on the Sisters. But nobody thought of meals; the one thing was to feed and nurse the four hundred and seventy-five wounded and sick men. Human endurance, however, had its limit, and unless the Sisters could get a little rest they would give out. I went on duty for twenty-four hours, and at night, with the assistance of one man, taking care of twenty-three patients—fever, measles, and dysentery cases, and three badly wounded men.

"Among the latter were Captain Mills, of the First Cavalry, and William Clark, a private in the Twenty-fifth Infantry regulars. They were brought over from the hospital tents and placed on cots on the little porch, where there was just space enough to pass between the cots. Their wounds were very similar, in the head, and of such a character as to require cool applications to the eyes constantly. Ice was worth its weight in gold, for the lives of these men, as well as of others, depended chiefly on cool applications to the eyes, with as uniform temperature as possible. We had one small piece of ice, carefully wrapped in a blanket. There never was a small piece of ice that 'went so far.' If I were to tell the truth about it nobody would believe it. Never in my life, I think, have I wished for anything so much as I wished for ice that night. It was applied by chipping it in small pieces, or bits, put in thin dry cotton cloth, folded over
in just the right size, and flat, to place across the eyes and forehead—enough of it to be cold but not heavy on the wounds. The ears of the sick are strangely acute. Whenever the sick men heard the sound of chipping ice they begged for ice water—even the smallest bit of ice in a cup of water was begged for with an eagerness that was pitiful. I felt conscience-stricken. But it was a question of saving the eyes of the wounded men, and there was no other way. To make the ice last till morning, I stealthily chipped it off so the sick men would not hear the sound.

"At midnight a surgeon came over from his tent ward with a little piece of ice, not larger than his hand. I do not know his name, but it does not matter—it was inscribed above. 'This is all we can spare,' he said. 'Take it. You must keep these wounds cool, at all hazards. I have another case, very like these, wounded in the head. I want to bring him over here, where he will be sure of exactly the same nursing. His life depends on the care he will get in the next twenty-four hours. Have you a vacant cot?'

"There was not a vacant cot, though we could make room for one on the porch if he could find the cot. He thought he could, and went back, taking the precious bit of ice that he really needed more than we did. In the course of half an hour the surgeon returned to say it was impossible to get a cot anywhere, and the wounded man must be left where he was in the tent—at least until morning.

"And so it went on through the long night—the patient suffering of the sick men, the heroism of the wounded—all fearing to give any trouble, desiring not to do so, and grateful for the smallest attention. The courage that faces death on the battlefield or calmly waits for it in the hospital is not a courage of race or color. Two of the bravest men I ever saw were here, almost side by side, on the little porch, Captain Mills and Private Clark, one white, the other black. They were wounded almost at the same time and in the same way. The patient suffering and heroism of the black soldier was fully equal to the Anglo-Saxon. It was quite the same—the gentleness and appreciation. They were a study—these men, so widely apart in life, but here so strangely
close and alike, on the common ground of duty and sacrifice. They received precisely the same care. Each was fed like a child, for with their bandaged eyes they were as helpless as blind men. When the ice pads were renewed on Captain Mills's eyes the same change was made on Private Clark's eyes. There was no difference in their food or beds. Neither ever uttered a word of complaint. The nearest to a regret expressed by Captain Mills was a heavy sigh, followed by the words:—

"'Oh, we were not ready—our army was not prepared.'

"Of himself he talked cheerfully—strong and hopeful. 'I think I shall get back with the sight of one eye,' he said. That was all. In the early part of the night he was restless—his brain was active—strong and brave as he was. The moonlight was very bright—a flood of silver light, seen only in the tropics. Hoping to divert him, I said: 'The moonlight is too bright, Captain. I will try to put up a little screen, so you can get to sleep.' He realized at once the absurdity and the ludicrous side, and with an amused smile replied: 'But you know—I can't see the moon.'

"I said it was time to get more ice for his head, and half stumbled across the porch, blinded by tears. When told who his nearest neighbor was, Captain Mills expressed great sympathy for Private Clark and paid a high tribute to the bravery of the colored troops and their faithful performance of duty. Private Clark talked but little. He would lie, apparently asleep, until the pain in his head became unbearable, then he would try to sit up, always careful to keep the ice pad on his eyes over the bandage. 'What can I do for you, Clark?' I would ask. 'Nothing, thank you,' he would answer, 'it's very nice and comfortable here. But it's only the misery in my head—the misery is awful.'"

Sergeant McInerney of Company E, Ninth Infantry, is credited with having fired the shot that disabled the Spanish General Linares. The Sergeant was peeping over the edge of the trench Saturday morning, the second day before Santiago; near him stood his Lieutenant. The Ninth had received orders from its Colonel not to fire unless so ordered.
“Lieutenant,” said the Sergeant, “there’s a Spaniard on a white horse with staff officers around him. I think he’s a general officer. The distance is 1,000 yards. Can I pick him off?” The word was passed along, and permission came back. McInerney rolled his cartridge over his tongue (a soldier’s superstition), and loaded his rifle. Then, resting his rifle on the edge of the pit, he aimed and fired.

“I undershot just 100 yards,” said he, drawing another cartridge from his mouth, “but it didn’t scare him.”

When McInerney’s rifle cracked again he cried, “I got him,” and the officer on the white horse fell over with a shot in his shoulder. It was General Linares, the Spanish commandant.

Before McInerney could get under cover a Mauser clipped the dirt an inch from his ear. “A little too far to the right,” he cried, waving his right arm as though he were a target marker on a rifle range.

One of the volunteers before Santiago had an excessive fondness for liquor, that at times rendered him unmanageable. One day while in camp in Florida the Colonel of his regiment called him into his tent for the purpose of talking to him like a father, as he had known him for years.

“Now, look here, John,” said the Colonel kindly, “what do you mean by this sort of thing?”

“I mean to quit, Colonel,” he responded.

“You’ve said that a million times. You ought to be ashamed of yourself. You are a man of more than ordinary intelligence, you have nice people at home, you are of a good family, you are quick to learn the duties of a soldier, you are clean, you look well, you keep your accoutrements in fine condition, you are obedient, you are always willing to take your share of the hardships, you never complain, and, in fact, you are a model soldier with one exception.”

“What’s that, Colonel?” asked John, just a shade leerily, it must be confessed.

“You will get drunk.”

“Is that all, Colonel?”
"That's enough, isn't it?"

John steadied himself by the Colonel's table.

"Now, Colonel," he said — all volunteers have a way of talking to their superiors — "if I'm all these good things that you say I am, why not let the drinking go with the balance? You don't expect to get all the cardinal virtues for $13 a month, do you?"

It was in the canteen at Camp Wikoff that a reporter heard this anecdote from a regular.

"Talk about your Generals, Chaffee's the old boy for my money. I found out what he was at El Caney. My company was at work digging trenches and while we were finishing up one the Spaniards began to fire and the bullets sang their little tunes pretty nigh to our heads. Well, there was a kid in the company that couldn't have been over eighteen. Never ought to have let him enlist at all. He was always complaining and kicking, and at the first fire down he went flat on his face and lay there. One of the men kicked him, but he didn't stir. Then along came Chaffee, cool and easy, and sees the kid.

"'Hello, there!' says Chaffee. 'What's the matter, you fellow down there? Get up and fight with your company.'

"'No, I can't,' whines the kid.

"'Can't?' says Chaffee, jumping down into the trench and hauling the boy up. 'What's the matter with you that you can't? Are you hurt?'

"'No, sir,' says he. 'I'm scart. I'm afraid of getting hit.'

"'Well, you're a fine soldier,' says the General. Then he looked at the boyish face of the kid and his face kind of softened. 'I suppose you can't help it,' he said. 'It ain't so much your fault. I'd like to get hold of the fellow that took you into the army.'

"I suppose any other General would have sent the kid to the rear in disgrace and that would have been the end of it; but Chaffee stood there with the bullets ki-yi-yi-ing around him beside the boy, who had crouched down again, and thought. with his chin in his hand. By and by he put his hand on the boy's shoulder.
"'There isn't as much danger as you think for,' he said. 'Now, you get up and take your gun and fight and I'll stand here by you.'

'The boy got up shaking like a leaf, and fired his first shot pretty near straight in the air.

'Ve got plenty high,' says the General. 'Keep cool and try again.'

'Well, sir, in three minutes that 'scairt' kid was fighting like a veteran and cool as a cucumber, and when he saw it the General started on.

'You're all right now, my boy,' he said. 'You'll make a good soldier.'

'God bless you, sir,' said the youngster. 'You saved me from worse than death,' and he was pretty close to crying when he said it.

'After a while the order came to retire from the trench, and we just had to collar that kid and haul him away by the neck to get him to retreat with his company. And, at that, he'd got a bullet through the fleshy part of his shoulder an hour before. In the rest of the fights there wasn't a better soldier in the company, and not only that, but we never heard a grumble or a kick from him from that day.'

Here is the story of "Old Hoss" at Camp Wikoff: In the middle of the main roadway from the railroad station across the point is a little grassy rise where the wagon trails divide to reunite a few rods further on. A rough wooden cross stands upright there. It marks the last resting place of a veteran of the Sixth Cavalry, who fell there and was buried where he fell. On the cross is the inscription:

"RATTLESNAKE BILL,
A HORSE."

The Sixth are mourning Rattlesnake Bill almost as they would a man of the regiment, for he was a part of it before half of them enlisted. Years of service had weakened his frame, but not his spirit, and as one of the equine veterans he was treated with special consideration. Yesterday a trooper rode him down to the station, where he
found a message requiring his immediate return. He urged the old horse to extra speed with voice and rein. spurs never were needed for Rattlesnake Bill.—and the animal answered with the best there was in him. But Montauk roadways turn and twist over a hundred little rises and descents, that break the wind and torture the spirits. The sandy dust was fetlock deep. Clouds of it blew into the straining nostrils of the horse, and his breath came harder and harder. Once or twice he looked around appealingly, but this was a case of haste, and his disciplined spirit set the wearied muscles firmly to the task at the word of command. On a roadway where nearly half the cavalry horses go at a gallop not an animal passed him, until he reached the hill where the roadway curves just before it splits at the grassy mound. Then three colored cavalrmen went tearing by.

"Get on, Bill," urged his rider. "What's got you, lettin' a lot of skates like that go by you?"

Up went the old horse's ears, and with a short whinny he leaped forward, stumbled, staggered, plunged blindly up the little slope and fell. In an instant the trooper was at his head.

"What's the matter, Bill, old boy? Come, boy, get up."

Bill lay with half-closed eyes, panting. A little group of infantrymen came up, and looked on while the trooper patted the animal's neck and talked to him.

"Come up now, boy!" cried the rider. "Come on, Bill!"

For the last time the brave old horse answered the word of command, got his forelegs under him, struggled half way up, then, with a moan like that of a suffering human being, fell back. The trooper sat down and took the great head on his knees. Bill whinnied brokenly, nestled his soft nose into his master's hand, stretched out, and was dead. The man's head drooped over, and the face was buried in the heavy mane. The infantrymen silently turned and walked away, the owner of the flask forgetting, or not caring to reclaim it. Presently there came along a detachment of Sixth Cavalrymen. They dismounted and joined their grief-stricken comrade. All their efforts could bring no sign of life from the horse.
They left a guard of honor beside the body of Rattlesnake Bill until sunset. That night ten men of the Sixth ran the guard, and with pick and spades, which they had borrowed from the engineers, dug the veteran’s grave and buried the horse. His rider set firmly in the ground the wooden cross with its penciled inscription, the men uncovering, and walking away in silence.

Sergeant Ousler of the regulars told some stories of the action at Las Guasimas. “That story about Assistant Surgeon Church, the young Washington medico of the Rough Riders, who dressed a fallen man’s wound away out ahead of the line, amid a hail of Mauser bullets, has been published,” said he, “but the coolness of that young fellow wasn’t even half described. While he was making an examination of his wounded comrade, paying no attention to the whistle of the bullets, a young private of the Rough Riders, who had been a college mate of Church at Princeton, yelled over to him from a distance of about twenty feet—he was in with a half a dozen fellows doing sharpshooter’s work from behind a cluster of bushes—to ask how badly the patient was hurt. The young surgeon looked over his shoulder in the direction whence the private’s voice proceeded, and he saw his former chum grinning in the bushes.

“‘Why, you whelp!’ said Church, with a comical grin on his face, ‘how dare you be around here and not be killed!’

“Then he went on fixing the wounded man, and he remained right there with him until the arrival of the litter, that he had sent to the rear for.

“In my cavalry outfit there was a fellow with whom I soldiered out West four or five years ago. He was a crack baseball pitcher, and he would rather play ball than eat, any time. He got a Mauser ball plumb through the biceps of his right arm early in the engagement. I never saw a man so darned mad over a thing in my life. The wound pained him a good deal, but it wasn’t the pain that hurt him so much. I met him at the rear after the scrap was over. He had tried to go on shooting with his carbine, but he couldn’t make it go with his left hand and arm alone, and so he had to drop back.
He was alternately rubbing his arm and scratching his head when I came across him.

"'Hurt much?' I asked him.

'Ho, hurt, nothing!' said he, scowling like a savage; 'but did you ever hear of such luck as this, to get plugged right in my pitching arm? Why the devil didn't they get me in the neck, or somewhere else, anyhow? I'll never be able to pitch another game, I'll bet $2, for these muscles are going to contract when the hole heals up,' and he went on swearing 'to beat the band' because the Spaniards hadn't let him have it 'in the neck, or somewhere else.'

"One of the fellows in the Rough Riders, an Oklahoma boy, got a ball clean through his campaign hat, which was whirled off his head, and fell about five feet away from him. He picked up the hat, examined it carefully, and said:—

"'I'll have to patch that up with sticking plaster, or I'll get my hair sunburnt.' The fun of it was that his hair was about the reddest I ever saw."

Another regular of the First Cavalry related an incident of the advance on San Juan. "There was a young fellow near me," he said, "behind a tree trunk, one of those stunted little trees. It was big enough to cover his body, because he was about as thick as a lath. His name was Charlie Jacob, and his father was United States Minister to Colombia at one time, and is now a rich and prominent man at Louisville, in Kentucky.* Young Jacob was just a boy in heart, though he was twenty-one. When the war came he enlisted among the very first in the old First Cavalry. His hands were made for kid gloves, and his feet for patent leathers, and he was as tall and thin as they can make 'em without breaking. Well, we tried putting work onto him, but he seemed to like it, and was so full of singing, joking, and skylarking that it was'int three weeks before we all got to taking work off him. He never bragged, and he never kicked; soldier-work was fun for him. When he was standing behind the

*The Honorable Charles D. Jacob, a distinguished citizen of Kentucky.
tree there, his Sergeant started on a rush ahead for a clump of brush in sight. He had'nt got twenty feet past young Jacob's tree when a bullet or two socked him in the legs and he fell. Shrapnel and Mau-
sers were coming hot when young Jacob put down his gun, and made
about two jumps to the Sergeant, and stooped over to lift him up and
bring him back to cover. He was asking where the Sergeant was
hit and gathering him up, when two bullets struck him, one in the
head. He did'nt live but a few hours.

"The Sergeant said, 'you ought'nt to have done it, Charlie.'

"'I could'nt help it,' said Charlie.

"His hands were soft, but he had a strong heart in him, and went
into fighting like he went into playing. When we buried him next
day we laid a brave soldier away, and thought of his happy disposi-
tion that had cheered us so much. There was some crying, I tell
you, used as we were to such things."

Edward Marshall, the correspondent, badly shot at Las Guasimas,
describes the Mauser bullet and its effect.* He could not find a bet-
ter way to describe the sound of the Mauser bullets that were singing
around the Rough Riders in that fight than by the letters "z-z-z-z-
zu," adding that the cracks of the rifles sounded for all the world like the
explosion of a lamp in a drawing-room. "The noise of the Mauser
bullet traveling through the air is not impressive enough to be
really terrifying until you have seen what it does when it strikes.
It is a nasty, malicious little noise, like the soul of a very petty and
mean person turned into sound. Its beginning and its ending are
pitched a little lower than its middle. Its beginning is gradual, but
its ending is instantaneous. I saw many men shot. Every one went
down in a lump without cries, without jumping up in the air, with-
out throwing up hands. They just went down like clods in the grass.
It seemed to me that the terrible thud with which they struck the
earth was more penetrating than the sound of guns. Some were only
wounded; some were dead.

* Scribner's Magazine, September, 1898.
“Once I thought I had found a coward. A man was running wildly toward the rear. I stopped him and asked him what he was running away from. He restrained himself with difficulty from braining me with his carbine. He had torn off the sole of one shoe, and the accident hampered his movements. He was running wildly about in a temperature not less than one hundred and three degrees, searching for a dead man to take a shoe from. He was running so that he could get quickly back to where the firing was. I showed him the dead man and helped him to take the shoe off. He was very grateful, and after he had once more gained protection for his foot he started on the double-quick for the firing line.”

III.

In an account of the sea fight at Santiago by George E. Graham, a press correspondent on board the Brooklyn,* he describes some acts of great courage and how they were performed. “Up forward on the gun decks,” he writes, “was a six-pounder that in this close forty-minutes’ action had been doing valiant work. As they were putting in a cartridge the shell loosened from the casing and became wedged. This was on the side near the enemy, but there was not a moment’s hesitation. Out on the gun’s muzzle crawled Corporal Robert Gray, of the Marine Corps, a rammer in his hand ready to drive the shell out. The gun was hot, and he could not retain his hold; so he dropped down to the sea ladder. Over his head was the frightful blast and draft of the big gun, while around him pattered the shot of the enemy. He failed in his attempt, and gunner Smith then tried it, but he too failed. It looked as though the gun would have to be abandoned, but Private MacNeal, of the squad, asked permission to make an attempt, and was allowed to try it. Clinging to the hot gun, with death by water assured if he dropped or was knocked off by the concussion.

* In McClure’s Magazine, September, 1888.
and the enemy firing at him, he got the rammer in the muzzle and rammed out the shell, amidst cheers from his comrades. I watched these men closely. None of them showed the slightest sign of heroic exhilaration. It was evidently to them a duty of the commonest sort. A few minutes later a 6-inch projectile smashed into a compartment just below them. They laughed at the gunner’s aim when they found nobody hurt. Five minutes later I photographed a man at the after masthead fixing up one of the battle flags, the halyards of which had been shot away. The fire was deadly about him. He would not give his name.

Mr. C. S. Clark, in the United Service Magazine, recounted an extraordinary exploit by an officer named Gillis on the torpedo boat Porter: “The torpedo had been fired from the destroyer Pluton, and, with force almost expended, was coming slowly but surely toward the anchored torpedo boat Porter. Gillis sprang overboard, swam to the torpedo, turned the nose away from the Porter, and screwed up the firing-pin tightly so that it would not operate. Then, treading water, he saluted Lieutenant Fremont and reported: ‘Sir, I have to report I have captured a torpedo.’ ‘Bring it aboard, sir,’ replied Fremont; and Gillis actually did so, swimming with it to the ship and fastening tackles to it.”

From a very finely written and spirited description of the capture of Guam Island, in the Ladrones group, in the New York Sun, is taken this amusing incident of the visit of the American soldiers and sailors to the house of the head of the police in Agaña: “Vincente Diaz produced cigarettes and cigars, of Manila make, and a bottle of hell-fire aguardiente of his own distillation. Then from some mysterious nook he brought out a new and shiny accordion. He gave it to a vacant-faced and bashful young man and commanded him to play. The Americans joined in the demand at once, and asked for a dance. But Diaz replied that the Chamorros had no dances. The boy tried the accordion a while and began to play. The first bar made every American in the room cock his ears and stare at his neighbor. No weird, fantastic music of any sort could have surprised them. They expected
that. They would have called it native and been well pleased with it. But this was familiar. It wasn't exactly as they remembered it, 'but as the song grew louder' it developed unmistakably into the 'New Bully,' and when it struck the chorus the whole crowd joined with a roar in yelling:—

When I walk that levee roun'  
I'm lookin' for dat bully 'n' he mus' be foun'.

"The applause that followed this performance so astonished the young artist that he stopped playing. When he was persuaded to go on again he played 'Ta-ra-ra-boom-de-ay.' amid the wildest cheers. The reception the Americans gave his music surprised him very much.

There were loud inquiries as to where he learned the tunes, but this was the only question, almost, that the Diazes could not answer. They 'guessed' that it was from a whaler, and probably they guessed right. But the 'New Bully' is not so very old, and it was mighty queer to hear it ground out on an accordion under a cocoanut-palm thatch in Guam, when it was just the other day that May Irwin was singing it in New York."

The same correspondent gave an account of Aguinaldo's military band, at Cavite, which will surprise those who know so little of the Far East. "A wonderful band," he wrote, "marched up the muddy Calle de San Francisco from Aguinaldo's headquarters this morning, and for an hour serenaded General Anderson with playing that would set the music lovers of New York wild with excitement. The average Filipino does not present the appearance of a musician or a music lover. But for his bright, intelligent eyes he would look like a stupid Patagonian sheep herder. There are few musical instruments in the native villages. Once in a while one runs across an old tinepan-toned cracked piano horribly out of tune, and two or three places have harps. But this band, composed entirely of Filipinos, is worthy to rank with the bands of the world. It was the famous military band of Manila, where it used to furnish classic music on the Lunetta when
the aristocratic Spaniards went out for their evening drive or promenade. And occasionally, or oftener, it was turned out to play while a few dozens of the musicians' people were shot for the edification of the multitude, on the charge of sympathizing with insurrection or some other trumped-up accusation.

"In Manila there were seventy-two members. Sixty of them managed to get away with their instruments and music. This morning forty-eight played on the little plaza in front of General Anderson's headquarters. And such playing! It was recompense for every discomfort, every vexation, every disappointment, every hardship of seven thousand miles in a troop ship, the last five thousand at half steam in a tropic sea. You shut your eyes and heard the orchestra of the Royal Opera at Vienna, the great Budapest Band, the famous military band in Berlin, the Boston Symphony at its best, Seidl's finest work, anything in the world. With never a note in front of them, they played what you liked, any part of any opera, the grandest music ever written, or a simple Strass waltz or a folksong. And the bass drummer was the leader. You will never hear a bass drum really played until you hear that Filipino do it. He makes a bass drum talk, sing, cry, shout. It fits the mood and movement of the music. It is subordinate or dominant, soft, subdued, or loud and roaring; it laughs and chuckles like a thing alive; it raves and protests like an angry soldier, and all in perfect harmony and sympathy with the rest. The ambition of the average bass drummer is to develop the muscles in his arms. He pounds the uncomplaining drum as if he were swinging clubs for exercise. But with this Filipino it is a science and an art, and he is master of both. It is a curiously organized band—one bass drum, two snares, a lyre, five tubas, eleven saxophones, big and little; eleven clarinets, eight cornets, one ballad horn, and four altos and tenors. They played songs from 'Faust,' and I sat again in the Metropolitan Opera House and heard and saw the vast audience get to its feet with frantic cheers when Calvé and the two de Reszkes finished the prayer song. They played, but no telling describes what they played."
From two articles on the subject are extracted some comparisons of American and Spanish seamen on war vessels:

"A man-of-war commander in the American naval service seldom knows what one-half of the men of his crew are capable of doing until the man's respective capabilities are revealed by incidents that happen aboard ship. There are some curious instances of how men forward, down on the rolls as 'laborers' or 'clerks,' have shown their hands, and made decided hits in emergencies. One night about three years ago, when most of the officers, including the surgeon, of a gunboat lying in San Francisco harbor were ashore attending a social function, a newly shipped coal heaver, whose occupation on the rolls was that of a laborer, fell down the hatchway ladder from the main deck to the machine shop. There was no one in the machine shop at the time. The coal heaver with his legs, the right one badly broken, dangling in the air, walked on his hands from the machine shop up forward to the sick bay, where some of the bluejackets picked him up and deposited him on a couch. The coal heaver told the men that his leg was broken, and one of them rushed to report the case to the officer of the deck.

"The officer of the deck sent for the apothecary. The apothecary told the officer of the deck that he didn't have the skill to set broken legs. A big, indolent marine, a recruit, whose only capability thus far had seemed to consist in the getting on the outside of three very heavy 'squares' a day, heard the excitement from his hammock where he was dozing. The big marine tumbled out of his hammock, went to the sick bay, and set the coal heaver's broken leg in a style that aroused the admiration of the surgeon when he returned to the ship after midnight. All hands wondered how the coal heaver had managed to walk on his hands from the machine shop forward to the sick bay, until he admitted that he had been a professional acrobat ashore, and that he had shipped in the navy because the circus with which he last traveled had gone to pieces in San Francisco, leaving him stranded in the hardest town in which to go broke in the Western Hemisphere. The big, indolent marine, who set the coal heaver's broken leg, had to admit to the surgeon that he had been graduated in surgery years before, and had done his tour in several famous English hospitals before he drifted into sea-soldiering.

"'How did you happen to enter the marine corps?' inquired the surgeon.

"'Rum,' laconically replied the marine.

"One afternoon, down in Honolulu harbor, Admiral Beardslee, in command of the Pacific squadron from the flagship Philadelphia, was in a quandary because of the unexpected arrival a day ahead of time of the Australian steamer that was to carry the fleet's mail to San Francisco. The Admiral had a voluminous report to make on the situation in Honolulu—this was during the last Hawaiian revolution—and he had only three hours in which to draw up the report, for the Australian steamer

*From the New York Sun, May 22, and June 5.
could not, of course, wait. The Admiral came out of his cabin and told the officer of the deck at the gangway to send ashore with all haste for somebody who could take rapid dictation on a typewriting machine. A young landsman, who had been a good deal of a muff at 'sailorizing,' overheard the Admiral giving this order, and he walked up to Beardslee, knuckled his forehead in the usual manner, and volunteered to do the work. The Admiral looked at the landsman without much confidence in his gaze.

"What kind of a typewriter do you handle?" he asked the recruit.

"Any kind," was the reply.

The Admiral took the landsman recruit aft and began to dictate trial stuff to the bluejacket. The bluejacket rattled the copy off in a style that opened the Admiral's eyes. Beardslee dictated his report to the lightning swift bluejacket typewriter, the words hardly falling from his lips before the landsman had them down pat. The Admiral took the pages one by one. There wasn't a mistake in spelling, punctuation, or paragraphing. The copy was absolutely clean, although the Admiral had dictated at the rate of ninety words a minute. The Australian steamer carried Beardslee's report, and the landsman was immediately rated Admiral's yeoman, or private secretary. A yeoman is a sixty-dollar-a-month chief petty officer. The bluejacket had been a court stenographer in New York.

"A bluejacket who put in a three-year's enlistment as a deck hand took his discharge from the navy a couple of years ago while his ship was at Yokohama, Japan, and got a job as a shipping clerk. A few weeks after he went to work ashore one of his shipmates was arrested and locked up, charged with stabbing a jinriksha Jap. The sailor was tried before the Consular Court, but before his trial came off his ship left Yokohama for China. The ex-bluejacket conducted his shipmate's defense before the Consular Court, and he conducted it so ably and with such a fine knowledge of law that his man-of-war's man client was acquitted. The ex-bluejacket lawyer had been in his day the junior partner in a well-known firm in St. Louis. Rum, injudiciously mixed with politics and cards, had got him over the side of a man-of-war with a hammock and ditty bag, but he went in as a 'laborer.'

"When the officers of one of our cruisers on the Mediterranean station were giving a dance aboard one night about a year ago, the ship's dynamo broke down and all the lights on the ship went out at once. The swell congregation of American tourists and foreigners was in the midst of a waltz on the main deck at the moment of the extinguishment of the lights, and the women fell into a panic. The officer of the deck galloped to the dynamo room, where he found the chief gunner's mate, who used to be the chief electrician aboard our war ships, in despair. The dynamo was in such a condition that its custodian, whose course in electricity had been of a hurried and superficial sort, reported that it would require a week anyhow to patch it up. The machinists were called forward, but machinists are not supposed to have much knowledge of electrical apparatus, unless they have been specialists ashore with that kind of gear. They shook their heads.
"Then a bluejacket, who had shipped aboard in New York City a few months before, when the cruiser started on her Mediterranean trip, turned up in the dynamo room. He sized up the dynamo with the eye of a man who knew dynamos down to the ground; and while the officers and chief gunner's mate and machinists stood by watching him wonderingly, he made a few little adjustments with a wrench, and the dynamo started to whir, the ship immediately becoming a blaze of light again. The landsman was down on the rolls as a laborer. But he had put in an apprenticeship of seven years at Mr. Edison's electrical works, and he is about the most valuable electrician—a chief petty officer—in the navy to-day. He is serving with one of the fleets in Cuban waters."

The contrary of these pictures of skill and intelligence is presented by the Spanish sailors:—

"Naval officers of the United States service, in common with officers of the British navy, have often marveled over the lack of expertness exhibited by Spanish officers in handling modern ships, but they have always dwelt particularly upon the apparent stupidity of the Spanish man-of-war's men forward. There is nothing ashore or afloat to equal the stolidity, indifference, slouchiness, and general incapacity of the Spanish bluejacket. Nor is the wonder great that the Spanish bluejacket is so poor a seaman, so inferior a gunner, so sluggish a performer of the thousand and one chores aboard ship of which a good man-of-war's man has the knack. Four-fifths of the Spanish bluejackets are men who had never been at sea before being impressed into the naval service. Impressed is the word, for the difficulty the Spanish navy has experienced during the past decade or two in getting enough men to man the ships is well known to those who make a study of naval matters. 'Impressed' is almost too well-sounding a phrase with which to express the fashion the Spanish naval recruiters have of getting bluejackets. The term should rather be 'shanghiaied.' The Spanish law forbids the conscription of naval recruits in time of peace. But if you ask any Spanish man-of-war's man how he happened to take on in an outfit wherein he received so little consideration, the reply is apt to be: 'I was drunk.' It is asserted that a majority of the Spanish sailors are men from inland Spain. The Spanish merchant sailors, the men living in Spanish ports, who are of age for service aboard war ships, know too well the cruelties and hardships inflicted upon men forward in their country's naval service to put themselves in the way of being trapped into it.

"Spanish sailors forward are ill-treated habitually by their officers. This is not a prejudiced or an exaggerated statement. It is literally true. The officers of the Spanish navy are, for the most part, younger sons of good families, who have gained their billets not by ability or through competition, but through the intercession of their people at the court. The incapacity of many of them is laughable; their cruelty is notorious. From the very day that a Spaniard is enlisted in the ship's
company of one of his country’s war vessels.—enlisted voluntarily or involuntarily,—he is made to feel that he is no better than a beast. For the slightest infraction of regulations he is punished in a fashion that makes bluejackets in navies like our own or that of Great Britain flush with anger. The central and consuming idea of the Spanish naval officer is that all hands forward are his servants. There is absolutely nothing of this in the American navy. Once in a while when an American ship is at sea for a considerable period in tropical waters, and all hands, fore and aft, are wearing white uniforms, an officer will pay a mess attendant for scrubbing one of his uniforms and hanging it out on the scrub-and-wash line. The officer who requests a man to do anything like this stands by to have the man refuse. It is the man’s privilege to refuse outright to perform such a task for money or otherwise, but if he accepts the job he is well paid for it. In the Spanish navy every man forward, from the chief petty officer down to the unrated landsman, stands by for a trick as valets for all the officers aft. They are not asked to wash the officers’ linen; they are not requested to blacken the officers’ shoes or pipeclay their belts—they are commanded to do these things, and tasks more menial, more repugnant to men of self-respect; and the slightest indication of hesitancy on the part of a bluejacket is visited by heavy punishment. When a Spanish officer ‘gets it in’ for a chief petty officer for any real or fancied cause, he does not immediately undertake to secure the petty officer’s disrating. Instead, he begins systematically to humiliate him. He calls him vile names in the hearing of the unrated bluejackets, and not infrequently kicks him. He calls him aft—especially when the petty officer is showing a party of women visitors about the ship—and orders him to blacken his shoes, right in sight of all hands and all the visitors on the main deck.

“The stanchion punishment is employed for the most trivial offenses in the Spanish navy. The bluejacket who breaks his liberty by a few hours knows that he is in for the stanchion lash when he returns aboard. The Spanish sailors who deserted their ships by the score in New York at the time of the centenary celebration in 1880, were most of them liberty breakers who, after having got a whiff of freedom, could not muster up the nerve to return to their ships to get the stanchion lash. The man who is twenty minutes late in returning from his leave of absence from a Spanish man-of-war gets as many cat-o’-nine-tail blows on his bare back, while his wrists are securely lashed to a stanchion, as the officer of the deck cares to have inflicted upon him. It all depends upon the state of the liver of the officer of the deck. . . . To reduce the matter to its smallest term, a Spanish man-of-war is simply a floating hell for the bluejackets, and the idea of the officers of the Spanish navy expecting men to put up a good fight for any sort of cause, after having had a taste of the kind of treatment they get aboard ship, is a matter a bit beyond the comprehension of the American mind.”

These descriptions account for the difference between the “men behind the guns.”
CONCLUSION.

MEMBERS OF THE PEACE COMMISSION.

Under the terms of the peace protocol, the President and the Spanish ministry each selected five members to meet in Paris on October 1, 1898, to negotiate final terms of peace between the two countries. The members of the commission were as follows:—

For the United States.

The Hon. William R. Day,
Ex-Secretary of State, of Ohio.

The Hon. William E. Frye,
U. S. Senator from Maine.

The Hon. George K. Davis,
U. S. Senator from Minnesota.

The Hon. Whitelaw Reid,
Of New York.

The Hon. George Gray,
U. S. Senator from Maryland.

For the Kingdom of Spain.

Señor Monteko Rios,
President of the Senate.

Señor Aranzuza.
Señor Guanica.
General Cerero.
Señor Villarrutia.

The commissioners began their sessions in Paris, October 1, under the friendly and hospitable auspices of the French Government.

Commissioners for the evacuation of Cuba by Spanish officials were appointed as follows:—

By the United States.

Major-General James F. Wade,
Admiral Wm. T. Sampson,
Major-General Matthew C. Butler.

By Spain.

General Gonzales Parrado,
Captain Pastor Landera,
The Marquis of Montoro.

The corresponding commissioners for the island of Porto Rico were the following:—

For the United States.

Major-General John R. Brooke,
Admiral Winfield S. Schley.
Brig.-General William W. Gordon.

For Spain.

Admiral Vallarino,
General Ortega,
Señor Sanchez Delagulla.

These met during the latter part of the month of September, and all the commissions were in negotiation at the time this narrative of the war closed.

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APPENDIX

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APPENDIX.

REPORTS OF THE NAVAL COMMANDERS ON SANTIAGO.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK,"
FIRST RATE, OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA,
July 15, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle with and
the destruction of the Spanish squadron, commanded by Admiral Cervera, off San-
tiago de Cuba, on Sunday, July 3, 1898:

Second—The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9:35 and 10 A.M.,
the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9:31, and emerging from
the channel five or six minutes later.

Third—The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment
were as follows: The flagship New York was four miles east of her blockading
station, and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had started for
Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to
the front to consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the situation and a more
definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been rendered
necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of Santiago.
I had sent my Chief-of-Staff on shore the day before to arrange an interview with
General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrange-
ments to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in the position mentioned
above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels
were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle about
the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward in the following
order:

The Indiana about a mile and a half from shore; the Oregon, the New York's
place; between these two the Iowa, Texas, and Brooklyn, the latter two miles
from the shore, west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor en-
trance was from two and one-half to four miles—the latter being the limit of day
blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about eight
miles. The Massachusetts had left at 4 A.M. for Guantanamo for coal. Her station
was between the Iowa and Texas. The auxiliaries, Gloucester and Vixen, lay close
to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large vessels, the Gloucester to

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the eastward, and the Vixen to the westward. The torpedo boat Ericsson was in company with the flagship, and remained with her during the chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning Vizcaya. I inclose a diagram, showing approximately the positions of the vessels as described above.

Fourth—The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor at a speed estimated at from eight to ten knots, and in the following order: Infanta Maria Teresa (flagship), Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, and the Almirante Oquendo. The distance between these ships was about eight hundred yards, which means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbor, an interval of only about twelve minutes elapsed. Following the Oquendo at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the torpedo-boat destroyer, Pluton, and after her the Furor. The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from their guns.

Fifth—The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday "quarters for inspection." The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, "Enemy's ships escaping"; and general quarters was sounded. The men cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within eight minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The New York turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal, "close in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels," and gradually increasing speed, until toward the end of the chase she was making sixteen and one-half knots and was rapidly closing on the Cristobal Colon. She was not at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the Gloucester.

Sixth—The Spanish vessels upon clearing the harbor turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro at the instant of the enemy's appearance, and at their best speed delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and destructive, speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the battle developed into a chase in which the Brooklyn and Texas had, at the start, the advantage of position. The Brooklyn maintained this lead. The Oregon, steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The Iowa and the Indiana having done good work and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the Vizcaya was beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These vessels rescued many prisoners. The Vixen, finding that the rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column, and remained there during the battle and chase.
Seventh.—The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excited the admiration of every one who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht Corsair—and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying two miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the Pluton and Furor, the Gloucester was slowed, gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed and was able to close to short range, where her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the Gloucester was under the fire of the Socapa battery. Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago harbor, the careers of the Furor and the Pluton were ended and two-thirds of their people killed. The Furor was beached and sunk in the surf; the Pluton sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battleships Iowa, Indiana, and the Texas, yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the Gloucester's battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the Gloucester did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the Infanta Maria Teresa.

Eighth.—The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards—all steering in the same direction and in formation—removed all tactical doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading ships, which could not immediately work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in passing, and the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Oquendo were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement; it was afterward learned that the Infanta Maria Teresa's fire main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach—the Infanta Maria Teresa at about 10:15, at Nima, six and one-half miles from Santiago harbor entrance, and the Almirante Oquendo at about 10:30 A. M., at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

Ninth.—The Vizcaya was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the Cristobal Colon had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the leading American ships. The Vizcaya was soon set on fire and at 11:15 she turned in shore and was beached at Aserraderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago the Indiana had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Aserraderos the Iowa was signaled to “resume blockading station.” The Iowa, assisted by the Ericsson and the Hist, took off the crew of the Vizcaya, while the Harward and the Gloucester rescued those of the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Almirante Oquendo.
APPENDIX OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded from the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this, a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.

Tenth—There remained now of the Spanish ships only the Cristobal Colon—but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the Vizcaya went ashore, the Colon was about six miles ahead of the Brooklyn and the Oregon, but her spurt was finished, and the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the Brooklyn and the Oregon came the Texas, Vixen, and New York. It was evident from the bridge of the New York that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12:50 the Brooklyn and the Oregon opened fire and got her range—the Oregon's heavy shell striking beyond her—and at 1:20 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors, and ran ashore at Rio Tarquinio, forty-eight miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the Brooklyn, went on board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up on the New York, received his report, and placed the Oregon in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible; and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the Resolute, which had followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose Chief-of-Staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. The Cristobal Colon was not injured by our firing and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her surrender, and, despite all efforts, she sank. When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the New York bodily up on the beach—the New York's stem being placed against her for that purpose—the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment—and sank in shoal water, and may be saved. Had this not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss.

Eleventh—I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the Cristobal Colon.

Twelfth—It seems proper to briefly describe here the manner in which this was accomplished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade—there
being but one entrance, and that a narrow one, and the deep water extending close up to the shore line presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of the entrance. At the time of my arrival before the port, June 1, the moon was at its full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any movement outside of the entrance to be detected; but with the waning of the moon and the coming of dark nights, there was opportunity for the enemy to escape, or for his torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It was ascertained, with fair conclusiveness, that the Merrimac, so gallantly taken into the channel on June 3, did not obstruct it. I therefore maintained the blockade as follows: To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro—dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere,—they threw a searchlight beam directly up the channel and held it steadily there. This lightened up the entire breadth of the channel, for half a mile inside of the entrance, so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the searchlight ship was always a matter of surprise to me, but they never did. Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three picket launches, and, at a little distance further out, three small picket vessels,—usually converted yachts,—and, when they were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement there was, at least, a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected. After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish Admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battleship was placed alongside the searchlight ship with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The Massachusetts, which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guan- tanamo, like the others, had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that morning. I inclose, for the information of the department, copies of orders and memorandums issued from time to time, relating to the manner of maintaining the blockade.

Thirteenth—When all the work was done so well, it is difficult to discriminate in praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it—the Commodore in command on the second division, the captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire of the battleships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. The fine speed of the Oregon enabled her to take a front position in the chase, and the Cristobal Colon did not give up until the Oregon had thrown a 15-inch shell beyond her. This performance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battleship, and speaks highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been maintained during a service unprecedented in the history
of vessels of her class. The *Brooklyn*’s westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in the chase, which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine battery with telling effect. The *Texas* and the *New York* were gaining on the chase during the last hour, and, had any accident befallen the *Brooklyn* or the *Oregon*, would have speedily overhauled the *Cristobal Colon*. From the moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed, the result was never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have been expected of her. Careful measurements of time and distance give her an average speed—from the time she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she was run on shore at Rio Tarquino—of 13.7 knots. Neither the *New York* nor the *Brooklyn* stopped to couple up their forward engines, but ran out the chase with one pair, getting steam, of course, as rapidly as possible on all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines would have meant a delay of fifteen minutes—or four miles in the chase.

*Fourteenth*—Several of the ships were struck, the *Brooklyn* more often than the others, but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard the *Iowa*. Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the *Brooklyn*. It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor, at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by observation. The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the harbor, were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battleships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows that the *Almirante Oquendo*, especially, had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere pierced, and her decks were strewn with the charred remains of those who had fallen.

*Fifteenth*—The reports of Commodore W. S. Schley and of the commanding officers are inclosed.

*Sixteenth*—A board appointed by me several days ago has made a critical examination of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting upon the result of our fire and the military features involved, and of reporting upon the chance of saving any of them and of wrecking the remainder. The report of the board will be speedily forwarded.

Very respectfully,

W. T. Sampson.

Rear-Admiral United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

To the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
SIR: First—I have the honor to make the following report of that part of the squadron under your command which came under my observation during the engagement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898:—

Second—At 9:35 A.M. Admiral Cervera, with the Infanta Maria Teresa, Vizcaya, Oquendo, Cristobal Colon, and two torpedo-boat destroyers, came out of the harbor at Santiago de Cuba in column at distance, and attempted to escape to the westward. Signal was made from the Iowa that the enemy was coming out, but his movement had been discovered from this ship at the same moment. This vessel was the farthest west, except the Vixen, in the blockading line; signal was made to the western division as prescribed in your general orders, and there was immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron, and a general engagement at ranges beginning at 1,100 yards and varying to 3,000 until the Vizcaya was destroyed, about 10:50 A.M. The concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them.

Third—About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began, two vessels, thought to be the Teresa and Oquendo, and since verified as such, took fire from the effective shell fire of the squadron, and were forced to run on the beach, a few miles east of the harbor entrance, where they burned and blew up later. The torpedo-boat destroyers were destroyed early in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen from your flagship.

Fourth—The Vizcaya and Colon, perceiving the disaster to their consorts, continued at full speed to the westward to escape, and were followed and engaged in a running fight with the Brooklyn, Texas, Iowa, and Oregon, until 10:50, when the Vizcaya took fire from our shells. She put her helm to port, and, with a heavy list to port, stood in shore and ran aground at Aserraderos, about twenty-one miles west of Santiago, on fire, fore and aft, where she blew up during the fight. Observing that she had struck colors, and that several vessels were nearing her to capture and save her crew, signal was made to cease firing. The Oregon having proved vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the Brooklyn, together with the Texas and another vessel which proved to be your flagship, continued westward in pursuit of the Colon, which had run close in shore, evidently seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to elude her pursuers.

Fifth—This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the Brooklyn, Oregon, and other ships, and soon the Brooklyn and Oregon were within long range of the Colon, when the Oregon opened fire with her 13-inch guns, landing a shell close
to the Colon. A moment afterward the Brooklyn opened fire with her 8-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the Colon, now in range of the Brooklyn's and Oregon's guns. Her commander, seeing all chances of escape cut off and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun, and struck her flag at 1:15 p.m., running ashore at a point some fifty miles west of Santiago harbor. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, as was also the Texas and Vixen. A little later, after your arrival, the Cristobal Colon, which had struck to the Brooklyn and the Oregon, was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron under your command.

Sixth — During my official visit a little later, Commander Eaton, of the Resolute appeared, and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battleship near Altares. Your orders to me were to take the Oregon and go eastward to meet her, and this was done by the Brooklyn, with the result that the vessel reported as an enemy was discovered to be the Austrian cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa, seeking the Commander-in-Chief.

Seventh — I would mention for your consideration that the Brooklyn occupied the most westward blockading position with the Vixen, and, being directly in the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes, possibly ten, to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west battery at a range of fifteen hundred yards from the ships and about three thousand yards from the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range. I have never before witnessed such deadly and accurately shooting as was done by the ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem it a high privilege to commend to you for such action as you may deem proper the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision and the skillful handling of their respective vessels, of Captain Phillip, Captain Evans, Captain Clark, and especially of my Chief-of-Staff, Captain Cook, who was directly under my personal observation, and whose coolness, promptness, and courage were of the highest order. The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the Indiana and the Gloucester, but, as these vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate observation.

Eighth — Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the Vixen, acted with conspicuous courage; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his light guns, nevertheless he was close into the battle line under heavy fire, and many of the enemy's shots passed beyond his vessel.

Ninth — I beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my Flag-Lieutenant James H. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr., both who were constantly at my side during the engagement, and who exposed themselves fearlessly in discharging their duties; and also to the splendid behavior of my secretary, Lieutenant B. W. Wells, Jr., who commanded and directed the fighting of the fourth division with splendid effect.
Tenth — I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in the engagement of Lieutenant-Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer, whose presence everywhere over the ship during its continuance did much to secure the good result of this ship's part in the victory.

Eleventh — The navigator, Lieutenant A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers, Lieutenant T. D. Griffin, Lieutenant W. R. Rush, Lieutenant Edward Simpson, Lieutenant J. G. Doyle, Ensign Charles Webster, and the junior divisional officers were most steady and conspicuous in every detail of duty, contributing to the accurate firing of this ship in her part of the great victory of your forces.

Twelfth — The officers of the medical, pay, and engineer and marine corps responded to every demand of the occasion and were fearless in exposing themselves. The warrant officers, boatswain William L. Hill, carpenter G. H. Warford, and gunner F. T. Applegate were everywhere exposed in watching for damage, reports of which were promptly conveyed to me.

Thirteenth — I have never in my life served with a braver, better, or worthier crew than that of the Brooklyn. During the combat lasting from 9:35 until 1:15 p. m., much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a moment, and were apparently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing ahead, astern, and over the ship.

Fourteenth — The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the capture of the Admiral and some thirteen to fifteen hundred prisoners with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated by Admiral Cervera at 600 men.

Fifteenth — The casualties on board this ship were: G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, killed; J. Burns, fireman, first class, severely wounded. The marks and scars show that the ship was struck about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one scars as the result of her participation in the great victory of your force on July 3, 1898. The speed-cone halliards were shot away and nearly all the signal halliard. The ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it down, at the close of the action, it fell to pieces.

Sixteenth — I congratulate you most sincerely on this great victory to the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us.

Seventeenth — I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the commanding officer and a drawing in profile of the ship, showing the location of hits and scars; also a memorandum of ammunition expended, and the amount to fill her allowance.

Eighteenth — Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of the Captains, viz.: Captain Eulate, of the Viscaya, and the second in command of the Colon, Commander Contras, I have learned that the Spanish Admiral's scheme was to concentrate all fire for a while on the Brooklyn, and the Viscaya to ram her, in hopes that if they could destroy her the chance of escape would be increased.
as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of your squadron. This explains the heavy fire mentioned and the Viscaya's action in the earlier moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose was promptly defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close range and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemy's squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.

Nineteenth — I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the water line was due to a water valve being opened from some unknown cause and flooding the compartment. The injury to the belt is found to be only slight and the leak small.

Twentieth — I beg to inclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in the combat of July 3, 1898.

Twenty-first — I cannot close this report without mentioning in high terms of praise the splendid conduct and support of Captain C. E. Clark and the Oregon. Her speed was wonderful, and her accurate fire splendidly destructive.

Very respectfully,

W. S. Schley,

Commodore United States Navy, Commanding Second Squadron, North Atlantic Fleet.

TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCE,

NORTH ATLANTIC STATION.

CAPTAIN CLARK'S REPORT.

United States Ship "Oregon," First Rate,
Off Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898.

Sir: First — I have the honor to report that at 9:30 a. m., yesterday, the Spanish fleet was discovered standing out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. They turned to the westward and opened fire, to which our ships replied vigorously. For a short time there was an almost continuous flight of projectiles over this ship, but when our line was fairly engaged and the Iowa had made a swift advance as if to ram or close, the enemy's fire became defective in train as well as range. The ship was only struck three times, and at least two of them were but fragments of shells. We had no casualties.

Second — As soon as it was evident that the enemy's ships were trying to break through and escape to the westward, we went ahead at full speed, with the determination of carrying out to the utmost your order: "If the enemy tries to escape the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels, or force them to run ashore." We soon passed all of our ships except the Brooklyn, bearing the broad pendant of Commodore Schley. At first we only used our main battery, but when it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo boats were
following their ships we used our rapid-fire guns as well as the six upon them, with telling effect. As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships, she headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked her as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead, using our starboard guns as they were brought to bear, and before we had her fairly abreast she, too, was making for the beach. The two remaining vessels were now some distance ahead, but our speed had increased to sixteen knots, and our fire, added to that of the Brooklyn, soon sent another, the Vizcaya, to the shore in flames. Only the Cristobal Colon was left, and for a time it seemed as if she might escape, but when we opened with our forward turret guns, and the Brooklyn followed, she began to edge in toward the coast, and her capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the beach her flag came down, and the Brooklyn signaled, "Cease firing," following it with "Congratulations for the grand victory; thanks for your splendid assistance."

Third—The Brooklyn sent a boat to her, and when the Admiral came up with the New York, Texas, and Vizcaya she was taken possession of. A prize crew was put on board from this ship under Lieutenant-Commander Comewell, the executive officer, but before 11 a.m. the ship, which had been filling in spite of all efforts to stop leaks, was abandoned, and just as the crew left she went over on her side.

Fourth—I cannot speak in too high terms of the bearing and conduct of all on board this ship. When they found the Oregon had pushed to the front and was hurrying to a succession of conflicts with the enemy's vessels if they could be overtaken and would engage, their enthusiasm was intense.

Fifth—As these vessels were so much more heavily armored than the Brooklyn, they might have concentrated upon and overpowered her, and, consequently, I am persuaded that but for the way the officers and men of the Oregon steamed and steered the ship and fought and supplied her batteries, the Colon, and perhaps the Vizcaya, would have escaped. Therefore, I feel that they rendered meritorious service to the country, and, while I cannot mention the name of each officer and man individually, I am going to append a list of the officers with their stations that they occupied, hoping that they may be of service to them should the claims of others for advancement above them ever be considered.

Very respectfully,

C. E. Clark.

Captain United States Navy, Commanding.
CAPTAIN EVANS' REPORT.

UNITED STATES SHIP "IOWA, FIRST RATE.

OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, JULY 4, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement with Spanish squadron off Santiago de Cuba on the 3d of July:

First.—On the morning of the 3d, while the crew were at quarters for Sunday inspection, the leading vessel of the Spanish squadron was sighted at 9:31 coming out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. Signal, "Enemy's ships are coming out," was immediately hoisted and a gun fired to attract attention. The call to general quarters was sounded immediately, the battery made ready for firing, and the engines rung full speed ahead.

Second.—The position of this vessel at the time of sighting the squadron was the usual blockading station off the entrance of the harbor; Morro Castle bearing about north, and distant about three or four miles. The steam at this time in the boilers was sufficient for a speed of five knots.

Third.—After sighting the leading vessel, the Infanta Maria Teresa, Admiral Cervera's flagship, it was observed that she was followed in succession by the remaining three vessels of the Spanish squadron, the Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, and Almirante Oquendo. The Spanish ships moved at a speed of about eight to ten knots, which was steadily increased as they cleared the harbor entrance and stood to the westward. They maintained a distance of about 800 yards between vessels. The squadron moved with precision, and stations were well kept.

Fourth.—Immediately upon sighting the leading vessel, fires were spread and the Iowa headed toward the leading Spanish ship. About 9:40 the first shot was fired from this ship at a distance of about 6,000 yards.

The course of this vessel was so laid that the range speedily diminished. A number of shots were fired at ranges varying between 6,000 and 4,000 yards. The range was rapidly reduced to 2,500 yards, and, subsequently, to 2,000 and to 1,200 yards.

Fifth.—When it was certain that the Maria Teresa would pass ahead of us, the helm was put to starboard and the starboard broadside delivered at a range of 2,500 yards. The helm was then put to port and the ship headed across the bow of the second ship, and as she drew ahead the helm was again put to starboard and she received in turn the full weight of our starboard broadside at a range of about 1,800 yards. The Iowa was again headed off with port helm for the third ship, and as she approached the helm was put to starboard until our course was approximately that of the Spanish ship. In this position, at a range of 1,400 yards, the fire of the entire battery, including rapid-fire guns, was poured into the enemy's ship.

Sixth.—About 10 o'clock the enemy's torpedo-boat destroyers, Furor and Pluton, were observed to have left the harbor and to be following the Spanish squadron. At the time that they were observed, and, in fact, most of the time that they were under
fire, they were at a distance varying from 4,500 to 4,000 yards. As soon as they were discovered, the secondary battery of the Iowa was turned upon them, while the main battery continued to engage the Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Maria Teresa.

The fire of the main battery of this ship, when the range was below 2,500 yards, was most effective and destructive, and, after a continuance of this fire for perhaps twenty minutes, it was noticed that the Maria Teresa and Oquendo were in flames, and were being headed for the beach. Their colors were struck about 10:20, and they were beached about eight miles west of Santiago.

Seventh — About the same time (about 10:20), the fire of this vessel, together with that of the Gloucester and another smaller vessel, proved so destructive that one of the torpedo-boat destroyers (Pluton) was sunk and the Furor was so much damaged that she was run upon the rocks.

Eighth — After having passed, at 10:35, the Oquendo and Maria Teresa, on fire and ashore, this vessel continued to chase and fire upon the Vizcaya until 10:36, when signal to cease firing was sounded on board, it having been discovered that the Vizcaya had struck her colors.

Ninth — At 11:00 the Iowa arrived in the vicinity of the Vizcaya, which had been run ashore, and, as it was evident that she could not catch the Cristobal Colon, and that the Oregon, Brooklyn, and New York would, two steam cutters and three cutters were immediately hoisted out and sent to the Vizcaya to rescue her crew. Our boats succeeded in bringing off a large number of officers and men of that ship's company and in placing many of them on board the torpedo boat Ericsson and the auxiliary dispatch vessel Hist.

Tenth — About 11:30 the New York passed in chase of the Cristobal Colon, which was endeavoring to escape from the Oregon, Brooklyn, and Texas.

Eleventh — We received on board this vessel from the Vizcaya, Captain Eulalie, the commanding officer, and twenty-three officers, together with about two hundred and forty-eight petty officers and men, of whom thirty-two were wounded. There were also received on board five dead bodies, which were immediately buried with the honors due to their grade.

Twelfth — The battery behaved well in all respects.

The dashpot of the forward 12-inch gun, damaged in the engagement of the 2d, had been replaced the same day by one of the old dashpots, which gave no trouble during this engagement. This ship was struck in the hull, on the starboard side, during the early part of the engagement, by two projectiles of about six-inch caliber, one striking the hull two or three feet above the actual water line and almost directly on the line of the berth deck, piercing the ship between frames nine and ten, and the other piercing the side and the cofferdam between frames eighteen and nineteen.

The first projectile did not pass beyond the inner bulkhead of cofferdam A 41–43. The hole made by it was large and ragged, being about sixteen inches in longitudinal direction. It struck with a slight inclination aft, and perforated the
cofferdam partition, bulkhead A 41-43-45-47. It did not explode, and remained in the cofferdam.

The second projectile pierced the side of the ship and the cofferdam A 105, the upper edge of the hole being immediately below the top of the cofferdam on the berth deck in compartment A 104. The projectile broke off the hatch plate and coaming of the water tank compartment, exploded, and perforated the walls of the chain locker. The explosion created a small fire, which was promptly extinguished. The hole in the side, made by this projectile, was about five feet above the water line and about two or three feet above the berth deck. One fragment of this shell struck a link of the sheet-chain, wound around the 6-pounder ammunition hoist, cutting the link in two. Another perforated the cofferdam on the port side, and slightly dished outside plating.

These two wounds, fortunately, were not of serious importance.

Two or three other projectiles of small caliber struck about the upper bridge and smoke stacks, inflicting trifling damage, and four other small projectiles struck the hammock nettings and the side aft.

There are no casualties among the ship's company to report. No officer nor man was injured during the engagement.

After having received on board the ship's crew of the Vizcaya, my vessel proceeded to the eastward, and resumed the blockading station in obedience to the signal made by the Commander-in-Chief about 11:30.

Upon returning upon the blockading station the Gloucester transferred to this vessel Admiral Cervera, his Flag-Lieutenant, and the commanding officers of the torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Pluton, and also one man of the Oquendo's crew, rescued by the Gloucester.

Naval Cadets Frank Taylor Evans and John E. Lewis and five men belonging to the Massachusetts were on board the Iowa when the enemy's ships came out. They were stationed at different points and rendered efficient service.

The officers and men of this ship behaved admirably. No set of men could have done more gallant service.

I take pleasure in stating to you, sir, that the coolness and judgment of the executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Raymond P. Rodgers, deserves and will, I hope, receive a proper reward at the hands of the government. The test of the executive officer's work is the conduct of ship and crew in battle—in this case it was simply superb.

The coolness of the navigator, Lieutenant W. H. Schuetze, and of Lieutenant F. K. Hill, in charge of the rapid-fire guns on the upper deck, are worthy of the greatest commendation.

Other officers of the ship did not come under my personal observation, but the result of the action shows how well they did their duty.

I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen, but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women.
CORRESPONDENCE

In conclusion, sir, allow me to congratulate you on the complete victory achieved by your fleet. Very respectfully,

R. D. Evans,
Captain United States Navy, Commanding.

To the Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force,}
North Atlantic Station.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ADMIRAL SAMPSON, CAPTAIN TAYLOR AND COMMANDER EATON.

Admiral Sampson filed in the Navy Department copies of letters that had passed between himself and Captain Taylor, of the Indiana, regarding the part taken by the latter in the action of July 3, off Santiago.

United States Ship “Indiana.”}
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, August 6, 1898.

Admiral: The report of Commodore Schley on the battle of July 3, as published, gives credit in the seventh paragraph to four ships, and mentions by name their Captains, Phillip, Evans, Clark, and Cook, and adds: “The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the Indiana and the Gloucester, but as these vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate observation.”

Second—In your report, as published, you make but a slight mention of the Indiana, stating that “the Iowa and Indiana, having done good work and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me,” etc.

Third—The result of these reports is that the Captains of all the vessels of the line of battle except the Indiana have received personal mention in the official report before the department, while the two smaller vessels have also had distinctive mention, either from the Commander-in-Chief or the second in command.

Fourth—If the official record should be referred to in future, it will appear from its general tone that the Indiana was less deserving than all of her consorts. Leaving out my personal interest in the matter, it is right that I should consider the officers and crew of the ship; and I speak for them as well as for myself when I submit to you, Admiral, that the above combination of reports will place the ship, in the opinion of the department and the country, markedly below all the other vessels of your squadron. I respectfully submit, sir, that this is injustice to the Indiana and her officers and crew.

Fifth—I can say, without disparagement of any other vessel, that during the first hour of the fight the Indiana’s gun fire contributed to the destruction of the
Oquendo and the Teresa more than that of any single vessel of our squadron except one, and equaled hers. I do not know why the second in command failed to observe the Indiana during this period of our hottest action. I saw the Brooklyn quite plainly.

Sixth—An examination of these reports with reference to the Indiana will, I believe, convince you, sir, that they do produce the effect of putting the Indiana below all the other vessels of the squadron. If it be your opinion, sir, that this is the case, and that all the vessels, from the Brooklyn to the Vixen, rendered services as much more valuable than the Indiana’s as the published report of the Commander-in-Chief and the second in command, taken together, would indicate, then I must accept it for myself and the ship. If, on the contrary, that be not your opinion, I urge respectfully that such steps be taken to remedy this injustice as may seem wise to you. Very respectfully.

H. C. Taylor.
Captain United States Navy, Commanding.

TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCE,
NORTH ATLANTIC STATION.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON replied as follows:

UNITED STATES SHIP “NEW YORK,”
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, August 8, 1868.

SIR: I am greatly obliged that you have called my attention to what appears to have been an injustice to your ship, and of course, your crew, for the part which they took in the action of July 3, and, also, for the very proper manner in which you have presented it. I think, however, that you will agree with me that in submitting such a report to the Secretary of the Navy, where so many officers are vitally interested and justly proud of their ships, it is no easy task to do so without apparently bestowing praise unjustly. It requires very careful consideration of the report from every point of view to avoid misunderstanding.

Second—The position of the ships of the squadron must be carefully considered to fully appreciate what it was possible for each vessel to accomplish under the circumstances in which she was placed. Those that were to the westward of the escaping enemy were certainly better placed for stopping the enemy, and also better placed for delivering their fire, than the vessels to the eastward, which was the blockading station of the Indiana.

Third—No distribution of the fleet could completely predict and provide against every variation of such a sortie, nor do I consider that any commanding officer deserved either credit or blame because the ship under his command was faster or slower than another ship, or carried a heavier or lighter battery, but, rather, that the commanding officer was blameworthy when he failed to put his ship
in the proper place for destroying the enemy, just in proportion to the advantage which he possessed in speed, battery, or position over his neighbors.

Fourth — Each commanding officer, in my opinion, was personally responsible for the good use which he made of the tools with which he had to work. I certainly did not intend to criticize you, nor to bestow less praise upon the Indiana than was bestowed upon any other ship of the squadron.

Fifth — The fact that the commanding officer of the Indiana was signaled to return to blockade duty at the mouth of the harbor, after she had so gallantly contributed to the destruction of the Spanish ships, was only a necessary precaution which the Commander-in-Chief felt obliged to take to prevent disaster to the large number of transports which were left in that vicinity when the fleet started in pursuit of the enemy. There were still some armed vessels remaining in the harbor of Santiago — at least two, and we did not know, then, how many more — which could have come out, in the absence of the fleet, and produced great havoc among the troop ships, which were defenseless in the absence of an armed vessel.

Sixth — This explanation, together with your letter, will be sent to the department, with the request that it may be attached to and form a part of the original report.

Very respectfully,

W. T. Sampson,

Rear Admiral United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

To the Commanding Officer United States Ship, "Indiana,"

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Commander Eaton, of the Resolute, also contributed his observations of the Indiana's part in the great battle, in the following frank letter to Admiral Sampson:

U. S. S. "Resolute," Navy Yard, New York,

September 3, 1898.

Sir: I consider it my duty to lay before you the following report of the events witnessed by myself in the action of July 3, 1898, off Santiago:

The Resolute, which I commanded, lay just east of the Indiana, distant from her one thousand feet, and about two and six-tenths miles from the Morro, when the Maria Teresa was sighted.

The Indiana had been near the Morro, but about 9 o'clock circled to the eastward with a port helm, leaving the Resolute within the arc of the circle described by the fleet. The Resolute was then turned under a slow bell and stopped when the Indiana was due west of us, and just outside the circle of fighting ships. The Gloucester was to the northward and eastward, nearly off Aguadores.

As the Maria Teresa appeared the Iowa fired a 6-pounder and hoisted signal. Within a few seconds of this shot (not more than five or ten) all the Spanish batteries opened, and at the same instant the port broadside of the Maria Teresa.
was discharged. It seemed to me then that all or nearly all of these shots and shells were fired at the Indiana, and as the Resolute lay directly in line the water around the Indiana and the Resolute was alive with the fall of projectiles.

Before the Vizcaya appeared the Indiana opened fire with her heavy guns, and, with screws whitenning the water astern, was heading for the Morro.

As the Vizcaya came out I distinctly saw one of the Indiana's heavy shells strike her abaft the funnels, and the explosion of this shell was followed by a burst of flame, which for the moment obscured the afterpart of the Vizcaya.

The Vizcaya fired her port battery apparently at the Indiana, for many of the shells struck about and beyond the Resolute, which was then headed east.

The Cristobal Colon, as soon as she was clear off Morro point, fired her first broadside at the Indiana.

The Oquendo, in coming out, also fired her first broadside at the Indiana, and I could see some of the Indiana's shells strike the Oquendo as she steamed south.

Following close astern on the Colon and Oquendo came the destroyer Furor, and I distinctly saw her struck by an 8-inch or 13-inch shell from the Indiana, which was followed by an explosion and flames aboard the Furor.

During all this time the Indiana had been steaming ahead, and I roughly estimated that she was then about 3,000 yards from the Oquendo and the Furor.

The Resolute was nearly in line with the Indiana, and I could clearly follow the course of the Indiana's projectiles.

The other ships engaged, except the Oregon and occasionally the Brooklyn, which showed at times to the southward, but were most of the time hidden by other vessels (the Resolute being by this time well to the windward) were hidden in smoke.

From the position of the ships engaged it appeared to me that the Indiana was the first to close with the escaping enemy, and, though I could see the Teresa and Vizcaya sweeping across her course, it was apparent that the Indiana's shells were the first to reach them. This was due, first, to the Indiana's proximity, and, second, to the fact that the Indiana had a fair beam target on each ship as it came out.

The Oregon had this in a less degree, and the other vessels engaged seemed to have all fired their first shells when the Spanish ships were four points off.

In addition to the heavier shells noted as striking the enemy, we could count many lighter projectiles from the secondary battery exploding on board, and as the Indiana's fire was incessant I took these to be from her guns.

The Spanish officers who were prisoners from the Colon and the Vizcaya have since told me that the fire from the Indiana and the Oregon, as they (the Spaniards) passed from the harbor, was deadly in its destructiveness, and that although the Colon escaped with small injury, due to her greater speed, and being in a measure covered by other ships, the Vizcaya was hopelessly crippled before she had gone a mile from the Morro.
LETTER FROM CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN

I have ventured to address you this letter, as I had exceptional opportunities for observation during this part of the engagement, and it has seemed to me that the very important part taken by the Indiana in the first part of the action should be laid before you.

Very respectfully,

J. G. Eaton,
Commander, Commanding. To the Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces,
North Atlantic Station.

LETTER FROM CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN.

To the Editor of the New York "Sun"—Sir: In your issue of July 29, a correspondent asks: "Why did Nelson, second in command, receive the credit for Copenhagen, if Schley is not to have it for Santiago?"

A better knowledge of history would have shown the essential differences between the two cases, and have saved the question. At Copenhagen, Nelson did not merely do the fighting; the entire conception of the method of attack was his, and by him was forced—the word is not too strong—upon a reluctant Commander-in-Chief. When the latter had yielded his consent, the separate and decisive attack was made by Nelson, commanding a detachment from the main fleet, all the movements of which detachment, including the positions in the order of battle, were prescribed by him.

With the preliminary dispositions and subsequent conduct of this detachment, his Commander-in-Chief, Parker, had nothing to do, although within signal distance, beyond making the since historic signal to "withdraw from action," which Nelson refused to obey.

It is to be added that, although Parker was not formally censured,—as far, at least, as I know,—he was recalled to England as soon as the accounts of the battle were received there, Nelson being left in command in his place. A stronger implied censure than the recall of a Commander-in-Chief after such a victory is difficult to imagine.

At Santiago all the dispositions prior to action, and for over a month before, were made by the Commander-in-Chief. A number of orders, issued from time to time by him, for the enforcement of the close watch of the harbor’s mouth, were published in the Washington Post of July 27, and, I presume, by other journals, as well.

There is very strong ground for believing that Cervera’s attempt to escape by day instead of by night—the incident of his conduct which has been most widely censured and is most inexplicable—was due to the fact that the United States ships kept so close to the harbor mouth at night that a dash like his, desperate at best, had a better chance when the ships were at day distance. This was so stated, substantially, to Admiral Sampson by the Captain of the Colón. If so, the merit of this, forcing the enemy
to action under disadvantageous conditions. — and it is one of the highest achievements of military art, — belongs to the Commander-in-Chief. *It was the great decisive feature of the campaign, from start to finish.* Few naval authorities, I imagine, will dispute this statement.

It will be noted, also, by comparing the report of Admiral Sampson, stating the disposition of the ships, with the report of Captain Cook, commanding the *Brooklyn*, Commodore Schley’s flagship, that the United States ships chased and fought in the order, from left to right, established by Sampson. There is in this no particular merit for the latter, beyond that in placing the two fastest ships, *Brooklyn* and *New York*, on the two flanks, he had made the best provision for heading off the enemy, which the *Brooklyn* so handsomely effected. But the fact that the ships chased as they stood shows that it was unnecessary for Schley to make a signal; and in truth, from first to last, the second in command needed to make no signal of a tactical character, and made none, so far as is shown by his own report, or that of the Captain of the ship. That is, the second in command exercised no special directive functions of a flag or general officer while the fighting lasted. In this, there was no fault, for there was no need for signals; but the fact utterly does away with any claim to particular merit as second in command, without in the least impairing the Commodore’s credit for conduct in all possible respects gallant and officer-like. So far as plan is concerned, the battle was fought on Sampson’s lines; and, to quote Collingwood before Trafalgar, “I wish Nelson would stop signaling, for we all know what we have to do.” The second in command, and the Captains before Santiago all knew what they had to do, and right nobly they all did it.

But the distinctive merit of the series of events which issued in the naval battle of Santiago is that, so far as appears, Cervera was forced to fight as he did on account of the unrelenting watch, through more than a whole moon, including its dark nights, maintained by Admiral Sampson. The writer has been told by a naval officer whose name he has no authority to mention, but who would be recognized as one of the most efficient of his mature years, and who had been off Santiago during part of that eventful month, that he regarded Sampson’s watch of the harbor as the decisive feature in the great result. This neither ignores the merits of the Captains nor of the “man behind the gun.” Captains and the men behind the guns may be of the best, the Colonels of the regiments and the privates of land warfare the same, but vain are their valor and their skill if the Commander-in-Chief be wanting in either. “Better an army of stags led by a lion than an army of lions led by a stag.”

The phrase of the *Washington Post*, meant for a sneer, “Admiral Sampson wishes the American people to believe that . . . things could not have happened otherwise, even if Admiral Sampson had been seventy, instead of seven, miles away,” expresses an exact truth. With the wise and stringent methods laid down and enforced by the Admiral, it would not in the least have mattered, as things happened, with such ships and such Captains, had the Commander-in-Chief and the second in command, either or both, been seventy miles away. It is exactly with the fleet as with the
single ships. The merit of each Captain was not only, nor chiefly, that he handled and fought his ship admirably on the day of battle. His greatest merit was that, when he took his ship into action, she was so organized and trained that, had he himself been absent or struck dead by the first shot, the ship would none the less have played her full part efficiently in the fight, under her second in command.

Few things in the observation of the writer have been more painful than the attempt of a portion of the Press and of the public to rob Sampson of his just and painfully won dues. During the night hours of July 2-3, when there is strong reason to believe that Cerroña, despite the full moon, wished to come out, the Commander-in-Chief, with the whole of his force, lay close to the harbor’s mouth, and the Spanish attempt was deferred till day, when it might be supposed from their usual practice that the besieging vessels would be more distant, and, perhaps, off their guard. At 4 a.m., when day began to break, the Massachusetts, commanded by one of the most spirited officers in the service, silently withdrew to coal at Guantanamo, forty miles away. Half an hour before the enemy was discovered coming out, the flagship New York also proceeded east. In doing this the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sampson, was obeying a specific and direct order of the Navy Department, to confer personally with the Commander-in-Chief of the army. To this was owing that, to use the words of Sampson’s dispatch, the flagship “was not at any time within range of the heavy Spanish ships.” Upon this circumstance, mortifying as a mere disappointment, that the ship, though pushed to her utmost speed, could not retrieve her original disadvantage of position,—incurred in obedience to the orders of the Navy Department,—has been raised the shameful outcry, designed to deprive an eminent officer of the just rewards of his toils.

The injustice is, with many, doubtless unintentional and unwitting. The same excuse can scarcely be made for the charge that the Admiral has grudged praise to his subordinates. Some Washington papers have been particularly vicious in this matter, and the Post of that city, in an editorial of July 31 to that effect, is guilty, in quoting from one paragraph of Sampson’s dispatch, of suppressing these following words in the succeeding paragraph: “The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan [of blockade] and put it into execution. The Massachusetts, which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others, had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that morning.” Again, as regards the action: “When all the work was done so well it is difficult to discriminate. The object of the blockade of Cerroña’s squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it—the Commodore in command of the second division, the Captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire of the battleships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts.” If higher praise is expected, the only reply that can be made is that it is, historically, rarely given. When individual men are
named, unless some conspicuous and unusual deed compels it, those passed over will feel slighted; while, if each who has done his duty is individually named, all distinctive effect is lost. Those who doubt may examine the dispatches of men like Nelson and Farragut.

It would be improper to conclude without saying that there is not the slightest proof that Commodore Schley is, in the least, responsible for the malicious attempts made to depress Admiral Sampson with a view to exalt the second in command. On the contrary, when they came to his ears he telegraphed to the Navy Department (on July 10) his "mortification" at the fact, handsomely attributing the victory to the force under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic station; "to him the honor is due." More than this, there is no occasion for him to say, nor need he have said anything but for the obligation forced upon him by the indiscreet and ungenerous clamor of those posing as his friends, from whom he might well pray to be saved.

So far as precedents may properly influence opinion in a matter of this kind, it is interesting as well as instructive to notice two other instances in the career of Nelson. Nelson was usually a second in command and was prone to come to the front, as at Copenhagen, not by the absence of his superior, but by his own initiative. At Cape St. Vincent, Nelson, — not being second, but third or fourth, — of his own motion, without orders, took a step during the course of the battle which was a leading cause of its success, and threw upon his own ship the largest single share in the whole fighting. Nevertheless, although for this he received ample recognition, official as well as public, the greater reward by far was rightly adjudged to his chief, whose ship was much less exposed, but to whose previous dispositions and action it was owing that Nelson had the opportunity he so well improved.

At the Nile, Nelson, in seniority of flag rank upon the station, was again only third or fourth, but he was in sole command of a large detachment, 2,000 miles away from his nearest superior. The battle, therefore, was fought solely "off his own bat;" the decision to fight, the methods, and the actual fighting, were all his own. Nevertheless, although the Commander-in-Chief was absent, in a very full sense of the word, the fact that Nelson was not a Commander-in-Chief was held, unjustly, I think, to diminish his claim to reward. The reward, quite inadequate to the achievement, was "the highest," wrote the First Lord of the Admiralty. "that has ever been conferred upon an officer of your standing who was not a Commander-in-Chief." This decision, therefore, was based on precedent, and throws light on British practice and opinion — and in naval matters no nation has had a wider experience — as to the relative responsibilities and claims of Commanders-in-Chief and flag officers junior to them.

A. T. MAHAN,

Captain (Retired) United States Navy.

WASHINGTON, August 5.
LETTER OF SECRETARY LONG

LETTER OF SECRETARY LONG.

The Secretary of the Navy received several letters violently attacking Admiral Sampson. The following is a copy of his reply to one of them:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, August 5, 1898.

My Dear Sir: I am in receipt of your letter, and hasten to assure you that what you say about Admiral Sampson is so unjust that it can only be pardoned on the ground of your ignorance of the whole matter. You have no appreciation of the responsibilities that have been upon Admiral Sampson, of his very superior attainments as an officer, and the splendid work he has done in preparing for the naval victory which was the crowning accomplishment of his efforts for weeks and weeks before Santiago. Justice is always done in the long run. But when you indulge in such unfounded criticism I cannot forbear to protest, as I should feel bound to do if you had referred in similar terms to any other of our deserving officers.

Admiral Sampson was selected for the command of the North Atlantic squadron because the department, in the exercise of its best judgment, with an eye single to the public interest, believed that he was specially fitted for the place. Admiral Sicard, who held the command, having become incapacitated for duty, by reason of sickness, was necessarily withdrawn by order of the department, and Sampson was next in command. These two are especially accomplished ordnance officers, having been each at the head of the Ordnance Bureau and having devoted themselves to that branch of naval science. Sampson is a man of the very highest professional attainments, solely devoted to his duty. He never pushes himself forward, and when you accuse him of anything on that score you do most cruel injustice to a man who has never sought favor or applause in any other way than by the simple discharge of his duty.

Second — The movement on Porto Rico was not a movement for its capture. The department, which has very rarely interfered with the movements of Admirals commanding squadrons, did, however, make one express order, and that was that our battleships should not be exposed to the risk of serious injury from the fire of any fort. At that time the Spanish fleet was strong; its whereabouts and destination were unknown. The primal necessity was to meet and crush its ships, and to secure for us the domination of the sea. The Oregon had not arrived, the Maine was destroyed, and no naval authority would justify the unnecessary risk of the destruction of any of our battleships, except in battle with the enemy's ships. The movement to Porto Rico was to meet, if possible, the fleet of Cervera, which was then expected. Cervera, undoubtedly, learning that our fleet was at San Juan, changed his destination to
Santiago. Our movement to Porto Rico thus became a reconnoissance and fulfilled its purpose. There was no intention at this time of taking Porto Rico, as the army was not then ready to cooperate.

Third—With regard to sending our ships into the harbor of Santiago, Admiral Sampson was acting under the explicit orders of the department, not to expose his armored ships to the risk of sinking by mines; and the wisdom of this course, I believe, is universally acknowledged by naval authorities. He waited, as he should have done, the cooperation of the army. How effectually under this cooperation the result was accomplished is now matter of history. There are few more graphic scenes than must have been presented at 4 o'clock, on the afternoon of the 14th of July, when Shafter, with his troops, ready to assault Santiago, awaited the reply of the Spanish commander to the demand for surrender. Sampson's fleet was at the mouth of the harbor, drawn up in line and ready to bombard, as it had been for days previous, and the signal officer stood on the heights ready to wigwag the signal for firing. Happily, instead of this signal, came the good word that the Spanish had surrendered to this combined readiness for attack.

Fourth—Please bear in mind the variety and weight of the responsibilities which were upon Admiral Sampson for the month prior to the great battle which destroyed Cervera's fleet. He was commanding officer of the whole squadron, charged with the blockade of the whole Cuban coast, charged with the detail of all the movements of ships, charged with clerical correspondence with the department and other officers, and specially charged with preventing the escape of Cervera. Remember that this man, whom you so sweepingly accuse, was devoting his days and nights to these duties. If you will read the orders issued by him, beginning with June 1, you will find that the most thorough precautions had been taken to prevent the escape of Cervera: that our fleet was kept constantly in line, so far from the entrance at night and so far by day; that the most rigid care with searchlights and every other appliance was taken every night; that the commanding officer of every vessel knew his post and his duty in case of an attempt to escape, so that, when that attempt came, the movement to prevent it, by the attack of our vessels upon the outgoing Spaniards, went on like clockwork; as at Chattanooga, every movement of that great battle was carried out, although General Grant was neither at Missionary Ridge nor Lookout Mountain.

I can well understand why the friends of other officers should be so enthusiastic and earnest, as I am, in giving them the credit they so richly, every one of them, deserve, for their glorious work. I cannot conceive of anybody so mean as to detract, by a single hair, from their merit. But I cannot understand why such a bitter feeling is manifested, in many quarters, toward Admiral Sampson, when all these officers, subordinate to him, in their reports, clearly and cordially recognize the fact that, although at the beginning he was, by orders from Washington, going to confer with General Shafter, yet the battle was fought under his orders, and that the victory was the consummation of his thorough preparation. For myself, I know no
predilection for any one of these gallant men. I would crown every one of them with laurels. I want them all to have their just deserts. Every one of them deserves unstinted praise; not one of them deserves anything less than full measure for that day's work. And, therefore, I can think of nothing more cruel than a depreciation of the merit of the faithful, devoted, patriotic Commander-in-Chief, physically frail, worn with sleepless vigilance, weighed with measureless responsibilities and details, letting no duty go undone; for weeks with ceaseless precautions blockading the Spanish squadron; at last, by the unerring fulfillment of his plans, crushing it under the fleet which executed his commands; yet now compelled in dignified silence to be assailed as vindictively as if he were an enemy to his country. I am sure that no one more deprecates such an attack than the officers of the fleet—Commodore, Captains, and all. Among them all is peace; whatever disquiet there may be elsewhere, the navy is serene. I am reminded of Mrs. Beecher Stowe's beautiful verse:

"Far, far beneath, the noise of tempests dieth,
   And silver waves chime over peacefully;
And no rude storm, how fierce soe'er it flieth,
   Disturbs the Sabbath of that deeper sea."

Yours truly,

John D. Long.
CRUISE OF THE BATTLESHIP "OREGON."

ACCOUNT WRITTEN BY HER CHIEF ENGINEER.

UNITED STATES SHIP "OREGON."
BLOCKADING SANTIAGO DE CUBA.
JUNE 22, 1898.

Knowing the great interest you take in all matters pertaining to our navy, and
the especial interest with which you have followed our remarkable race for the scene
of war, I am sure you will be pleased to have a more or less full account of our recent
voyage, together with some general data. I will, therefore, start this account, making it
from time to time as opportunity offers.

The Oregon, you know, is a first-class coast defense battleship of about 10,000 tons
displacement at the so-called normal draught. In this condition, however, she has only
a certain limited amount of stores on board and only four hundred tons of coal. When
she goes to sea, with her bunkers full of coal, all stores and all ammunition on board,
her actual displacement is something over 12,000 tons, and her draught of water is then
over twenty-seven feet, and she was, of course, in this latter condition when we
started out from San Francisco, having on board at that time about 1,500 tons of
coil, all bunkers being practically full.

The ship is driven by twin screws, worked by triple expansion engines. The engines
being placed in separate water-tight compartments, and the tops of the cylinders
come well below the protective deck. There are four large main boilers, double-
ended cylindrical, each boiler in a separate water-tight compartment, and, of course,
also well below the protective deck. These boilers are each fifteen feet in diameter,
eighteen feet long, and have eight furnaces, four in each end. The dimensions of
each furnace are three feet diameter, and length of grate five feet six inches,
giving a grate surface for each furnace of seventeen and a quarter square feet, or
552 for all main boilers.

We all knew, of course, that we had a remarkably fine ship, but before starting
out we felt some little anxiety as to our ability to keep the machinery fully up to
its work during such a long cruise. Nothing approaching it had ever before been
attempted by a heavy battleship. Fortunately, we had just come out of dry dock
in Bremerton (and our trip should really be considered as starting from that point
rather than from San Francisco) and were only nine or ten days in San Francisco
before starting for Callao—just long enough to fill our bunkers and magazines.
Our machinery, both engines and boilers, were then in excellent condition, every-
thing having been thoroughly overhauled by our own people while in dry dock,
so it was not necessary to do any great amount of work in San Francisco.

Having finally filled up with coal, ammunition, and stores we left on March 19,
and proceeded under three boilers direct for Callao, which port we reached on the
morning of April 4, having expended, during this run of sixteen days, nine hundred tons of coal, leaving six hundred tons still in our bunkers. This we consider a remarkably efficient performance, having averaged 4.24 knots per ton of coal. The revolutions of the engines during this run were remarkably steady, averaging seventy-five revolutions per minute for day after day without a variation of a tenth of a revolution.

On two different occasions one of the boilers in use began to leak slightly around the back ends of some of the tubes. On both occasions we immediately started fires in the idle boiler, and allowed those in the leaking boiler to die out, and as soon as possible the boilermaker was sent in to recouple the tubes. During all this time the water in the boilers was perfectly fresh, our evaporators and distillers having a capacity of 5,000 gallons a day, which was sufficient for all purposes, including the necessary make-up feed for the boilers.

On the afternoon of March 27 smoke and gas were discovered to be coming out of one of the coal bunkers. This bunker was over half full at the time, having probably between sixty-five and seventy tons in it. There was nothing to do but dig for the fire, as it was evidently down somewhere in the body of the pile. So we started in, working a couple of men in the bunker for about ten minutes at a time, and then sending in a couple more to relieve the first. After about two hours' work the fire was reached, only about a shovelful of live coal being found, but probably a couple of tons so hot that it was giving off smoke and gas. After about four hours' steady work all the dangerous coal had been removed, and no further trouble was encountered. We had to call for assistance from the deck force to help us out in carrying the coal away, as we kept up the speed of the ship the whole time; but our own men did all the work in the bunker itself. Naval Cadet Jensen, one of our engineer cadets, was temporarily relieved from watch duty and put in charge of the fire gang, and the way he went at it, never paying the least attention to the excessive heat and foul air and gas in which he was working, was wonderful to see.

On arriving at Callao we found that our coal had been ordered for us by the Marietta. The lighters had all been loaded, and were brought alongside as soon as we let go the anchor.

Then began some real work. I started in on the starboard engine and Reeves on the port engine, and we overhauled connections, scraped in brasses where necessary, examined, cleaned, and repaired air pumps, circulating pumps, wiped out and oiled all the main cylinders and valve chests. Fortunately for me, my engine was in pretty good shape, needing only a slight amount of keying up here and there. Reeves, however, found one of his main cross-head slippers so badly cut and scored that it was deemed best to remove it and put in place a spare one, which we carried on board. This sounds easy, but it required twenty-four hours' continuous work, as it had to be fitted exactly, the face carefully scraped to a true surface; and, finally, the guides nicely adjusted.
In the meantime the firemen and coal passers were engaged in trimming the bunkers, under the supervision of our two cadet engineers, who took twenty-four hours' watch at a time.

When we arrived here it was evident that war with Spain was inevitable, but war had not yet broken out. However, every precaution was taken to guard against any treachery on the part of Spanish sympathizers. The ordinary number of sentries was doubled and these men were armed with ball cartridges, ammunition was gotten up for the rapid-fire guns, and the steam launches were manned with armed crews and kept patrolling around the ship all night, to warn off and prevent any strange boats from approaching. These precautions were observed whenever we were at anchor in any port during the whole trip.

All our coal was finally on board by the afternoon of April 7, and out we started again, using three boilers and averaging something over eleven knots per hour until the evening of the 9th, when the fourth boiler was put on and the average speed increased to about thirteen knots, and this was kept up until the evening of the 16th, when we reached Port Tamar, just inside the entrance of the Straits of Magellan. We had a few leaky tubes in one boiler a day or so after leaving Callao, and, of course, stopped them as soon as possible. Soon after this, in some way which we have never been able to determine, a small amount of salt water got into our boilers, just enough to cause the density of the water to become about what it would be if one-quarter of it were sea water. This, of course, meant a certain amount of scale, but fortunately the amount was so small that it merely served to make our tube ends tight, without being enough to cause any bad effects on the boilers. At all events, from that time until long after our arrival off Santiago we did not have another leaky tube.

We spent the night at anchor in Port Tamar, and the next morning started out with the intention of making Sandy Point by dark. This, of course, required a semi-forced draught run, what is known technically as "assisted draught"; that is to say, the forced draught blowers are run, but the firerooms are not closed up air-tight, as under full forced draught. We ran our blowers at such a speed as to give an air pressure of one-quarter of an inch of water, and were thus able to run the engines at a speed of 107.3 revolutions per minute, giving the ship a speed through the water of 14.6 knots per hour. As a matter of fact our speed from point to point along the shore was much greater, as there was a very strong current running through the straits in our favor.

While at Callao we had heard that a Spanish torpedo boat was at Montevideo, and we thought it just possible that she might attempt to intercept us in the straits, lying behind one of the numerous high points and darting out on us. So the rapid-fire gun crews were kept at their guns, ready for instant work. However, we saw nothing of her.

Sandy Point was reached in the evening, and the next morning (April 18) began our usual work — coaling ship, cleaning, repairing, and overhauling machinery.
Of course, the only way to keep the ship going, was to turn to at every opportunity and do everything possible in the time allowed; but it was beginning to tell on all of us. We all had to stand watch at sea, and as soon as port was reached, all hands of the engineer's force had to go at the work and keep it up, going for every little thing that showed the least sign of wear, and not waiting even for it to show, but hunting for things of which there was the least probability of their becoming out of order. But all hands stood the strain well.

We remained at Sandy Point until the morning of April 21, leaving with about 1,200 tons of coal in our bunkers. The Marietta accompanied us from Sandy Point to Rio, or rather until the morning of the 30th, when we increased our speed to about fourteen and a half knots an hour, in order to arrive in port during the afternoon, leaving the Marietta to follow in later. The run from Sandy Point to Rio was without incident, and was at a slower speed than our previous runs, on account of the Marietta.

It was at Rio that we received the news that war was on with Spain, and at the same time a rumor of Dewey's victory at Manila reached us. We also received a long cablegram from Washington, informing us that Admiral Cervera's squadron of four heavy armored cruisers and four seagoing torpedo boats had left for Cuban waters, and we were advised to avoid them if possible. We remained at Rio until May 4, doing what repairing we could and filling up with coal, taking something over a thousand tons. During our stay in this port we were not allowed to visit the shore. Here, too, we found the Nictheroy, which had been bought by an American firm and was flying our flag, and which was to be convoyed by us to the United States. However, she was not allowed to leave port with us, so we stood up the coast a few miles to wait for her. She joined us the following evening, but her boilers were in such bad condition that it was decided not to waste time with her, so she was left in charge of the Marietta, and we went ahead, arriving at Bahia on the evening of the 8th. Here we put on our war paint and made arrangements for refilling our bunkers, but on the evening of the 9th a cablegram was received from Washington, ordering us to leave, so out we went immediately, heading for Barbadoes, which was reached at about 3 o'clock on the morning of May 18. Here we took 240 tons of coal and left the same evening, standing well to the eastward, and finally reached the Florida coast at Jupiter Light on the evening of the 24th, reporting our arrival to Washington. Orders came back to proceed to Hampton Roads if in need of repairs, otherwise to Key West. There was no hesitation as to which direction to take under these orders, and, finally, Key West was reached on the morning of the 26th, thus completing the most remarkable and successful performance ever undertaken by a battleship.

I have since heard that there was great anxiety among our own people at home on account of this ship and that foreign nations were watching our run with great interest, while many doubted our ability to successfully accomplish it.

In the first place the machinery of this ship was beautifully and strongly built, and, above all, was erected in the ship with the greatest care and thoroughness. Great
credit is therefore due to her builders and to the inspectors who supervised the work. From the day she went into commission the greatest care has been taken to keep everything up as nearly to perfection as possible. On the discovery of the least defect in any part, it has been remedied immediately. Whenever a run has been made, no matter how short it may have been, on reaching port again the cylinders and valve chests, air pump valves, etc., have been carefully examined, cleaned, and oiled. The most careful attention has been paid to the condition of the boilers, and every endeavor has been made to avoid the use of salt water in them; that, indeed, is the point to which our success is largely due. Every leak, however small, in the boilers themselves, in the steam pipes, in the engines or in the condensers has been stopped just as soon as possible, and thus only has it been possible to keep down the amount of water necessary for make-up feed to such a point that our evaporators have been able to furnish it, in addition to the water required for all other purposes.

The following is a summary, in tabular form, of our runs, showing at a glance the number of knots run, the speed of the ship in knots per hour, the consumption of coal, and the knots run per ton of coal. The data in this table are taken from the time of getting fairly under way, the time while entering and leaving port being eliminated. The coal, of course, does not include that used while lying in port, but includes coal consumed for all purposes while at sea.

<table>
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<th>Distance,</th>
<th>Time,</th>
<th>Speed,</th>
<th>Coal,</th>
<th>Knots Run</th>
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<td>Knots</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>Knots per Hour</td>
<td>Tons</td>
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<td>10.08</td>
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<td>*</td>
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*Speeds variable. Data unreliable.*

C. N. Opfley.