stood a round stone fort with a tiled roof sloping up to a sharp point. To the east, south, and southwest the town was defended by barbed wire entanglements, and the stone houses in the town— even the old church—had been loopholed and converted into defensive stands for resistance.

Capron’s battery continued firing until it had delivered twenty-seven shots, to which no answer was made. But as the twenty-eighth shot was being fired there was a whistling near our battery, followed by the explosion of a shell from the Reina Mercedes’ battery. Another and another followed, but the Spaniards on their harbor water battery did poor shooting. Their shells did not touch our battery, but fell on a house where some soldiers were hiding, some distance away. The three shells wounded thirteen Cubans and eighteen Americans.

The number of our troops sent against El Caney was about 5,000, though only about 3,500 were engaged. The plan of attack was made by Brigadier-General Adna R. Chaffee, who had reconnoitered the country and acquainted himself with all the paths and roads. General Chaffee’s brigade of the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Infantry was placed on the east of the town, Colonel Miles’s brigade of the First, Fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry was on the south, and General Ludlow’s brigade, comprising the Second Massachusetts Volunteers and the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry, was at the left on the southwest side.

The Spaniards were quite as willing as, and better prepared to sustain a fight than, the Americans. After the long bombardment by Capron’s battery Chaffee’s brigade was sent forward to lead the attack under cover of the artillery. The Seventh and Twelfth were moved ahead and the Seventeenth was held in reserve. An advance was also ordered on the south and southwest, but all had to be made cautiously. The powder smoke from the battery and the guns of the volunteers gave the Spaniards our range, and enabled them to do deadly execution. Besides, the ground was covered with barbed wire resistances and every thicket concealed sharpshooters.
At a distance of 600 yards from El Caney, hiding behind bushes and lying in the grass, our troops maintained a rifle duel with the enemy for three hours. The volunteers were ordered to the rear, so as not to expose our line by the smoke from their guns.

A blockhouse on the slope, that harbored a small detachment of the enemy’s sharpshooters, was turned over to a detachment of our Cuban allies. They exhausted their ammunition, but did not disturb the Spaniards. Yard by yard the Americans crept up the hill, but hour after hour passed and the progress was painfully slow.

At 10:30 we were just holding our advance in good safety, although losing more than the enemy, when an order arrived from Shafter to cease the assault and move to the assistance of Wheeler and Kent at San Juan. It was a serious interruption. As a military observer present pointed out, to comply with the order would have entailed a demoralizing defeat in the face of the enemy. General Lawton did not obey the order, but pressed the attack. The Fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry joined in the attack. The fire of Capron’s battery became terribly effective, and was directed to reduce the fort. At one o’clock the flag was shot away. The incident evoked cheers from the whole army of attack, and heartened them up.

Captain Lee of the British army, who was present for observations under the orders of his Government, described the spirit and peril of our troops at that moment. “Wishing to see how Chaffee’s men were faring,” he wrote, “I crawled through a hedge into the field beyond, and, accidentally, into such a hot corner, that I readily complied with General Chaffee’s abrupt injunction: ‘Get down on your stomach, sir.’ Indeed, I was distinctly grateful for his advice, but could not fail to notice that he was regardless of it himself. Wherever the foe was thickest he strolled about unconcernedly, a half-smoked cigar between his teeth, and an expression of exceeding grimness on his countenance.

“The situation was a trying one for the nerves of the oldest soldier, and some of the younger hands fell back from the firing line and crept into the road. In a moment the General pounced upon
them, inquiring their destination in low, unloved accents, and then taking them persuasively by the elbows, led them back to the extreme front and, having deposited them on the firing line, stood over them while he distributed a few last words of pungent advice. Throughout the day he set the most inspiring example to his men, and that he escaped unhurt was a miracle. One bullet clipped a breast button off his coat, another passed under his shoulder strap, but neither touched him, and there must be some truth in the old adage that fortune favors the brave.

"Close in front of me, a slight and boyish Lieutenant compelled my attention by his persistent and reckless gallantry. Whenever a man was hit he would dart to his assistance, regardless of the fire that this exposure inevitably drew. Suddenly he sprang to his feet, gazing intently into the village, but what he saw we never knew, for he was instantly shot through the heart and fell over backward, clutching at the air. I followed the men who carried him to the road and asked them his name. 'Second-Lieutenant Wansboro, sir, of the Seventh Infantry, and you will never see his better. He fought like a little tiger.'

"A few convulsive gasps and the poor boy was dead, and as we laid him in a shady spot by the side of the road the Sergeant reverently drew a handkerchief over his face and said: 'Good-bye, Lieutenant, you were a brave little officer, and you died like a true soldier.'"

A few minutes before three o'clock Capron's battery had played so effectively upon the stone fort as to materially reduce the resistance, and then General Chaffee at the head of the Twenty-fifth Infantry charged the hill and took the fort in the face of deadly volleys. The inner walls of the fort were splashed with blood. The gate was so wedged with dead and débris that it could not be entered. The rifle trenches were full of Spanish dead, most of them shot through the forehead, their brains oozing out.

But yet the town remained to be taken. Our troops were sheltered in Spanish trenches and by the brow of the hill. Capron's battery now turned upon the town itself, but the effect could not be observed.
When our troops had moved up under the shelter of the foothill, they were divided and sent right and left to enter the streets.

The fighting before they reached El Caney was as nothing compared with the resistance met in the town. They were fired on from all sides by the enemy, who were concealed everywhere. The trenches in view were filled with men, whose hats were visible. The Americans shot the hats to pieces, but killed none of the Spaniards, who had resorted to the old trick of placing their hats on sticks for our men to shoot at. The breastworks in the northeast corner of the town did the most damage. This battery of Gatlings was not discovered for a long time. It showered an almost resistless fire upon our men. The Americans lay down to avoid it. The Spaniards had the range, however, and killed and wounded many of our men as they lay. The officers suffered particularly.

But the masked battery was soon located and then began a charge through the streets that sent the Spaniards flying, while our soldiers picked them off as they ran. Every street leading out was filled with the rout, and 125 Spaniards were captured. The enemy had lost half their number in killed and wounded, 125 were prisoners, and 375 escaped.

Up went the flag over the fort and church and four miles to the southwest came cheers from the heights of San Juan, where victory was already perched.

The Spanish retreat from El Caney left that outpost safely in our possession, being further from the city than San Juan. At night General Lawton attempted to march with some troops to reënforce Wheeler's division at San Juan, but met with opposition from concealed Spanish forces and was compelled to make a detour so long that he reached the point only next day at noon.
When the sun went down on that terrible first day of July, the stars and stripes waved over San Juan and El Caney, and over our troops, weakened by many killed and wounded, worn by twelve hours of constant marching and fighting under the broiling sun, with little to eat, and yet with the prospect of still more desperate work ahead. There was to be no rest. No wonder there was a moment of depression, when for an hour the hearts of some of these heroes sank within them. On San Juan there were not more than 5,000, while in front of them the enemy, 8,000 strong, lay in their trenches, supported by heavy artillery ready to assault or defend. We had 5,000 at El Caney.

In his report to General Shafter, written that night at 8 o'clock, General Wheeler described the position with the simplicity of a soldier, and the dauntless heart of a hero. This sick man had been at his post all day. After describing the capture of the hill and the cessation of the fighting towards sunset, he wrote:

"I examined the line in front of Wood's brigade, and gave the men shovels and picks and insisted on their going right to work. I also sent word to General Kent to come and get intrenching tools, and saw General Hawkins in person and told him the same thing. They all promise to do their best, but say the earth is very difficult, as a great part of it is rocky.

"The positions our men carried were very strong, and the intrenchments were very strong.

"A number of officers have appealed to me to have the line withdrawn and take up a strong position farther back, and I expect they will appeal to you. I have positively discounterenced this, as it would cost us much prestige.

"The lines are very thin, as so many men have gone to the rear with wounds and so many are exhausted, but I hope these men can be got up to-night, and with our line intrenched and Lawton on our right we ought to hold to-morrow, but I fear it will be a severe day. If we can get through to-morrow, all right; we can make our breastworks very strong the next night. You can hardly realize the exhausted condition of the troops. The Third and Sixth Cavalry and other troops were up marching and halting on the road all last night, and have fought for twelve hours to-day, and those that are not on the line will be digging trenches to-night."
"I have been on the extreme front line. The men were lying down and reported the Spaniards not more than three hundred yards in their front."

There was in the condition much to appal any but the strongest heart. Throughout the night the picket firing was continuous. Men who could be spared were carrying the wounded back to Siboney and burying the dead on the battlefield. The wounded were carried in army wagons, that jolted over the stones during the passage of five long miles.

What a passage of torture that was—not of physical pain alone; but the Spaniards, with the instinct of cruelty, threw off the restraints of civilized warfare. During the day’s fighting their sharpshooters deliberately fired upon our wounded as they were carried from the battlefield, and guerillas, armed with Mausers, infested the road to Siboney, firing upon the wounded, nurses, helpers, newspaper correspondents, and all non-combatants. The perpetration of such acts enraged our troops to a point that threatened reprisals, but none was permitted.

The Spaniards expected vengeance, conscious of their own brutality. A body of 165 Spanish prisoners was sent to the rear in charge of a detachment of our troops. Half the prisoners were servants and camp followers taken at El Caney. The remainder were a company of regulars of the Battalion Constitucional, with two lieutenants and one sergeant. They saluted the American officers they met, in a most cringing fashion, and one officer hailed a Cuban who was with our troops, saying:—

"Please ask these gentlemen who are in charge of us to kill us here by the roadside and not force us to undergo the torture of a long walk before we are shot."

"Fools," answered the Cuban in Spanish and with evident disgust, "they will not harm you; they will only keep you prisoners."

But the Spaniard shook his head. He believed little in warfare in which the lives of captives were spared, and he could not believe that the Cuban was not taunting him.
At Siboney doctors and nurses were ready. The nurses did wonderful work. In the cases of a large percentage of the wounded operations were necessary; the tables were filled, and hundreds were waiting their turn. The work went on steadily all night by the light of small lanterns and candles. It was a strange scene in the huge tents. When their wounds had been dressed, the men were carried out and laid upon the grass in blankets.

At the front fighting was resumed early Saturday morning. The Spaniards made a desperate effort to recapture San Juan hill. They assaulted again and again, and each time were driven back with awful loss. Our Hotchkiss guns did great execution. Finally, the enemy was driven back upon the third intrenchment, before Santiago itself. Then the Spanish sharpshooting began and all day long the exhausted soldiers on both sides carried on the sullen duel, with artillery, with volley firing, with spasmodic advances and feints, while all through the field and along the roads the guerillas harassed and shot down our stragglers. The Spanish fire along the line was so hot that no one could stand up at times. For two miles in our rear the road was blocked with wounded. But when night came the Americans held every inch of ground they had taken, and the Spanish prisoners brought in were dejected and confessed the desperation of the enemy within the city's entrenchments.

Our losses in the two days' fighting included twelve officers and about two hundred and fifty men killed, with thirteen hundred wounded. The wounds proved to be unusually easy to handle and deaths from them were few. The Spanish loss was very much greater, both in killed and wounded. Half the force in the city was disabled in the two days' fighting.

Among our dead were a number of gallant and distinguished officers. Colonel Charles A. Wikoff of the Twenty-second Infantry, killed, enlisted as a private in Company H, First Pennsylvania Infantry, in the War of the Rebellion. He was made a First-Lieutenant, and promoted to Captain in 1864. He was made a Major in the Fourteenth in 1886, and promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel of the Nineteenth in
1891. His commission as Colonel of the Twenty-second dated from 1897. For gallant and meritorious services at the battle of Shiloh he was brevetted Captain, April 7, 1862, and for bravery at Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge was made a Brevet Major. Colonel Wikoff was born and reared at Easton, Pennsylvania. He was highly esteemed as an excellent officer and amiable and agreeable man. Colonel Wikoff lost an eye in the Civil War, and could have been retired for that disability, but he always expressed the wish that he might serve until his sixty-fourth year and be regularly retired. Since the Civil War he had been on constant duty in the West.

Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Patterson of the Twenty-second Infantry, killed, wore a medal of honor presented to him by Congress "for most distinguished gallantry in action at the battle of the Wilderness in Virginia, on May 5, 1864, under the heavy fire of the advancing enemy, in picking up and carrying several hundred yards, to a place of safety, a wounded officer of his regiment, who was helpless and would otherwise have been burned in the forest; while serving as First-Lieutenant, Eleventh United States Infantry." He was a New Yorker by birth, a soldier of fine character, and popular in the service.

Colonel John M. Hamilton of the Ninth (black) Cavalry enlisted in the Civil War as a private in 1861. He was born in Canada, and after serving for two years with gallantry he was transferred to the regular army and came out of the struggle a Captain. He was advanced to the command of the Ninth during the Indian wars on the frontier.

On the Spanish side there was among the killed General Vara del Rey, a distinguished officer in charge of the defense at El Caney. General Linares, Commander-in-Chief at Santiago, was badly wounded in the charge on San Juan and was compelled to hand over the command to General José Toral. Commander Romero, of the celebrated Guardia Civile of Spain, was also desperately wounded.
San Juan and El Caney comprised together one of those great contests that history will discuss and controversy will struggle with for a long time. Everything will be disputed except the valor and determination of American soldiers and the desperation of Spanish resistance. Well-informed men who participated express the opinion that when the military statistician completes his work and military experts analyze the totals showing the number of men engaged and those killed and wounded, it will be found that the battle of San Juan was one of the bloodiest on record. It is estimated that the average of disabilities was above ten per cent. General Kent’s division, it is said, suffered to the extent of thirteen per cent.—an average higher than many of the famous battles in history.

Although the battle of July 1 was properly one engagement, nevertheless there were two distinct and separate, though interdependent, fights going on at the same time—that which gave us the stone fort and the town of El Caney, taken by the men of Lawton’s division, and that which advanced our center (Wheeler’s division) three miles and gave us San Juan hill and blockhouse, and commanding positions for our batteries. The two engagements were interdependent, for, if the center had been repulsed and driven back the Spaniards could, and probably would, have swept down and flanked our right. Had Lawton’s division been driven back, the Spaniards would have come between Wheeler and our base of supplies—Siboney—and starved Wheeler out. The artillery opened the engagement in each fight (treating El Caney and San Juan as separate engagements), but it was the infantry and dismounted cavalry, assisted to some extent by the Gatling section, that secured definite results.

From the best obtainable information it may be set down to the glory of the United States soldier that part of the charge on San Juan was made, not after orders, but without orders from any officer commanding a division or brigade. It was the spontaneous forward movement
of one brigade that could not be stopped or checked until the troops halted, breathless, but victorious, on top of San Juan hill, and that carried commanding officers along with it, willing, leading, and brave, but without the intention.

Of the incidents of the first day’s fighting, that illustrate the temper of our troops and the unconquering patience and fortitude of the wounded in the absence of surgeons and hospital helpers, those described by Captain Arthur Lee of the British army, a competent and disinterested observer, are best in point. His observations were set out in his official report to his Government, and are not, therefore, to be considered as tinged with any sentiment, except that which is necessary to put his own military authorities in possession of the truth concerning the character, courage, discipline, and disposition of the troops of another nation.

He noted that at El Caney our total artillery force was but four guns, and these were quite unequal to the task of demoralizing the enemy. Consequently the infantry had to do all the fighting, and the brunt of it fell upon the men of one brigade. He reported that little attention was paid to the Spanish firing until our black powder smoke established the range, and then bloody execution commenced.

"The expenditure of ammunition on our side," he writes, "was enormous and improvident, for there was little target visible, but the Spanish sharpshooters concealed in the trees, cottages, and blockhouses were replying with deadly effect. At one point eight marksmen of Captain Evans's company crept forward to occupy a small advanced knoll, and five were hit in less than as many minutes. At another point seven men of the Seventeenth regiment broke through a hedge into the field beyond, and instantly a volley killed three and wounded the remaining four. The Second Massachusetts was compelled to withdraw from the fight, because their Springfield single-loaders drew so much fire in their direction.

"Two men of the First Infantry crept forward under fire, and, within 200 yards of the enemy's trenches, cut all the barbed-wire impediments. Colonel Haskell, leading the Seventeenth Infantry, was hit
three times in a very few seconds; his quartermaster was killed by his side.

"The Seventh was exposed to a terrible fire. Hour after hour the men stood it unflinchingly, the fierce sun scorching their backs, suffering heavy losses from an enemy practically invisible, and to whom they could not reply effectively."

Captain Lee at noon came to a sunken road and noticed it was full of men lying down. He asked an officer if they were reserves. The answer was:—

"No, sir; by — , they are casualties."

He found over a hundred killed and wounded laid out on as many yards of road, and so close together that one could only pass by stepping over them. There was a strange silence among these men, not a whimper or a groan, but each lay quietly nursing his wound with closed eyes and set teeth, only flinching when the erratic sleet of bullets clipped the leaves off the hedge close above their heads.

"Many looked up curiously at my strange uniform as I passed," he added, "and asked quickly and quietly: 'Are you a doctor, sir?' I could but shake my head, and they would instantly relapse into their strained, intent attitudes, while I felt sick at heart at the thought of my incompetence. Some of the slightly wounded were tending those who were badly hit, and nothing could have surpassed the unskilled tenderness of those men. I was astonished, too, at their thoughtful consideration.

"'Keep well down, sir,' several said as I stopped to speak to them, 'them Mausers is flying pretty low and there's plenty of us here already.'"

"The heat in the little road was intense: there was no shade, not a breath of air, and the wounded lay sweltering in the sun until the head reeled with the rank smell of sweat and saturated flannel. Right among the wounded lay, curled up, a Cuban, apparently asleep. Upon approaching him, however, it was only too apparent that he had been dead for several days, and on the tree overhead two sleek and gorged vultures looked down furtively at his ever-increasing companions."
"The worst feature of it all was the scarcity of doctors. Hour after hour these wounded men had lain in the scorching sun, unattended, and often bleeding to death. Their comrades had, in many cases, applied the first aid dressings in rough and unskilled fashion, but, so far as one could see, there had been no medical assistance. The nearest dressing station was three-quarters of a mile to the rear, and, while the medical staff there was, undoubtedly, more than busy, it was chiefly with such cases as were slightly enough wounded to walk down for aid.

"One man I noticed lying very quiet in a great pool of blood. A comrade with a shattered leg was fanning him with a hat, and keeping the flies off his face. I sat down beside them, and, seeing the man was shot right through the stomach, knew there was nothing I could do beyond giving him a little water. I asked him how he felt, and he replied with difficulty:—

"'Oh, I am doing pretty well, sir.' His companion then said: 'Well, sir, if you can, you might send a doctor to see this man. He was one of the first hit, about eight this morning, and no one has seen him yet.' The wounded man here broke in: 'That's all right, Mick, I guess the doctors have more than they can do looking after them as are badly hurt, and they will be along soon.' I looked at my watch and it was nearly one o'clock."

Saturday afternoon both sides, worn out with fatigue, rested. Then came a lull as if before a storm—the night of Saturday, July 2, glorious to our military arm, presaging ominously the event that was to follow on Sunday on the sea, and fill the world with astonishment at American prowess.
CHAPTER THE TENTH.

DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA’S SQUADRON.

The Dash of the Spanish Ships Out of the Harbor of Santiago—The Greatest Naval Duel in the World’s History—All the Enemy’s Ships and Destroyers but One Annihilated by Our War Ships in Fifty-Five Minutes—The Long Chase after the “Caristobal Colon” and Her Capture after a Race of Fifty Miles—The Glory of the “Brooklyn,” “Oregon,” “Texas,” and “Gloucester.”

I.

Sunday morning, the third of July, dawned clear and beautiful over the ocean and the bay of Santiago. The United States ships of war that lay in a great semicircle before the entrance were bathed in the brilliant sunshine that glittered on the water just rippled by a breeze. Along shore the last misty haze of dawn hung under the cliffs, blue and dim. On the crags of Old Morro and Socapa Point the guns were still pointing outward from the battered forts, and above the walls streamed the flag of Spain.

For a month and a day our ships of war had lain off the same spot, keeping unwearied watch upon the gash in the cliffs that marked the harbor entrance. By day they lay off from four to six miles, with a lookout at every ship’s head; at night they steamed in, lying from two-and-a-half to four miles off, with a blazing searchlight from one of the ships, by two-hour turns, fixed upon the center of the gash. As our troops closed about Santiago, the ships drew nearer in daylight, and on this Sunday morning they steamed with bare steerway, or drifted, in a half-circle eight miles long, from two to four miles from the shore.

Inside the bay, in front of the wharves of Santiago, were the ships of Spain commanded by Admiral Cervera, the torpedo section commanded by Vice-Admiral Villamil, two officers of great repute and

(150)
noble lineage. The Admiral had determined to remain in the harbor and assist in the defense of the city by driving back the American troops with his heavy guns when our men should move on the lines. But the cord had tightened about Santiago, and the Admiral’s plan had proved impracticable. He could not elevate his guns sufficiently, and the intrepid Americans had followed the Spanish so closely, beating them back step by step, that his fire would have endangered his own allies quite as much as the American forces. It was gloomy in the city. With the invaders at its very doors, the Spanish soldiers, exhausted by fighting, hunger, disease, and sleeplessness, were dejected; the citizens terrorized with vague apprehension. The sailors on Cervera’s ships were in want of food and worn with nervous anxiety.

The Admiral had, moreover, received positive orders from the Spanish Government and Captain-General Blanco at Havana, to leave the harbor, put to sea and, if possible, sail to the rescue of Havana. With his swift cruisers it was believed Cervera could at an opportune moment dash out of the harbor at full speed and escape danger from pursuit, except by our New York and Brooklyn, equally swift vessels. Under these orders, against which the Admiral had protested as being impossible to execute with hope of success, he had, nevertheless, made his preparations to act. The coal bunkers were filled, live cattle for provision were taken aboard, the ships were stripped, guns loaded, and all was in readiness.

Saturday night, in fact, had been selected for the desperate enterprise; but on that night the United States ships had refrained from keeping their searchlights on the harbor entrance, and it had been decided that the Spanish ships could not steam past the sunken Merrimac in the dark. For that reason Cervera waited till Sunday morning. The news of his purpose was abroad in the city, and thousands of persons were expected on the wharves to witness the dash to battle. But the events of the previous day had rendered such a spectacle uninteresting to the beleaguered and terrorized populace in Santiago. None came to see the pride of Spain’s navy go to the field of the swiftest and most awful destruction ever known in naval warfare.
On the ships, therefore, the men waited in dejection for orders. The Captains issued brandy freely to dispel the nervous depression, and encouraged their men with promises or urged them with threats to do their duty. There was to be no surrender, but a fight to death. At eight o'clock a lookout on the mountain top brought the information that Admiral Sampson's flagship, the New York, and the battleship Massachusetts had left the blockading line and steamed eastward out of sight. This was good news to the Admiral. The Brooklyn, he thought, was the only American left capable of overhauling any of his own cruisers. Quickly the plan of sortie was arranged. Admiral Cervera, on his flagship, the Maria Teresa, was to lead the way, turn to the west, where the Brooklyn lay at one end of the blockading line, and attack Commodore Schley's cruiser. Under cover of this the Vizcaya was to follow and ram the Brooklyn if possible. If this was successful, there was the open sea in which to run away from the heavy battleships.

The commanders were given orders, more brandy was served, and the men were worked up to the point of desperation, at which it seems the Spanish sailors were expected to fight best—the old eighteenth-century plan of "Dutch courage through a blind drunk." as long ago described by an English sailor.

Meanwhile, out on the sea, in the dancing sunlight, the Americans were at easy Sunday duties. No man on those ships dreamed that Cervera would emerge in the broad light of early morning, when the men he must engage were fresh from a profound night's rest, and in perfect condition to meet attack. The Brooklyn lay at the west of the line, three miles off shore, while the little converted yacht Vixen was close in under the cliffs, two miles west of the Scapa battery. Next in order, eastward from the Brooklyn, lay the Texas, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, and the steel yacht Gloucester, formerly the pleasure yacht Corsair. The Gloucester was off the bay of Aguadores, so that it was at the western end of the line only, between the Brooklyn and the shore, that there was an open space through which the enemy could turn, unless it intended to attack the line.
The *Massachusetts* had sailed east to Guantánamo bay to coal, and, seven miles off in the same direction, Admiral Sampson, on the *New York*, was steaming to Siboney to meet General Shafter by agreement for a conference.

At half-past nine o'clock Commodore Schley, seated in his chair under the awning of the *Brooklyn*, had just dismissed the men after "quarterly muster," when the articles of war are read aloud to the crew, according to regulations, four times a year. On the other ships quarters inspection was in progress. The men were in their "Sunday clothes." It was a peaceful and lazy scene, despite the air of prompt discipline during the performance of duty.

Overhead the bright sun. There was nothing ominous of the next minute that was pregnant with the most frightful destruction and terrible carnage that modern war has yet known.

II.

There came one moment when every ship in the line was alive with premonition. Lookouts had observed smoke rising back in the harbor, but that was not unusual. Suddenly, every look-out saw the same thing, and at the same instant every sailor on the fleet felt a mysterious thrill. Even those on the *New York*, seven miles away, afterwards told of the mysterious instinct that, like a telepathic whisper, made all suddenly look back at the harbor entrance.

At the rear of the gash in the cliffs appeared the fighting masts of a war ship, her funnels pouring out dense clouds of smoke, indicating that she was coming out with speed.

"The ships are coming out!" was shouted on every Yankee war vessel.

It was as if electricity had vitalized every man and every machine on our ships of war. The same signal flew to every masthead, followed by another from Commodore Schley, on the *Brooklyn*. "Close in and engage the enemy!"
But signals were not necessary. The clear orders that had been known for weeks, the perfect discipline on board every vessel, caused every Captain to fight his ship without signals. Then it was, not taken by surprise, but steadied by amazed excitement, that the three thousand men aboard our war ships, drilled in perfect sobriety, trained upon excellent food and with regular method, felt the nerves and muscles in their healthy bodies tingle with the eagerness of long-expected combat. They had enjoyed splendid gunning practice during the bombardments, and now it was “to do or die.”

It was thirty-five minutes past nine when the nose of the Spanish flagship, Maria Teresa, showed outside the entrance and, swinging to the west, headed toward the Brooklyn, firing as she came. On all our ships some of the furnaces and boilers were being cleaned out, and the driving power was low; but signal bells and tubes were hurrying orders everywhere, while messengers went scurrying about ship, gunners stripped for action, and awnings were stowed away. The Iowa, Indiana, Oregon, and Texas were at nearest range, with the Gloucester off to the right.

In a minute guns were trained from every turret, barbette, and steel bastion, and into the cloud of white steam and black coal smoke that enveloped the Maria Teresa, the four battleships hurled their shells and solid shot. The first shell that struck the Spaniard shattered her main water-supply pipe and the second went into the Admiral’s cabin, exploded and set the stern afire, while another from the Indiana, as the flying Spaniard turned to westward, exploded as it tore through a gun-room and killed sixty men. Still the Spaniard held on his way and headed out somewhat toward the Brooklyn.

And now, eight hundred yards behind her, the second Spaniard, the Vizcaya, steamed out of the entrance, belching smoke and flame under forced draught, and turned to follow the Maria Teresa.

 Commodore Schley, on the Brooklyn, had but two boilers in service, though the others were being fired up, and he was not able to make more than eight knots. With the instinct of a fighter he guessed the intention to ram his ship, and with the splendid skill of a manoeuvrer,
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he executed a movement so bold as to confound the Spaniards. He had not yet fired a shot, but was running westward and northward to cut off the flight. Now, however, he wheeled in the face of the enemy, to starboard, and with all the speed he could command, steamed bow on to meet the Vizcaya prow to prow. The Spanish flagship, however, was undone. Already her men were unable to stand to their guns, swept by the killing metal of our battleships, and thick with the smoke of fire burning everywhere. In vain did her officers threaten their gunners, and even shoot them down to prevent desecration of the guns. The Texas and Oregon were running in and devastating her, and the Iowa and Indiana were assisting.

Captain Victor Concas, of the Teresa, was standing on his bridge with the second officer, Captain Maocochron, to whom he turned:—

"Shall we beach the ship for humanity’s sake or fight longer, disabled as we are?" he asked.

"We should beach her," replied Maocochron.

As he spoke, a shell struck Captain Concas, who fell dying. His last orders were to beach the Teresa and haul down the colors. This was done and the Spaniard ran ashore, on fire from stem to stern. The men were compelled to leap into the water and swim ashore. Admiral Cervera, an old man, was aided by his son, a Lieutenant, and gained the beach wearing only his underclothing. All occurred in twenty minutes.

Meanwhile the Vizcaya had come out twelve minutes after the Teresa, and, seeing the plight of the flagship ahead, abandoned the idea of ramming the Brooklyn. She therefore sheered off towards the coast, seeing which the Brooklyn changed her course, and with the Oregon and Texas poured a terrible fire into the new enemy that had just run the gauntlet of the Indiana and Iowa.

At this moment the Cristobal Colon, the fleetest ship of the Spanish navy, its pride and glory, had steamed out, and the scene in front of the harbor became magnificent and terrible. The clouds of smoke that enveloped the ships from the rapid discharge of the great guns began to expand and cover the water. The Oregon, Iowa, Indiana, and
Texas were cramming their furnaces with coal saturated with oil, which produced such rapid and pure combustion that the flames from the furnaces roared out of the smoke stacks, while the continuous flashes from the guns belching out fire and smoke gave observers in the rear an impression that American and Spanish ships alike were on fire. And all around on the water the falling and exploding shells made fountains of spray leap up.

Through the veil of smoke that impended, the Cristobal Colon had rushed from the harbor fast upon the heels of the Vizcaya and plunged through the rain of shot and shell almost unscathed. Immediately behind her came the Almirante Oquendo, last of the cruisers. Into her the Indiana, Iowa, Texas, Oregon, and Brooklyn hurled the full weight of their guns. The first shell that landed exploded in her after-torpedo compartment, setting the ship on fire. The decks were swept as if by a hurricane of destruction, the Spanish gunners were killed at their guns, and the guns overturned upon them. But she fought on desperately, hoping to give the Vizcaya and Colon some advantage in flight.

Just as she passed the Indiana and Iowa, the Oregon moved in upon her with guns vomiting destruction, while the Texas and Brooklyn, heading for the quarry making west, turned their after-guns upon her. On the Oquendo brandy had been served out to the crew for desperate resistance, but no courage could withstand the tempest of fire that swept her. Suddenly there was an explosion forward and she turned to the beach, just a mile beyond the spot where the Maria Teresa was already wrecked and burning. Her colors came down and her commander, Captain Juan Lazaga, it was reported by some of the crew, committed suicide in the conning tower of his vessel, as she headed to the rocks. Afterwards, when the wreck was examined, there were found at the entrance to the tower a jeweled sword, a revolver, and a heap of ashes, among which were human bones. The cartridges of the revolver had been discharged, four by heat, one by the hammer. The captain of the Oquendo was not found among the prisoners.
Forty minutes had now expired since the first ship emerged. To the west the Vizcaya and Colon were speeding, pursued by the Brooklyn, Texas, and Oregon.

A few minutes before, out of the harbor entrance came rushing, like a railroad train, the torpedo destroyer Pluton, with Vice-Admiral Villamil in command, and, immediately behind, her sister craft, the Favor. They were spitting shots furiously from the small guns they carried.

These were the type of war craft designed to make thirty knots an hour. Armed with torpedo tubes and small batteries, much mysterious power had been attributed to them by the navies of the world in the absence of practical tests. Was it part of Cervera’s plan to have these boats come out last, and, while our great ships were occupied with his cruisers, the torpedo machines should fall upon the rear and destroy them? If it was, never did plan fail so wretchedly.

At the east of Morro the steel yacht Gloucester had been lying. Her commander, Lieutenant Richard Wainwright, expectant of the appearance of the destroyers in the rear, had moved up slowly under cover of the shore, gaining steam power by the delay, but firing the small batteries of his ship at the big cruisers as they came out.

As soon as the low, black, racing hulls of the destroyers were seen in the harbor channel, the big shells from the battleships began to fall about them, enveloping them in the smoke of explosion and the spray of columns of water that shot up like fountains from the spots where shot and shell fell about them. The awful impact of that storm of metal seems to have produced upon the little craft a shock like that which a charging army feels when it receives the point-blank, deadly volley of a cool adversary in waiting. They wavered for a minute, seemed to slow up, and hesitated whether to turn to the east or west. That moment was fatal. One more concentrated hail of missiles fell upon them from the battleships that immediately left and steamed westward. Captain Taylor, of the Indiana, signaled “Gunboats in,” indicating that the Gloucester would not be endangered by our own
ships' fire. The destroyers, with blind fatality, had also turned west and were following the path of death.

Then the thrill which always accompanies the sight of heroic bravery leaped in the hearts of the American crews. They saw the Gloucester with the speed of the wind dash in northwestwardly towards the shore, directly across the course of the destroyers, firing her port guns at the Oquendo and Vizcaya, her starboard broadside at the destroyers. The Texas sent one last shot at the Pluton, which struck her boiler. There was a rending, tearing sound, and a volcano of steam and black smoke rose from the Vice-Admiral's boat. Another shot from the Gloucester destroyed the Pluton's steering gear and she hung helpless, close up to the beach, toward which she began drifting on the tide. Then the Gloucester turned her bow and steamed directly to meet her, and, the Furor coming up, she ran between the two, delivering both broadsides. The New York had come up speedily to the chase of the Colon, and she sent two shots at the Furor. The Gloucester held on her course with dauntless courage, straight into the fire of the destroyers and under the guns of the shore forts. Then the flag came down on the Pluton as she went ashore, and the Furor, with fire and smoke pouring from her deck, wavered, turned shoreward, struck her colors, and went down, battered, riddled, and sinking, as was her companion.

III.

Hugging the coast ahead, masked by smoke and flame, urged on by desperation and hope, the Cristobal Colon and Vizcaya raced to the west, with the Brooklyn, Oregon, and Texas off shore in hot pursuit, firing as they raced, with the Iowa and Indiana, foul of hulls, laboring behind at slower speed. On the Oregon and Texas full speed had been hard to attain. Steady to the task, straining every human power on board to increase the steam pressure, the two ships hung upon the quarry to capture or destroy. It was a terrific race of steam against steam, of machinery and men against machinery and men, of hunter against hunted, of hope against despair.
The great vessels groaned and the draughts roared as if the ships were alive and laboring with human desire. On board these battleships it was like that other race, when—

"The Prairie Belle burnt a hole in the night
*   *   *   *
With her furnace crammed with resin and pine."

Except the Brooklyn, it was heavy battleships against swift cruisers. Down in the furnace rooms on the battleships, stripped to the skin, dripping oily sweat from their shining bodies, the stokers—those obscure heroes, without the inspiration of scene or objective to encourage them—were true Americans. On the Brooklyn, when the chase began after the Cristobal Colon, Commodore Schley realized the position of the engine room and furnace men. He called his sailors, formed a line down the stairs and sent cool beer, kept for the officers, down the line to cheer the faithful workers. In addition, an ensign stood at the hatchway and described the chase, the shots, and the results, to the first man in the line. The message was thus carried down to the depths of the hold by human telegraph. Every point of our success was cheered by the gallant stokers, who worked on with renewed energy to send the great ship with greater speed than even her builders had expected.

That was the American way.

On board one of the Spanish vessels, it was told with horror that firemen and engineers who were unable to endure the heat, smoke, and escaping steam, and who attempted to come up, were pushed back by the officers, and the hatches fastened. That, finally, in an insane fury, coal oil was poured over the hatches and ignited when the ship was about to drift ashore—and no man came alive out of that hell under the water line.

That was the Spanish way.

The Colon had outstripped the Vizcaya, and now the pursuers concentrated their fire upon the latter, with an occasional shell at the Colon. It was long-range shooting and they were difficult targets, but
the United States gunners were good at all ranges and targets. Six minutes after the onslaught began on the Vizcaya, that vessel was on fire astern, her gun-decks swept, her sailors dead and dying strewing the floors, her hull was riddled, and she turned and lurched headlong to the shore. Her flag was still flying at the gaff, and it fluttered there until it was almost burned away by the flames that were leaping up from her hull and upper works. A boat was lowered from her and men leaped overboard on every side. A detachment of Cuban insurgents on the shore were firing upon the unfortunates in the water and in the boats. Captain Evans of the Iowa fired a small gun over the Cubans to warn them off, and, in obedience to orders, stopped to pick up the survivors, 38 officers and 240 men. The Vizcaya went ashore at Aserraderos, fifteen miles west of Santiago.

During this time the Cristobal Colon had increased her lead and was flying under forced draught along the coast. Flame and smoke came from her funnels, and, under cover of the shore, her hull was with difficulty observed. After her sped the Brooklyn in advance, well out from shore, the Oregon next, a little closer in, the Vixen, still closer in, and the Texas astern. It was the quarter of an ellipse hemming in the flying Spaniard. Behind, at a great distance, came the New York, flying like the wind. As she passed the spot where the Vizcaya had been destroyed, she passed two naked men in the water. They were Spanish sailors who had leaped overboard to escape from the burning ship. The first was a magnificent fellow, physically, and an expert swimmer. He was heading, apparently, for Santiago. As the New York approached him he stood up in the water, waving both arms above his head, shouted some unintelligible words, and smiled terribly. A life-preserver was hurled toward him, for which he struck out in long, powerful strokes. The second man was passed a few minutes later heading for the beach. He was nearly exhausted, and wasted much of his remaining strength in shouting for help and cursing at the apparent delay in getting it. He was evidently frightened. Life-preservers were also thrown to him, but it could not be seen whether or not he reached them.
Minute after minute the chase sped on, the speed of the Americans increasing, that of the Spaniard not improving, until the Colon began to slip back to the inner focus of the terrible ellipse that was rushing to embrace her in destruction.

Minute after minute went by. The Americans had ceased to fire and were intent upon capture or to demonstrate the superiority of our ships in chase. Mile after mile the great engines of war raced on. On the Oregon the speed was seventeen knots an hour and she was keeping up with the Brooklyn and overhauling the Spaniards, while the Texas was also exceeding her speed record.

Twenty, thirty, forty miles, were run and now the doom of the last of Spain's famous squadron appeared. Far ahead the dim blue outlines of Cape Cruz were seen. The cape jutted out from the coast and the Colon, following the shore line, must skirt it. The Brooklyn, sheering off the coast, steered straight for the Cape Cruz point, making the diameter of a quarter circle, while the Colon would be forced to make the circumference. The Brooklyn and Oregon drew abreast the enemy; the Texas followed the quarry.

The men on our ships had been cheering, and were gathered on decks, watching the chase with intense excitement and with that outflow of humor, so cynical, yet practical, in the teeth of danger. Captain Clark signaled from the Oregon to Commodore Schley on the Brooklyn:—

"A strange ship, looking like an Italian, in the distance."

This was an allusion to the fact that the Colon had been purchased from Italy.

Commodore Schley, sitting on the edge of the forward eight-inch turret, in a careless attitude, his glasses on the Colon, smiled as the message was brought, and answered:—

"Tell the Oregon she can try one of those thirteen-inch railroad trains on her."

There was a terrible roar as the shell went by the Brooklyn, a moment of suspense and watching, and then a hearty cheer as the great projectile struck the water close astern the Colon, four miles away.
Another was tried, which reached the mark, and there were more cheers. It had struck the bow and weakened the ship.

Plainly outraced, the Colon slowed up. She fired one shot to the rear at the Texas, hauled down her colors, which were left in a limp huddle at the foot of the line, turned her nose to shore and ran aground at Rio Tarquino, forty-eight miles west of Santiago at 1:15 P.M.

This was the spot where the crew of the Virginias had landed and had been massacred by the Spanish, thirty years ago.

The other five ships had been destroyed in fifty-five minutes, but the chase of the Colon lasted three hours and sixteen minutes, during which, under complete preparation and forced draught most of the time, she had made less than sixteen knots an hour, while our ships under disadvantages in respect to preparation, removing which as they steamed, had outsailed and destroyed the pride of Spain—a cruiser rated as the swiftest in the world’s navy.

Captain Cook of the Brooklyn went on board the Colon in a boat to receive her surrender. The New York then came up and Commodore Schley went on board to report to Admiral Sampson. While doing so the Resolute came up and reported a strange war ship off Santiago. Schley was ordered back with the Brooklyn to meet her. It proved to be the Austrian cruiser, Maria Teresa, seeking permission to take Austrian refugees from Santiago.
CHAPTER THE ELEVENTH.

DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON (Continued).

Dreadful Scenes Attending the Rescue of Survivors and the Capture of Prisoners—Incidents of the Surrender of Admiral Cervera and Captain Eulate—Spanish Ships Reduced to Worthless Hulks by the Fury of Our Attack—Treachery's Destruction of the "Colon"—Anecdotes of the Engagement—Contrast of American and Spanish Men and Methods—The Effect of the Victory and the Credit of It.

I.

Captain Cook, of the Brooklyn, chief-of-staff of Commodore Schley, who had boarded the Colon to receive her surrender, bore from his commanding officer considerate instructions to permit all the officers of the enemy's ship to retain their personal effects. This was chivalrous treatment of the vanquished. It proved to be entirely undeserved. The rules of warfare provide that when an enemy has hauled down his colors and run up the white flag of surrender, the property of the government he carries and the arms of the crew are by that act transferred to the conquerors. The Colon was run ashore at high speed upon a rather steep beach, from which she slipped back into the sea by the working of the waves. Then it was discovered that the sea-valves of the vessel had been treacherously opened, so as to render it impossible for her to float. It must have been done after she had surrendered, or she could not have made the swift run that carried her far up on the beach.

The Colon was not much injured by our firing; her hull was not penetrated below the water line, and it would have been possible to repair her at small cost and convert her into a valuable addition to the United States navy. It was doubtless to prevent this that her commander resorted to the trick, dishonorable in civilized warfare, of rendering her useless. The sea-valves were not only opened but
their caps were heaved overboard, the dead-lights of the portholes were smashed, and even the breech-plugs of the guns were thrown into the sea.

The 530 survivors were taken on board the United States ship Resolute, and the captured ship was examined. Except for the vandalism of her crew she could have been saved. But she swung off, and drifted westward, turning her bow off shore. The New York went in, and placing her prow against the nose of the Colon, pushed the latter into shoal water, where she turned over on her side and sank, swallowing the sand and refuse of the coast, an almost hopeless wreck.

The Colon had but two serious wounds from our fire, her sides having been masked by the Oquendo and the Vizcaya during the hottest part of the engagement.

Meanwhile, the death-strewn coast of Cuba, from Santiago to Aserraderos, a distance of fifteen miles, the scene of gigantic work of destruction, had become a theatre of heroic rescue. It was as if the angel of Mercy had followed upon swift wing the angel of Death.

No sooner had the riddled ships run ashore than the American pursuers changed from merciless adversaries to unwearying life savers. When Captain Cook ordered a boat out to board the Colon, his men, half-naked and begrimed with powder, ran shouting and dancing to their work. He cautioned them, however, to show no signs of triumph or exultation to the vanquished, and the crew rowed to the Colon in silence. As they approached the ship the Spaniards called out "Bravo Americanos!" and then our men returned "Bravo Españoles!" The cabin and gun-room tables of the Spaniard were littered with wine and brandy bottles, and the men were half drunk and dazed.

Back at Aserraderos the Iowa had stopped when the Vizcaya was beached. Five boats were sent out to rescue the Spaniards. It was a frightful scene. Fire was raging furiously between decks, and portions of the steel hull were red with heat. Men were hanging to chains or other grappling points, many were scrambling ashore through the surf. The fire was threatening magazines and projectiles, but the American seamen plunged into the wreck, seeking the wounded that
had been abandoned to a horrible fate by their own terror-stricken comrades. Loaded guns were now and then being discharged by the heat, but all this was braved. The Ericsson, torpedo boat, assisted at this rescue. Ashore Cubans were in waiting to assail the wretched Spaniards as they crawled upon the beach, but the arrival of the Americans put a stop to the barbarity.

Captain Antonio Eulate commanded the Vizcaya. More than any other Spanish officer he typified the racial pride and weakness of his nation. He had been especially selected to bring his vessel to New York harbor in a show of defiant courtesy when the Maine had been sent to Havana. While he was yet on the ocean the Maine was destroyed at Havana and Captain Eulate did not discover the fact until he reached New York. Then he entered the harbor with his flag at half-mast, without music, and declined all invitations to be entertained, giving as his reason his sympathy for the sailors lost on the Maine. He displayed no fear, and his conduct in all ceremonious acts was above reproach.

He remained ten days in New York, during which time the excitement over the Maine tragedy was high, and then he sailed away to Havana. After he had gone one of the boulevard papers of Paris printed a ludicrous story which was attributed to an officer of the Vizcaya, who was said to have written the account home. It was intended to illustrate the cowardice of the Americans and their trembling fear of the Spanish. The story was, that when the Vizcaya raised anchor to steam out of New York harbor, the piers were crowded with thousands of “Yankee pigs” who began hooting and jeering at the vessel. Captain Eulate, who was on the bridge, heard the contemptuous sounds and became white with passion. Ordering the ship to stop, he had his launch lowered and manned, and then called for his second officer, to whom he said, showing a revolver:

“ If you hear a pistol shot from me on shore, you will at once open fire and bombard the city!”

Then he went in his launch to the pier, while the “Yankees” continued to jeer or to show confusion. He mounted the stairs, walked
along the front of the pier, revolver in hand, while the "trembling pigs of Yankees" cowered before him and crushed each other as they huddled back. Captain Eulate, controlling his voice, which was almost breaking with passionate and scornful rage, cried out:—

"If any man dares to jeer the ship and flag of Spain, I will kill him!"

Dead silence ensued and lasted for twenty minutes, during which time the Spaniard, with frowning brows, paced the pier, ready to execute his threat. At last, seeing that the "rabble of Yankee pigs" was completely cowed, he descended into his launch and, without a glance backward, boarded his ship and steamed out, while the thousands upon thousands of frightened "Yankees" stood in respectful silence.

It is not possible that Captain Eulate, or any of his officers, was authority for this ludicrous romance. It was doubtless made of the fancy of some Paris scribbler, for the amusement of the Latin prejudice against Americans. But it had been translated and republished in the newspapers of the United States, so that an individual and special interest was felt in the brave Spaniard who had borne himself so well under trying circumstances at New York.

When he was discovered on the beach by the Iowa's crew, he was covered with blood from a number of wounds and, it afterward appeared, was suffering some mental strain or aberration. Yet he retained his pride of office and race as he was taken off to the Iowa. As he was carried up the battleship's side, unable himself to mount, Captain Evans ordered the ship's guard to parade as a token of respect. The Spanish commander was deeply affected as he was carried aft, where Captain Evans waited.

Here Captain Eulate stood up, drew his sword from its scabbard, held it up and, with tears in his eyes, kissed the blade. Then he stepped forward and offered the hilt to Captain Evans. But the American Captain with a gesture pushed it back, and advancing seized Captain Eulate's hand.

"Keep your sword, sir," he said; "you have fought like a brave and gallant officer."
The Spaniard fairly broke down in gratitude at this signal courtesy. He would have fallen but for assistance, and was borne to his state-room in tears, crying, "My poor Vizcaya—lost, lost!"

He was the only officer who refused parole when brought to American soil. To accept parole from the enemy is against the regulations of the Spanish army and navy, justifiable only before court-martial. It was also said that he was the only officer among the captured who possessed no independent income and was solely dependent upon his pay.

It was darkly hinted, also, that his mental condition of moroseness, nervous excitability, and depression, was due to remorse—that he had, with his own hands, pistolled forty of the Vizcaya's gunners who attempted to desert their posts during the terrible fight. This was not established; it was most probably false in entirety, one of those grim manufactures of a moment opportune to the hands of a picturesque seeker after sensation. But Captain Don Antonio Eulate was the most strikingly picturesque figure of that day. He tempted the romancers of both continents.

From the Vizcaya 24 officers and 248 men were rescued, out of a crew of about 550. Others were picked up later, on the beach, where they were hiding from the Cubans. But more than 150 were killed by our fire, drowned, or burned on the ship. Captain Eulate said one shell had exploded in a wardroom, killing 90. Of the survivors, 32 were wounded, a few of whom died afterward.

Eight and a half miles further in the direction of Santiago, the Almirante Oquendo lay wrecked on Juan Gonzales Point, and a few hundred yards further, the Maria Teresa; these two, the last and first of the Spanish cruisers to emerge, and first to be destroyed.

The Indiana and Gloucester were here engaged at rescue. The surroundings were appalling. Both ships were glowing like furnaces, their upper works an array of twisted and distorted beams and shattered walls. Admiral Cervera had leaped overboard, clad in his under-clothing only, and his son had assisted him until a life raft was reached. The Admiral entreated Lieutenant Huse of the Gloucester
not to go aboard his burning ship, lest explosions should kill those attempting to rescue the wounded on board. But the Americans did not hesitate. They scrambled upon the decks and bore the wounded out of the intense heat and stifling smoke, and transferred them to our boats, where American surgeons attended to their injuries with all the skill they would have exerted for our own crews.

Admiral Cervera was conveyed on board the \textit{Gloucester}, where Captain Wainwright received him with the distinction due to his rank. The Spanish Admiral, Don Pascual de Cervera y Topete Conde de Jerez, Marquis de Santa Ana, was the nephew of Admiral Topete, one of Spain’s naval heroes, and boasts of royal blood. He was about sixty-five years old. His first campaign was the Spanish expedition to Morocco in 1859, where he won promotion. He was once naval attaché of his government at Washington, and speaks English fluently. He was sent to Cochin China in 1862, and in 1868 to Peru, as captain of a war ship. Two years later he was called to Cuba, to take charge of the blockade, but later went to Spain and became Minister of Marine. When he retired he was placed in command of the \textit{Pelayo}, Spain’s only first-class battleship. He was made Admiral in 1887. When Spain prepared her fleet for Cuban waters Cervera was placed in command. A man of distinction by birth, manners, education, and experience, he does not appear to have possessed abilities equal to his opportunities. On the \textit{Gloucester} he was given a stateroom and provided with apparel.

“I have been defeated,” he said to Captain Wainwright, “and my career is ended. I thought you would be having ‘church’ on your ships, and as I had been ordered to run out and escape to Havana it was the best opportunity to be expected. My ships are lost, and all I have is lost. Permit me to give you my autograph—all I can—in recognition of your courtesy and humanity.”

Two and a half miles nearer Santiago, the Destroyers, \textit{Pluton} and \textit{Furor}, had sunk near the beach. Each carried 72 men. Only 39 of the 144 men were found alive. Among the dead of the \textit{Pluton} was Vice-Admiral Fernando Villamil, an expert in torpedo-boat construction,
who was a naval officer of eminence, well known in Europe and America. He was a man of tenacity of purpose, a fine drillmaster and executive aboard ship, and of very agreeable appearance, bearing, and manner. He enjoyed the personal friendship of the Queen-Regent. Some four years before his death, while a Commodore, he was ordered to San Sebastian, the summer home of the Spanish royal family, to act as guard for the youthful King and the Queen-Regent, at that seaside town. His appointment aroused the envy of other Spanish naval officers who desired the opportunity of being near the royal family.

At that time Villamil commanded the torpedo boat Destructor, a boat of his own designing, but the laughing stock of the Spanish navy, on account of its small size and low freeboard. The Queen-Regent, however, was greatly interested in this new fighting craft and paid frequent visits to it, causing much heartburning among the other officers. In the middle of summer she and the King decided to sail to Bilbao, and chose the Destructor for the voyage. This caused a great outcry, and the Minister of Marine begged the Queen-Regent to send the King on another boat, so that in the event of an accident at least one of them would be saved.

"Commodore Villamil," asked the Queen-Regent, "is there the slightest danger?"

"None, your Majesty," was the reply.

"Then we will both sail with you," replied the Queen-Regent, much to the discomfiture of the Minister of Marine. The trip was made in safety, and Villamil was shortly afterward raised to the rank of Admiral.

The Spanish loss was about 300 killed, 150 wounded, and about 1,600 prisoners. The four cruisers had complements of about 550 each, but these were doubtless reduced by disease and accident; and the Destroyers 144 together. There were at least 2,250 men on the vessels, and it is believed that the Cubans killed and secreted the bodies of a number, not reported, and that 150 managed to find their way back to Santiago through the jungle, unless they were picked off by Cubans on the way.
THE GLORY OF OUR SHIPS

The glory of our ships was deservedly great. To the Oregon was credited the first alarm of the enemy's intention. She signaled "Think the enemy are preparing to leave the harbor," and fired a small gun to attract the fleet's attention to the signal. On the authority of one who investigated the action, who observed it from the New York, who seems to have been a naval officer, and whose report is here adopted for its lucid account of the part taken by each ship, the Oregon was the first of our battleships cleared for action, and she engaged every Spanish ship in order. Her 13-inch guns did most execution among the enemy's ships, and the handling of the ship herself was a proof of her excellence in every particular. Her station was south of the Morro, well to the eastward of the Vixen, Brooklyn, Texas, and Iowa. In the long chase after the Cristobal Colon she passed all these, one after another, except the Brooklyn, and did it with less apparent effort at speed than was shown by any other ship. The Cristobal Colon's funnels, especially, belched out immense columns of dark smoke. The power of her forced draught carried even flames at times from the stacks. None of the American vessels made so much smoke, and from none were the columns so continuous. The Oregon's smoke was not heavy at any time, and there were minutes at a time when only the faintest haze floated from her funnels. The great ship piled up a big foam-crested billow across her bows, and rushed on as though dragged by a hidden force of incalculable power.

The Gloucester, formerly the pleasure yacht Corsair, achieved a name for herself that will long be remembered. She had the slight advantage of a harmless appearance, and may not have been attacked very fiercely. Her own advances were straight, quick, and fearlessly undertaken. She was not hit during the action, and this statement alone is convincing proof of the incomparably poor marksmanship of the Spaniards. The little vessel was a target for every gun mounted on shore and for the broadsides of the Colon, Oquendo, Furor, and Pluton, all at easy range. The shells flew around her, landing on all sides.
After the two destroyers had shown the white flag, the *Gloucester* lowered her boats and gathered in as many prisoners as came her way. Some she rescued as they swam, a few she took directly off the burning *Pluton* with that vessel's surrendered colors, and some she took from the beach.

The *Brooklyn* was lying at the western and outer end of the American line when the ships came out. Her first sight of the escaping enemy was when the Spanish flagship *Teresa* rounded the head of land at the western side of the harbor and pointed for her, firing as she came. There was a distance of at least three miles between the ships, but from the direction taken by the *Teresa* the *Brooklyn* expected to be rammed at any moment and turned her own strong bow to meet the enemy. When the whole Spanish line had cleared the harbor entrance and headed to the west, the *Brooklyn* turned off too, and started to head off the escaping ships. She fired her starboard broadside as she gathered headway, and kept up an intermittent fire until her guns grew hot and several of them were put out of commission. Her turret guns, considering the range, were her most useful arms. Only two of the *Brooklyn*’s boilers were in commission at the appearance of the enemy and it was some time before fire could be placed under the others. Like the *New York*, however, she hurried on, increasing her speed by coupling on fresh boilers as fast as steam was up in them. Before one o’clock she had six and her auxiliaries in circuit. The *Brooklyn* was slightly in advance of the *Oregon* during the greater part of the long chase of the *Colon*, but when the *Colon* finally ran ashore the *Brooklyn* turned in astern of the battleship.

The *Vixen*, formerly the yacht *Josephine*, was on the extreme western station. The course of the Spanish ships was outside her. For several reasons the little vessel moved quickly out. She was in range of the American ships for one thing, and her presence might interfere with their fire at the enemy. So the *Vixen* raced out to the southward as fast as she could, firing valiantly at the cruisers as she went. She followed the chase to the westward and was sent back from Rio Tarquino with dispatches.
The Texas, which had met with many accidents of navigation in times of peace, and had thus earned the wardroom sobriquet of "The Old Hoodoo," proved herself worthy to rank in the first class, doing work scarcely less effective than the Oregon. She was in the thick of combat from beginning to end, and her guns engaged every one of the enemy's ships. The shot that tore open the boilers of the Pluton is credited to Ensign Guise of the Texas. The Spanish commanders had special orders to sink the Brooklyn and Texas if they could. As the Texas drew up on the Oquendo Captain Phillip, her commander, left the bridge and went to the conning tower to direct the fighting. Scarcely had he done so when a shot passed where he had been standing. She was several times struck, one shell exploding in her smokestack, but no shots caused serious injury. The guns of the Texas were swung in so many directions in the fury of fighting, that the concussion caused by cross-deck firing deafened most of her men for days. One was hurled down a hatchway by the tremendous impact of the rushing air, and suffered a broken arm.

The Indiana, being slow and unwieldy, did little more than fire as a stationary fort as the ships came out of the entrance. After the sinking of the destroyers, by which time the outcome of the action was already pretty evident, she was ordered back to the harbor entrance to keep watch there. On the way she lowered boats and joined in the rescue work.

The Iowa was in all the fighting equally with the Texas, until the sinking of the Vizcaya, when she was ordered back to take part in the rescue of the Spaniards.

The New York and her Admiral took no part in the fighting, but the ship was racing to the assistance of the Brooklyn, Oregon, and Texas, after the Colon. She made the 55 miles under the handicap of small boiler power, but arrived only half an hour after the Colon was beached.

For the Spaniards there was no glory. All their ships had met the same fate but the Colon, and she escaped it only through treachery. She was surrendered in order that her own men might destroy her.
Her officers shrank from combat only to take refuge in the vandalism of cowardice. For these acts they were liable to punishment by death; but no notice was taken of it.

A correspondent of Harper's Weekly, describing the Spanish wrecks a day after their destruction, wrote thus of the Teresa and Oquendo, which might also describe the Vizcaya:

“They lie in a little cove a few hundred yards apart, both bows on to a hard sand beach, at the foot of high hills that come down to the sea less steeply than usual, and are separated from the water by a stretch of flat, low, grass-grown land adorned with tall coconut palms. The two beaches, neither more than 300 yards in length, are separated by a bluff of precipitous rock. High and gloomy hills to the north shut in the view, while the heavy ground-swell rolls in its heavy voice against the shore. This cove, five and one-half miles from the entrance to Santiago, was most opportune for the two hard-pressed ships, as the usual coast line is steep, rocky, and it would be impossible for ships or men to have survived for a minute the thundering breakers.

“Smoke still poured from the two ships, and blew away in a thin veil against the dark hills; the surf beat along their sides and swept in and out through the sternports and through shot-holes and torpedo-tubes. It was quite a climb up the tall sides of the Maria Teresa, and once in the gangway the scene that met our eyes was one of utter ruin. Bad as the ships looked from the outside, the paint all burned off, or hanging in folds where the water had cooled its farther progress, guns slaved every which way, and wire rope and tackle hanging over the side in wild disorder, the scene on deck was so much worse as to leave one speechless with dismay.

“The spar-deck was nothing but an array of twisted sagging iron beams, set with copper bolts that had held the deck-planking, and now stuck up in ragged rows or bent over as the fire had left them. Around some of the broadside 5-inch guns bits of deck still remained and smoldered, sending up wreaths of pale blue smoke. Around the guns and scattered about between the smokestacks and ventilators were charred bodies that gave out an unpleasant odor. The forward military mast had fallen, mixed up with guns, davits, and iron plates, on the starboard side. The bridge was a mass of twisted iron and brass. Smokestacks and ventilators sagged, and some of the latter had fallen down entirely. There was a great hole where the magazines had been, forward and aft; they had exploded from the bottom up, in the line of least resistance, ripping the deck and beams away entirely, so you could look down to the bottom of the ship, where the water swashed around. The iron deck aft was bent and twisted and buckled under the weight of the big turret and 11-inch gun. The main deck, made of iron plates, still remained, and was covered with ashes and débris fallen from above. The forward part of the
ship was full of dead, and was too hot to admit of much investigation. Sailors from the Texas swarmed over the vessel while we were there, and brought up from below rifles, cutlasses, and souvenirs of all sorts. One man had a hat full of silver money that had melted and stuck together. The hammock nettings were full of burned tin boxes that had held canned food; wine bottles and such litter were scattered about, and from forward and aft were brought many books of a doubtful character."

There was no honor for the Spanish ships. They were all magnificent vessels of their type. The armament, protection, and motive power of the Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and Vizcaya ranked them as almost second-class battleships rather than cruisers. The Colón's 11-inch guns had never been mounted, and they were missed. Her crew, however, was the best one of the four, and had had charge of the guns of the western battery at Santiago, that had done the most effective work against the blockading fleet. The Furor and Pluton were of the latest type of the torpedo-boat destroyer class, and had been much feared, though not by the Americans. The engagement at Santiago in many respects was without precedent.
CHAPTER THE TWELFTH.

DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON (Concluded).

SPANISH STORY OF THE BATTLE AS TOLD BY SURVIVING OFFICERS—IT DOES NOT DIFFER IN SUBSTANCE FROM THE AMERICAN ACCOUNT—INCIDENTS AND ANECDOTES OF THE ENGAGEMENT—HOW THE BATTLE LOOKED TO OBSERVERS—
TO WHOM DOES THE CREDIT OF VICTORY BELONG?

I.

The Spanish side of the story of the great battle is a part of its history no less necessary than our own. Admiral Cervera was permitted by our Government to make up and forward his official report to Spain, but it was a confidential communication, and its character was not indicated. A copy is in the archives of the United States Government. The Admiral declined to speak publicly of the battle, and the officers also declined to make any authorized statement; but during their passage to Annapolis on board the St. Louis, as prisoners, they spoke freely to our officers of the experiences of their ships. A report of these statements was carefully made up and published in the New York Sun, from which this summary is taken.

Lieutenant Gomez Imas of Cervera's staff on the Maria Teresa said:

"After clearing the harbor we headed to the westward along the shore. We fired the first shot of the battle, aiming at the Brooklyn, then about three miles away. The Texas, Oregon, and Brooklyn returned our fire, but their first shots all fell short. As the distance between the ships decreased the shells commenced to strike us and did great damage. First, a shell exploded in the Admiral's cabin, setting fire to the woodwork there. A signal was sent to the engine room to start the pumps, but the fire mains had been ruptured by an exploding shell, so that no water could be got on the fire. Another shell struck the main steam

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pipe, disabling the port engine, and the escaping steam killed every man in that compartment. One exploding shell killed or wounded eighty of our men. Our fire was directed principally against the **Brooklyn**. The fire in the after part of the ship had driven the crews away from the after guns, and the rapid-fire guns of the American ships were playing havoc with our men and riddling the upper works of the ship. Having one engine disabled and the whole after part of the ship on fire, the vessel was headed toward the shore in search of a suitable place for beaching. The Captain said to the Admiral:—

"'My ship is in flames, my engines are disabled, my men have been driven from the guns and are being killed; ought I not for humanity's sake to surrender?'"

"The Admiral answered, 'It will be useless to fight longer.'"

"The flag was hauled down and the ship run on the beach. The Captain was struck and severely wounded just as the flag was being lowered. The fire was now raging aft so that there was great danger of the magazine being blown up at any minute. The Admiral and those of the officers and crew still alive took to the water, the risk of drowning being preferable to the certainty of being burned or blown up. Many reached the shore, but some were drowned. Admiral Cervera stripped to his underclothing and plunged into the water. Two of the sailors secured ropes to a grating, and taking the other end of the ropes in their mouths swam to the shore towing the grating, the Admiral bearing part of his weight on it. The Admiral's son, one of his staff, swam along behind his father and assisted him as best he could. Had it not been for this assistance Admiral Cervera would undoubtedly have been drowned, as he is a very poor swimmer. While the men were in the water the Cubans on shore commenced firing at them until the **Iowa** put a stop to that atrocity by firing a shell among them and scattering them."

Captain Eulate of the **Vizcaya** said: "'When the **Maria Teresa** headed for shore I passed her, and I had the **Brooklyn**, **Texas**, **Iowa**, and **Oregon** all firing at me. The firing from these ships was terrific;
shells were bursting all around us. My ship was set on fire by a shell exploding in my cabin. My engines and pumps were disabled, and I could not fight the fire. My men were being killed and wounded in large numbers. A shell finally exploded in one of my forward magazines and I was forced to head for the shore. When I went into action I had flying at the mastshead a large embroidered silk flag, which had been made and presented to the ship by ladies of the province of Vizcaya. When I saw that my ship would be lost, I had this flag hauled down and burned, and hoisted another ensign in its place. My flag was shot away twice during the engagement, the last time just as the ship grounded. The boats of the Iowa picked up those of my officers and men still left alive, carrying them to that ship. When I went on board the Iowa, I took off my sword and tendered it to Captain Evans, but he refused it, saying that I had fought four ships and that I should keep my sword. That was the proudest moment of my life."

The Captain of the Oquendo committed suicide, and the second and third officers were killed during the engagement. The following description was obtained from the paymaster of the Oquendo:—

"When we came out of the harbor we were fired on by the Iowa, Texas, and Oregon. Our fire was mostly directed against the Texas, for we had seen the splendid shooting done by her in the attacks on the batteries. From the first the firing was terrific, and great damage was done. The after part of the ship was set on fire by bursting shell and could not be put out. Finally, fearing that the magazines would explode and everyone be lost, the ship was beached and the flag lowered. The mortality on the ship was great, over half of the crew having been killed and wounded."

Captain Moreu of the Cristobal Colon, said to have been by far the ablest officer in the fleet, gave an account of his ship. He did not open fire at first, but passed inside of the other vessels. When the Vizcaya headed for the shore, he passed her and then opened fire on the Oregon, Brooklyn, and Texas, which ships had taken up the chase. He ran to the westward, close to the shore. The heavy guns
intended for this ship had never been mounted, and when asked where they were, the Captain shrugged his shoulders and said: "Perhaps in the pocket of the Minister of Marine." Finally, when nearly fifty miles from Santiago, he was headed off and hauled down his flag at 1:20 p.m. There was no serious battle damage done to this ship, and but one man killed and sixteen wounded.

Lieutenant Diego Carlier, in command of the destroyer Furor, and Lieutenant Pedro Vasquez, in command of the Pluton, told each the same story. They were literally riddled by the rapid-fire guns of the Oregon, Iowa, and Texas. Their boilers were struck and exploded, one after the other, in rapid succession. A large shell struck the Pluton almost amidships and exploded, nearly tearing her in two. She sank almost immediately. The steering gear on the Furor was shot away, and she ran into shoal water and sank. These vessels each carried seventy-two men. But twenty-two were saved from the Pluton and but seventeen from the Furor. The officers all expressed themselves amazed at the rapidity and accuracy of fire of the American ships. They all expressed the hope that Spain would see the uselessness of continuing the war.

Another officer said: "For twenty days I have had no rest. Every night we expected some kind of an attack. One day, when you bombarded El Morro, a shell came over the heights and wrecked my room. Ever since the war began I have known that this day must come. Particularly since May 29, when you blockaded us in Santiago harbor, we have been under a nerve strain such as the knowledge of certain defeat, deferred from day to day, must always induce. Imagine to what a tension our nerves have been wrought up. We knew perfectly well that in coming out of the harbor we were coming to destruction, but it was a sacrifice that we had to make for our honor and our country. There was no way out of it, and, since it had to come, I cannot but feel relieved that it is over, and I am grateful to God that we have fallen into such kind hands."

An American officer who was present when the Spaniards were taken aboard one of our rescuing ships, bore testimony to the bravery
displayed. "About thirty of the prisoners," he said, "were wounded, all of whom bore their suffering with most admirable spirit. One poor fellow had his right foot knocked off above the ankle and another severe wound in the calf of his leg; but our surgeon was busy trying to stop the flow of blood from a man who was bleeding to death, so the heroic sailor said:

"'Oh, I'm all right; all I want is a cigarette.' Then, having smoked one, instead of fainting, he actually went to sleep! No man could witness, as I did, the patience and fortitude displayed by these poor, suffering prisoners, without experiencing increased respect for them. Understanding the condition of affairs at Santiago, notwithstanding that our forces were sure to administer a crushing defeat in case the enemy came out, I must bear witness to the courage of Admiral Cervera, his officers and his men. It was a cruel fate. They knew that they were offering themselves up in making a desperate effort, and they chose to do it because there was only one alternative—that of giving up without a struggle. They played their last card and lost. I must mention how the Spanish prisoners behaved when we fired our national salute at noon. As the first gun was fired and our officers all stood up and uncovered, the Spanish officers did likewise and their men followed the example, all standing in respectful silence until the last gun was fired."

II.

In this great naval battle off Santiago, Spaniard and "American mercenary" had measured themselves again, as they had on the other side of the world when Dewey erased the squadron of Montejo. The movement was reversed, but the result was not changed. Dewey had sailed into unknown and masked dangers and had annihilated the Spaniard under the guns of his shore forts, without the loss of a man. At Santiago Cervera steamed out against a force he knew perfectly well, with four cruisers
as strong as battleships in armament, and much higher in contemplated speed. Spanish incompetency with machinery and Spanish incompetency at the guns had in both instances gone down before the unrivaled skill and accuracy of American engineers and gunners. Dewey surprised Montejo in his own fastness, and beat him by celerity and intrepidity of action. Cervera surprised Schley, but yet was beaten by the celerity and intrepidity that could recover against all odds. Montejo had been at a ball. Schley’s squadron was expected to be “at church.” It was the living against the dying race.

Nothing could illustrate more strikingly their racial differences than the condition and conduct of the men. The American seamen were all sober; the Spaniards were all stimulated to the point of desperation by liquors—the fashion of the eighteenth century. When rescued, the Spaniards at first trembled at the expectation of death; the Americans risked death again to save their wounded enemies. So astonished were the Spaniards at their treatment that Admiral Cervera cabled to General Blanco: “The crews are very grateful for the noble generosity with which they were treated.” The prisoners were taken to healthful quarters in the United States, supplied with good quarters, clothing, and food, the officers conveyed to Annapolis and released on parole; yet they expected court-martial, disgrace, perhaps death, because they accepted this ordinary kindness. The Spaniards abandoned their own wounded to the fires on their vessels; and were amazed when the Americans entered those burning hells to rescue men they had just been engaged in destroying.

When the párre of the Vizcaya was taken aboard the Ericsson he sat down upon a chest. The wounded of his own charge were brought in and he was asked to remove from the chest in order that a wounded Spaniard might be placed upon it for treatment. He coldly refused to yield, and it is to the honor of Ensign Edie of the rescuing crew that he promptly seized the heartless chaplain and contumaciously threw him upon the floor.

These are not natural exhibitions of human cruelty; they are the outcome of caste, that institution of social slavery that exists in Spain.
Some of the Spaniards exhibited the highest courage, fortitude, and nobility of conduct under their misfortunes. The junior surgeon of the *Vizcaya* declined to have his wounds dressed until his men had been attended to. One young officer, with his left arm broken and helpless, mounted the side of his prison ship without assistance, and with his right arm saluted the deck as he reached it. Captain Eulate, Admiral Cervera, Captain Maocochron, and others, bore themselves with the naturalness, simplicity, and courage of brave men. When Captain Eulate's sword was refused, and he burst into tears, the crew of the *Iowa* burst into cheers for him as a brave man.

When the *Texas* had riddled the *Oquendo* and the Spanish colors came down, to be followed by a great explosion that marked her ruin, the crew of the American started to cheer.

"Don't cheer, boys!" cried Captain Phillip, "the poor devils are dying!" And the cheers were silenced on the very lips of the conquerors.

When the *Colón* surrendered, the same crew gave three cheers and a "tiger" for their veteran commander. Instantly Captain Phillip called all hands to the quarter deck, and, with bared head, thanked God for the almost bloodless victory.

"I want to make public acknowledgment here," he said, "that I believe in God the Father Almighty. I want all you officers and men to lift your hats and from your hearts offer silent thanks to the Almighty."

All hats were off. There was a moment or two of absolute silence, and then again the overwrought feelings of the ship's company relieved themselves in three hearty cheers for their commander.

The engagement was almost the counterpart under reversed plan of that at Manila. But one man was killed on the American ships at Santiago. He was George H. Ellis, yeoman, of the *Brooklyn*. Ellis was standing with Commodore Schley, when the *Vizcaya* came out of the harbor.

"Ellis," said the Commodore to the yeoman, "find the range of that ship."
Ellis stepped toward his place to comply, when a shell took his head off so quickly that the body remained swaying for a moment, until companions rushed forward and caught it.

"Too bad!" cried the Commodore, who replaced the glasses to his eyes and resumed his watch of the enemy.

The Brooklyn was struck twenty-six times by the enemy's shots, but sustained little injury. It was proof that the Spaniards concentrated their fire upon her. The Iowa was struck five times, two shells piercing her, one starting a fire that was quickly extinguished. The Texas was struck three times.

The Oquendo received greatest punishment from our gunners. When examined, part of her hull was under water, but in that portion above it, it was found that she had been struck sixty-six times. The Teresa was struck thirty-three times, the Vizcaya twenty-four, and the Colon eight. All had distinct wounds in their hulls. The shots were from the 4-, 5-, 6-, 8-, and 12-inch guns. One big shell, a 12-incher from the Texas, tore a hole through the Oquendo. There were other shell holes made by the Brooklyn, Oregon, and Iowa. The Vizcaya's forward torpedoes, which had their war heads on, exploded, tearing a great hole in her bow. She was the worst wreck of all. The Oquendo's back was broken on the beach. The Teresa's fire mains were destroyed at the beginning of the action. She was set on fire by a 6-inch shell immediately and could not put it out.

III.

TO WHOM BELONGS THE CREDIT?

The Fourth of July, 1898, in the United States was not less glorious to our national pride and the strength of our arms than the first Fourth had been to the struggling hopes of the Republic. On the afternoon of the 3rd Admiral Sampson sent the following cable dispatch to Washington:

SIRONKEY, July 3, via HAYTI, July 4.

The fleet under my command offers the nation, as a Fourth of July present, the destruction of the whole of Cervera’s fleet—not one escaped. It attempted to escape
at 9:30 this morning. At two the last ship, the Cristobal Colon, had run ashore sixty miles west of Santiago and had let down her colors. The Infanta Maria Teresa, Oviedo, and Vizcaya were forced ashore, burned and blown up within twenty miles of Santiago. The Furor and Pluton were destroyed within four miles of the port.

Our loss, one killed and two wounded. Enemy's loss, probably several hundred from gun fire, explosions and drowning. About 1,300 prisoners, including Admiral Cervera. The man killed was George H. Ellis, chief yeoman of the Brooklyn.

[Signed] Sampson.

This message reached the President at noon on Monday the 4th following quickly the information briefly printed in the newspapers. It filled the country with joy and exultation. From the depression caused by the heavy losses at San Juan and El Caney, national spirit leaped to patriotic heights.

Immediately on the receipt of Admiral Sampson's message the President sent the following:

Executive Mansion.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4.

Admiral Sampson, Playa del Este:

You have the gratitude and congratulations of the whole American people. Convey to your noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors have been added to the American navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation of the nation.

William McKinley.

Secretary Long sent the following:

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4.

To Admiral Sampson, Playa del Este:

The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your fleet, remembering affectionately your dead comrade, grateful acknowledgment of your heroism and skill. All honor to the brave! You have maintained the glory of the American navy.

John D. Long.

As has been pointed out, the battle of Santiago was almost a reversal of the movement at Manila, but the result had not been reversed, and was the same in both combats. The men behind the guns, behind the ship, behind the engines, had triumphed over Spanish incompetency. in each instance, with scarcely a scar to show for it. At Manila we had eight men slightly wounded; at Santiago one man killed and one slightly wounded.
In the two engagements the enemy had lost four of the finest first-class cruisers of the world’s navies, eight unprotected light cruisers, six gunboats, and two of the most valued destroyers of her great torpedo fleet—twenty ships in all, valued at about $25,000,000. The Colón had been purchased from Italy at a cost of $3,500,000 and the three original Spanish cruisers cost each as much to construct. The Spanish loss in men in both engagements was about 1,100 killed, 2,400 captured, several hundred wounded and missing.

The United States had not lost a ship or a ship’s boat, and the injuries sustained to armor and machinery were trivial. The superiority of our men could have received no more signal demonstration.

Whose was the victory at Santiago?

That was the question to spring up even before the cheers of national exultation had ceased. It was as though the people of the United States were unable to realize the vast extent and the glorious completeness of the battle in detail. The report of Admiral Sampson did not mention the name of an officer or ship of our navy, but gave the glory to “the fleet under my command.” The magnificent performances of the Brooklyn, Commodore Schley’s flagship, and the temporary absence of the Admiral, during which time the command devolved upon Schley, gave to public opinion, heated by excitement and passion, seeking for heroes and resentful of any appearance of favoritism, the impression that Sampson had ignored the claims of “the fighting Commodore.”

The sudden elevation of Sampson had caused comment, and his position was, professionally, embarrassing and delicate.

Whose was the victory at Santiago?

It was, as Sampson said, that of the fleet under his command. It was, as Schley said in his report, when with the directness of an officer of courage, loyalty, and thorough discipline, he wrote to the Admiral, “I congratulate you upon the great victory to the squadron under your command. . . . a victory that seems big enough for all of us.”

Who would care to alter this verdict of two heroes?
It was a victory "big enough for all"—from the Admiral, on his great cruiser, to the humblest powder-monkey on the Gloucester; from the gallant Commodore to the lowliest stoker. There can be no effective action without plan, just as there can be no good plan established without action. It is not the true nature of Americans, except under excitement, to underrate the value of that patient, silent, loyal, brave, and far-seeing Admiral, who made no mistakes in preparation or disposition, who demonstrated, in the difficult and burdensome task to which he was called, the glory of the genius of Republican institutions; the genius of thoroughness of education in his profession, of untiring industry and energy, of deliberate preparation for the purpose in hand, of unflinching responsibility for what result soever might ensue, and the calm courage and willingness to set his life upon the outcome.

Nor could they fail to view without admiration the valiant acts of the Commodore, ready in his place, quick and dauntless to meet the enemy, with his life in his hand, and who was the conspicuous figure to lead in the actual fighting—the figure of deathless courage that all the world hails as a hero. His work could not have been better done.

The victory at Santiago belongs to Americans, to Sampson, Schley, Clark, Phillip, Cook, Evans, Taylor, Wainwright, and the patriotic men on all the ships. What if Sampson was away at the beginning, upon an errand of highest duty—was he not there at the finish? If Schley had been struck down by the first shot, can Americans believe we should have lost? Were there not Clark, Phillip, Evans, Cook, and Taylor? Did any one of the men or the ships act in such manner as to indicate that the stout fabric of the American navy was woven about a single thread, to unravel and fall in pieces if that thread were cut?

To credit the victory to any but "the fleet under Admiral Sampson" is to discredit all.*

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*Lieutenant Akijama, naval attaché of the Japanese Empire at Washington, who accompanied our fleet for observation, was questioned by the New York Sun on his return
In recognition of the victory the President soon after promoted Acting Rear-Admiral Sampson to be Rear-Admiral, and Commodore Schley received the same advancement. In both cases the reason recorded was "for eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle." Captain Phillip, of the Texas, was made a Commodore, and all the other commanders were advanced in the order of their rank for their participation in this engagement, and that at Guantanamo.

from Santiago, July 21. He had witnessed the battle, and was asked if he had formed any opinion upon it.

"Many," he replied. "First, the arrangement of the American fleet by Admiral Sampson. It was complete. It was without fault."

"You think, then, that Admiral Sampson deserves the credit for the battle?"

"Sincerely, I do. The officers of other Governments all agree with me that the greatest credit is for the Admiral. He made the plans. He gave the orders. He said where each ship should wait for the Spanish. The Spanish came. The result was the most complete victory that ever was known. He was not there. He was unfortunate. But the fight showed, by its complete victory, that his plans were right. If the flagship had been in the fight, she would have fought as well as the other ships. The seamanship, the crews of the American ships, the directness of their aim, it is all alike. It could not be better.

"Admiral Sampson was fortunate to have brave, quick officers to obey the commands he had given to them. They were quiet, waiting. The Spanish came and made a surprise. The Admiral was away. It was a good test. The American fleet went quickly to meet them. It was as if they knew long before that the Spaniards were coming. Commodore Schley fights well. He led the fleet with great dash. They fired so fast, so fiercely, so accurately, that the people who looked thought 'the American ships are on fire.' The firing, I say, was so great that the Spaniards were [Here the Lieutenant made a downward motion of his hands with the palms outward, more expressive than words could have been.] stopped from helping themselves. The Spaniards would be brave in fight, very likely, but there was no chance; your fleet was too good. If any one had said before such a victory was possible, he would have been laughed at.

"The smoke around your fleet was very great. Shooting straight seemed to be impossible. But the shooting was very straight. All the foreign officers said to one another often on the Seneca: 'It is wonderful; it could not be better.'"

Asked to compare the naval battle of Santiago with the battle of the Yalu, Lieutenant Akijama said:

"They would be hard to compare, because the character of the fights differed. At the Yalu there was much manoeuvring. All through the fight the position of the ships changed. At Santiago it was shoot, advancing on the Spanish. When the Spanish found themselves overpowered and desired to escape, it was follow and destroy. It was simple, but it was well done. If it had not been well done it would not have been simple, but most confused; the American victory would not have been with only one man killed."

New York Sun, July 22, 1898.
CHAPTER THE THIRTEENTH.

PROGRESS OF OUR ARMY AND NAVY.

General Shafter Surrounsv Santiago and Demands Its Surrender — Singular Progress of the Negotiations — Exchange of Hobson and His Men, an Exciting Incident — The "St. Paul" Sinks the Torpedo Boat "Terror" at San Juan — The "Texas" Sinks the "Reina Mercedes" in Santiago Harbor — "Alfonso XII." Sunk at Mariel — The Ludicrous Voyage of Admiral Cama-

1.

While our navy was destroying the Spanish sea forces that
Sunday morning, our soldiers, haggard and exhausted with
battle and hunger, yet undismayed, lay before the walls of Santiago, tenaciously hold-
ing every foot of ground that had been won by their
blood and valor. Saturday four batteries were moved up into posi-
tion to bombard the city and a portion of the entrenchments, to
aid General Ludlow with a force to move to the north and shut in
the city on that side. The same day Colonel Escario arrived in San-
tiago with about 1,000 Spanish reinforcements.

The condition of the roads to the rear prevented supplies from being
brought up, and our troops were living upon scant rations. General
Shafter and General Wheeler were ill with fever, General S. B. M.
Young was seriously ill and had to be sent back to the hospital ship,
although he protested in the delirium of fever his desire to go to
the front. On Saturday night a council of war was held and misgivings
were expressed, only to be swept away by the tenacity of General
Wheeler, who declared that not an inch should be conceded. General
Shafter cabled to Washington for reinforcements to support the ex-
hausted army and was promised aid as quickly as troops could be
dispatched. The council decided to put on a bold front to the enemy

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On Sunday morning, while Cervera's fleet was leaving the harbor to meet destruction, a flag of truce from Shafter entered Santiago bearing this letter to the commanding General:

To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba:

Sir: — I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children that they should leave the city before ten o'clock to-morrow morning.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

W. R. Shafter, Major-General U. S. A.

It was given into the hands of General José Toral, who had succeeded to command through the wounding of General Linares and the death of General Vara del Rey, second in command. Toral was aware of Cervera's movement and hoped that its success would weaken our naval forces by the necessity of pursuit of the Spanish vessels. Without delay he sent back a response full of cool defiance. It read:

"I advise the foreign women and children that they must leave the city before ten o'clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message."

The reply was brought to Shafter at 6:30 in the evening, and with the truce-messenger came a deputation of foreign consuls who appealed for more time in which to get the non-combatants out of the city. They asked leave to send these to El Caney and represented that there were from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand persons anxious to leave, many of them old, feeble, sick, and helpless. They were also without food, which Shafter could not promise to supply while his own troops were hungry and supplies were coming forward with dangerous slowness. He granted to the refugees permission to go to El Caney, but firmly refused to allow any at Siboney, where it was determined to keep our hospitals free from the danger of infection. By the consuls he forwarded the following to General Toral:

The Commanding General Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba:

Sir: — In consideration of the request of the consuls and officers in your city for delay in carrying out my intention to fire on the city, and in the interest of the
poor women and children, who will suffer very greatly by their hasty and enforced departure from the city, I have the honor to announce that I will delay such action solely in their interest until noon of the fifth, provided during the interval your forces make no demonstration whatever upon those of my own. I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. R. Shafter,
Major-General U. S. A., Commanding.

General Toral consented to this truce and the evacuation of Santiago by the miserable refugees of war began next morning. Among them were the Civil Governor, the Mayor, and the highest officer of justice. They had been forbidden to depart by Toral, but escaped in the rout, a most significant indication to our authorities of the desperate straits in the city. When questioned they reported the effects of the siege as dreadful, and Spanish losses as very great. The poorer classes were at the point of starvation. Food was very scarce. Only rice and black bread were to be obtained. The food was all held by the army, and was given out in smallest quantities by officers. The people were almost ready to surrender before the fight, and after that they were anxious to capitulate. These civil officers had favored surrender, for which they had been denounced by General Toral, but they continued to urge him. The Archbishop of Santiago, the highest ecclesiastical authority in the island, was in favor of surrender, and he, too, had pleaded with General Toral, who continued, however, to maintain his stubborn attitude. They did not believe Toral could hold out much longer. Pressure upon him was great from citizens and soldiers. The foreign consuls had confirmed these reports and opinions.

Not fewer than 18,000 men, women, and children marched out of Santiago that Monday morning, over the roads deep in mire that led to El Caney. The village, that had only a thousand inhabitants, was much damaged by the battle on the preceding Friday, so that the massing of 18,000 helpless persons there meant pitiful hardships and much suffering. The sick were carried on litters, many of the weak women succumbed to the heat and fell almost dead by the roadside. Many women were widows, wives, or mothers, of Spanish
soldiers. Thousands were well dressed, some of the women of the highest class handsomely attired in silk gowns. These volunteered as nurses, and when the families of the killed or wounded discovered how well the wounded Spanish were being cared for, they became devoted adherents of the American cause.

At noon, on Tuesday, the truce would expire. That morning, however, a flag of truce came out from Toral. The bearer of it, instead of being blindfolded, as usual, to prevent observation of the strength and disposition of our forces, was escorted open-eyed past our batteries, trenches, and lines, so that he might be impressed with the hopelessness of resistance. Toral had heard that Cervera's ships were destroyed, but could not believe it. His communication to Shafter was lengthy. He asked that the truce be further extended, as he wished time to communicate with the Madrid Government concerning the surrender of the city. He also asked that cable operators be sent to operate the line between Santiago and Kingston. He pledged his honor as a soldier that the operators should not be asked to transmit any matter that did not solely bear on the surrender, and that he would return them safe to El Caney when a final reply should be received from Madrid. This request for operators was necessary for the reason that the operators of the Santiago cable were British subjects and had all left the city under the protection of the British Consul when the non-combatants left. The commissioner said General Toral desired to consult the authorities in Madrid because he had been unable to communicate with Captain-General Blanco at Havana.

It was finally arranged that the truce should be extended until Saturday, and the cable operators were sent into the city.

Toral's commissioner also bore to his commander the following letter from Shafter:—

SIR:—1. In view of the events of the 3d inst., I have the honor to lay before your Excellency certain propositions, to which, I trust, you will give the consideration which, in my opinion, they deserve.

2. I inclose a bulletin of the engagement on Sunday morning, which resulted in the complete destruction of Admiral Cervera's fleet, the loss of 600 officers and
men, and the capture of the remainder. The Admiral and General Paredes and other officers escaped alive and are now prisoners on the Harvard and St. Louis. The latter ship, in which are the Admiral, General Paredes, and the surviving Captains of all the vessels, except the Captain of the Almirante Oquendo, who was slain, has sailed for the United States. If desired, this may be confirmed by your Excellency sending an officer under a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson and he can arrange to visit the Harvard, which will not sail until to-morrow.

3. Our fleet is now perfectly free to act. I have the honor to state that unless a surrender is arranged by noon of the 9th inst. the bombardment of the city will be begun and continued by the heavy guns of our ships. The city is within easy range of these guns, the 8-inch being capable of firing 9,500 yards and the 13-inch much further. The ships can so lie that with a range of 8,000 yards they can reach the center of the city.

4. I make this suggestion in a purely humanitarian spirit. I do not wish to cause the slaughter of more men of either your Excellency's forces or my own, the final result, under circumstances so disadvantageous to your Excellency, being a foregone conclusion.

5. As your Excellency may wish to make reference of so momentous a question to your home Government, it is for this purpose that I have placed the time for the resumption of hostilities sufficiently far in the future to allow of a reply being received.

6. I beg an early answer.

Then began an extraordinary series of negotiations, never before heard of in the business of warfare. Both sides were not averse to gaining time. Toral dared not surrender without authority from Blanco or his Government at Madrid. Shafter, whose forces were suffering from disease following hunger, exposure, and exhaustion, was willing to wait for 6,000 fresh troops that were speeding to his assistance with General Nelson A. Miles, the Commander-in-Chief, at their head. These arrived at Baiquiri on the day the truce expired.

Meantime, Toral, after consulting with his superiors at Madrid and Havana, suggested terms offering to evacuate Santiago if General Shafter would permit him to depart unmolested with all his troops, arms, and flags. He added that any attempt to conquer the city must cost the Americans enormously in the matter of lives, for he had been reënforced, and now had plenty of ammunition. Resistance, he said, would be long as well as strong, because, by sending
out the poor of Santiago to be fed by the Americans, he had enabled himself to provision his garrison for an indefinite time.

The truce was again extended one day. Six batteries of Randolph's light artillery arrived and occupied positions overlooking the Spanish lines and the city. The disposition of troops composing our line was about as follows: On the right, Lawton's division (Ludlow's, Chaffee's, and Miles's brigades) and Wheeler's cavalry division (First, Ninth, Tenth, and Rough Riders); center, Bates's brigade; left, Kent's brigade. It was reported that the Spaniards were digging trenches in the streets of Santiago, and otherwise preparing for a house-to-house fight.

Sunday the 10th General Shafter notified Toral that by the President's directions the Spanish proposition to surrender was rejected, and that the United States would accept no terms but unconditional surrender. General Toral replied in effect that he would discuss no other terms than those suggested by himself.

The attack on the city by the artillery did not begin until after five o'clock in the afternoon, when the Brooklyn, Texas, and Indiana, lying off Aguadores, threw shells over the cliffs in an effort to reach the city, six miles distant and hidden from view. Signals from shore announced that the shells fell short of the Spanish position. From Shafter's lines, the Spanish defenses outside the city were fired upon by our field guns, mortars, Gatling guns, and the dynamite gun of the Rough Riders. The enemy's reply proved to be less vigorous than was anticipated. On our side Captain Charles W. Rowell and one private were killed and four wounded.

On July 11 Shafter's available forces, counting all reinforcements, and deducting the dead, sick, and wounded, was about 22,500 fighting men. This is based on an estimate of 15,337 men in General Shafter's original expedition, and a little more than 10,000 in various expeditions which had since gone, making in all 25,500 men. Bombardment was resumed that day until a flag of truce was raised in the city and negotiations were resumed.
The undeniably brave, if desperate, resistance of the Spanish troops had earned the respect and admiration of the United States forces. Whatever the incompetency of the Spanish navy, none was displayed by the military forces. Spain's troops have always been celebrated for courage and cruelty. They cost Napoleon more trouble than any other adversaries. During the truces before Santiago there was some fraternization between officers on both sides and our men recognized the courtesy and courage of their enemies.

This good opinion was increased when, on July 6, Toral agreed to exchange Lieutenant Hobson, the hero of the Merrimac incident, and his seven sailors, for an equal number of Spanish prisoners.

The incident was picturesque and exhilarating to the soldiers, wearied by long service in the trenches.

At two o'clock in the afternoon, the agreement having been concluded, the Spanish prisoners to be exchanged started from the American lines in charge of Lieutenant John D. Miley of Shafter's staff. Lieutenant Miley was followed by three Spanish Lieutenants, from whom one was to be selected to be exchanged for Lieutenant Hobson. They were blindfolded and carried in a covered wagon. The officers were followed by the soldiers for whom our sailors were to be exchanged. The road led up a hill on the crest of which our firing line was lying in the trenches. Passing through the line, the procession moved four hundred yards down the hill toward Santiago and turned into a field. Here the bandages were removed from the prisoners' eyes, and all the party sat down under a tree to await the arrival of Hobson and his men, who could already be seen moving out of the city with a white flag floating above them, accompanied by a guard.

When the two groups met beneath the tree the eyes of both armies were upon them. The Spanish officer in charge of the Americans talked for an hour with Lieutenant Miley before final terms of
exchange were agreed upon. Lieutenant Miley told the Spanish officer that he might select any one of the three Spanish Lieutenants in exchange for Hobson. Finally Lieutenant Arias was selected for the reason that he was wounded.

Then the two groups saluted and each turned back to its own lines. As the Americans came up the hill road, Lieutenant Hobson was riding in advance with Lieutenant Miley, on horseback. The soldiers recognized him by his uniform, and instantly broke into deafening cheers. The party moved rapidly forward, and when they were well within the American lines the sailors cheered, while the soldiers waved their hats and shouted themselves hoarse. One of the regimental bands played "The Star-Spangled Banner," whereupon all cheered again and again.

Hobson looked somewhat pale, due, perhaps, to his confinement in prison, but he smiled and bowed in response to the welcome given to him.

The ovation to the sailors equaled that given to Hobson. The men rode in the wagon that had conveyed the Spanish prisoners. The vehicle was constantly surrounded by cheering soldiers, who seized and heartily shook the outstretched hands of the released heroes, while the band, in honor of the seamen, played "When Johnnie Comes Marching Home."

Lieutenant Hobson's account of his imprisonment of a month gave to our soldiers and sailors, and to the people of the United States, a high impression of the courage and sincerity of Admiral Cervera. The Spanish Admiral had made their comfort and care his personal responsibility as far as the demands of his position permitted. "If he had been my personal friend," said Lieutenant Hobson, "he could not have been more solicitous for my welfare." The prisoners were in the Morro fort for a few days, after which they were removed to Santiago. They had been sick with fever, but received careful medical attention, and Cervera had brought to bear all his official influence to secure the exchange of these brave men, and their restoration to the fleet they had so greatly honored by their heroic deed.
Hobson's testimony to Cervera's fine conduct was sufficient to win from the United States a display of popular admiration and much kindness to the unfortunate Admiral when he was brought to Annapolis a prisoner of war.

On the second night before Hobson's exchange the Spaniards made a futile attempt to imitate his exploit. At midnight they tried to tow the dismantled cruiser, Reina Mercedes, into the entrance and sink her across the channel not closed by the Merrimac. It was moonlight, and the watch on the battleship Texas observed the glint of reflected light from the steel sides of the Mercedes. Signal was made to the other ships of our fleet and then the Texas opened fire with perfect deliberation, between the cliffs. The aim was so true that the shots drove the Mercedes out of her course to the north side of the channel, where a 13-inch shell struck her in the hull, exploded, and sank her in shoal water, leaving her masts and upper works out of water, and the ship far out of the channel.

July 6 the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII. left Havana harbor and proceeded eight miles to the westward before she was discovered by the American blockading squadron. The latter then gave chase. The cruiser attempted to enter Mariel, but stranded at the entrance of the port. We fired at her until she was set on fire. Detachments of Spanish infantry and artillery hastened to the shore and saved her crew and part of her cargo. Two of her crew were wounded. The cruiser was a total loss.

III.

While the army was waiting before Santiago, the prestige of our navy was to be advanced even more. Captain Sigsbee, who had been commander of the Maine, was placed in command of the auxiliary cruiser St. Paul, and on June 22 arrived off San Juan, Porto Rico, to assist in the blockade of that port. The afternoon of the same day, while lying six miles off shore, lookouts discovered a ship coming out of the harbor. It proved
to be the Spanish unprotected cruiser Isabella II., and she opened fire on the St. Paul without effect. Captain Sigsbee waited for a nearer approach, but the Spaniard stopped as if trying to draw our ship under the guns of the forts.

At this moment the lookout reported that the destroyer Terror, the finest of the Spanish torpedo boats, was coming out of the harbor, keeping out of sight behind the Isabella. The trick was now apparent. The cruiser was to act as a decoy to lure the St. Paul within striking distance of the destroyer. The Isabella maintained quick firing, perhaps to cover the Terror with smoke. The latter turned off along the coast, as if manoeuvring to come out. Captain Sigsbee followed, endeavoring to get between the two Spaniards with the purpose of keeping the Terror in the trough of the sea if she headed for an attack.

When the Terror realized that she was being outmanœuvred, her commander sent the destroyer around in a circle to get up speed, and then headed straight for the St. Paul. It was a perilous moment now, for everything depended on gunnery. Unless a shot stopped the Terror, there was nothing to prevent her coming near enough to launch a torpedo and destroy the St. Paul. The American gunners let the enemy get within 6,000 yards, and then welcomed her with the whole starboard battery—three 5-inch guns, two 6-pounders, two Hotchkiss rifles, and two 3-pounders. All guns carried the range, and several shots struck the Terror, damaging her slightly. She stopped suddenly in her onward rush—she was coming at full speed—and wheeling around fired at the St. Paul without effect.

Both Spaniards now seemed anxious to retreat, and the St. Paul pursued, shooting away the rear smokestack of the Terror and landing several shots on the cruiser that now ran away. Another gunboat coming from the harbor to assist her. The Terror was also retreating, firing as she ran, when the St. Paul sent in a shell from a 5-inch gun that struck the enemy on the port side astern. It tore through the engine room, killing the engineer's assistant and mortally wounding a sailor, completely wrecked the engine and
steering gear, and, going out through the hull, left her in a sinking condition.

The _Terror_ began drifting and signaling for help. A ship ran out to her assistance as she was now well under the guns of the fort. It was too late to tow her in. She was pushed towards the beach and sank fifty yards from shore. The _Isabella_ and her consort then retreated into the harbor.

Merchant ships coming out of San Juan reported the ludicrous side of the engagement. The Spaniards mistook the _St. Paul_ for her sister ship, the _St. Louis_, which was not so heavily armed, and concluded to sink her at a safe distance. The Spanish naval officers publicly announced their intention to engage the American in a duel for her destruction. The populace cheered the officers wherever they appeared, until finally the captain of the _Terror_ made an address in the public square. He was going out to sink the American or be sunk by her, he declared, and then cordially invited the people of the city to mount the hills surrounding the harbor and watch the battle. They accepted the invitation. From the _St. Paul_ hundreds could be seen watching the battle from the heights above the city. The other Spaniards were not much injured.

IV.

About the same time a new Spanish squadron, the third and last of the navy possessed by the enemy, sailed from Cadiz, ostensibly to succor the beleaguered capital of the Philippines, but really for the desperate hope of attempting to draw our ships away from Santiago to follow and thus give Cervera rather more chance to escape. It was under the command of Admiral Camara, and consisted of the battleship _Pelayo_ (second class), the armored cruiser _Emperador Carlos V._, the _Rapida_ and _Patriota_ (auxiliary cruisers like our _St. Louis_), the _Giralda_, a steel pleasure yacht converted into a destroyer corresponding to our _Gloucester_, and three torpedo boats, the _Audaz_, _Osado_, and _Proserpina_, with half
a dozen troop ships having about 7,000 soldiers on board, accompanied
by colliers and supply ships.

Never in modern warfare was the dispatching of a force against
the enemy, for the purpose of falling upon him with a swiftness amount-
ing to surprise, attended by ostentatious ceremonies so fully displaying
the weaknesses of race. The politicians who were governing Spain
knew perfectly well that the war was hopeless, that neither their army
nor their navy could cope with ours, but the internal dissensions of
factions, the perils that threatened the Alfonsoine dynasty, the uncon-
trollable selfishness and vanity of party leaders, made it impossible
at that time to publicly acknowledge the truth. Cervera’s squadron
had not been destroyed. Santiago had not been attacked by land, and
therefore, it was vitally necessary for political reasons to maintain at
home a warlike front.

The departure of Don Quixote de la Mancha to assail windmills
was no more solemnly ludicrous than the sailing of Camara’s fleet,
but the latter was enveloped in magnificent ceremonial. The ships
were splendid offensive machines on paper: practically they were
distrusted by their own officers. Their seaworthiness was suspected,
their engines were out of order. They had been renovated at Ferrol,
near the French border, by French engineers, and it was understood
that French and Austrian gunners and machinists were secretly en-
listed to secure the proper management of the engines and to work
the guns.

The ceremonies were solemn and aroused intense enthusiasm in
Spain. The ladies of Cadiz embroidered a flag, which the Bishop
blessed aboard the Emperor Carlos V., for which vessel the flag was
made. The prelate arrived and departed accompanied by a procession
of choristers, and vestmented youths bearing censers. The ceremony
was marked with all religious pomp. The choristers led the crew
of the war ship in singing hymns of hope and prayer.

The Minister of Marine delivered a lyrical, patriotic oration. He
announced that the reserve squadron would no longer be reserved,
but would seek danger for the country’s sake. It was a privilege to
be placed in a situation that must ennoble the humblest sailor, transforming him into a hero. The officers and men of the ships visited the cathedral, and amid much emotion, all kneeling, made the customary vow never to surrender to the enemies of Spain, but to die in her service.

Before leaving Cadiz Señor Aunon, Minister of Marine, telegraphed to the Queen-Regent that “the reserve squadron and the expeditionary troops, who are quitting Spanish waters, send a warm and enthusiastic salutation to your Majesty, avowing their determination to fight to the death for the honor of the nation.” A great pretense of secrecy was maintained concerning the fleet’s destination. The Spanish were not permitted to know whether it would attack Boston, go to Cervera’s relief, or to Manila. But the United States knew perfectly well that it was to sail eastward through the Suez Canal.

The progress of Camara’s fleet was comparable only to a comic-opera promenade. Moving slowly, with many impressive feints, accompanied by vague rumors and contradictions, it passed Gibraltar and entered the Mediterranean. Then it put in at Cartagena, where it was met with the announcement that the United States were assembling a squadron of war ships under Commodore John Crittenden Watson, to attack the seaports of Spain and ravage them. Camara’s project, as a reality, was thus instantly exploded. Dewey’s fleet, reenforced by the Charleston and the monitor Monterey, was strong enough to destroy him; yet even if he went to Manila, the Spanish coasts would be left undefended.

But Camara dared not return to Cadiz. At a farewell public banquet he had declared—for the purpose of impressing the populace—that he would never return until his flag had been dyed in American blood; and Spanish colors were waved, the band played national airs, while Spanish emotion and French champagne mingled themselves in a glorious “fizz” of patriotism and excitement.

For political purposes, therefore, our threat was counteracted with the announcement that a fourth squadron was assembling at Cadiz, and Señor Sagasta admitted that Camara had sailed for Manila.
And so he had, and he arrived at Port Said, the northern entrance of the Suez canal, on June 26. Then ensued a series of amusing difficulties. The Egyptian Government refused to permit him to coal in the harbor, and then granted to him the permission, only to withdraw it. Then he was permitted to coal from his own colliers, and again that privilege was withdrawn. Spain accused England of conniving at and fomenting these causes of delay and sent a note to the Powers. Meantime, the United States had purchased all the private coal supplies at Port Said.

When at last Admiral Camara took on coal of his own and made ready to enter the canal, he offered a draft on his Government for the $260,000 necessary to pay canal tolls. The draft was politely declined, and gold was demanded. After vexatious delay, the draft was guaranteed by French financial creditors of Spain, and the fleet passed through. It lay off Ismaila until July 9. Cervera’s squadron, meanwhile, had been destroyed, and Toral was about to surrender Santiago. Then the Spanish Government ordered the fleet to return to Cadiz, paid another $260,000 of toll, and Camara, turning the prows of his terrible armada to the north, once more braved the dangerous waters of the canal, and navigated his fleet through the frowning tempestuosities of the Mediterranean safely home without sustaining the loss of anything more than time and money.

American preparations to send Commodore Watson’s squadron against the Spanish coast were meanwhile continued, and knowledge of it filled all Spanish seaports with terror. The towns were deserted, and all Spain fled inland except from great fortified ports such as Cadiz, Barcelona, and Cartagena. It was our purpose to carry the war to Spain’s very doors.
CHAPTER THE FOURTEENTH.

THE DEATH GRIP AT SANTIAGO.

AN OMINOUS PAUSE ON BOTH SIDES—THE SPANISH REENFORCEMENTS OF PESTILENCE AND FAMINE—THE SINISTER MEANING AND HISTORY OF "THE HONOR OF SPAIN"—TWENTY THOUSAND STARVING REFUGEES TO SUPPORT, AND YELLOW FEVER TO COMBAT—SPANISH TROOPS LOOT THEIR OWN CITY WITH ATROCITY—SHAFTER SENDS A SHARP DEMAND TO TURAL—PERSONAL CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE GENERALS—"IT'S A D—D POOR SORT OF HONOR THAT MAKES SOLDIERS DIE FOR NOTHING"—TURAL AGREES TO SURRENDER THE CITY—WILD REJOICING IN THE AMERICAN ARMY.

The gaunt and haggard soldiers of the United States still kept sleepless guard over every rood of the walls and trenches that contained Santiago. Day after day passed with no change, except that the patient men added to their earthworks, or moved into a better position, or changed a battery. Day after day small bodies of reenforcements arrived from Siboney or Baiquiri, covered with the mire from the red roads, worn with the labor of wading through the sticky trail, climbing up hillsides, and along the rock-covered beds of mountain torrents. As they trudged wearily on they could see the mute signals of heroism, testifying how the advance army had fought its way.

Through jungles, on hillsides, in rank grass, and strung from rock to rock in gorges and streams, the terrible coils and strands of barbed wire, with which the Spaniards had abatised the approach, were discovered. It had been believed, at first, that these obstacles were merely wire fences along post lines, from four to eight feet high, but it was discovered when the advance was made on Santiago that there were not only fences to be encountered, but all the forms of the barbed torture that ingenious Spanish cruelty could invent. The wire was stretched from tree to tree at irregular heights. Sometimes a strand would be fastened to a stump, and from there to a
height of eight or ten feet to a tree, then down again to the next tree to a height of three or four feet from the ground. In this way hedges, with six or eight strands of barbed wire, were strung along for miles, the construction being so irregular that the soldiers could not learn where to look for the individual strands.

The whole formed a formidable barrier superior to the abatis made from the limbs or trunks of trees. Wood can be torn away by artillery fire, and, once down, the troops can pass over. Or it can be set on fire and destroyed. But the barbed-wire barriers had to be cut with shears, or beaten down carefully with clubs. While the men were halting, the wires did not prevent the enemy's bullets from mowing down our soldiers. In some instances the strands were woven so closely together that the clippers could not be inserted between them; yet the terrible Mauser bullets came through with deadly ease.

July 12 General Miles and about 8,000 reinforcements had arrived at the front and General Ludlow, with a force of Americans and Cubans, had occupied the town of Caimanes, west of Santiago, across the bay.

But the army of Spain meanwhile had also developed reinforcements, and these had invested our lines as effectually as our troops had invested Santiago.

This new Spanish force, though it flew no colors of Spain, though it marched with no pomp or display, was yet more to be dreaded than the Spanish army in Santiago—it was more terrible than a thousand armies with banners. It was massed and ordered and placed by malevolent veteran purposes that had served as allies and servants of Spain for five hundred years of abandonment of power to cruelty and treachery. These veteran allies had marched in the bloody train of Alva in Germany, with the Duke of Parma in the Netherlands, with Cortez in Mexico, with Pizarro in Peru, with Philip V., and Charles III., when Spaniard fought Spaniard with ferocity, treachery, and evil cunning that equaled themselves on both sides and demonstrated that good faith and mercy were congenitally absent from Spanish character. The cruelties practiced upon prisoners and harmless non-combatants are forbidden of record in open history.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

They are still practiced where Spanish domination is safe from the inquisitive eye of other races. Hideous ingenuity in cruelty drove the native Indians of Cuba, by thousands, to find suicide preferable to life in the power of Spaniards. To this year Spanish soldiers in the Philippines have nailed captive revolutionists to walls in an attitude of crucifixion, and lashed them to death. Within two years General Weyler, a worthy successor of Alva and of Philip, undertook to crush revolution by starvation. He had placed 225,000 murders to his account, when the United States forced his recall to Spain, where the public received him as a hero.

Wherever the army of Spain has passed, it has left behind scars upon the fair name of mankind as cruel as those of the branding iron upon the flesh of its victim. When the Spanish soldiery has relaxed itself it has been in the pleasures of torturing the conquered, in the unspeakable agonies of inquisition, in the exercise of intrigue in a bottomless sea of treachery, or in public corruption that has made practical government impossible among them.

In any monarchical government, buttressed by a rich and powerful caste of nobles, the soldiers of its standing army determine the character of the people. The soldier, representing everywhere the living type of courage, is the hero of the masses. What must be the hereditary practices of Spanish soldiers is reflected ominously today in the populace of Spain, whose vast crowds on holidays abandon themselves to blood-scent, and, as the fume of revolting cruelty rises from the sand of the bull-ring, it envelops every tier—royalty, nobility, commonalty—in a vaporous madness, such as the barbarous Greeks and degenerate Romans entered upon during their "mysteries," but which in Spain evokes a frenzied lust for murder that delights in the sight of physical suffering.

No wonder such a nature seeks concealment beneath the garb of a chivalrous etiquette, and masks its intentions behind the accommodating ambiguities of noble language. But, behind the costume and the alluring phrase, have always existed the pitiless heart, filled with the love of cruelty, with the intricacies of fraud and treachery, with the
pride of a limitless selfishness that would sacrifice the world for its own vanity. For five hundred years “the honor of Spain” has been a phrase with which Spaniards have juggled to conceal the selfishness of caste pride. The “honor of Spain” has been maintained by the sacrifice of every virtue and noble ideal that mankind has cherished as a factor entering into honor.

It was the army of Famine and Pestilence that Toral had marched out of the gates of Santiago, led by the spectral veterans of old. In the garb of helplessness and innocence it passed through the American lines to El Caney. Twenty thousand refugees were there, or scattered along the roads, or roaming the jungles in an effort to reach Siboney. It was the beginning of the season of the fioe amarilla, the yellow fever, that pestilence of filth and fetor, which Spanish institutions have allowed to persist—a silent witness of their indifference to death as the alternative of cleanliness and industry. For a hundred years Santiago de Cuba, Havana, and San Juan de Puerto Rico have been centers of this deadly disease, which has ravaged all the warm and tropical countries having free communication with them.

It was even showing its jaundiced face in the city of Santiago when General Shafter, pursuing the tactics of civilized warfare, answering the demands of humanity, had given Toral notice of assault in order that the non-combatants might retire. “Good!” was the reply of the Spaniard, “we shall have 20,000 fewer mouths to feed.” And the non-combatants did retire—retired to the ranks of the besiegers. “Good!” Toral might have said, if he did not actually say it. “we send you famine and the fioe amarilla along with our poor and helpless. Feed them and nurse them, or starve and die with them!” For Toral knew that the hunger and disease and filth and despair of 20,000 women and children in Santiago was a greater and more terrible army threatening his troops than the 22,000 Americans standing intrepid and unconquerable sentries at every door by which escape might be possible.

The Anglo-Saxon—to whose nature cruelty is to be justified only as the last extremity of necessity, to whom maleficent treachery is a brand of the unpardonable infamy—must turn with loathing from the
thought that Toral sent the poison of disease to the adversaries his soldiers had not been able to beat back from impregnable defenses. But he knew the disease, the season, the dangers, and the effects. He sent his helpless dependants to the magnanimous invaders—in return for magnanimity he offered the horrors of pestilence and famine.

And now, he could well afford to temporize, to squirm and delay behind the old sinister pretense of “the honor of Spain.” With an army 20,000 strong in disease and starvation in our rear, and an army of 11,000 in the trenches of his fortress, every day’s delay for Toral meant hope. Every day’s delay, while the cold rains fell in torrents, or the burning sun scorched and tortured the unacclimated, hungry, and exhausted Americans, gave opportunity for infection and spread of the fever.

Our army was supporting the Spanish army of pestilence. Our own troops were living upon half rations of “hard-tack” and water, while such supplies as could be brought up were divided with the starving thousands at El Caney. Men, women, and children, 20,000 of them, with two hundred houses in the village. They huddled in the streets, squares, roads, and fields, which they converted into a vast lazaretto of despair.

“Mucha hambre!” wailed the women and children, “I am so hungry,” and the food for the army went to the helpless. But no soldier of the United States complained or would have stopped the relief. The Red Cross Society sent nurses, medicines, and supplies to the refugees. Flour was distributed—the refugees did not know how to make use of it. The army cooks set up bakeries and made bread for the starving, while the soldiers in the trenches ate “hard-tack” and took courage of determination against the Spaniard hiding in the city. Our surgeons and physicians and nurses attended the sick of the refugees and the wounded of the enemy, while the wounded troops of the United States tramped back on foot, or were jolted in ammunition wagons, over the torturing roads to Siboney.

Even to Siboney a thousand helpless refugees had managed to penetrate, bringing with them fever and deadly hunger. July 11 yellow
fever had appeared at the hospital base there, and General Miles ordered every house in the town to be burned, in the hope of staying the infection. The torch was applied. A great, drowning torrent of rain extinguished the incipient flames and drenched the houses to a degree that made it necessary to lose another day. But Siboney was burned on the 12th.

Out in the trenches before Santiago the soldiers of the United States were chafing. There was no complaint at the hardships that humanity imposed upon them, although the seasoned regular troops were weakened for lack of good food, tents, and by the tension of hiding in trenches. Even those who had fought over the hot and arid plains of the West were appalled by the deadly humidity of this Cuban climate, a steaming suffocation all day, that gave place to a clammy chill all night.

They chafed at delay and inactivity. They wanted to fight, and cursed every hour that did not bring the order to storm the enemy’s works.

General Shafter reflected upon the cost of carrying the town by assault. Our ships could not enter the harbor until the mines there had been removed or destroyed. The long-range bombardment was a slow, difficult, and almost impossible task. There were only his soldiers, then, to take the city. To order these brave men, who had weakened themselves by fighting their way through every peril and difficulty of the jungle, and by hunger and toil in the trenches, to assault the artillery, barbed-wire abatis, and the treachery of street-fighting in Santiago, was a serious step to take. Even though they pleaded for the order, the cost of it was his responsibility, and he determined not to give the order except as a last necessity. And General Miles agreed with him.
II.

What our soldiers could see of Santiago from their lines on the hill of San Juan was its beauty in the panoply of war. They could look down upon its ancient red and yellow houses, gleaming in the sunlight against the vivid background of green on the mountains behind. The red and yellow flags of Spain were flying from walls, roofs, and pinnacles. The white flag of the Red Cross Society, with its blood-red Maltese cross in the center of the field, flew over the hospital from which the wounded Spaniards could see our troops by looking out the windows.

In the military headquarters on the Plaza de Armas General Toral devised the many ingenious ways of saying "To-morrow," by which he had evaded Shafter's demands, and he patiently waited for the work of his allies, pestilence, and famine.

The Spaniard was doing his work characteristically in the old city. Dreadful stories were brought out by refugees and deserters. Before surrendering the city they were sacking it. The Spanish soldier does not discriminate when he begins to loot. All valuable property of civilians, friends and enemies alike, is his by right of taking or destroying. The dwellings and storehouses of all who had fled were broken into and despoiled.

One peculiarly atrocious crime was reported, against the Señora Rosa Chacon de Odís, a wealthy resident who had refused to leave because her fortune, which consisted of gold, silver, and securities of various kinds, and her valuable jewels, were kept in her house. She thought the property would be safer under the protection of Spanish soldiers than within the American lines. It was known among the Spanish soldiers that she had much property in her house, and one night some of them went to her residence and assassinated her. Then they looted the house of everything valuable.

Churches and handsome residences were invaded and everything of convertible value carried off, fine pictures were cut out of the frames or defaced and slashed with swords, windows broken, furniture hacked
and destroyed. Banks were despoiled of money and nameless barbarities of violence perpetrated upon the few defenseless women remaining. For those two weeks Santiago de Cuba was in the merciless clutches of the fourteenth century. Only those things were left untouched that were necessary to the comfort of the Spanish soldiery who were upholding “the honor of Spain,” or to destroy which would necessitate the abandonment of indolence and a resort to labor.

In the San Carlos Club on the Plaza de Armas, the resort of aristocratic society, the officers off duty congregated at night to regale themselves. Resplendent in gold braid and decorations, they listened to a mechanical musical instrument that had been imported from the United States for the entertainment of the club membership. Among the airs rendered was one that none of the Spaniards recognized, but which became a favorite. It was “The Star Spangled Banner,” and its rendition always called out applause and a demand for repetition.

And so, between the excitements of riot and luxury, Toral communicated the mysterious evasions contained in the Spanish word mañana (“to-morrow”) in reply to Shafter’s demands. The fever was very slow in beginning its work.

But General Toral received on July 13 an abrupt notification that if Santiago was not surrendered unconditionally without further delay the ships would begin a continuous bombardment at noon next day and destroy the city for which his obstinacy must bear the responsibility. He read between the lines of that message that if he sought to escape the shells of the ships the soldiers he had so long irritated and menaced with treachery might meet him with terrible retribution.

III.

COUNCIL OF WAR. There was a council of war before Santiago on
FORCES THE July 13. It was between General Miles, General Shafter,
CAPITULATION General Garcia, and Lieutenant Hobson of the navy, representing Admiral Sampson. General Garcia counseled a heavy and continuous bombardment if the next answer from General Toral should
be a request for further delay or a refusal to surrender. He declared that the Spaniards could not hold out long, and that the best action to take was to reduce them at once by bombardment. He added that if General Toral's proposed terms of surrender, which specified that his troops be permitted to retire with their arms, were complied with, the Spanish forces would immediately join General Luque at Holguín, where there were 10,000 men and 2,000,000 rations, or would fall back on Puerto Principe, where the Cubans had many head of cattle.

It was declared at the council that Captain-General Blanco was personally opposed to the surrender on any terms, and wanted the forces there to hold out to the bitter end.

The possibility of the fleet forcing the entrance of the harbor, steaming up to the inner bay and bombarding the city, was brought up at the council. Many army men had insisted that it was Admiral Sampson's duty to go to the city with his battleships, and accusations had been made that the navy was not willing to accept its share of the dangers. These rumors had caused ill-feeling, but they were untrue. Admiral Sampson had told the military authorities that it would be madness in him to try to pass the harbor entrance as long as the forts commanding it had not been reduced. Lieutenant Hobson explained to the council the reasons rendering it impossible for the fleet to get into the harbor. The approach from the sea was several miles long, and was mined for the entire distance.

It was agreed at the council that the city could be taken by the army in three hours, with the loss of 1,000 men, and by the navy with the loss of one ship. It was also agreed that such losses were not necessary.

When the council adjourned the notice to Toral that caused him to act was at once dispatched. An answer was not expected until next day; but Toral replied at once and suggested a personal conference with Shafter. Up to that date the negotiations had been carried on through aides.

The conference was held under the shade of a great cottonwood tree, midway between the lines of the two armies. General Miles
was present, in his character as commanding general of the armies, and as an adviser. General Shafter was attended by Colonel Maus and Captain McKittrick. General Toral came attended by Colonel Velasquez, Mr. Mason, British Vice-Consul at Santiago. Señor Mendoza acted as Shafter’s interpreter. The two groups were characteristic of the two nations. General Miles wore a plain blue field uniform, while Shafter and his aides were attired in the dirty brown linen blouse coats adopted for the men in Cuba. Toral and Velasquez were magnificent with gold lace, braid, and medals.

General Toral began by pointing out that his government would not permit him to do more than surrender possession of the city, marching his troops with their arms to join the main Spanish army. General Shafter replied that the United States Government had declined to accept anything but unconditional surrender, and he must insist upon it.

To this General Toral politely responded that each General must obey the orders of his Government, as loyal soldiers. He, himself, personally regretted that his government left him no discretion.

General Shafter reminded him that no soldier was expected to destroy his army when nothing could be gained. He pointed out the investment, the presence of the ships, the unlimited reinforcements that could be brought, the starvation of the refugees, and the danger of disease that threatened all alike. That, moreover, it had been determined to immediately assault Santiago by land and sea, at all cost, and General Toral must realize that it could be taken.

Personal anecdotes are not always reliable, but when they are redolent of peculiar character they gain credence. Such an anecdote came from the front, growing out of this conference. General Shafter, known to the army as “Bull” Shafter, for his obstinate fighting and brusque qualities, was also celebrated for a vocabulary rich in powerful, if profane, emphasis. A self-made man, a self-made soldier, and full of vigor, he had learned to attend strictly to business and to waste no time upon the accomplishments of ceremonial etiquette.
The truce was continued until these commissioners could meet and conclude the work.

When the American conferees returned to our troops and announced the agreement of capitulation, the army broke into wild cheers of delight. They began in the center and spread right and left in waves of enthusiasm. The news flew to the rear over the miry roads and telegraph wires and the "Old Doxology" was sung along miles of bristling entrenchments. "Santiago has fallen!" was the pass-word from mouth to mouth between laughing, cheering, singing, and excited veterans, who hugged each other at the prospect of relief. But no sound of applause came from the ominous trenches in front of them or from the picturesque city that lay glowing in the bright sunlight in the valley below.
CHAPTER THE FIFTEENTH.

SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.


1.

On the morning of July 15, the commissioners from each army appointed to draw up and sign the terms of surrender met under a spreading ceiba tree between the lines. For the Americans came General Joseph Wheeler, General H. W. Lawton, and Lieutenant Miley of Shafter's staff. For the Spaniards came Colonel Fontaine, chief of Toral's staff, General Escariel, and Mr. Robert Mason, British Vice-Consul. They met shortly before noon and our commissioners were courteously invited to enter the city and complete the business comfortably. The invitation was as courteously declined.

At the very outset of proceedings a misunderstanding arose, through the presentation of a letter from Toral, which General Shafter had referred to our commissioners, with instructions to reject its proposition as to the disposition of arms. The copy here given is a literal translation and is a curiosity:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 15.

To Excellency, Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces:—

Excellent Sir: — I am now authorized by my Government to capitulate. I have the honor to so advise you, requesting you designate hour and place where my representatives should appear to confer with those of your Excellency to effect the articles of capitulation on the basis of what has been agreed upon to this date. In due time I wish to manifest to your Excellency my desire to know the resolution of the
United States Government respecting the return of arms, so as to note on the capitulation; also the great courtesy and gentlemanly deportment of your Great Grace's Representatives, and return for their generous and noble impulse, for the Spanish soldiers will allow them to return to the Peninsular with the arms that the American army do them the honor to acknowledge as dutifully descended.

José Toral,
Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Army Corps.

The misunderstanding, it was thought, was due to a failure of exact interpretation on the previous day. At that time the interpreter, translating the language of General Toral, had given Generals Shafter and Miles distinctly to understand that Captain-General Blanco had consented that the commissioners should have plenary powers to negotiate the terms of surrender, such terms as agreed upon to be binding upon both parties. Something had been said about a notification to the Madrid Government, but General Shafter insisted that the capitulation had actually been agreed upon, and that no further consent of the Madrid Government was required.

The Spanish commissioners combatted vigorously the assumption that Toral had already capitulated. The consent of Madrid, they insisted, was still necessary: but at the same time they declared decisively that it would be forthcoming, as Captain-General Blanco had authorized it and the home government would also approve. General Toral, who was personally present and who directed the negotiations on his own behalf, said he had never been overruled by the Captain-General. Still, he added, until Madrid had sanctioned it Santiago had not capitulated.

All this was extremely unsatisfactory to our commissioners, who clung tenaciously to the understanding General Shafter had received. Leaving the question still open, the commissioners proceeded to consider the preliminaries. Lieutenant Miley had drawn up thirteen articles of a general nature and these were submitted to General Toral personally, who made a strong appeal that the word "capitulation" be used instead of the term "surrender," and that his army be allowed to march out, the officers with their side arms and the men with their small arms. He said the arms could afterward be sent to Spain, either in the same ships with the troops or on some other ships. General Toral further remarked
that he expected that our commissioners, as representatives of a brave
and a chivalrous people, would not seek to humiliate his army or make
it appear that he was vanquished. As brave men, his soldiers desired to
go home with honor. They had simply yielded to superior force, and
they would prefer dying to going home without their honor.

The Americans expressed sympathy at this appeal but declared
it was beyond their power to change the terms as understood and
approved by the President. They could only agree to recommend
such changes in detail to the President, at Washington, who alone
had the power to approve.

At two o'clock General Toral retired to Santiago to confer with
General Linares and returned shortly with suggestions of further change
in details. He proposed an adjournment until next morning to con-
tinue the negotiations. General Wheeler, who had taken the lead
in the discussion for the United States, emphatically declined to wait,
and insisted that terms must be settled before the day closed. There-
upon a recess was taken until four o'clock, when a few alterations of
verbiage were agreed to, for the purpose of softening expression with-
out changing the meaning.

After each commissioner had been asked in turn if the agreement
was complete and satisfactorily understood, General Wheeler suddenly
requested them all to sign. It was a test of Spanish nature. The
enemy's commissioners had agreed to the articles, but they were plainly
surprised at the request to complete it by their signatures. There was
no excuse, however, and, with much reluctance, they signed the two
copies, and the boards separated to meet the next morning at 9:30
o'clock. In the meantime each side was to report the terms to its
own government.

Saturday morning Toral received approval of the terms from his
superior officer. The Washington Government, however, would not
approve the recommendation of its commissioners to consent to return
the arms of the Spanish troops. Shafter had been particularly in-
structed not to so agree, and the commissioners had been directed by
Shafter to the same purport. But the commissioners, after avowing
their inability to concede the demand, had consented to recommend it as a matter of form, to hasten the conclusion. The President was determined to retain the Spanish rifles and ammunition and declined the recommendation.

The articles of surrender that were signed may be thus summarized:

The first declares that all hostilities shall cease pending the agreement of final capitulation.
Second—That the capitulation includes all the Spanish forces and the surrender of all war material within the prescribed limits.
Third—The transportation of the troops to Spain at the earliest possible moment, each force to be embarked at the nearest port.
Fourth—That the Spanish officers shall retain their side arms and the enlisted men their personal property.
Fifth—That after the final capitulation the Spanish forces shall assist in the removal of all obstructions to navigation in Santiago harbor.
Sixth—That after the final capitulation the commanding officers shall furnish a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war and a roster of all the soldiers in the district.
Seventh—That the Spanish General shall be permitted to take the military archives and records with him.
Eighth—That all guerillas and Spanish irregulars shall be permitted to remain in Cuba if they so elect, giving a parole that they will not again take up arms against the United States unless properly exchanged.
Ninth—That the Spanish forces shall be permitted to march out with all the honors of war, depositing their arms to be disposed of by the United States in the future, the American commissioners to recommend to their Government that the arms of the soldiers be returned to those “who so bravely defended them.”

The territory surrendered was in extent somewhat more than a third of the province of Santiago, including the military jurisdiction of the Fourth Corps of the Spanish army. It did not embrace the important towns of Manzanillo and Holguin, where there were many Spanish troops, nor the 6,000 men of General Pando's corps, that had left Manzanillo to succor Santiago, but failed to reach their destination. The western boundary of the territory surrendered begins at Aserradero, a town near the coast, west of Santiago, thence to the town of Palma, a little east of north of Aserradero, and about
twenty-two miles distant, thence northeast to Sagua de Tanamo, on the north coast, a town at the head of the Surgedero, or anchorage of that name, and almost directly north of Guantanamo. It includes an area of 8,000 square miles.

The number of soldiers surrendered as prisoners of war was estimated to be about 20,000, but when the muster rolls were made up there were 22,789 in and about Santiago, and between 1,000 and

2,000 additional troops were reported to be scattered through the zone of surrender—a total of about 25,000 men, mostly in well-fortified places, protected by all the resources of the country, wholly surrendered to an attacking army of 22,250 men, only 16,000 of whom were effective when the surrender occurred. Within three days the Spaniards had turned over 7,000 Mauser rifles and 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition.
SUNDAY morning, July 17, the eleventh Sunday after Manila, the second Sunday after Cervera's annihilation, and the second Sunday after the first demand for the surrender of the city, the United States troops marched into Santiago to take possession. All Saturday swarms of refugees had tramped wearily over the roads returning to the city, many to find their homes despoiled, all to find hunger awaiting them.

It was shortly before nine o'clock Sunday morning, when, pursuant to the program arranged, General Shafter, accompanied by Generals Wheeler, Lawton, Kent, Ludlow, and Ames, with eighty other officers, marched out of the American lines down the hill to the tree under which the negotiations for surrender had been conducted. The moment they halted under the tree every cannon on the hillsides, within the city, at Siboney, and at Aguadores, boomed the national salute of twenty-one guns that filled the echoing valleys with the magnificent thunder of victory and called 60,000 people to attention.

From one end to the other of the eight miles of American intrenchments, our troops, standing on the sand bags, waved their hats aloft and raised cheer upon cheer of rejoicing.

A troop of colored cavalry and the Twenty-fifth Colored Infantry immediately started forward to join General Shafter and his officers.

A few moments later General Toral, in resplendent uniform, at the head of two hundred of his officers in full-dress uniform, left the gate of the city and marched to the tree, preceded by trumpeters. There was a salute of bugles on both sides, after which General Shafter and General Toral saluted each other formally and the officers on both sides exchanged courtesies and introductions.

When these ceremonies were concluded, the two commanding Generals met in front of the lines. General Toral spoke in Spanish, his voice trembling with feeling as he concluded:

"General," said he, "I am forced by my fate to surrender to the possession of the American army and to you the city and the strong-
holds of Santiago. I am now ready to do so formally and honorably as agreed.”

As he finished the Spanish officers brought their swords to "present arms."

“I receive the city,” replied General Shafter, briefly but courteously, “in the name of the Government of the United States of America!”

The two Generals saluted, after which General Toral turned and, addressing an order to his officers, they wheeled about and, with swords still presented, marched toward the city followed by the American officers and the troop of cavalry. As the procession entered the city, tremendous cheers broke out again from along the American lines.

Inside the walls Spanish troops met the official body and escorted it to the Plaza de Armas, in front of the Governor’s palace, opposite which stands the Cathedral. The square was filled with people. The soldiers drew up in line and General Toral was courteously authorized to salute his flag. This was done amid silence by firing twenty-one guns, after which the Spanish flag was hauled down from the staff over the portico, upon the front of which stood in black letters, formed of gas-pipe for illumination at night, the words:—

“VIVA DON ALFONSO XIII.”

General Shafter then formally presented to General Toral the sword and spurs of General Vara del Rey, who had been killed at El Caney. His body had been identified and given respectful burial by the United States troops. General Shafter had ordered his sword and spurs preserved to be returned to General del Rey’s family. He placed them in General Toral’s hands for that purpose. This considerate act made a deep impression upon the emotional Spaniards.

The Spanish troops were marched to the arsenal and surrendered their arms, after which, accompanied by the Americans, they were marched out, 7,600 strong, a weary, haggard, disheartened body, to a camp provided for them near the city.

The Americans returned to Santiago at once, accompanied by the Ninth Infantry Regulars, who were drawn up in the Plaza.
The American officers were then invited to the palace, where they were introduced to all the civil officials, the Governor, the Mayor, the Intendant of Police, and others. The Archbishop of Santiago, Fray José de Sturrs de Isainz y Crespo, the highest ecclesiastical dignitary of Cuba, accompanied by his chief prelates, came in a body and paid their respects to the conquerors. Luncheon was served and a short rest taken.

A few minutes before twelve o'clock, the Americans and their entertainers left the palace and walked into the Plaza. Lieutenant Miley had ascended to the roof of the palace with a great new silken flag of the United States. Just as the clock was striking twelve, Lieutenant Miley, Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., and Captain McKittrick bent the flag to the halyards, ran it to the top of the staff and broke its glorious folds wide open upon a strong southwestern breeze.

Every building facing the Plaza was crowded with persons and the little park itself was filled to suffocation with eager and curious humanity. As the flag unrolled its stars and stripes upon the breeze all heads were uncovered, and the soldiers presented arms. As the last stroke of the hour tolled out, the Ninth Regimental Band played "The Star Spangled Banner," which was followed by cheers from the soldiers. They were joined by more than half of the people, who cried "Viva los Americanos." The crowd was composed of miserable and half-starved creatures whose appearance told plainly the sufferings they had undergone since the siege began. They all seemed grateful that the Americans were in possession of the city, evidently believing the days of hunger and misery were over.

The Spanish officers and members of the San Carlos Club, who had been applauding "The Star Spangled Banner," and demanding its repetition by the orchestra at the clubhouse, were much astonished to hear our band playing it as the National Hymn of the United States. They looked at each other guiltily, then smiled, and finally told the story with laughter.

As the American flag floated over the city, Captain Capron's battery, at the right center of the American line, fired a national salute.
And as the guns thundered, all the 20,000 men, from the Third Regiment on the left of the line, to the Eighth Regiment far off on El Cobre road on the right, shouted, cheered, and threw their hats into the air. Following the salvos of cheering, one got an idea of how completely Santiago and the Spanish army were hemmed in. Our soldiers stood on the crest of the trenches, which they had won at the cost of so many lives, as far as the eye could reach.

To these ceremonies succeeded fraternization over the trenches between men of the opposing lines. Our soldiers had been forbidden to cross trenches or to enter the city, for fear of infection, but the Spaniards went forward from their near camp to the edge of the American trenches, shook hands with their captors, expressing admiration and respect for those with whom they had so desperately fought.* It was a curious spectacle. Each Spaniard had a bottle of rum or wine in his haversack, and these were offered to the Americans to drink "good health." In return our soldiers gave their recent antagonists "hardtack," which was received with gladness.

*An incident that stands alone in the history of wars, occurred upon the sailing of the Spanish prisoners for their homes in Spain. A Spanish private soldier, Pedro Lopez de Castillo, authorized by a plebiscite taken of his 11,000 fellow-prisoners, sent through his officers the following address to the American army from the vanquished side:

Major-General Shafter, Commanding the American Army in Cuba:—

Sir: The Spanish soldiers who capitulated in this place on the 16th of July last, recognizing your high and just position, pray that through you all the courageous and noble soldiers under your command may receive our good wishes and farewell, which we send them on embarking for our beloved Spain. For this favor, which we have no doubt you will grant, you will gain the everlasting gratitude and consideration of 11,000 Spanish soldiers, who are your most humble servants.

(Signed.) Pedro Lopez de Castillo,
Private of Infantry.

The letter addressed to the soldiers of the American army was as follows:—

Soldiers of the American Army:—We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-born men, in whose breasts there live gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending to you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor, and with all our strength, endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been vanquished by you (so our Generals and Chiefs judged in signing the capitulation), but our surrender and the bloody battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for resentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in compliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the power of our
That afternoon 90,000 pounds of rations were served to the Spanish prisoners from our commissariat. These soldiers cared nothing for the loss of Cuba, and were overjoyed at the thought of returning home. They had received no pay for nearly a year, had been poorly fed, and were discouraged.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Marble of the navy, in command of steam launches, had entered the harbor in the morning, by permission of Admiral Sampson. The Spanish gunboat Alvarado, was surrendered to him, and he took possession of other vessels in the harbor that had been used for troop ships. Spanish officers accompanied him to explode or remove the submarine mines in the bay, a task accomplished in time to permit the Red Cross relief boat, State of Texas, to enter at 5 P. M.

From the Spanish officers was heard again almost incredible statements of the dense ignorance in which the home government had kept its most trusted officers of the events of the war. Admiral Cer- vera and his captains had not learned of the annihilation of Montejo's respective States. You fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage, as before stated, a quality which we had not met during the three years we have carried on this war against a people without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but hidden, shot their noble victims from ambush, and then immediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land.

You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of the world, have given honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished, have cared for your wounded with great humanity, have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort, and lastly, to us, whose condition was terrible, you have given freely of food, of your stock of medicines, and you have honored us with distinguished courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony.

With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains but to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in this land which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours, who have conquered it by force and watered it with your blood, as your conscience called for, under the demand of civilization and humanity, but the descendants of the Congo and of Guinea, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers, these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized communities.

From 11,000 Spanish soldiers.

[Signed.] PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO.
Soldier of Infantry.

Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898.
fleet at Manila and the capture of Cavite until they became prisoners on our ships. In Santiago the Spanish officers and troops were officially informed from Madrid that Admiral Montejo had won a glorious victory over Dewey. No other information had been permitted to reach their army and navy. They admitted that if they had known the facts they would not have fought. At Santiago they had been informed that Camara’s fleet was coming to Cervera’s aid, as at Manila Augusti had been informed that Cervera had destroyed Sampson’s fleet, was ravaging the American coasts, and that Camara was hastening to the relief of Manila. For three months the edifice of colonial resistance had been supported by a scaffolding of ingenious and absolute falsehood.*

Upon examining the harbor forts, Morro, Socapa, and Estrella, they were found to be knocked to pieces and of no strength. Modern guns from the Reina Mercedes, some old eighteenth-century cannon, rapid-fire, and Gatlings were half in place, half knocked over. The harbor entrance could have been passed by our ships, but the mines were the defenses that made the task dangerous.

In the city our Generals were astonished at the ingenuity of the military fortifications and barricades erected to resist assault. General Wheeler after examining them admitted that the army could have forced its way through, but that it would have cost great loss of life to the Americans.

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*General Shafter, writing under date of August 17, of the expedition of Major Miley to Baracoa and Sagua de Tonamo to receive the surrender of 7,756 officers and men, says: —

"These troops knew nothing whatever of the destruction of Cervera’s fleet, the fall of Santiago, or any later events. They accepted the situation, however, and appeared to be glad at the opportunity of getting home. Major Miley says that on the door of the commanding officer was posted a bulletin purporting to be a telegram from the naval commander at Manila, informing Sagasta of his great victory over Dewey at Manila, and Sagasta’s thanks to him for the same."
paper money was demonstrated. For two weeks citizens of the highest standing and means had been forced to live upon rice, tough meat, and occasionally poor vegetables. Horses killed in battle were turned over to the butchers for the soldiers.

It was a dreadful condition to face both inside and outside the city. The camps of the prisoners were sure to become a threatening source of disease and infection. The most strenuous efforts of the military executive and the noble labors of the Red Cross Society were necessary to mitigate the sufferings, which could not be fully relieved. The helpless populace, the prisoners, our own army in the mountains, the thousands of sick and wounded at Santiago, El Caney, Siboney, and Baiquiri, must be handled under circumstances difficult enough to dismay the stoutest heart and will.

This was not all. Business destroyed by the siege must be reestablished, commerce must be reopened with all its tedious regulations under the new attitude of the province toward our government. Order must be maintained, jealousies soothed, appeals heard, and over all must be held an iron hand to establish the unquestioned authority of the United States in all questions of public and private rights.

The President at once transmitted by cable to General Shafter a proclamation to be published, declaring the intentions of the United States towards the territory under temporary control of the United States. It guaranteed to the people security of their persons and property in all their private rights and relations, without regard to party, faction, birth or religion. The municipal laws already in force were to be continued until suspended or superseded by others. The courts were to continue their functions under the judges occupying their seats if they accepted the supremacy of the United States. Such judges would administer justice under the law of land as between man and man, under the supervision of the United States Military Governor, who was empowered to establish new courts of common justice if the sitting judges failed to recognize the new authority. All public property, railways, telegraphs, schools, churches, homes of art and science, monuments and archives were to be guarded and
protected; none must be destroyed except as an urgent military necessity. Private property was to be carefully protected in every case and, if its seizure should prove necessary for military purposes, must be paid for in cash at a fair valuation. The revenues payable formerly to Spain were to be collected for the United States. All ports in the surrendered territory were to be opened free to the commerce of neutral nations upon the payment of duties in force at the time of importation.*

*The President's proclamation is a historical paper of great interest. It is the first State paper ever issued from this government containing authorization and instruction for the government of captured foreign territory, and also a proclamation to the people of the territory of the intentions of the government regarding them and their interests. The full text of the document is as follows:—

Ad joint General's Office,
Washington, July 18, 1898.

General Shafer, Santiago, Cuba:—

The following is sent to you for your information and guidance. It will be published in such manner in both English and Spanish as will give it the widest circulation in the territory under your control:—

Executive Mansion,
Washington, July 18, 1898.

To the Secretary of War:—

Sir: The capitulation of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern part of the province of Santiago, and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States, render it necessary to instruct the military commander of the United States as to the conduct which he is to observe during the military occupation.

The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property, and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the inhabitants of Cuba should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. It will, therefore, be the duty of the commander of the army of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not to make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible.

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerents, and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before
The conditions prevailing in and around Santiago were crushing in their immediate demands. The prevalence of rains, the precipitate advance of the army from the coast, the length of the lines, and their thinness, had disorganized and demoralized the supply trains, and in

the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.

The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the supremacy of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land, as between man and man, under the supervision of the American Commander-in-Chief.

The native constabulary will, so far as may be practicable, be preserved. The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it is necessary to do so.

While the rule of conduct of the American Commander-in-Chief will be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind, if, unfortunately, the course of the people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or to create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his experience, and a high sense of justice.

One of the most important and most practical problems with which it will be necessary to deal is that of the treatment of property and the collection and administration of the revenues. It is conceded that all public funds and securities belonging to the government of the country in its own right, and all arms and supplies and other movable property of such government may be seized by the military occupant and converted to his own use. The real property of the State he may hold and administer, at the same time enjoying the revenues thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military necessity.

All public means of transportation, such as telegraph lines, cables, railways, and boats belonging to the State may be appropriated to his use, but, unless in case of military necessity, they are not to be destroyed. All churches and buildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all schoolhouses, are, so far as possible, to be protected, and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of historical monuments or archives, or of works of science or art is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity.

Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected, and can be confiscated only as hereafter indicated. Means of transportation, such as telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats may, although they belong to private individuals or corporations, be seized by the military occupant, but unless destroyed under military necessity are not to be retained.

While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions upon the enemy in their seaports, towns or provinces which may be in his military possession by conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the expenses of the war, this right is to be exercised within such limitations that it may not savor of confiscation.

As the result of military occupation the taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former government become payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to
the immensity of casualties, sickness, and suffering the medical and surgical corps, though it labored with unspiring devotion, was wholly inadequate to the task confronting it.

The army was cheered up by immediate acknowledgment of its great triumph. After the flag had been raised in Santiago at noon, General Shafter received and had read to the troops present the following telegram from President McKinley:

"The President of the United States sends to you and your brave army the profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops and territory under General Toral.

"Your splendid command has endured not only the hardships and sacrifices incident to campaign and battle, but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed the most conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation.

"The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them."

The message was transmitted by the Secretary of War, who sent with it a telegram of congratulation.

To the President General Shafter replied:

"I thank you and my army thanks you for your congratulatory telegram of to-day. I am proud to say every one in it performed his duty gallantly. Your message will be read to every regiment in the army at noon to-morrow."

Major-General William R. Shafter of the Fifth Army Corps, who was in command of the forces at Santiago, was born in 1835 on a farm
near Galesburg, Michigan. He was, therefore, sixty-three years old when, at the head of the army of invincibles, he invaded Cuba. He weighed three hundred pounds when he set out and lost fifty pounds during the campaign of thirty days. General Shafter's history is characteristic of American life and opportunity. He was reared as a plain farmer's boy, doing hard work in the field and getting such schooling as he could obtain between crops and through the hard winters. His youth was one of plain living, hard work, modest ambition. When he was grown he became teacher of the county school, and there Lincoln's first call for volunteers found him in 1860, being then twenty-five years old.

He quitted his occupations and ambitions, went into town, raised a company of volunteers for the Seventh Michigan Regiment, and was commissioned First-Lieutenant. His record in the Civil War was a fine one. He was brevetted Brigadier-General, for "most distinguished gallantry in action at Malvern Hill, Virginia, August 6, 1862, while serving as First-Lieutenant, Company I, Seventh Michigan Infantry, in command of prisoners, voluntarily taking an active part in that battle and remaining on the field, although wounded, until the close of the engagement." At Fair Oaks, before, he had been brevetted Colonel for gallant conduct. In 1864, he organized the Sixteenth Regiment of colored troops and in the battle of Nashville led them with marked success. At Fair Oaks, General Shafter was badly wounded, but he could not be persuaded to leave the field until the battle was over. He then went back to the hospital tent for treatment. Shortly after the battle he was promoted to be Major of the Nineteenth Michigan Regiment, and in a few months he was made Lieutenant-Colonel. In 1866, he was mustered out of the volunteer service, and then began a struggle to determine what he should do. He had become a thorough, well-disciplined soldier, and dreaded farm life. After long consideration he entered the regular army. He was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of the Forty-first United States Infantry. After the consolidation of regiments in 1879, he was promoted to be Colonel of the First United States Infantry. He obtained his star as Brigadier-General in 1897.
With the development of plans for the invasion of Cuba the President and Secretary of War began to seek for suitable leaders. Prominent among them was General Shafter. President McKinley made him a Major-General, and he was assigned to command the troops in the Santiago campaign.

General Shafter's thirty years of service on the frontier distinguished him as a splendid soldier, an aggressive and daring fighter of Indians, and a popular officer and gentleman. He was a firm but practical disciplinarian, caring little for the niceties of form but demanding faithful performance of the spirit of discipline. He was full of geniality and humor and subject to quick changes of temper. But he was just to his men, who stood in awe of him and who loved to follow him in danger, where he was at his best. Personally a man of conspicuous bravery, he was very active and liked hard work. His great bulk was never in his way until the terrible climate about Santiago struck him down. But illness did not make him cease his purpose with the army. There is no successful general who can escape criticism, but it must be admitted that the obstacles to be overcome at Santiago were so enormous that, while they will increase the criticism, they will increase in a corresponding degree his distinguished success in the campaign. It was characteristic of the man, blunt, unaffected, violent in language, brusque in manner at times, that he wrote this in a letter home from the front at Santiago: "It is to the gallant soldiers who uncomplainingly bore every privation that the country is indebted for its victory."

Major-General Joseph Wheeler, of the Cavalry Corps, cooperating with General Shafter, second in command, was a distinguished leader of cavalry in the Confederate army during the Civil War. He was born in Alabama in 1836 and was, therefore, a year younger than Shafter. He weighed nearly two hundred pounds less. He was admitted to West Point Academy in 1854, when eighteen years old, and graduated to enter the regular army as Second-Lieutenant in a regiment of mounted riflemen at Fort Fillmore, on the Rio Grande.
He resigned his commission April 22, 1861, to enter the service of the Confederacy. He was attached to General L. P. Walker's staff with the rank of Colonel; but after a short service on the staff, he went back to Alabama and raised a regiment. When it was proposed to make him a Brigadier-General in the Confederate army, objection was offered on account of his youth, but the objection was overcome, and the wisdom of the appointment was justified by his results.

He became a daring and skillful commander of cavalry, dividing with General Forrest the honors of that arm of the service on his side.

Since his disabilities were removed after the close of the Civil War, General Wheeler has been continuously in Congress from the Eighth Alabama district. He left his seat to accept a commission as Major-General of Cavalry in the war with Spain. In his absence the Governor of Alabama, acting upon the rule prohibiting any member of Congress from holding employment under the government, declared his seat vacant, and ordered an election to be held to fill the vacancy. General Wheeler's constituents met in convention and promptly nominated him to fill the vacancy by unanimous action.

He has been an interesting, active, and respected Congressman. He is but five feet two inches tall and weighs one hundred and ten pounds. His nervous vitality and physical restlessness made him a marked personage. One of the characteristic stories of this peculiarity is told of the Honorable Thomas B. Reed, then Speaker of the House, who cherished high respect for General Wheeler's unswerving integrity of character and firmness of purpose. After the death of an old member of the House, a group was discussing those left alive. General Wheeler was present, an old member, and one of the group observing him, remarked, "Well, we have General Wheeler left." "Yes," remarked the Speaker quickly, "the Almighty has never been able to find the General long enough in one place to lay His finger upon him." Nobody enjoyed the epigrammatic comment more than the subject of it. He was one of the strongest men of the Ways and Means Committee. When asked by Mr. Dingley if he would like to
go to Manila as Military Governor, he replied that he wanted to go to Cuba, where he could more readily help to bring things to a close. He had been a student of the operations of the Cuban insurgents. At sixty-two General Wheeler displayed at Santiago the same indomitable spirit that distinguished him thirty-three years ago. He left his sick bed and went on horseback to the front of the line all day at San Juan, and, though burning with fever after twelve hours of fierce battle and exposure, interposed before discouraged officers who were suggesting retirement from the positions already won and that could only be held by unflinching bravery, and indignantly refused to hear of retreating one foot. He warned General Shafter against the proposal and by his splendid and fearless courage of heart and determination turned the disheartened ones the other way about, by infusing his own tenacity of purpose into them.

At San Juan, during the hottest fighting, it is told that General Wheeler forgot his whereabouts on the calendar of time for a moment and, as the enemy showed signs of weakening, cried out impulsively to his troops:—

"Give those Yankees h---ll now, boys!"

His aides and those standing near, burst into laughter and told him what he had said.

"Oh, well," he explained with a smile of deprecation, "I just forgot a moment—but you all know I meant the Spanish. I'm a Yankee myself, now, wearing the uniform and following the old flag of the country where Yankee and Dixie are the same words to the whole land."

No soldier earned more distinction than General Wheeler.
CHAPTER THE SIXTEENTH.

GARCIA'S DISAFFECTION AND MANZANILLO.


I.

Political misunderstandings with the armed Cuban forces began with the surrender of Santiago, and added for the moment to the difficulties of the situation. It was particularly noticed on the day of occupation that no Cuban flags were raised in the city. A party of Cubans mounted the hill of the Morro at the harbor entrance on Sunday morning and displayed a Cuban flag on the staff over the walls, but Admiral Sampson ordered it down at once by signal to his shore forces. The only Cubans accompanying General Shafter into the city to take possession were General Joaquin Castillo and an aide on his staff. They went as personal guests of the American General, and did not take official part in the ceremonies.

General Calixto Garcia, commanding the Cuban allies in the department of Eastern Cuba, had been engaged in all the operations around Santiago from the landing of the United States troops to the surrender. He had arrived at Aserradero on June 14 in response to a communication from General Miles to place himself under the orders of the American commander for full cooperation, having about 4,000 troops under his authority. They were poorly clothed, and when some of them reached the American fleet and camps, were so nearly starved that a number died in a few hours, after voracious
eating. As rapidly as possible they were supplied with clothing, equipments, food, and then assigned to positions in the United States line under command of their own officers. They were principally used for scouting and advance skirmishers, because they were familiar with the country and the Spanish methods of fighting.

General Garcia took part in important conferences and movements before and during the investment of the city. His troops fraternized with the Americans in good spirit at first, but complaints arose. There can be no doubt that the ragged and unfortunate insurgents were wholly undisciplined according to our ideas. They had been fighting for three years after guerilla tactics, and had no training in the business of proceeding by regular formation and with cool determination to assault. The overwhelming numbers of the United States troops and the display of power and preparation in ships, munitions, and supplies, doubtless served also to make these half-starved bush-rangers feel some discouragement between foes and allies each so much greater in strength. They could not speak English, which gave room for much misunderstanding. They were not gluttonous for the hard and exhausting labor of building roads and fortifications. They had never needed either, flying light in their campaigns through jungles, having no supply trains to provide for, each man carrying his all on his horse or in his haversack.

That the Cubans rendered valuable services during the Santiago campaign, there is little doubt. General Wheeler said that while they were wholly undisciplined according to our standard, they had in no instance, to his knowledge, refused to obey any order or respond to any request made upon them. On the contrary, they seemed anxious to do everything in their power, and where there were miscarriages, they were probably due to lack of understanding of our language and inability to comprehend just what was wanted. At El Pozo, one of the points in the Santiago battle, where three hundred of the Cubans fought, forty-seven of their number were killed and wounded, or more than fifteen per cent., as high a percentage of casualties as any other organization could show.
When Santiago was evacuated by the 20,000 non-combatants, and capture or surrender was inevitable, the Cuban patriots were expectant of the immediate triumph of their cause under the guarantee of the United States that this Government intended only to extinguish Spanish sovereignty on the island and establish the independence of the people of Cuba. A plebiscite was taken quietly among the non-combatants and Cuban troops, which resulted in the selection of General Demetrius Castillo for Military Governor of Santiago when the city should be taken. Accordingly, the name of General Castillo was recommended to General Garcia by the leaders, and in a conference the recommendation was laid before General Shafter. The Cuban leaders maintained that at the first conference between Garcia, Sampson, and Shafter at Aserradero, Shafter had promised to turn Santiago over to Garcia’s occupation as soon as it was surrendered. *

If such a promise was actually made it was singularly unwise and, under the light of conditions that prevailed at the time of the surrender, General Shafter could not, under the President’s instructions, or in good common reason, place the city under control of insurgent authorities. At that time it was an imperative necessity that the 40,000 occupants of the city should feel the strong arm of United States authority for the prevention of panic and disorder. The recommendation of General Demetrius Castillo for Governor was therefore rejected by General Shafter, who explained that the capitulation was to the United States forces and that it was his intention to continue the autonomist officials in place until further orders from the President.

Upon this General Garcia declined to enter Santiago on the day of surrender or while it was administered by officials that had received their commissions from the Spanish Government.

When, therefore, orders were issued that no Cuban or American troops should enter Santiago for occupation, except those needed to maintain order, and that no Cuban flag should be raised in the city, General Garcia and his staff held aloof from all participation and

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withdrew to a distance for consultation. A few days afterward Garcia sent to Shafter a letter containing a statement of his intention to withdraw from the campaign and his reasons therefor. He said:

"I have done my best, sir, to fulfill the wishes of my Government, and I have been until now one of your most faithful subordinates, honoring myself in carrying out your orders and instructions as far as my powers have allowed me to do it.

"The city of Santiago surrendered to the American army, and news of that important event was given to me by persons entirely foreign to your staff. I have not been honored with a single word from yourself informing me about the negotiations for peace or the terms of the capitulation by the Spaniards. The important ceremony of the surrender of the Spanish army and the taking possession of the city by yourself took place later on, and I only knew of both events by public reports.

"I was neither honored, sir, with a kind word from you inviting myself or any officer of my staff to represent the Cuban army on that memorable occasion.

"Finally, I know that you have left in power at Santiago the same Spanish authorities that for three years I have fought as enemies of the independence of Cuba. I beg to say that these authorities have never been elected at Santiago by the residents of the city, but were appointed by royal decree of the Queen of Spain.

"I would agree, sir, that the army under your command should have taken possession of the city, the garrison, and the forts. I would give my warm cooperation to any measure you may have deemed best under American military law to hold the city for your army and to preserve public order until the time comes to fulfill the solemn pledge of the people of the United States to establish in Cuba a free and independent government. But when the question arises of appointing authorities in Santiago de Cuba, under the peculiar circumstances of our thirty years' strife against the Spanish rule, I cannot see but with the deepest regret that such authorities are not elected by the Cuban people, but are the same ones selected by the Queen of Spain, and, hence, are ministers to defend against the Cubans the Spanish sovereignty.

"A rumor, too absurd to be believed, General, ascribes the reason of your measures and of the orders forbidding my army to enter Santiago to fear of massacres and revenge against the Spaniards. Allow me, sir, to protest against even the shadow of such an idea. We are not savages ignoring the rules of civilized warfare. We are a poor, ragged army, as ragged and as poor as was the army of your forefathers in their noble war for independence, but, as did the heroes of Saratoga and Yorktown, we respect too deeply our cause to disgrace it with barbarism and cowardice.

"In view of all these reasons I sincerely regret to be unable to fulfill any longer the orders of my Government, and therefore I have tendered to-day to the Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban army, Major-General Maximo Gomez, my resignation as commander of this section of our army.

"Awaiting his resolution, I withdraw my forces to the interior."
The letter was transmitted to Washington, by General Shafter and it was accompanied, according to reports from the War Department, with comments disparaging to the Cuban troops. He held Garcia’s troops responsible for the safe arrival in Santiago before the surrender of General Nario’s regiment of Spanish regulars. He sent the following reply to General Garcia:

"I must say that I was very much surprised at the receipt of your letter this morning, and regret exceedingly that you should regard yourself as in any way slighted or aggrieved.

"You will remember the fact that I invited you to accompany me into the town of Santiago to witness the surrender, which you declined.

"This war, as you know, is between the United States and Spain, and it is out of the question for me to take any action in regard to your forces in connection with the surrender, which was made solely to the American army.

"The policy of my Government in continuing in power temporarily the persons occupying the offices is one which I am, of course, unable to discuss. To show you the views held by my Government, I inclose a copy of the instructions received by me yesterday from the President, which appear to cover everything that can possibly arise in the government of this territory while it is held by the United States.

"Full credit has been given to you and your valiant men in my report to my Government, and I wish to acknowledge to you the great and valuable assistance you rendered during the campaign.

"I regret very much to know of your determination to withdraw yourself from this vicinity."

As has been said before, Shafter’s action in refusing to permit authority to the Cubans to any extent was entirely proper and necessary, but it is evident after reading the two letters that he had lacked in tact and in proper consideration of the delicate position of those despairing and long-hoping patriots, whose impulsive nature would have responded to kindly candor.

This is not pointed out to criticize General Shafter’s conduct of the war. It is always easy to point out mistakes after the fact, but in haste, difficulties, and confusion, action must be taken without delay and in the temper of the moment. General Shafter was in bad physical condition, he was harassed with manifold duties, and was, moreover, a man of brusque and quick temper.
The errors of detail in all great emergencies are many and are of no importance if they do not affect the result of the central purpose. In this instance the disaffection of the Cuban leader caused the Washington administration some uneasiness.

There had been many disparaging criticisms of the Cubans made by some of our officers. It had been suggested that no more supplies or arms be furnished to them. Washington authorities, however, were favorably impressed by General Garcia's protest, and the Cabinet decided not to cease its efforts to retain the cooperation of the allies.

Immediately after sending his protest, Garcia sent a courier to General Maximo Gomez of the Cuban forces with his resignation, and withdrew with his troops toward Jiguani, fifty miles northwest of Santiago.

The influence and extent of the feeling aroused by this incident could not be estimated at the time it occurred, but it was unfortunate.*

II.

The fall of Santiago was followed in two days by another naval victory at Manzanillo, not less complete than those at Manila and Santiago, but involving fewer and smaller ships and lacking, therefore, that factor of peril upon a vast scale which invests battle with magnificence and dramatic display. The United States war ships on blockade duty before Manzanillo on the east side of the Gulf of Guacanayabo, about one hundred

*In one paragraph of his report on the Santiago campaign Inspector-General Breckinridge speaks of the Cuban allies in these words: "In the beginning the Cuban soldiers were used largely as outposts on our front and flanks. There has been a great deal of discussion among the officers of this expedition concerning the Cuban soldiers and the aid they have rendered. They seem to have very little organization or discipline, and they do not, of course, fight in the battle line with our troops. Yet in every skirmish or fight where they were present they seemed to have a fair proportion of killed and wounded. They were of undoubted assistance in our first landing and in scouting our front and flanks. It is not safe, however, to rely upon their fully performing any specific duty, according to our expectation and understanding, unless they are under the constant supervision and direction of one of our own officers, as our movements and views are so different and a misunderstanding or failure so easy."
miles west of Santiago, were the Wilmington, Helena, Scorpion, Hist, Hornet, Wampatuck, and Osceola. All were auxiliary vessels except the Wilmington, under command of Captain Todd (who had been at Cienfuegos when the Winslow was badly damaged and Ensign Bagley was killed), and the Helena, her twin gunboat. Captain Todd was the ranking officer in command of the Manzanillo flotilla, and by direction of Admiral Sampson he approached the harbor at seven o’clock on Tuesday morning, July 18, for the purpose of destroying the Spanish gunboats and transports contained in the harbor.

At 7:30 o’clock the Wilmington and Helena entered the northern channel toward the city, the Scorpion and Osceola the mid channel, and the Hist, Hornet, and Wampatuck the south channel, the movements of the vessels being so timed as to bring them within effective range of the shipping at about the same moment.

At 7:50 fire was reopened on the shipping, and, after a deliberate fire lasting about two and a half hours, three Spanish transports, La Gloria, José García, and La Purísima Concepción, were burned and destroyed. The pontoon, which was the harbor guard and store ship, probably for ammunition, was burned and blown up. Three gunboats were destroyed. One other was driven ashore and sunk, and a fifth was driven ashore and was believed to be disabled.

The firing was maintained at a range beyond that of the shore artillery. It was continued until, after a gradual closing in, the shore batteries opened fire at a comparatively short range, when one of our ships was recalled, the object of the expedition having been accomplished. No casualties occurred on board any of our vessels. Great care was taken in directing the fire that as little damage as possible should be done to the city itself. The Spanish loss was reported to be nearly a hundred killed. The gunboats destroyed or driven ashore helpless were the Dalgado, Guantánamo, Ostralia, Continola, and Guardian.

If the Manzanillo engagement had occurred at the outset of war, it would have taken a great place in history. It is only smaller in size than the other great engagements and the result was exactly
the same—the enemy’s ships annihilated, not one of our vessels in-
jured, and not an American sailor injured.

The achievements of the navy up to July 19 were extraordinary. The two squadrons under Dewey and Sampson had destroyed, of Spanish war vessels, four armored cruisers, three torpedo boats, seventeen unprotected cruisers and gunboats, and four transports, and had captured nearly thirty merchant prizes of considerable value. Our only loss was the damaged Winslow, six men killed, and seven men wounded. The Spaniards had lost about twelve hundred killed, six hundred wounded, and two thousand prisoners.

Commander Todd’s triumph at Manzanillo was in keeping with the glory of this unparalleled naval record.
CHAPTER THE SEVENTEENTH.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FALL OF SANTIAGO.

EXTRAORDINARY TEST OF THE FIGHTING QUALITIES OF AMERICANS BEFORE THE SURRENDER—
THE ENDURANCE, COURAGE, AND INDIVIDUAL SKILL OF OUR TROOPS AMAZED ALL FOREIGN
MILITARY OBSERVERS—OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY SOME OF THE EXPERTS—THE
STORMING OF SAN JUAN CONSIDERED AN IMPOSSIBILITY IN ADVANCE—
WHAT THE NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS DEMONSTRATED TO THE
WORLD—EFFECT OF THE COMBINED OPERATIONS—
GREATER IN SIGNIFICANCE THAN ANY
BATTLE OF THE CENTURY.

I.

THE land fighting before Santiago was dwarfed by the spectacular

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glory of the naval engagement that followed swiftly upon
its heels. The ocean is the perfect battlefield,

offering no natural advantage to either combat-

ant. On land, the limitless opportunities for defense,

concealment, and surprise require most patient investigation both
of the original plan of a battle and its variations in execution, in
order that the action may be comprehended and explained. All that
is known at first are the general results and the confused mass of
individual experiences and incidents that indicate the fighting temper
of the forces engaged. The fighting before Santiago on July 1 and
2 was without precedent, and was involved in more confusion than
any other modern battle of respectable scale. The destruction of
Cervera’s squadron was achieved amid all the surroundings of a magnifi-
cent theatrical display. Its opening, swift progress, and final tragedy,
possessed a dramatic completeness of effect that could not have been
surpassed if the details had been designed and rehearsed in advance.

Yet, splendid as the achievement was, the heroism displayed by the
soldiers in the obscurity of the inland jungles was of a quality that
equaled the courage and skill by which our ships were brought out
victorious. And, at the moment when the observers of the land battles were preparing to analyze the incidents and construct the great story, the naval engagement intervened and relegated the army's achievements to second place. It was not until two weeks had elapsed and Santiago had surrendered, that the world understood the significance of the American fighting at San Juan and El Caney.

The discovery was momentous. Upon a larger field 16,000 men, against the same odds and with the same determination of unprecedented courage, devoid of any quality of desperation, had repeated the achievement of the 950 at Las Guasimas. As Sampson's fleet demonstrated that Dewey's victory was the fruit of national character and system, and not chance, the forces at San Juan and El Caney enforced with equal thoroughness the lesson of Las Guasimas.

It established the quality of manhood developed by free government, which the monarchical systems had persistently denied. The very blunders of forecast called out triumphantly the individual resource of each soldier, apart from the combination in bodies. It is doubtful if the desperate courage of the Spaniards had been underestimated; but certainly the deadly Cuban climate, with its alternation of burning heat and nightly chill, its drowning tropical rains, the rankness of vegetation, the tangled jungles, and the absence of foundations for road building—certainly, these were all underestimated or not prepared for. Yet, if it had been determined to overcome these obstacles before attacking, the purpose of the government to push the war to a quick conclusion could not have been achieved. Cuba could not have been scientifically invaded and the war ended short of twelve months.

It was thoroughly characteristic of the American idea of "business" that when Shafter perceived the heat and the impending of the rainy season he determined without hesitation to "beat the rains to Santiago," and do the necessary fighting while the health and spirits of the men were good. It cannot be said that the losses in battle were greater because of the impetuous advance. The losses by disease later demonstrated the wisdom of haste.
The three battles on the journey were characteristic of what Europe has sarcastically called "American enterprise." Disregarding tradition and precedent, the army of the United States, provided with no field artillery of sufficient power, plunged into a jungle and marched against a fortified city—leaving all supplies behind, and throwing away, on the march, every pound of clothing and equipment that was not necessary for actual fighting.

The extreme advance guard of 950 cavalrmen, marching and fighting for the first time dismounted, half of them volunteers of two months' training, charged an enemy two or three times greater in numbers, intrenched, provided with artillery, protected by barbed-wire entanglements, in a familiar jungle, and drove him back after an hour's fighting. It was called an "ambush," and at home amateur critics of war attributed the valor of our troops. It was to be discovered later that from Las Guasimas to Santiago the same ambush confronted all our troops.

Halting only to fight, rest, and permit the main body to come up, cut off from provisions and hospital relief, with quarter rations for empty stomachs, the half nude and weary, but determined, army reached the outposts of Santiago and assaulted them with a spirit that would not be denied. The outposts that were to be taken in two days were stormed and captured against overwhelming odds of defense in one day, after ten hours of ceaseless fighting. The night was spent in making intrenchments and resisting attempts at recapture, and the next day in the blazing sunlight, without tents, without food, without relief, they fought the enemy back to his last ditch and held the city.

Of the 15,000 troops engaged, three regiments were volunteers practically useless, not for lack of fighting qualities—the stubborn march disproved that—but because their rifle ammunition carried black powder and the smoke menaced our troops by revealing our position at every discharge. Of the remainder one regiment was of volunteers with smokeless powder ammunition and the remainder regulars, one-third of whose ranks had been recruited within sixty-five days. One-third of that army was practically composed of volunteer recruits.
The military observers present, representing foreign nations, were unanimously of the opinion before the attack on Friday the 1st, that the storming of San Juan and El Caney, without the aid of heavy artillery, was a military feat impossible of accomplishment. The intrenchments of the enemy, his position, his advance defenses, his artillery and numbers, rendered him impregnable against enormous odds. Yet all this was swept away by infantry alone, by troops thrown into regimental confusion in the jungle, some without brigade or regimental commanders, yet all welded into substantial cohesive formation by the instinct of self-reliance, springing from intelligent knowledge of the value of combination and organization.

Captain Lee and Captain Paget of the British army declared that the United States troops had performed the impossible in warfare. Count von Goetzen, the German attaché, whose opinion will scarcely be suspected of too much leaning to the side of the United States, said the fighting of the Americans was wonderfully well done, and that the storming of the outposts was a wonderful feat of war. The fighting was creditable, he declared, to both sides, but he did not dream how formidable San Juan was until after it had been taken. The American marksmanship was surprising. The vigorous way in which our troops sprang to the deadly work was a tremendous lesson to other nations. The volunteers, he heard from other expert observers who had watched them, were fully up to the regulars, and the dash and spirit exhibited were marvelous. Major Grandprey, of the French service, who has been quoted elsewhere, declared that some of the best-grounded theories adopted in Europe were overthrown by the achievements of the American soldiers. The Frankfurter Zeitung, a leading newspaper authority of Germany, in a well-considered article from a military contributor, declared that the United States troops before Santiago had surpassed all precedent, and that the susceptibility of the American citizen to quick training had demonstrated that our volunteer militia was a much more reliable force than the compulsory reserves of Europe, an utterance astonishing in the light of past beliefs.
It may be said that our military operations against Santiago were marred by blunders or misfortunes, without raising the question of cause or responsibility for them. But through all, the intelligence, tenacity, and strong character of the American citizen found an unerring way to victory against the odds of the enemy in front and the failure or impossibility of support behind.

The courage of our soldiers was matched by the skill of our seamen. The naval battle of Santiago was most extraordinary in its contrasts of methods and men. For eighty-six years American seamen had engaged no foreign adversaries. Our ships were regarded as too light in armor, or too heavy in armament, and too delicate in interior mechanism. It had been predicted by foreign experts that our battleships would be capsized by the recoil from the delivery of full broadsides from the great and small guns. These theoretical doubts were dissipated. The battleships, in bombarding, were "listed," or careened to one side by running the heavy guns out of the ports and turrets, in order to gain elevation sufficient for the guns on the other side to throw shells over the hills. Not a gun exploded, not a piece of delicate machinery failed, not one gloomy prediction was realized.

Our methods of fighting, like our methods of diplomacy, were startling to the enemy. Europe has clung to the conventions. In diplomacy, Europeans proceed by the tortuous paths of tradition and the etiquette of precedent. They pronounced the American directness of procedure by going to the heart of the subject in a businesslike manner as "brutal" and "irritating." At San Juan the Spanish complained that our troops charged, when, under all the conventions of warfare by accepted tactics they should have run away!

In the naval battle our commanders wasted no time in vain technical parade and manœuvre. They fell upon the adversary with all the weight of metal that could be discharged, pounding the amazed and breathless Spaniards to destruction before they could recover from the shock. The European gunner is trained to shoot on the upward roll of his side of the ship, with the result that most of the Spanish shots were hurled harmlessly over our ships. United States
gunners are trained to fire on the downward roll, so that the missile may go straight to the enemy's hull, or reach it on *ricochet*. The hulls of the Spanish cruisers testified to the deadly efficacy of the method.

II.

The three battles of this century, preceding Santiago, that were enormously greater in political significance than important as mere military operations, were Waterloo, Gettysburg, and Sedan. The effect of Waterloo was the destruction of the personal power and threatened political supremacy in Europe of Napoleon. The effect of Gettysburg was to presage the downfall of the institution of slavery in the United States, and the denial, by force of arms, of the political theory of the right of a State to peacefully withdraw from the Federal Union. The effect of Sedan was the ushering into immediate power of the German Empire, that Bismarck had patiently constructed from the petty German States, the solidarity of which was committed with its crown to the keeping of William I., of the new imperial dynasty. In no military sense are these battles comparable, but in significance they are. They were of momentous effect upon the nations and continents whose interests were directly concerned. But, to the round world, they were, after all, more or less, incidents of locality. Waterloo was, perhaps, greatest of all; but the world of 1814 was much smaller than the world of 1898.

In respect of the importance of the forces engaged on land and the display of recognized scientific military operations, the land battles before Santiago were mere skirmishes beside Waterloo, Gettysburg, and Sedan. But in respect of the revelation resulting from measuring the fighting and enduring qualities of the American soldier by the standard obtaining in the standing army of Spain, the result was of the highest significance. Among the people of the United States it confirmed and established the confidence they had long cherished in the efficiency of their race. It was more important to
us than Gettysburg, in that while it erased every jarring memory of Gettysburg itself, it sanctified and heightened the one glorious—of the valor of all Americans who met on that field of heroic struggle; and that the reunited devotion to one country and one flag was sealed in sacrifice of blood and life by North and South together fighting side by side. It revealed to us, as by inspiration, the strength and character of our population, and the resourceful intelligence springing from liberty restricted only by the rights of man. That this revelation was understood by all foreign observers was confessed. They were sent to observe both sides; not merely the tools of war, but the nature and power of the men who wielded them. It is for the purpose of studying forces as possible adversaries that such observations are made.

When the combined operations of the army and navy at Santiago are considered, it is not improbable that the Spanish defeat will prove, by future results, to have been more significant than any other battle of the century.

The overwhelming and quick defeat of Spain was confidently prepared for and expected by the United States. The progress of the war did not appreciably interrupt the regular course of our every-day life or business.

It was also conceded by all other nations that Spain must be defeated, if the prosecution of the war was not averted by the intervention of European Powers. But some grave authorities abroad did not dream that it was possible for Spain in a hundred days to be stripped of all her colonies, her splendid fleet annihilated, her ocean commerce paralyzed, her finances demoralized, her population maddened to the point of revolution, an important body of her army captured within its own fortified places by a smaller army, and the prisoners transported back to Spain, at the expense of the conquerors, as an act of compassionate charity, founded upon good "Yankee" economy.

And all this without the enemy being able to strike a single blow in return, or to disarrange in any particular the ordinary course of life in this country.
The significance of Santiago lay in this: that those who had considered Dewey's action at Manila to be a miracle of good fortune, saw it repeated at Santiago, at Manzanillo, at San Juan de Porto Rico, and at Nipe. Those who thought the 950 at Las Guasimas were reckless dare-devils, who won out of sheer audacity, saw the same quality of indomitable courage repeated by increased forces, with equal success, at San Juan and El Caney.

When Santiago surrendered, the republic of the United States, so long scorned by Europe as a nation of money-getters and sordid adventurers, with no traditions of dignity or glory; so long treated with contempt by Europe in its accredited representatives as being a government of ignorant and corrupt politicians and mercenaries—that republic, after Santiago, stood before the world suddenly revealed in its real strength, taking undisputed place in the first rank of nations, unsurpassed in its practical ability to provide for offense or defense, and with a capacity for future influence in the whole world, and for the increase of its strength restricted only within the national purpose, whatever that might be.

The surrender of Santiago was the deathblow to Spain, and sudden warning to Europe.

Even after the destruction of the Maine the Spanish Government did not expect war with the United States. That act of cruel perfidy was so well shrouded in mystery, as Spain viewed it, that it might be made the subject of endless diplomacy, or, if put to it, the "mercenaries" of America could be pacified with a money indemnity. No allowance was made for the existence of a profound public sentiment in the United States aroused by the murder of our seamen. Once before Spanish authorities had shot to death the crew of the Virginius, filibusters from this country going to aid Cuban revolutionists, and nothing had come of the outrage. The idea that the United States possessed any actual sympathy for Cubans perishing under Spanish cruelty, neither Canovas nor Sagasta could comprehend as anything more than rhetorical declamation covering a pretense to forward some scheme of sharp practice that our government was preparing to
present. They frankly admitted that Spain could not be victorious in a war with the United States, but they did not expect war—diplomacy, and money indemnity, at the proper time, would dispose of American protestations of honorable purpose and humane motives.

Curiously enough, England, the European nation best able to know and understand the spirit and power of the United States, underrated the situation at first. Her naval and military authorities did not hesitate to prophesy that the Americans were sure to be victorious in the end, because, although the national spirit rose slowly, it rose surely under adversity, and was then irresistible. They were ready, however, to expect the first successes for Spain, whose standing army and excellent navy, equipped according to European standards, would be superior to the overloaded and lumbering ships of our fleet and the handful of soldiers composing our standing army, which would have to be laboriously recruited from raw volunteers, these, naturally, of the lowest classes of our population.

Even after Manila, the London Times, that recognized channel of sound conservative opinion in England, took a gloomy view of our outlook. “In time, of course,” it said, “the United States will be able to bring out their immense, almost inexhaustible resources of military and naval strength, but for the moment nothing decisive can be looked for so long as Admiral Cervera’s fleet is in being, and while the American army is in process of manufacture.” All that had then been gained, it believed, was the knowledge that European intervention was no longer practicable.

“Intervention by the Powers” was, in fact, the trump card that Spanish statesmen believed they held for use when all other resources should prove futile. It was not possible to admit that a republic of “pig-stickers,” “railroad builders” and “tradesmen” would dare resist the dignified wishes of the “Concert of Europe,” whose mission was the maintenance of the balance of power, the custodianship of the secrets of diplomacy by circumlocution, and the division of the estates of deceased governments among heirs to be selected for the decedent.
It was to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the Franco-Russian League that Spain looked for assistance. Great Britain was, as usual, independent of alliances, a solitary among nations, more powerful and much more feared than the United States, but yet a solitary, as we have always been.

When Congress had taken steps that left no doubt of immediate war, Spain recognized that her own diplomacy was ended. She turned immediately to Austria, whose Emperor was the uncle of the Queen-Regent and grandunce of Alfonso XIII., to the Pope and to France. The mighty mystery of the "intervention of the Powers" was thus solemnly invoked. The venerable Leo XIII., representing in his pontifical character and personal virtues the loftiest mission of religion, made overtures to the President that were acknowledged with interest and respect and replied to with open frankness of explanation. Then the aged pontiff suddenly learned that even in this effort to preserve that curious national pretense called her "honor," Spain had not hesitated to ascribe his action to the wrong initiative and to represent his motives in such a manner as to cover his high office with indignity and to reflect insult upon the United States. Overcome with grief and feeling deep humiliation, Leo XIII. withdrew, not the less respected by our Government and the world that recognized his greatness of mind and nobility of purpose.

During this time, also, the Powers of the continent had agreed to make united "representations" to the government of the United States through their ambassadors and ministers in a body. The note was intended to have the appearance of disinterested anxiety for peace and the effect of a menace from combined Europe, if we persisted in the determination to make war on Spain, and to destroy her sovereignty in Cuba. Italy did not join in the action.

The continent having agreed upon the plan, application was made to Great Britain to join in the remonstrance. The continent relied upon the ancient feeling of jealous dislike between England and the United States, and the recent embroilment over the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary, as causes sufficient to move the Queen's ministers.
Much to Europe's surprise, Great Britain declared a purpose to take no step unfriendly to Spain or the United States, which countries were presumed to be capable of managing their own affairs. But Mr. Balfour, in the Premier's absence, went further and consented to an action, the significance of which the Powers did not then probably fully perceive. He desired peace, but he could not interfere. He would, however, unite with the Powers in presenting to the President of the United States an address expressing the hope that war might be averted, and offering friendly offices. But the nature of the address must first be communicated to the President and his consent obtained for its public presentation.

The text of the original note as determined upon by the Powers is not known, but when the British ambassador at Washington entered the White House, at the head of the delegation of foreign representatives, it was notice to the world that the President had dictated the terms of the joint address and that the British ambassador presented it as the friendly and courteous suggestion of the greatest European Power, and that his presence estopped the representation from being construed as a menace, upon peril of its repudiation by the British Government, and the danger of provocation that might attach.
CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH.

DEFEAT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

Effect of England's Attitude on Continental Europe—New Cuban Policy and Its Complete Reversal in Our Favor—The Concert of Europe Accepted It as Proof of an Alliance—Character of the Governmental Diplomacies and the Methods of their Procedure—Action and Attitude of All the Nations When War Began—Effect of Dewey's Victory at Manila.

I.

The action of Great Britain, which converted the intended menace into assurances of apologetic anxiety, and thus enabled the President to express, under terms of courteous acknowledgment, the unalterable determination of the United States not to permit interference by the European concert in any of our differences with Spain, was as annoying to the concert as it was gratifying to the American people. Our old fraternal enemy had atoned to the great republic for the wrongs inflicted upon the colonies before 1776. At the opportune moment Great Britain had chosen between aliens in language and political ideals and a people possessing substantially those she possessed. And she chose her own.

Whatever reasons may be ascribed to England, of selfish interest or shrewd foresight, her decision cannot be impeached as lacking in that unerring common sense and high intelligence of practical purpose which characterizes what are known as the Anglo-Saxon people. There is nothing permanent in the effusions of impulsive sentiment alone. The United States not less than England has founded her greatness upon practical and material interests. The independence of the American colonies, achieved against gross oppression by the mother country, has been of vast benefit, not alone to the enfranchised colonies, but to the people of England. In contrast with the Continental and South American republics,—mere personal or organized
autocracies wearing republican costume,—the British people have studied the United States, and have themselves erected a great republic attired in the robes only of monarchy and imperialism.

The first result of England's action was to inflame Europe against her and intensify the feeling against the United States, though it could not be expressed in overt acts. It must be admitted that Europe had abundant reason for disappointment. For a hundred years it had been England's expressed policy to maintain the sovereignty of Spain in Cuba against any strong maritime rival, particularly the United States. Mr. Canning said during his primacy that "the possession by the United States of both shores of the channel, through which our Jamaica trade must pass, would, in time of war with the United States, or, indeed, of a war in which the United States might be neutral, but in which we continued to claim the right of search and the Americans to resist it, amount to a suspension of that trade and to a consequent total ruin of a great portion of our West Indian interests."

The utterance was made in support of his proposal to send a squadron to Havana to check any advances the United States might be tempted to make in 1822. As late as 1852, England, foreseeing the probable construction of a canal through the Central American isthmus, served notice upon the United States of its expectations. In that note was this paragraph:—

"Now, if the maritime Powers are, on the one hand, out of respect to the rights of Spain, and from a sense of international duty, bound to dismiss all intention of obtaining possession of Cuba, so, on the other hand, are they obliged, out of consideration for the interests of their own subjects or citizens, and the protection of the commerce of other nations, who are all entitled to the use of the great highways of commerce on equal terms, to proclaim and assure, as far as in them lies, the present and future neutrality of the island of Cuba."

So tenacious had been England's purpose to guard the interests of her vast maritime commerce in the West Indies, and even its future opportunities, that she succeeded in obtaining from the United States an agreement in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty that a canal through the isthmus, if built, should be open to ships of all nations upon equal
terms, in times of war as well as peace, and that the United States would not establish any fortifications or exert any control in violation of that pledge.

In view of these facts of history, the continental nations naturally sought reasons for the sudden volte-face upon a question of the greatest magnitude to the supremacy of British maritime interests. France, it was asserted, had taken the initiative in forming the concert and in seeking England's agreement to it. If this is true, there was very good reason, because France and England had been closely united in Cuban understandings. Just after the Mexican War these two Governments had proposed to us a tripartite agreement of self-denial between each other and joint denial against other nations, against taking possession of Cuba and to discountenance attempts toward that purpose on the part of Cubans themselves, though it was not to prejudice the right of Cubans to assert and obtain independence. The treaty was rejected by the Fillmore administration and England retired with a direct notice of her determination to exercise her free right to enforce her views, if occasion arose, by combination with other interested nations.

The expressed intention of the United States not to annex Cuba or to do more than establish the freedom of the people, and their right to self-government in 1898, did not afford any explanation of England's attitude. It was not possible for continental diplomats to believe that the declaration of such magnanimous purpose was more than a hypocritical cloak for the acquisition of rich territory. Even if that were possible it did not explain England's purpose. During the Ten Years' War in Cuba when the Virginius affair was agitating the United States, President Grant had proposed the independence of Cuba to Europe through diplomatic overtures. France remembered that England had then urged the Powers to refuse, and the proposition fell lifeless.

It was not to be believed that England relied upon the self-denying purpose of the United States in 1898 more than in 1874—besides international philanthropy was the dream of utopian people only.
The only reason practicable under continental ideas was that Great Britain and the United States had established an agreement to resist European intervention, or coercion, in Cuban affairs, in order that they might take and hold the invaluable island for themselves. They were confirmed in this by the publication in an English newspaper of recognized authority of the statement that the Queen's ministers had determined to remain neutral; that if any combination was formed to interfere with the United States, Great Britain would not only hold aloof from it, but would, in fact, assist the United States. The publication was not upon official authority, but it was not denied.

The view continental governments took of these movements, indicating a perfect accord between the two nations, was of profound significance. An alliance of English-speaking nations was gigantic in its potentialities. It offered elements of cohesive strength in a common language, correlated ideals and purposes, and in material wealth and power, that was incalculably threatening. The continental nations, speaking diverse languages, accustomed to diverse ideals and purposes, honeycombed with petty jealousies, the masses of people weakened in faith by growing temptation to emigrate to the United States or the British Colonies, whence came from relatives and friends established there glowing accounts of peace, prosperity, and freedom—all these constituted elements of disintegration, in spite of the perfection of their enormous war establishments.

Besides, if there actually existed an Anglo-American agreement, resistance to it meant the precipitation of that dreaded evil of the century's governmental development—universal war.

The failure of the concerted representation, and the specters evoked by the situation, left Europe without immediate plan of action, but the pressure to force intervention grew stronger during inaction.
When, therefore, we declared war with Spain, England was our acknowledged friend; Russia was practically the unchanged friend of all previous political existence; France, the first of our friends and allies, torn by distracting interests and political jealousies, was leading the opposition to our purpose; Germany, bound to us by the natural strong ties created by millions of faithful and excellent citizens come to us from all parts of the sturdy Fatherland of genius, courage, and energetic industry, was unfriendly in its ruling classes, but yet to be relied upon in the body of its people; Austria, of course, was devoted to Spain with feeble power; Italy expressed popular approval of our intentions; the Spanish-American republics were officially loyal in the fullest degree to their continental protector, but the blood and language of Spain decided the sympathies of their populations against us.

The narrative of the adventures of these governmental interests during the war is not less interesting than the story of actual war itself. For, after all, one nation, among all the nations, is as one person, made up of the types of its population composed into a generalization of their traditions, intelligence, character, wealth, and local customs. The capacity of a nation for courage, purpose, and ambition is expressed as it is in one man. Pride or simplicity, impulsiveness or deliberation, jealousy or trustfulness, strength or weakness, candor or duplicity, appear in nations, and are as distinctly recognizable as in men.

The establishment of a free democracy in the United States was upon the foundation of the equal political rights of all men, and the social equality of all men to the extent of their equipment. To the leadership of a vast, nervous, energetic, and ambitious population, we have called men of natural genius and capacity, without regard to precedent or origin. It is not form so much as substance that free democracy demands. The great Liberator and profound statesman among
our leaders began life as a rail-splitter; the great General, twice president, began as a farm boy and tanner. We have honored a canal-boat boy, a tailor, farmers, lawyers—there is no presidential caste excluding any male child born in the United States. Those of our leaders who have shown greatest genius have usually been those who had the humblest beginnings in life. In the war with Spain every leader that was to develop sprang from the common average of industrious and sturdy citizenship.

The American national character as expressed by its Government is an aggregation of directness of purpose, disregard of details that are not vital, and a sort of energy in action that may be best described, perhaps, in the American phrase of "getting down to business," with the intention of going directly to the point without evasion.

In monarchical government the theory of the power of royalty "by the grace of God" demanded through many centuries, and does yet demand in a modified form, that the idea shall always be materially presented through the glamour of splendid ceremonial, privileged castes, the exclusion of subjects from the affairs of the sovereign, who is the state; consequently, the envelopment of state functions, diplomatic exchanges, and political procedure in a cloud of ceremonious formalities, precedents, mysterious phrases, and time-consuming leisureliness, has made European diplomatic service a profession open to those who have mastered the cult and closed usually to those who have only the capacity.

It is because representatives of our government at these centers of etiquette have ignored nice distinctions (that could only delay progress) in order to conclude a simple matter, that they have been regarded with terror, Americans generally described as "pigs," and our whole governmental procedure in diplomacy as "brutal." Prince Bismarck, the greatest man of the century in intellectual power and clearness of foresight, was celebrated as one European diplomat who brutally told the truth, while others, who knew thoroughly well the esoteric verbiage in which to encase a fact and involve it in tortuous uncertainties, dreaded to meet him in conference or negotiation.
He mastered them with ease, and they described him as intolerably brutal in stating his demands. But Bismarck, himself, when, at the Berlin Peace Congress, he met Disraeli,—who was master of the etiquette of diplomacy, as well as of the power of direct and energetic pressure, stripped of all reservation and pretense,—said, "I do not care much for their Lord Salisbury, who is merely a wooden lath, painted to look like iron; but look out for that terrible Jew—he means business."

Of all European governments—excepting, of course, that of the Sultan—the diplomacy of Spain has been the most artful and unscrupulous in method. Having small significance among nations, because of her poverty and degeneration, her diplomacy has been exercised by dynasties and cabinets upon the political factions of the Spanish people, upon the revolutionists of the outraged colonies, and guarded as a weapon to be used by leaders temporarily in power, but not to be betrayed to the common people. The chief diplomatic weapon she has used in times of revolution was magnanimous promise, canceled by cruelest treachery. The Ten Years' Revolution was brought to an end by the promise of Marshal Campos that Maceo and all his officers and soldiers should be permitted to leave Cuba, and that the insurgent slaves should be emancipated to full citizenship without punishment. The terms were accepted, Maceo left the island; but his officers were sent prisoners to Ceuta, and the slaves were not emancipated until most of them had died under punishment from masters against whom they had revolted. In the Philippines revolutionists have been soothed by decrees of chivalrous amnesty. When they reported to surrender arms, they were massacred in cold blood.

Hundreds of instances might be cited of Spain's Machiavellian procedure. The revolutions in Cuba that devastated the island, destroyed prosperity and trade, and involved the United States in continuous cost and hurt by the necessity of suppressing filibustering expeditions, were due to Spain's utter incompetency to govern. Yet for years, by the exercise of the most adroit diplomatic duplicity, by explanations and promises limitless in ingenious cunning, she was
able to prevent action until the atrocities of Captain-General Weyler revoluted our common instinct of humanity. In the presence of the horror she had aroused, her politicians shifted places and the relentless cruelties of Canovas were succeeded by the generous promises of Sagasta. Autonomy had been promised often before with the knowledge that it could be suspended. Hesitating upon that memory the doubt of the United States was answered by the sacrifice of the Maine.

Such was governmental Spain among international associates—the persuasive and enticing strumpet of diplomatic morals, whose idea of national virtue was that the more sincere it was the more it would cost to purchase. What more could be expected of a country whose social code is crowded with maxims such as these:

"Renounce the devil and thou shalt wear a shabby cloak. The good man's son inherits poverty. Alas, for the son whose father went to heaven! Blessed is the son whose father went to the devil. The official who cannot lie may as well be out of the world. He who does not lie does not come of good blood. Gold is omnipotent, and the ducat is his lord-lieutenant."

The usages of diplomacy in Europe rendered the continental nations much more susceptible to influence by the Spanish procedure than Great Britain or the United States. France, especially, with vast financial stakes in Spanish securities, and Austria, moved by ties of family, could give great assistance in an attempt to entice Europe into a threatening attitude against us.

III.

Public manœuvring and feinting in diplomacy are carried on along lines of phrases calculated to hasten or delay expected action by others or to invite expression of opinion. Thus, a dispatch beginning, "It is reported here in political circles," etc., means that the press of the other interested country will reveal how popular opinion receives the action rumored as probable. Then, there is the phrase, "An attaché of a foreign embassy,
of high standing, declared to-day,” etc. The phrases progress in definiteness thus: “It is rumored that the Government is preparing a decree”; “Unofficial announcement is made”; Semi-official statements appeared to-day”; “Official announcements were issued by the Government to-day.” Usually the latter is final, but, if a loophole is vitally necessary, it is possible to follow the official decree with this: “The minister of war has advised the authorities that the official decree published yesterday is subject, of course, to all the modifications consistent with the decree of the year before last, defining the status of the governmental bugbear,” etc. It must be remembered that these are mere primary phrases in the diplomatic Ollendorf. When one government is in position to secure the dissemination of these feints by origination in the news center of another country, the finesse increases in complication. While the antagonist is occupied in deliberating upon the intention or significance of the feint, much may be done.

On the day that Sampson’s fleet sailed from Havana, “it was reported” from London that Great Britain was preparing a neutrality proclamation for immediate issuance and that the cruiser Albany, which we had purchased and were outfitting at New Castle to bring home, and the torpedo boat Somers, at Falmouth, would not be able to leave those ports within the regulation time, and therefore must remain until after the war. It would also force Dewey’s squadron from Hong-Kong.

Spain had war vessels in French docks and ports; in Italian ports; her finest squadron in the Portuguese harbor of St. Vincent, Cape de Verde Islands, in Argentina. If England chose to rush into neutrality before official declaration of war, there was no reason why France and Portugal need hurry to disoblige a neighboring government.

The United States, thus reminded, hurried the last details of preparation. Cargoes of ammunition, of sulphur, of various war supplies, were cleared from all ports where they originated. From Washington went a semi-official statement, that if England took such hasty action this government would demand of Portugal immediate action
to compel Cervera's fleet to leave St. Vincent. Cervera's fleet was in distress for coal and supplies.

Four days later Washington furnished a paragraph that "the War and Navy Department officials are looking forward with interest," to the official publication of Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality; that Dewey's fleet at Hong Kong and a Spanish torpedo boat at Queens-town had been ordered to leave those British ports in advance of official publication, that, however, the United States would probably not make demands on Portugal until Great Britain's action was formally announced. From London "a Berlin correspondent learned" that Great Britain and Germany would not interfere, but that France and Austria, and probably Italy, would do so after the first collision, "even if it prove quite indecisive."

The next day in the British Commons Mr. Balfour announced that the proclamation of neutrality would soon be ready, and the press dispatches gave information that "the report that American war ships had been notified to depart within forty-eight hours is incorrect." That day Congress declared that a state of war existed, and the next day the President cabled his proclamation of that declaration to all the nations. England at once issued neutrality commands, put Dewey's fleet upon notice to sail, and the Albany and Somers, unprepared, were locked up pending the end of the war.

The President's proclamation granted to all Spanish merchant ships in our harbors, when the war began, a period of thirty days for safe clearance. The act perplexed Spain. "What," asked the official press "is the meaning of this moderation after so many provocations? Does America want to gain time?" Spanish military and financial circles were anxious. They translated our fairness as foreboding an intention to prolong preparations until autumn, and thus wear Spain out in expense and anxiety. They could not believe we were eager to fight the "invincible forces of Spain." This question was answered the same day by the bombardment of Matanzas and the death on the field of glory of Captain-General Blanco's historic mule of Matanzas. All eyes were thus fixed upon Cuba.
The publication by Washington that Dewey’s fleet had withdrawn to Mirs Bay and would sail thence to Manila, was answered by dispatches from Madrid that the American squadron that was going to Manila was composed of vessels of no importance and that Manila was enthusiastically eager to receive them, and all preparations were complete to destroy them. Two days later Madrid announced “it is rumored here” that Germany had officially warned the United States that she would not permit bombardment of any of the principal towns in the Philippines for the reason that German interests would suffer greatly from such an act.

Throughout the first ten days the British Government had made no sign, but popular feeling in England and Canada had expressed itself in open and universal enthusiasm for the United States. Messages of sympathy and hope had been cabled to the President from societies and public meetings, and the newspapers were filled with cheer. To a London correspondent, admitted to an interview, the President had said, for publication in London, in answer to the question whether he had any message for the English people: “Tell them that the people of our whole nation respond to their expressions. And,” he added, “tell them we will not forget.”

To this Madrid replied through Paris in an interview with the Conservative leader, Silvola, in which he declared Spain’s intention to convene the Powers of Europe for intervention as necessary to continental interests. “England,” he said, “has sided with the United States, but it will not be long until she perceives the immensity of her mistake.”

The very next day the explosion of Dewey’s shells annihilating the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, glorious as the sound was to this nation, frightful as it was to Spanish hopes, was yet merely the hissing of a fuse that was to explode the greatest international political bomb-shell of the century.
CHAPTER THE NINETEENTH.

THE PHILIPPINES QUESTION.

Dewey's Victory and Its Effect upon the Eastern Question in International Politics—
Lord Salisbury's Speech on Living and Dead Nations—Explanation of the Eastern
Question Developed Since the Chinese-Japanese War—Mr. Chamber-
lain's Startling Speech Suggesting an Anglo-American Alliance
on the Lines of Common Purposes—The Sensation Caused
in the World by His Unexpected Freedom of
Speech, against All Cabinet Precedents.

I.

Within forty-eight hours after Dewey had hoisted the Star
Spangled Banner over the arsenal at Cavité international
governmental diplomacy was astounded at
the interjection of the Philippines question
into the complications and threatening aspects of the
Eastern Question. The first news of our victory called
into existence in the United States a new spirit that from various
quarters demanded the capture of the entire Philippine Archipelago and
the holding of the islands as American colonies. This was echoed by
similar suggestions from England and was opposed by strong elements
in this country as well as by intimations from continental capitals
that such action was impossible in view of the political policy of the
United States, even if the attempt should not be prevented by Europe.
Before the final reports of the utter destruction of Montejo's squadron
were received, the situation at Manila could only be guessed at, but
the question was debated fiercely.

The first news made public by Spain that the American ships had
been repulsed, followed by reluctant admissions of partial Spanish
defeat and intimations of injuries to the Americans, left upon Euro-
pean minds a doubt whether Dewey's victory had been as sweeping
as claimed at Washington. The cutting of the cable deepened the
perplexity until official dispatches could arrive. The United States
nourished no doubts of the superiority of our men and ships, and
England expressed no hesitation to believe the full extent of our
success. But England expressed fears that Dewey could not hold
his advantage for lack of supplies and assistance, to obtain which
would involve delay, during which continental jealousy of America
would be accentuated. France threatened us immediately with vague
hints of interference, and all Europe was cheered by the fact that our
Pacific squadron lacked a secure base of operations.

After the battle at Cavite the British consul at Manila offered to
take the Chinese population under British protection. Spain refused
the offer with an outburst of resentment toward Great Britain, accus-
ing her of attempting to inject Chinese politics into the situation.
From Russia came reproachful intimations that an Anglo-American
alliance would be distasteful, reminding us of old friendship, and the
fact that she had long looked forward to an eventual Russo-Ameri-
can alliance. Germany maintained silence during the opening dis-
cussion.

It was on May 5 that, Lord Salisbury having returned, petulant
exchanges of feeling became serious apprehensions. On that day he
delivered an address to the Primrose League in London, in which
he referred to the all-engrossing subject in the manner of the old-
fashioned English statesman, avoiding direct mention but giving to
his allusions mysterious suggestion of weight.

He began his address gravely by declaring that he could not pass
by the terrible conflict now being waged between two highly civili-
lized nations. He could only hope that the recollection of the bless-
ings of peace would before long restore the tranquillity of the world.
"I cannot dwell upon the subject," he said, "without danger of de-
parting from that attitude of strict neutrality which it is my duty,
as well as that of many others, to maintain." After discussing point-
edly the dangerous relations between Great Britain, Russia, Germany,
and France, as developed in the Eastern Question, he closed with a
foreboding criticism that was to enrage Europe. The nations of the
earth, he declared, might be roughly divided as the living and the dying. On one side were the great countries of enormous power, with railroads giving them the means of concentrating at one point the whole military force of their population, and assembling armies of a magnitude never dreamed of in generations gone by, with weapons growing in their efficiency for destruction.

By the side of these splendid organizations, which presented rival claims that the future might only be able by bloody arbitrament to adjust, there were a number of communities which he could only describe as dying. They were mainly the communities that were not Christian, but he regretted to say that this was not exclusively a fact. In these States disorganization and decay were advancing almost as fast as the power of the others was increasing. There were other countries which were not well provided with leading men or ministers in whom they could trust, that were apparently drawing nearer and nearer to that fate, and yet clinging with strange tenacity to the life they had.

Misgovernment, he said, was constantly on the increase there, and their administration was a mass of corruption, so that there was no firm ground on which any hope of reform or restoration could be based, and in other degrees they were presenting a terrible picture to the more enlightened portion of the world. How long that state of things was likely to go on, he would not attempt to prophesy. All he could indicate was that the process was proceeding and that the weak States were becoming weaker and the strong States becoming stronger.

He did not think it was necessary to go into any detail, but only to point out what the inevitable result of that process must be. It was that the living nations would gradually encroach upon the territory of the dying States and the seeds of conflict would speedily appear. Undoubtedly, England would not be allowed to be at a disadvantage in any rearrangement that might take place. On the other hand, England would not be jealous if desolation and sterility were removed by the aggrandizement of a rival Power.
The studied care with which Lord Salisbury refrained from designating the governments decaying in public corruption, was the old-school manner of lending profound significance to the countries obviously in point. China, threatened with dismemberment; France in the throes of fear through the intimations of unspeakable corruption in her legislative and military oligarchy, exposed by glimpses of the Dreyfus case; Spain, honeycombed with dishonest administrators and helpless to govern at home or abroad—these were some of the interesting names with which to fill the blanks.

As if to add emphasis to Salisbury's warning, the Chinese Minister to the Court of St. James on the evening of the same day spoke at a public dinner with cordial welcome to Great Britain. He said the only way China could survive in competition with the world was by combining with Great Britain, to whom she offered a free field for her commerce. China, hitherto, had been the most exclusive country in the world, acting on the principle of excluding outsiders. This was now the principle of only her common people. The educated classes were prepared to welcome British trade and desired that the friendship of the two countries be consolidated on the widest basis, socially, politically, commercially, and economically. He referred to the opening of the Chinese waterways and the impending construction of railroads, and said he hoped that every obstacle to the expansion of British trade in China would soon be removed.

Four days after the glorious first day of May, therefore, Great Britain's first minister and the Chinese voice had thrust upon Europe the Philippines question wrapped in the Eastern Question.

Further significance was given by the preparations already hurry ing in the United States to send Major-General Merritt with troops to the aid of Admiral Dewey.
II.

The Eastern Question, that is, the aspect of it that interposed itself between the United States and any practical interference by Europe with our seizure of the Philippines, may be briefly summarized. It was the outgrowth of the Chinese-Japanese War. The Chinese Empire had been opened to the commerce of the world many years ago by the persistence of British commercial interests. What are called “open ports” were established by England through which all commercial exchanges must pass. No foreigner was permitted to enter the Empire through any closed port. The Anglo-Chinese treaty pledged England against attempting to acquire any territorial rights beyond the coaling station and commercial base of Hong-Kong, and it pledged China not to alienate to any other Power any portion of the rich and productive basin of the Yang-tse-Kiang River, which contains half of the 400,000,000 inhabitants of the Empire.

The terms of the treaty were kept in good faith and other nations made treaties with China by which they were permitted to extend their commerce through the open ports on equal terms with “the most favored nation.” Great Britain’s maritime preponderance and the close relations established with the Chinese administrators gave her great advantages of good will, and when the war with Japan began the value of her trade with China was about $200,000,000 annually, with the United States next in importance.

Russia, which had been steadily increasing her Asiatic territory, seeking an open harbor on the Pacific below the winter ice line, had gradually penetrated down the coast until Korea was reached. More advance was contemplated, but the strength of Great Britain was feared.

That Great Britain did not exert her good offices to avert the war between China and Japan was surprising to European governments. She was friendly with both, might have composed the grievances, or, as a last resort, was strong enough to have compelled arbitration.
Her failure to act awoke European suspicion of her wisdom and determination. When, therefore, in 1893, the treaty of peace between China and Japan had been concluded at Shimonoseki, to the dissatisfaction of the defeated nation, by yielding Korea to Japan, and England looked on without making a sign, Russia invited Germany and France to intervene with her. The result was that the Shimonoseki treaty was revised by them, Japan was permitted to hold Korea as a guarantee only until China should pay over the money indemnity for the cost of war as agreed. Great Britain made no protest and Japan was compelled to renounce the advantages gained by war and to give up all hope of enlarging her industries and relieving her population by having a foothold on the mainland.

The weakness displayed by Great Britain in that incident set in play the resources of impenetrable Muscovite diplomacy. She did not make the first move—she never does—but there is always produced a capable instrument to precede and open the way. Two or three years had elapsed when two German missionaries were murdered by a Chinese mob. The German Emperor sent some war ships to Kiaochou Bay on the west coast of the Yellow Sea, between Korea and Shantung Province, and seized the port and bay as an indemnity. He followed that by demanding a cession of the bay and a small territorial district on the terms upon which Great Britain held Hong-Kong.

This was German initiation, but the Muscovite justification was established. The Czar promptly seized Port Arthur and Talienwan, commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, within reach of Pekin itself. France followed, taking the island of Hainan off the south coast, protecting the French colonies of Tongking on the mainland.

These successive blows to the prestige of Great Britain were sufficient to destroy Chinese confidence in her strength. Russia at once took energetic measures to complete a Manchurian branch of the Trans-Siberian railway to Port Arthur, and began to acquire actual ownership of land by purchasing the ground in Port Arthur. Alarmed
by these proceedings Great Britain obtained from the Chinese Emperor the port of Wei-Hai-Wei, commanding the approach through Korea Bay to Port Arthur.

The situation was full of serious menace to English industries and British commerce. The Northern Chinese provinces, now within the influence and under the fear of Russia, could be crossed with railways, while the German sphere of influence south of Wei-Hai-Wei could be opened through similar concessions. The promise of China that the valley of the Yang-tse-Kiang and the treasures of the Middle Kingdom should never be alienated to any other Power was of no importance, if the territory could be drained of and supplied with vast commerce through flanking encroachments.

When the Spanish-American war opened, therefore, Great Britain was placed between the alternatives of making war against the Russo-Franco-Germanic Power, or of surrendering her old power and being undermined of her great commercial trade in the East. She could not fully rely upon Japan as an ally, although the two nations were well able to defeat the three in opposition on the sea. English manufacturers and shipowners were in despair at the prospect, and British politics were taking on threatening aspects.

This was why Dewey's victory at Manila, and the instant demand on the part of a strong body in the United States to hold the Philippines, were so enthusiastically received by all England. Since this country had at stake the next greatest value in commerce with China, the acquisition by us of vast colonial interests in the Philippines would increase our commerce and effectively check the encroachments of Russia, Germany, and France. Great Britain and the United States could be depended upon to maintain open doors to every port in China.
III.

The resentful protest excited in continental Europe by the scarcely veiled allusions in Lord Salisbury's speech was as nothing compared with the uproar created by the unexpected and remarkable utterances of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary in the English cabinet, on May 13. Mr. Chamberlain's speech was delivered at Birmingham and was received with great outbursts of enthusiasm by the vast assemblage that listened to it.

Mr. Chamberlain's speech was as remarkable for its method in departing from all recognized conventions of restraint by cabinet ministers as it was for the boldness of the views he expressed, views that amazed Europe—not because they were held, but because the etiquette of cabinets was thus rudely destroyed. Lord Salisbury had uttered disagreeable reflections, but he had uttered them in correct form, so that no "gentlemanly" government could find fault with the manner. Mr. Chamberlain, on the other hand, was telling the truth so directly and plainly as to be offensive to all the governments in opposition.

Mr. Chamberlain began by declaring that the time had come for English leaders to leave off the old ideas of fifty years ago and speak plainly to the great public, instead of keeping mysteriously silent. Then, after explaining and commenting upon Great Britain's long-continued policy of isolation, he continued:—

"A new situation has arisen, and it is right that the people of this country should have it under their consideration. All the powerful States of Europe have made alliances, and as long as we keep outside these alliances, as long as we are envied by all, and suspected by all, and as long as we have interests which at one time or another conflict with the interests of all, we are liable to be confronted at any moment with a combination of Great Powers so powerful that not even the most extreme, the most hot-headed politician would be able to contemplate it without a certain sense of uneasiness. That is the situation which I want you to have in view, which you must always have in view, when you are considering the results of the foreign policy of any Government in this country. We stand alone, and we may be confronted with such a combination as that I have indicated to you. What is the first duty of a Government under these circumstances? I say, without hesitation, that it is to draw all parts of the empire closer
together, to infuse into them a spirit of united and of imperial patriotism. We have not neglected that primary duty. We have pursued it steadfastly and with results that are patent to all the world. Never before in the history of the British Empire have the ties which connected us with our great colonies and dependencies been stronger; never before has the sense of common interests in trade and in defense and in war—never before has the sense of these interests been more strongly felt or more cordially expressed.

"What is our next duty? It is to establish and to maintain bonds of permanent amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic. They are a powerful and a generous nation. They speak our language, they are bred of our race. Their laws, their literature, their standpoint upon every question are the same as ours; their feeling, their interest in the cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world are identical with ours. I do not know what the future has in store for us. I do not know what arrangements may be possible with us, but this I know and feel—that the closer, the more cordial, the fuller, and the more definite these arrangements are with the consent of both peoples, the better it will be for both and for the world. And I even go so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance. Now, it is one of the most satisfactory results of Lord Salisbury’s policy that at the present time these two great nations understand each other better than they have ever done since more than a century ago. They were separated by the blunder of the British Government.

"It is not in this connection that our foreign policy has failed; it is in regard to the East, and especially to the Far East.”

After discussing the comparative situation of Great Britain in China and the perils that threatened British interests there, Mr. Chamberlain closed with this declaration:

"No, there was only one alternative to the policy of the Government—the policy of war. Let us consider the alternative. We might have declared war on Russia. We might for a year or two have held Port Arthur against Russia, but we have no military force there to back us and no frontier in China. I am one of those who think that for any country there are worse things than war; there is loss of honor; there is loss of those interests which are so vital to the security of the existence of the nation. But, in any case, I hope I am sensible enough never to give my voice for war unless I can see at the commencement of the war a fair probability that at the end of the war the objects of the war will have been obtained. Now, what does history show us? It shows us that unless we are allied to some great military power, as we were in the Crimean War, when we had France and Turkey as our allies, we cannot seriously injure Russia, although it may also be true that she cannot seriously injure us. If that is the case, it is a case which deserves the serious consideration of the people of this country. It is impossible
to overrate the gravity of the issue. It is not a question of a single port in China—that is a very small matter. It is not a question of a single province; it is a question of the whole fate of the Chinese Empire, and our interests in China are so great, our proportion of the trade is so enormous, and the potentialities of that trade are so gigantic that I feel that no more vital question has ever been presented for the decision of a Government and the decision of a nation, and for my part I have tried to-night to state clearly and without exaggeration the conditions of the problem that we have before us. I think you will see that it is complicated enough to preclude all hasty judgment. One thing appears to me to be certain. If the policy of isolation, which has hitherto been the policy of this country, is to be maintained in the future, then the fate of the Chinese Empire may be, probably will be, hereafter decided without reference to our wishes and in defiance of our interests. If, on the other hand, we are determined to enforce the policy of the open door, to preserve an equal opportunity for trade with all our rivals, then we must not allow Jingoes to drive us into a quarrel with all the world at the same time, and we must not reject the idea of an alliance with those Powers whose interests most nearly approximate to our own. I have thought it right to warn you of the dangers ahead. But I have a great confidence in the future of this country, and I do not doubt that an issue will be found out of all the difficulties which will be worthy of our tradition and our race."

The day before this startling declaration was made by Mr. Chamberlain, the official papers in Germany had printed an official communication from the Emperor’s Government, called out by rumors in the French, English, and Austrian press that German sailors and naval officers were openly fraternizing with the Spanish and that Germany would oppose American seizure of the Philippines. The communication declared that, after the Emperor’s declaration in the speech from the throne, upon closing the session of the Reichstag, nobody could doubt that Germany’s neutrality would be loyal, complete, and strict. Let this be said also of the French, English, and Austrian newspapers, it continued, which were endeavoring to represent the German Government and public opinion as taking a part against policy. Unless there should be imperative reasons for force, Germany would do nothing to disturb the friendship existing for a hundred years with a country where millions of Germans have found a second fatherland.

Mr. Chamberlain’s advocacy of Anglo-American alliance in terms of eloquence amounting to sentimental enthusiasm, had come as if in
quick response to the German Emperor's calm diplomatic reserve. Spain resented it bitterly, and Señor Sagasta observed that if he had given utterance to sentiments so full of feeling Europe would have regarded him as a reckless statesman. The Spanish press said, "it was believed" Spain would appeal to Europe to oppose an Anglo-American alliance, and that the day such a document was signed would be the date of the conflagration of universal war.

The organ of the Social Democracy in Germany published this comment, which was significant of popular German opinion, because no prosecution followed it:—

"Into the putrid swamp of European politics has been cast a stone, and the turbid, slimy waters spout up. The great Republic on yonder side of the ocean, without castles, nobles, or a standing army, has suddenly sprung out of her position of neutrality to Europe, and one European State which has slaughtered myriads of men wrestling for freedom is undone. Old Europe, in consequence, is shaken to her foundations. It is a new power—no militarism, no huge fleet, yet a mighty, an overwhelmingly mighty, elemental power.

"In Asia the same phenomenon has appeared. The new power has become the balance of the scales. Even if an alliance with England comes to nothing, the new American position in the Far East crosses every combination hitherto effected."

The German Government made no sign, but expressed surprise that a cabinet minister should speak with such unreserve. The French journals considered it as foreboding designs against the French fleet and then against Russia, seeking thus to alarm her Muscovite ally into action.

The semi-official press of Moscow assumed for Russia a strong pro-Spanish attitude. It denounced the Americans as pirates, whom only Great Britain's attitude saved from having to face the coalition of Europe. It was jubilant over a report that two Spanish vessels had beaten five American war ships. It heartily hoped that Spain would be the victor in the war.

Other papers were much more guarded in their expressions, though they generally displayed a pro-Spanish tendency.

Even the English press was astonished at the unexpected candor of Mr. Chamberlain's revelations, and hastened to explain that his
declarations would be construed by other governments so as to find in them what they desired to find. Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords said the importance of Mr. Chamberlain’s remarks depended upon their interpretation, and in the Commons Mr. Balfour said the Government would not discuss them.

In the United States the speech was received with popular enthusiasm. The possibility of such a governmental alliance was scarcely considered, but the evident intention of Mr. Chamberlain’s speech, to call out an expression of race feeling, was successful. In numerous public meetings in the United States and Canada, the American and British colors were displayed, entwined together, evoking tremendous enthusiasm. The Queen’s birthday was celebrated by American and British orators, speaking at the same boards, each extolling the common race virtues as displayed by the other’s Government and national history.
CHAPTER THE TWENTIETH.

"Imperialism"—"Expansion"—Annexation.


I.

The Philippines question, as discussed in the United States from the moment the extent of Dewey's victory was comprehended, was called "Imperialism," or "The Policy of Expansion." But the uneasiness it caused in the United States was not comparable to the consternation into which it plunged all European politics. It was well understood when war began that our Government would not stop at securing the independence of Cuba. It was the full purpose to seize Porto Rico and all the islands of Spain in the West Indies. This was a necessity. The presence of Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies was not a cause of political fear, but the destructive wars, the cruelties practiced, and the apparent incompetence of Spanish administrators, rendered her presence, in Cuba at least, unendurable for humanitarian and economic reasons. Her presence in Porto Rico, if Cuba were taken from her, would not be so annoying and not at all to be feared in itself. But if, after the war, she should sell Porto Rico to England or to some other powerful nation, our southern seaboard would be menaced, and we should have a very vulnerable front in maintaining our South American and Central American interests. The sound alternative was to expel Spain altogether from the continent, and seize her possessions for security and as our indemnity for the cost of war.

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This situation as it applied to our interests was reversed in the Philippines. If we should hold them permanently, it meant to three of the greatest European Powers the intrusion of a new and dangerous rival in a position of great strategical importance, at the very doors of their Eastern interests. It meant to them politically what it would mean to the United States if Germany or Russia acquired Porto Rico, and could inject the jealousies and perils of European affairs into our home waters. But it also meant to them, in an economic sense, far more than the alternative would mean to the United States.

The long-inherited feuds of European monarchies at home, and their acquired feuds in colonial experiments, have necessitated standing armies and naval establishments upon such a great scale that taxation has become among them not only oppressive in amount but irritating in the trivial and numberless methods of its application. If the United States intended to permanently occupy the Philippines and annex them as national territory, the defensive power of England, Russia, Germany, France, and Japan, would of necessity have to be largely augmented by each of the nations, not upon terms of cordial alliance with us. If all were on equal terms, then the power of all would have to be increased.

To the United States, comparing her population, vast wealth, and unlimited natural resources (already in process of rapid development under her free industrial system) with those of the other countries, the increased burden would be inconsiderable. It would crush the others, except Great Britain. The national debt of the United States is very small when compared with the nations she might meet in Eastern rivalry. However small the debt or however light the tax rate, no increase of either is ever desirable by those who have dealings with the tax collector. But at the point where Americans would merely grumble and pay, the continental taxpayers would be driven to revolution or ruin. This was the secret of European consternation and the secret of Great Britain's prompt offices in our behalf. Next to the United States she possesses the greatest reserve power of wealth; but her taxation is great. In proportion to national wealth, the taxation
and debt of the United States is trivial as compared with European States. The common language and common business purposes of the two English-speaking nations would render their alliance, in the sense of sympathy, a natural and perfect solution of the situation for Great Britain. The only other possible allies she could then count upon in the last extremity were Germany and Japan—neither made to the purpose by nature.

It must be acknowledged, also, in fairness, that when Great Britain offered her friendship to induce the United States to take territory in the East and be a supporter in keeping open to commerce the ports of China, she was well aware that this country would have a hostage to hold. Canada, with its great railway system, giving England communication with Hong-Kong and Australia, of great importance in conceivable times of difficulty, lies beside the United States, full collateral to secure the performance of honest obligations. In that respect alone, if for no other reason, Great Britain was the best of possible allies for the purposes urged upon the United States, as this Government was responisvely her best ally.

The preparations of the President to send reënforcements of war ships, and an army corps under General Merritt, to the assistance of Admiral Dewey, were approved with enthusiasm. The popular movement in favor of seizing the Philippines, which immediately followed the fall of Cavité, was the natural impulse of a people full of exultation and pride over the completeness, without precedent in naval wars, of the victory that Dewey had achieved with a skill and intrepidity that conferred splendor upon American arms. It was the spontaneous outburst of simplest patriotism to ask that the flag, so valiantly planted, might float there forever in memory of the heroes who raised it. But popular outbursts are not always the safest gales for ships of state to sail before.

Political leaders and students of national policy grew uneasy. There was no party alignment upon the question. Each spoke for himself, or for the expressed views of his constituency, as he could ascertain and interpret them.
It was admitted that if the United States annexed the Philippines for colonial territory the act would involve very serious responsibilities and a radical departure from the traditions and customs of national policy. But it was contended that traditions and customs of national policy were good only when they promoted good ends; that when they interfered between the country and the manifest high destiny of its influence to confer freedom and civilization upon the oppressed, they ought to be given up for better policies and ideas.

The warning contained in Washington’s “Farewell Address” against entangling foreign alliances, was met with the completion of the sentence advising that such alliances should be contracted only as needed to serve our purposes.

The difficulties of governing and properly controlling “conquered peoples,” elicited the rejoinder that there had been very little trouble in governing Louisiana and Texas, both conquered from aliens. But, was the interruption, the Filipinos were mostly in primal savagery, to which retort was made that they could not be expected to emerge from that condition under the sinister rule of Spain, and the United States had a similarly savage population when the country was first settled, and results had justified the methods of civilization.

It was urged as prudent national economy to reserve merely coaling stations in the islands and return the sovereignty to Spain. To this Imperialists interposed the declaration that as we were encouraging the native revolutionists for our own advantage, justice and humanity would be revolted at the consequences of turning these natives back to face the pitiless vengeance of Spain.

It was suggested that the islands might be turned over to one of the Powers of Europe. Against this it was pointed out that to do so would provoke war among European Powers; that as the United States was, by the fortune of war, in practical possession of the islands, all considerations of national duty to republican governmental ideas forbade her to throw the responsibility upon others; she must inculcate the principles of liberty and education in the Philippines.
The opponents of "Imperialism" argued that the possession of the Philippines would require a vast addition to our naval strength to defend the islands; the maintenance of a large standing army to preserve order during the years necessary to convert the population to American ideas of law and order; that the United States would become embroiled in the quarrels of other nations; that there was enough territory at home to fully occupy the government and the energies of the population.

The advocates of "expansion" answered that the enlarged revenues from the islands (although taxation would be greatly reduced from the Spanish exactions) would pay for the increase in cost of the army and navy; that the encouragement of industrial activity under decreased taxation would soon make the islands valuable; that the United States ought to take her place as an international power without fear of embroilment; that she had successfully defended herself from colonial infancy to magnificent national maturity; that she had become responsible for the islands through an accident, not through intention, and the American people were entirely capable of developing and governing them without lessening the progress of the United States; that the islands were necessary to protect our commerce in the East, threatened by Russia, Germany, and France; that the decline of England's trade with China in the past two years ominously foretold the fate of American trade if it were not defended with determination, backed by a display of power ready for use; that the first cost of colonial establishment was not to be considered as a loss, for the reason that the loss of trade certain to follow a failure to occupy the Philippines would be enormously greater than the cost of occupation, and, moreover, would be a permanent loss.

Anti-expansionists quoted the Monroe Doctrine and its long and determined enforcement by the United States as being in itself an implied pledge that our country would not seek to plant a republican form of government on other continents. Imperialists answered that the expressed pledge was not to interfere with the "internal affairs" of foreign countries, and pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine was
only the declaration of our purposes and had never been approved
by Europe, and could be upheld by the United States by force only,
as was intimated in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, and that Great
Britain agreed to arbitration without assenting to the doctrine.

II.

While the arguments thus briefly outlined were the simple prin-
ciples of the differences of political opinion, the unknown lengths to
which a policy of expansion by colonial acquisition
would commit the United States were, after all, the real
cause of uneasiness. The immediate horizon of the
necessities of such a policy was plainly visible. If the
Philippines were to be held, the annexation of Hawaii was logic-
ally necessary for strategic and economic reasons. Manila was 7,500
miles from San Francisco. Honolulu was 2,000 miles out on the path
to Manila. Our ships would need the Hawaiian Islands for all pur-
poses. It would be equally necessary to have stopping places between
Honolulu and Manila, a distance of 5,500 miles. More than this,
fortified coaling stations on the Asiatic mainland would be a require-
ment.

From another point of view arose the necessity of completing the
Nicaraguan Canal or of securing coaling stations along the route from
the Atlantic seaboard by way of the Suez Canal to the Philippines.
The ownership of the Spanish West Indies, if independent Cuba
should ultimately be annexed on her own request, would give perfect
security to the canal and increase the volume of traffic.

Commodore A.S. Crowninshield, U.S.N., chief of the Bureau of Navi-
gation, an officer of experience, keen observation, and capacity, out-
lined the possibilities and advantages of the Nicaraguan project in a
congressional publication,* early in May.

"We Americans," he said, "pride ourselves upon the rapid develop-
ment of our country, upon its great trade and commerce, which have

* Senate Document No. 263, issued May 16, 1898.
arisen from its wonderful resources through the activity and business qualities of our people. But there is a country whose development has been much more rapid than ours, a country which remained for untold centuries isolated from the rest of the world, but which, within the past few years—mainly through our aid and example, it is true—has burst the web of ignorance and inactivity which bound it, and emerges to-day before the eyes of the world as a civilized nation, making quick progress in all that proves a people strong. Suddenly, therefore, we are brought to face the fact that a new power has arisen in the Pacific, that Japan is already claiming imaginary rights within the Hawaiian Islands— islands civilized and peopled by those of our own blood, whose intelligent citizens speak our mother tongue—and we realize on the instant that here is a power with which we must reckon in the settlement of serious questions.

"Hawaii is 3,400 miles from Japan, but there are now 20,000 of the Mikado's subjects settled in Hawaii, and the interest of Japan in the status of these people is so great that it has caused her to protest vigorously against the suggestion of the annexation of these islands to the United States. In thus recognizing the necessity of possessing a powerful fleet of war vessels as a factor in defense or aggression, her statesmen, themselves apt students of history, have read to us a lesson which we might well commit to memory and to practice.

"Beyond Japan, a few hundred miles to the west, lies the Chinese Empire, with its four hundred millions of people. While Japan has advanced, China has remained dormant. But will this continue? Given new rulers, a new form of government, and the adoption of Western ideas, China will throw off its yoke of conservatism, and then our Pacific States will be confronted with a second Asiatic power many times greater than Japan. With these possibilities to be considered, it behooves this country to make itself strong where it is now weak. In other words, it should be our first effort to develop our Pacific coast States. Let us glance for a moment at the effect of an isthmian canal upon this development."
"As a political factor in increasing the influence and power of this country in the Pacific, the canal will be far-reaching. To-day, if the United States were forced into a war with Japan over possession of the Hawaiian Islands, which to her are stepping-stones to our continent, we should be placed at a great disadvantage; for it is a fact that at this moment Japan's naval force is greater than our own Pacific and Asiatic squadrons combined. To reinforce our Pacific fleet we should be obliged to send ships from our Atlantic squadron, forcing them to make a voyage of 12,000 miles, thus consuming many weeks, whereas, with the canal in existence, our powerful North Atlantic squadron could be put into the Pacific within a week. Thus would the canal enable us to more than double our naval strength in the Pacific.

"From every point of view, whether political or commercial, it is plain that the Nicaragua Canal is a necessity to the United States. It will build up our Pacific coast States as they must be built up if we are to properly face the Orient. It will add immeasurably to our naval power, and it will increase our influence not only far out into the Pacific Ocean, over the islands and waters of that vast region, but also over the Caribbean Sea and adjacent waters.

"It is undoubtedly a fact not only that the American people believe that any canal that shall connect the Atlantic and Pacific shall be controlled by the United States, but that our government has given, upon more than one occasion, expression to this sentiment.

"We should be wise in our generation, and, by legislation and such other steps as may be necessary, inaugurate, without further delay, the work of completing the Nicaragua Canal. Let us pierce the isthmus at the one spot which nature has already pointed out, and thus fulfill what has been for centuries the hope of commerce and the dream of navigators."

The Nicaragua Canal had not been merely the dream of navigators. It had been one of the dreams of international avarice and the subject of governmental activity and fear. In the failure of the United States to encourage it, France had undertaken the Panama Canal project. For
years the Nicaraguan project had been a cause of bitter dispute in Congress. It was antagonized by corporations of great wealth whose interests were involved by the competitive strength of a short water way of carriage. Its cost was estimated at from $115,000,000, by its advocates, to $200,000,000, by its opponents.

The annexation of Hawaii had also been resisted by industrial interests and the traditional influences of governmental policy strong in parties. The writings of Captain Mahan, U. S. N. (retired), on the influence of sea power upon the history of nations, had made a profound impression upon Europe, but were estimated at their key value by the men of our navy only. They had pointed out the modern changes and necessities of naval armament and support. Great Britain, especially, had applied his theories and occupied many small Pacific islands for future emergencies of her sea power.

The discussion of these projects in the United States during times of peace had been accompanied by much rancor and exaggeration and had the effect of giving to them an ominous importance in respect to cost and the evils to be feared. The influence of this effect still remained, but to popular sentiment the changed position of the country dwarfed reasons that had once been gigantic in argument. There was no question that the great preponderance of popular sentiment, excited by splendid achievements and buoyed up by pride, was favorable to expansion as it appeared at the time.

III.

Immediately after the announcement that ships and troops were to be hurried to Manila to enable Dewey to occupy the city, the sentiment in favor of expansion was cheered by two significant intimations from the President. One was that the first expedition to Dewey’s relief at Manila would pause on the way and seize the chief island of the Ladrones group, belonging to Spain. The other was, that Congress, upon the expressed
desire of the President, would take determined action to annex the Hawaiian Islands.

Since the native monarchy had been overturned by the revolution which resulted in the establishment of a republic under President Dole, the annexation of Hawaii had caused bitter contention in Congress. President Harrison sent to the Senate just before he retired from office a treaty of annexation, and one of the first acts of President Cleveland was to withdraw the proposed treaty and advise the reinstatement of the monarchy, on the ground that the revolution was aided and abetted by forces from the United States war ship in the harbor at the time and that without that aid the revolution would not have been successful. He contended that reparation should be made to the native government. His efforts failed, and upon his retirement President McKinley sent to the Senate the treaty of annexation for confirmation. A two-thirds' vote of the Senate was required to approve the treaty. There was no possibility of obtaining the necessary majority and the treaty remained in committee without action.

The lower house was known to be largely in favor of annexation, but the minority was very strong in influential leadership and the measure threatened to produce party dissensions and disturb alignment. The House could not, of course, take action on the treaty, but it could promote and effect annexation by a joint resolution accepting the application of the Republic of Hawaii to become territory of the United States. The resolution required a majority vote only in the House and Senate and would thus evade the necessity for a two-thirds Senate vote to approve the treaty.

Preparations for dispatching the first reinforcements to Manila revealed the inconvenience of possessing no coaling station in the Pacific and the sore need of colliers to accompany and supply our men-of-war and the troop ships in convoy. This was the opportunity of the annexationists and on May 17 the government of Hawaii decided to render assistance unconditionally to the United States against Spain and offered the use of her harbors as a base of supplies. The
acceptance of the offer would commit the little mid-Pacific republic to a breach of neutrality and bind the United States to defend her against all consequences arising.

The offer was accepted by the President as an executive act rendered necessary by war. On May 18 a joint resolution introduced in the House by Mr. Newlands, of Nevada, was reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Among the reasons advanced by the committee for its adoption were these:—

"We must face the future in dealing with this proposed annexation. It is impossible for the republic of Hawaii to maintain a permanent existence, preserving in force the influences which are now in the ascendant there and which are cordial and friendly to the United States. Of its mixed population of 106,000 a powerful element is Japanese — 24,497,— of whom 19,212 are males, almost all of them grown men, for they are not divided, as ordinary populations are, in the usual proportions of men, women, and children.

"They are a far stronger element of physical force than the native race, which has diminished until there are now only thirty odd thousand, of whom, by the usual proportions of population, there are not over 8,000 grown men. The native Hawaiian race cannot in any contingency control the island. It must fall to some foreign people.

"The Japanese are intensely Japanese, retaining their allegiance to their empire and responding to suggestions from the Japanese officers. Very many of them served in the recent war with China. The Japanese Government not long ago demanded of the Hawaiian Government, under their construction of a treaty made in 1871, that the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands should have equal privileges with all other persons, which would include voting and holding office. This claim was made when a flood of Japanese subjects, under the supervision of the government of that country, of from 1,000 to 2,000 per month, were being poured into the Hawaiian Islands, threatening a speedy change of the government into Japanese hands, and ultimately to a Japanese possession. The demand was resisted by the little Republic, and a treaty of annexation with the United States arrived at for a time."

After reciting the history of Japan's protest against the treaty, the advantages of its reciprocal clauses to our commerce, and the fact that the rights of the United States to the privileges of Pearl Harbor would cease with the termination of the treaty, the committee's report continued:—

"With the Japanese element in the ascendant and the government under Japanese control, the treaty would be promptly terminated, and with it our special
rights. This would be the first step taken by that active and powerful government toward the complete incorporation of the islands into the Japanese Empire and their possession as a strategic point in the northern Pacific, from which her strong and increasing fleet would operate. The Japanese Government is now friendly, but that would be the manifest dictate of enlightened self-interest to a wise Japanese statesman.

"Annexation, and that alone, will securely maintain American control in Hawaii, Resolutions of Congress declaring our policy, or even a protectorate, will not secure it. The question of protectorate has been successively considered by Presidents Pierce, Harrison, and McKinley, in 1854, 1893, and 1897, and each time rejected because a protectorate imposes responsibility without control. Annexation imposes responsibility, but will give full power of ownership and absolute control.

"In the struggling interests that have recently come into play in the Pacific, the separate existence of the Hawaiian Government is liable at any time to raise complications with foreign governments, as in the case mentioned above of the recent interposition of Japan. An independent feeble government is a constant temptation to powerful nations, in the stress of contending interests, to intermeddle and disturb the peace. Once incorporated into the territory of the United States, all this is done away with.

* * * * * * * * * *

"It has been objected that the constitution does not confer upon Congress the power to admit territory, but only States. The same objection was raised to the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, because there was nothing in the constitution expressly authorizing such admission and treaty, and Jefferson himself, who made the purchase, shared the doubt. But we have made eleven such acquisitions of territory, and the courts have sustained such action in all cases. Texas was annexed by joint resolution of Congress, similar to the one proposed now. The island of Navassa, in the Caribbean Sea, and many others, have been made territory of the United States under the act of August 18, 1856, authorizing American citizens to take possession of unoccupied guano islands. They are United States territory, subject to our laws. So Midway Island in the Pacific, 1,000 miles beyond Hawaii, was occupied, and Congress appropriated $50,000, which was expended trying to create a naval station there. The manifest principle is that the power to acquire territory is an incident of national sovereignty.

"The acquisition of these islands does not contravene our national policy or traditions. It carries out the Monroe Doctrine, which excludes European powers from interfering on the American continent and outlying islands, but does not limit the United States, and this doctrine has long been applied to these very islands by our government. As Secretary Blaine said in 1881, the situation of the Hawaiian Islands, giving them strategic control of the North Pacific, brings their possession within the range of questions of purely American policy."
"The annexation of these islands does not launch us upon a new policy or depart from our time-honored traditions of caring first and foremost for the safety and prosperity of the United States."

The opposition to annexation was deep-seated, and involved so much delay, that in the Senate ten days later Senator Lodge of Massachusetts and Senator Morgan of Alabama, resorted to the extremity of offering amendments to the war revenue bill, thus making resources for war depend upon annexation. Mr. Lodge's amendment was the Newlands joint resolution. This proceeding quickly forced the lower house to an agreement to permit early and free discussion and action upon Hawaii.

Debate did not begin in the House until June 12. Eleven days before, the first military expedition to the Philippines had arrived at Honolulu, outward bound. The soldiers were welcomed with lavish kindness. Two Hawaiian native princes boarded the Charleston and presented to the ship two American flags on behalf of the ex-Queen Dowager, widow of King Kalakaua. The United States troops paraded through the city and were reviewed by President Dole. A great public dinner was prepared at which the 3,500 soldiers were entertained. Natives and aliens all joined in the demonstration.

During the day the Spanish consul sent a protest to the government against the violation of neutrality. Foreign Minister Cooper replied as follows:—

"In reply to your note of the 1st inst., I have the honor to say that, owing to the intimate relations now existing between this country and the United States, this country has not contemplated a proclamation of neutrality, having reference to the present conflict between the United States and Spain, but, on the contrary, has extended to the United States privileges and assistance, for which reason your protest can derive no further consideration than to acknowledge its receipt."

The Gordian knot of opposition was disposed of by the force of events. The joint resolution quickly passed the House by an overwhelming majority, and, in spite of determined delay in the Senate, was adopted by that body on July 6 by a vote of 42 to 21, exactly the two-thirds needed for treaty confirmation.
The joint resolution as adopted is as follows:—

*Joint resolution to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.*

*Whereas,* The government of the republic of Hawaii, having in due form signified its consent, in the manner provided by its constitution, to cede absolutely and without reserve to the United States of America all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, and also to cede and transfer to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public, government, or crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining; therefore,

*Resolved, etc.,* That said cession is accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and that the said Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies be and they are hereby annexed as a part of the territory of the United States and are subject to the sovereign dominion thereof, and that all and singular the property and rights hereinbefore mentioned are vested in the United States of America.

The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition, provided that all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil, military, or naval purposes of the United States, or may be assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes.

Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands, all the civil, judicial, and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing government in said islands shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct; and the President shall have power to remove said officers and fill vacancies so occasioned.

The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations shall forthwith cease and determine, being replaced by such treaties as may exist, or as may be hereafter concluded, between the United States and such foreign nations.

The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands not enacted for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this joint resolution, nor contrary to the constitution of the United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine.

Until legislation shall be enacted extending the United States customs laws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands, the existing customs relations of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States and other countries shall remain unchanged.
The public debt of the republic of Hawaii, lawfully existing at the date of the passage of this joint resolution, including the amounts due to depositors of the Hawaiian Postal Savings Bank, is hereby assumed by the Government of the United States, but the liability of the United States in this regard shall in no case exceed $4,000,000. So long, however, as the existing government and the present commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are continued as hereinbefore provided, said government shall continue to pay the interest on said debt.

There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States; and no Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands.

The President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of whom shall be residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, recommend to Congress such legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they shall deem necessary or proper.

SEC. 2.—That the commissioners hereinbefore provided for shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

SEC. 3.—That the sum of $100,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, and to be immediately available, to be expended at the discretion of the President of the United States of America for the purpose of carrying this joint resolution into effect.

Possession of Hawaii was not taken until August 12, by which time the Hawaiian legislature had ratified the action of the United States. The flag was raised over the executive building with brief ceremonies in the presence of a great concourse. United States Minister Sewall and President Dole had exchanged the ratification documents, and Admiral Miller with a force of marines took formal occupation.

IV.

Meanwhile, the first Philippines expedition, convoyed by the cruiser Charleston, commanded by Captain Glass, had taken possession of Guam, the principal island of the Ladrone group, about 1,200 miles east from the Philippines. The original name of this group of numerous, but mostly uninhabited islands, was "Islas de las Velas Latinas," or, Islands of the Lateen Sails, chosen by Magellan, their discoverer; but his sailors preferred to call them
"Islands of Thieves," and the nickname has survived the memory of the more poetical designation.

The Charleston, with three transports under convoy, arrived off Umata Harbor on the morning of June 20. Protecting the entrance to the harbor frowned the ancient stone forts of St. Iago and Santa Cruz. The latter is on an island in the middle of the harbor. The weather was misty and rainy, but it was soon made out that St. Iago was not manned, but that Santa Cruz presented a dark air that seemed to mean business, probably because of the thickness of its walls and the depth of embrasures and ports in which the guns might be masked.

After a reconnaissance that failed to discover the presence of the enemy, Captain Glass fired a 5-inch shell at the fort. It fell short, but a dozen more chipped holes in the walls and scarred the tower. No response was made, and no human being was to be seen.

After waiting some time a rowboat was seen coming around the island. It contained the Spanish naval captain of the Port of San Luis d’Apra, the town at the head of the little harbor; the surgeon of the Spanish garrison, and a merchant who had once lived in the United States, and could speak English.

These Spanish officials and the merchant came aboard the Charleston and apologized with great courtesy for being unable to return the salute. They explained that there were no cannon and no powder at San Luis and they were unaccustomed to receiving salutes.

To say the least, the situation was one not fitted to the grim-visaged surroundings of war. When Captain Glass informed them that he had been bombarding their fortress and not saluting the flag—that their country and his were at war, the Spaniards were astounded. The last mail had been received early in April and contained no intimation of war. The mail was received every two months and the June steamer was two weeks overdue. When they heard of Montejo’s destruction, their wonder increased. Their ignorance was complete, as was Cer- vera’s, Augusti’s, and Toral’s concerning Spanish defeats. Only victories are published by Spain.
The officers were set at liberty to communicate with Governor Marina, at Agaña, the capital of the island, four miles from the port, and arrange for surrender. Next day the Governor, his officers, fifty-four Spanish soldiers, and fifty-four native soldiers, were disarmed and the Spaniards taken aboard ship, prisoners, to be carried to Cavité. The natives were released. The downfall of the Spaniards was very popular. The Stars and Stripes were hoisted over the fort.

The merchant, Francisco Portusac, was a naturalized American citizen. He said it was useless to leave a garrison; that the Chamorros or natives were honest, mild, and orderly. He had the largest pecuniary interest at stake and he could trust them. Upon learning this, the Charleston and her consorts sailed away to Manila. The island of Guam has from 8,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, and in the remainder of the group there is a population estimated at 16,000.

Thus, the annexation of Hawaii and the seizure of Guam were links in the chain across the ocean. Guam is 1,200 miles from Manila, 4,300 miles from Honolulu.
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-FIRST.

ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE.

Remarkable Reversal of the Old Attitude of Aversion Between Americans and Britons—Continuation of the Response to Mr. Chamberlain's Speech—Utterances at the Anglo-American Dinner in London—Party Leaders on Both Sides in Parliament Commit Themselves to Friendship and Union with United States Interests in a Memorable Debate—Remarkable Fourth of July Celebration in London.

I.

No aspect of the war was more surprising than this sudden reversal of the official and popular attitude of British and American relations. For a hundred and twenty-two years feelings of cordial and open aversion had been expressed and maintained between the two peoples. The vigorous dislike of the people of the United States for England had compelled official expression of it by representative leaders. That feeling was actively reciprocated by the English Government and the English people. The growth of American sentiment in favor of the Irish agitation for Home Rule and the ample financial support contributed to the Irish organizations, had intensified that feeling of aversion which cannot be called hatred, but may, perhaps, be described as a condition of jealous pride, that found expression in an attitude of scornful aloofness and in continual "nagging." To "twist the tail of the British lion" was political capital to an American politician.

At the bottom of the feeling, however, was an instinct of profound respect that each held for the national strength, intelligence, and practical, homely wisdom of the other. The United States constitution is founded upon the essential common-law principles of England, with no caste exceptions. Our national democracy is, in its nature, much like the charter of the corporation of the city of London.
Although we have received a very great proportion of immigrants from Germany, Scandinavia, France, and Ireland, these have assimilated the Anglo-Saxon ideas of individual freedom and have not changed in appreciable degree the original political character of the population. It might almost be said that, in proportion as the immigrant has understood, accepted, and exercised the Anglo-Saxon aspiration for liberty under the common laws of order, he has become prominent and successful. This curious influence of American citizenship upon the foreigner may be observed everywhere in localities where natives of the same foreign country are not gathered in sufficient numbers to form a separate quarter, where they are often tempted to continue alien customs and ideas. The Germans and Irish have adapted themselves marvelously to a free democracy. Their ties of sentimental affection for and family relations with the Fatherland are strong and unwavering, but their loyalty to their new home has been demonstrated to be as firm as if they were native Americans.

So it is that the United States and the British peoples are one at bottom, despite the infusion here of other races and the differences that climate has produced. All possess the patriotism that finds expression in an arrogant national pride. But it is the pride of conscious intelligence of strength. The English-speaking people study their rivals carefully, in order to discover and possess themselves of the strength of their rivals, and to ascertain their weakness also. And they study their own strength and weakness, and their pride is, therefore, the confident expression of knowledge. The “dying nations,” on the contrary, have the fatal habit of ignoring the rival as one incapable of furnishing valuable suggestion, and their pride is born of ignorance and blind self-confidence.

When the details of Dewey’s victory came from Manila, Great Britain recognized the significant difference between American and Spanish men and methods. She had long taunted us with ruinous corruption in politics, pretending to deduce the result that we had become degenerate through wealth and self-pride. Twice had England fought us. Twice had England found us to be good fighting men and
most dangerous marksmen. She saw again exhibited at Manila the same qualities, developed and augmented, exercised with modern implements of war. She required no further test to be convinced that the only change was improvement.

A few days later Mr. Chamberlain spoke. He spoke for an hour and a half in order to make a declaration for the United States in ten lines. This declaration with apparent carelessness was placed near the middle of his address. The remainder was devoted to home politics and European neighbors. Let us see, was the inquiry contained in Mr. Chamberlain’s brief reference to the United States, whether these Americans, who can fight so well, are strong enough in common sense and political wisdom to turn their backs on past animosities. Both nations are big enough to look into each other’s affairs and its own at the same time.

The popular response to Mr. Chamberlain’s declaration was prompt and astonishingly unanimous, in England and her distant colonies, in Canada, and in the United States. Australian sailors applied to be received into our navy, public meetings in Canada indorsed alliance, and within ten days the popular attitude of brotherly aversion had been reversed.

In London on June 3 a public “Anglo-American” dinner was given, attended by six hundred persons, prominent in public attention, but not connected with the government. A large majority were Englishmen, the remainder American residents and visitors. It was arranged for the definite purpose of “promoting closer relationship between the two countries.”

Lord Coleridge presided and in proposing the first toast, “Our Kinsmen beyond the Sea,” he said that he had seen the motives of America in the Spanish War question. There were always people who disbelieve in the possibility of national probity and honor; but he was foolish and ignorant enough not to share in this disbelief, but even if he did, none the less he would desire victory to wait upon the American banner. He would wish it in the interest of America and of Spain, and, higher than all, in the interest of common humanity. He did not
Mr. Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, in a speech practically closing the debate, referred to an assertion by Mr. Morley that no positive alliance was desirable. Mr. Chamberlain said: "Nothing in the nature of a cut-and-dried alliance is proposed. The Americans do not want our alliance at this moment; they do not ask for our assistance, and we do not want theirs. But will any one say that the occasion may not arise when Anglo-Saxon liberty and Anglo-Saxon interests will be menaced by a great combination of other Powers? I think that such a thing is possible, and in that case, whether it be America or England that is menaced, I hope that blood will be found to be thicker than water."

Mr. Chamberlain's concluding sentence was received with loud cheers from both of the British parties, but with expressions of dissent from the Irish Nationalists. It ran as follows: "Meanwhile, I say, without forcing this opinion upon either party, or desiring that either nation should enter into an alliance with which the majority of both nations would not thoroughly sympathize,—I repeat what I said at Birmingham,—the closer, more definite, and more clear the alliance between the United States and ourselves, the better it will be for both nations and for the civilized world."

It was apparent to statesmen and leaders in both nations that no alliance was possible in the sense of formal compact of offense and defense as understood in Europe. The temper of both nations and the nature of the Government of the United States were opposed to any political alliance beyond that growing out of immediate sympathy, interest, and common purposes. The popular response to the so-called proposition of "alliance" was the manifestation of the ready purpose of Great Britain to help us if any European combination threatened interference. Successful interference would injure England's interests quite as much as those of the United States. The common sense and common interests of the two governments were thus brought into much closer relations by the general expression of opinion.

Throughout the period of the war there was no change in the attitude of the two countries. When our war revenue bill was discovered
to press heavily upon the maritime tonnage of British commerce, a reminder of that fact, by the Salisbury government was met by a prompt revision of the clause by Congress, entirely to the satisfaction of England.

The Fourth of July was celebrated this year in England, Canada, and the United States, with equal enthusiasm. The flags of both nations were displayed at public meetings. The American Society in London gave a public dinner at which many Englishmen of eminence and great influence were present. Admiral Sampson's telegram, announcing the victory over Cervera, arrived just before the guests were seated, and its reading was greeted with indescribable excitement and enthusiasm.

The addresses were all tinged with cordial congratulations to both nations. The Marquis of Ripon impressively pointed out that the United States was now at the parting of the ways. The responsibility of President McKinley, he said, was greater than that of any President save Lincoln. He must face a greater problem than that of war, a problem which would determine the history of America. Continuing, he said: "The interests not only of your country but of this are involved, and the decision to a large extent will shape the destinies of the world." He and all the other English speakers affirmed that Great Britain awaited without jealousy or envy the decision of the United States to become a great international Power, carrying the blessings of liberty, knowledge, and peace to other quarters of the earth.

The Earl of Dufferin recalled the ties binding Great Britain and the United States. There were, he said, dominant responsible forces which must in the long run unite the two countries in honorable and generous friendship. He rejoiced at the fresh symptoms necessary to amity. Whether these feelings, in the face of the unstable condition of the world, would eventually take a concrete form might be regarded as a matter for pleasant speculation.

United States Ambassador Hay's reply in response to the friendly utterances was received with great cheering and enthusiasm. His very first sentence evoked a deafening burst of cheers. "To-day," he said, "a new splendor fills the span of the earth from Santiago to
Manila.” The passing year, he continued, would be memorable for nothing of greater significance than the lucid recognition by both the American and British peoples that the way of pleasantness between them was the way of wisdom, and that anything like variance would be folly and madness. This recognition was no mere passing emotion born of a troubled hour, but had been growing for many quiet years. It only needed rough weather to show it to the world. Now that a cordial and clear understanding had come, there was no reason why it should not last forever. It injured none and threatened none. All its ends were peaceful and beneficent. Recalling the day, he contended that it ever had been a day of good anger to mankind. He predicted that the nation would show the same efficiency and promptness in war and the same clemency and generosity in its hour of triumph as in days of old. The nation that ended a vast rebellion without a single execution or bill of attainder might safely be trusted to be considerate and magnanimous in victory; and when the bitterness of the present troubles had passed, both sides would be found to have profited from the issue.

Mr. James Bryce, a Scots member of Parliament, distinguished for his critical writings on the constitution of the United States, said: “In 1776 there was on one side a monarch and a small ruling caste, on the other side a people. Now, our Government can no longer misrepresent the nation, and across the ocean people speak to a people. The Atlantic is ten times narrower now than it was then, and the passage of men to and fro has increased a thousandfold; and through the personal knowledge of Americans by Englishmen and of Englishmen by Americans there has been laid the best foundation for good will and mutual understanding between the nations. We have both come, and that most notably within the last few months, to perceive that all over the world the interests of America and of England are substantially the same, and in recognition of this fact we see a solid basis for a permanent cooperation.”

The public celebration of the day in London called out demonstrations of popular fervor unprecedented in the celebration of the day
outside of the United States. London streets were filled with American and British colors intertwined.

The usual reception at the American embassy was attended by 15,000 persons. Lord Salisbury called personally, an unprecedented Fourth of July compliment, and the function was also attended by almost the entire diplomatic corps.
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-SECOND.

ATTITUDE OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

The Curious Relations Between France and the United States—The Desperate Causes of Her Unfriendly Attitude towards Us at the Outbreak of War—Mistakes and Follies of the Parisian Press and Parisian Populace—Absurd Comparisons of Spain and America—Refrains Proposed in the United States that Caused a Swift Change of Attitude—Russia and Her Connection with the Anti-American Concert—A Negative Act Atoned for by Long, Unbroken Friendship, and Fresh Manifestations of Good Feeling.

I.

It is not exaggeration, perhaps, to say that the United States as a nation has entertained for France a feeling of warmer friendship than for any other country on the globe.

There was a strong element of almost sentimental affection in our regard for France as an abstraction, and equally for the French people. La Fayette was not nearly so clothed with national devotion at home as he was in the United States. The feeling for the French people can scarcely be described. Absolutely alien in temper, taste, ideals, and race, yet that they were our friends in the first death-struggle for independence was enough. The fact had given us courage. It awoke in the heart of America that fervid gratitude which a competitor in any struggle feels springing up at the sight of one face in a strange multitude that cheers him with a look of encouragement and sympathy.

But, truth to tell, no man ever received more monument in proportion to actual deserving than did La Fayette from America. His abilities as a soldier and statesman were not above mediocrity. He was a good man and a brave man, and, as an aristocrat, sympathizing with humanity, his position was striking. To the American colonies his sympathy was inspiring. What if he did not show himself a

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Hannibal in battle, or a great statesman in the closet, was he not the loyal and loved friend of Washington? He was to Americans, and is yet to many, the Washington of France. No good American would take back one word of all the affection and reverence that this nation has uttered about him.

In La Fayette we saw the French people—that look of sympathy at the critical moment. After independence, the affectionate feeling for France grew, despite quarrels and petty disagreements.

For, we reasoned, was not the ever-increasing intensity of her inherited hatred of "perfidious Albion" most satisfying to our national susceptibilities? Americans have been able to enjoy English jibes and sneers at the French; but, laughing, we none the less loved. Was not a friend privileged to have all the faults and foibles convenient to and necessary for happiness?

But there was much more than the La Fayette heroic myth at the bottom of American friendship for France. He was merely the symbol of an idea. The genius of French philosophical letters at the period of our independence was of much more value to us than her arms. The desperate excesses that attended her reaction against the long tyranny of the Capets, not less than her declared views of human rights, were of service. The one warned this new republic against license; her theories of natural rights applied by the fathers of America, with cooler blood and calmer vision, inspired the infant republic of the United States with wisdom and forethought.

Our friendship for France constantly grew. American people were amused but not offended at the French idea of us: that we were a race of monster millionaires, great giants of fellows, more amiable and tractable than Englishmen, but, also, even more vulgar and ignorant. They had no doubt that La Fayette had enabled us to conquer the English. Without La Fayette all would have been lost. Yet at home La Fayette was known to be esteemed as not among the first of France's sons of genius. But, as he had enabled the amiable and novelty-mad Americans to beat "perfidious Albion," they were proud of and amused with their protégé.
The French have never quite understood the American feeling of gratitude that ignored passing differences. Even though she sought to interfere in our Civil War, the act was overlooked.

The United States did, however, deliver one serious and overwhelming blow at French pride. It was made necessary by the invasion of Mexico, concerted by Napoleon III. and Austria during the Civil War. It was at the zenith of the third empire's glory, when Paris was glowing with the splendors of imperial extravagance and display promoted by Eugenie. The Emperor attempted to inflame the patriotism and pride of his people after the manner of his illustrious uncle, by kindling military glory abroad.

Acting with Austria he determined to erect a Franco-Austrian empire in Mexico, with Maximilian on the throne. Our State Department protested, but European Powers had never quite considered United States diplomacy as having serious weight, and Napoleon III. ignored the protest.

When the Civil War was ended and the United States free to turn its attention to neighboring relations, the expulsion of France and Austria from Mexico was determined upon. An ultimatum was drawn up, setting forth fully and conclusively the reasons for the demand that French troops be at once withdrawn from the American continent. It was the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, clearly and firmly repeated. The Atlantic Cable was then newly laid and tolls were costly, but the document in entirety was transmitted over the cable, by Secretary Seward, to the French Foreign Minister in Paris, at a cost of $15,000. The imperative nature of the demand was emphasized by the cost of its transmission—enormous and unprecedented at the period—and Napoleon III. awoke with a shock to the realization that "L'Oncle Sam," good, amiable, but yet awkwardly strong, "meant business."

He was embarrassed, since it was no part of his expectation or intention to fight the United States. Prussia, growing under Bismarck, was a threatening and immediate danger. He must yield. The army of France was immediately withdrawn from Mexico and the fate of
Maximilian and Carlotta added to the humiliation of France an element of terrible tragedy.

Howsoever seriously statesmen viewed that action of France, it is undeniable that the mass of our people—perhaps because the incident was entirely diplomatic and not active—did not change in their feelings toward France. The French were French, excitable, erratic, impulsive; but the French had been our friends and what quarrels we might have with her must be, of course, friendly quarrels.

But to France and the French people the blow struck at their military and national pride was too severe to be forgotten. French leaders, who succeeded to the control of the nominal republic that was to-day exerting imperial authority, to-morrow relapsing into the effusive simplicities of free democracy, inherited the imperial resentment.

But it would be grossly unfair to France—and no American willingly would do injustice to France—to declare that while our war with Spain impended and after it had opened, her action was dictated by nothing more than vain resentment. Her situation was very distressful, her needs distracting. With pitiless accuracy, Lord Salisbury's description of dying nations and the symptoms of their decay applied to France. The bursting of the vast bubble of Napoleonic pretense and extravagance in 1870 had staggered the faith of the French people in all leaders. Under Thiers and MacMahon there seemed to be recovery, but it was to be rudely interrupted by an explosion of corruption in the parliament; in the shady but fashionable financial enterprises, in which needy nobles found great profits from lending their names; and in the representative press. The shameful revelations of the Panama Canal inquiry, smothered down in order that other nations might not learn the full disgrace, destroyed again the faith of the industrious millions in the integrity of representative leaders.

The French citizen is always vulnerable in his patriotic pride. When, therefore, scapegoats of the Panama affair had been solemnly offered up upon the altar of "national honor," the victims of the swindle were persuaded to wait. The canal, they were told, would be completed as soon as confidence could be restored. They were urged
to hold to their stock certificates, the value of which their children would realize, even if the present holders should not. The habit of thrift in France, which in the provinces has attained almost the eminence of a national parsimony, was soothed. The stock was put by for the inevitable dot in marriage settlements.

But the Dreyfus incident, which in 1894 had made the army glorious, was to return in 1897, threatening to expose in the general military staff corruption so revolting and cruel as to make the world stand aghast. At the moment when the United States was electrified by the destruction of the Maine, all civilization outside of France looked with amazement at the spectacle of the French Government, the French army staff, the French ministry of justice, and the French press, engaged in a duel with the author, Zola, and Colonel Picquart, head of the secret service of the army, resorting to the most desperate quibbles of law to destroy these two champions of honest justice, who were ready to prove the innocence of Dreyfus. But, if this should be permitted, the military corruption of France would be naked before the nation and the whole world.

Once more patriotic pride was appealed to. The army, at least, must be trusted. Was it possible that Frenchmen would permit sensational writers and egotists, acting perhaps with foul motives, to traduce the army? Could not a court-martial, conducted by the general staff upon the "honor of a soldier," be definitive until its findings should be revised and ratified by foreign opinion and mere writers for the newspapers? And patriotic pride stood firm once more. Zola was overthrown in form; but he had succeeded in convincing the world that Dreyfus, the most pathetic figure in the history of political exile, was probably innocent, and that the general staff was guilty.

Under the blistering criticism and denunciation of the press of civilized countries, France was shrinking before war began. The press of Great Britain and the United States was keenest and most searching in its indictment of the injustice, cowardice, and impotence, of the French Government, as displayed in sacrificing Dreyfus through fear of learning too much truth, and doing too much justice.
A much stronger nation than France would have been distracted by the dangers confronting her. Her people held 4,000,000,000 francs ($800,000,000) of Spanish bonds, many of them secured by pledges of the revenues of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. Her financial institutions and capitalists were heavily interested in Spanish railway and industrial stocks, and much capital was employed in commercial operations between the two countries. In addition to this the enormous capital involved in the Panama Canal scheme, which had been contributed by popular subscriptions, and which holders of the certificates clung to upon promises of future redemption, would be lost forever, if Great Britain and the United States could reach an understanding.

Involved in a fog of despair over the integrity of their entire official system, with the loss of immense capital threatened, what could be expected of a people but bitter resentment and hostility to the foreign country whose actions might cause such losses? The thrifty population was certainly excusable in wishing that Spain might triumph; while a ministry that had been unable to deal with the Dreyfus outrage could not be expected calmly to examine the future.

II.

Under the circumstances, it was inevitable that the French popular press and her people generally would sympathize with Spain. It was inevitable, also, that the Government would do so, but with circumspect concealment. For weeks before and after the first act of war, the popular press was filled with editorials denouncing the United States, misrepresenting our motives; it printed all sorts of false news derogatory to the dignity and integrity of Americans, and contained interviews, real and imaginary, calculated to arouse against us the rage and anger of their readers. The cause of Spain, on the other hand, was defended for its righteousness, and sympathy for her was manufactured to a vast extent and fanned to ardent heat.
The immediate popularity of this abuse and scorn proved that such utterances reflected popular sentiment accurately. Many persons of prominence and influence, some officials, or occupying semi-official posts, expressed through the newspapers bitter resentment against the United States. A Rear-Admiral declared that, in his opinion, the officers composing the Maine Board of Inquiry "were not, under the circumstances, to be believed on oath." The value of his opinion, as it defined his prejudice only, without accurate knowledge of the subject, may be estimated from an additional declaration he made that, "there is not an officer in the United States navy capable of commanding a vessel, and the navy included few vessels worthy of command!"

It is to be remembered that these opinions were expressed prior to Manila and Santiago. But they were entertained not alone by the Rear-Admiral. Many other naval officers in Paris declared in interviews that our naval officers were incompetent, inexperienced, ignorant! That discipline was lax, that instruction was ignored, and that the crews were mostly mercenaries kicked out of all other navies for drunkenness, or were deserters. One officer's opinion was that Spain's navy was three times as powerful as ours in ships, but when the efficiencies of command, crew, and discipline were considered, the Spaniards were ten times stronger.

A Spanish Admiral, who at Madrid consented to be interviewed for the purpose of suggesting a plan for their naval campaign, said: "With immediate vigor. I should advise the sending of a fleet against Washington first; then, after reducing the city, the fleet should proceed to Chicago and bring it to terms." This was equaled by sentences in a French naval Captain's published article, accompanied by diagrams suggesting also a plan of campaign. "As Cuba," he wrote, "is not far from Havana, it would be easy for the United States to transfer its fleet in the secondary movement from the one to the other." He placed the Philippines in the Indian Ocean, the Canary Islands in the Chinese Sea, and the Carolines in the spot occupied on the Atlantic chart by the Canaries.
These were not burlesque or humorous articles, but were intended as serious contributions to the discussion.

In *La Patrie*, a very popular Paris paper, appeared an interview evidently concocted by some scribbler, and pretended to give the views of a Canadian army officer. Nothing could better expose the ignorance of the reporter or of the editor who could write or accept such absurdities. Some of the views are reproduced for amusement:—

* * * * * * * * * * *

"The United States are in no condition to sustain a war with Spain. A war, even if they were victors, would bring such disaster to American commerce that it would be equivalent to their ruin.

"With the exception of two or three armored ships the United States navy is absolutely valueless. The officers who command it may be decent enough engineers in theory, but they are entirely ignorant of the method of fighting guns. As to the sailors, they have never been drilled to fight; they are worthless as artillersists.

"The United States army does not exist. There are, to be sure, some 22,000 men under arms, but they are not soldiers. Doubtless, one could get recruits, but in order to raise an army of 100,000 of them an enormous amount of money would be required, and it would take several months. Still they would be only mercenaries, who would draw bounties at the recruiting station and then desert. During the war of secession every recruit got a bounty of $3,000; and I have known personally of one man who drew this bounty three times within a week, and then immediately fled to Quebec, where he went into business on the money.

"The American soldier, the typical American soldier, is not what one would call a soldier in Europe, where one expects a man to be amenable to discipline, intelligent and docile in the hands of his chiefs. Individually, he is a good marksman and capable of withstanding fatigue, but he is of no use as a component of a body of troops, where he would have to learn tactics. However, the American officers are not tacticians, and are absolutely ignorant of the art of war. Remember, too, that I am now speaking of the standing army of 22,000 men. You may judge from this what the recruits would be.

* * * * * * * * * * *

"There is Jingoism in the United States, but no patriotism whatever, as that word is understood by other peoples. Americans will work, and sometimes fight, but only for money. That is the one consideration, no matter what circumstance arises. Perhaps if the United States were to undertake a war of pillage in Cuba
they would be able to raise armed bands, who would fight in exchange for the proceeds of the robberies they could perpetrate. Otherwise not.

“All the ports of the United States, from New Orleans to New York, from Florida to Newfoundland, are entirely open and unprotected. Not one has a single gun or a soldier for defense. A small fleet of Spanish gunboats could bombard all the principal cities, one after the other, and soon bring the Yankees to terms. It would be the work of a few days only.

“In conclusion, the resources of America might prolong the conflict and make the outcome doubtful. But there are many unforeseen things to take into account. We must remember that it would be a war between a valiant, courageous people on the one side, and a horde of mercenary cowards on the other.”

The volume of execration poured out upon everything American at last produced a condition of excitement that exposed Americans, visiting Paris for pleasure or business, to insults and annoyance.

The few serious and dignified journals did not, of course, descend to the level of the popular press, but they dared not take the initiative to restrain the popular feeling. They did not excite malignant ignorance, but they displayed more discretion than information. It was hopeless to stem the tide when the Government was secretly leading in an attempt to checkmate the United States.

The vanity of French leaders renders them prone to be induced to take initiative when others hesitate. It has been declared upon good authority that France acted as the organizer of the attempt to form a concert for intervention. The belief that her interest with England in opposing the Nicaragua Canal and the significance of her willingness to throw over her old friend in America, in order to draw Great Britain into an alliance that would “teach America a lesson,” could not be resisted. The fact that Germany had declined to act unless Great Britain joined, was ominous to all the Powers except France. The consequence of her failure inflamed her afresh against Great Britain and the United States.

All France believed in the incompetence of our army and navy, because all France was wishing for incompetence. When Dewey had won his unprecedented victory, France believed it was an accident, because France wished it to be an accident. She transferred her faith
to Cervera, to the Offenbachian Camara, and her sneers and jibes to Sampson, Schley, and Shafter.

At this time, however, France began to feel a new agony. The preparations for the Paris World's Fair of 1900 were greatly advanced. Our State Department had prepared plans and an appropriation bill for $1,000,000, through which the representation of the United States at her fair would be an impressive feature. Opposition to the appropriation appeared in Congress, and the bill languished. In many cities and towns of the United States clubs had been formed for the purpose of saving funds in advance for the expense of visiting the fair. These clubs began to disband.

In a number of cities organizations were projected and some were formed by women, for the purpose of systematically refusing to purchase any articles imported from or made in France, and for notifying merchants that if they carried French articles of stock it would be considered cause sufficient for a withdrawal of patronage. Agitation in such direction was, of course, mere ebullition of resentment, and no more to be justified than the action of the French. It was quickly abandoned, discouraged and ridiculed by newspapers generally. But it was reported, and it had its effect upon French conduct.

The large reduction in the number of American tourists in Paris and other European centers began to cause consternation. Americans are credited with spending upon pleasure $150,000,000 a year in Europe. France and particularly Paris receive the greatest proportion of these 750,000,000 francs annually. It seemed to the Paris tradesman as if the economic cataclysm were at hand.

Then France came to her senses. Commissioners, representing boards of trade, bringing with them letters of commendation from the Government, came to Washington and gravely issued explanations prepared for the purpose of convincing the United States that the French people had been grossly maligned by a mercenary and frivolous press, representing no actual sentiment. The French people loved the American people and were natural enemies of Spain. The appeal was full of pathos, and faultless in diction.
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

While this was making its effect, the "incompetent" Captains of our fleet and their "undisciplined and uninstructed crews of mercenaries" repeated before Santiago the miracle that Dewey had performed at Manila—and against Spanish ships, commanders, and crews that, according to French estimates, ought to have equaled sixty of our ships.

And our soldiers, who, by French account, were "absolutely ignorant of the art of war," had fought at Las Guasimas, San Juan, and El Caney against enormous preponderance of the enemy in position and force. When the Spanish surrendered 27,000 troops and a fortified city to about 16,000 available Americans, France was not yet convinced, perhaps, but her courtesy of speech was much improved, and the tone of her newspapers greatly changed.

There was much in the acute distresses of France to excuse her attitude, the knowledge of which caused the United States Government to exert every effort to mitigate the strain of the situation, and to refrain from any act calculated to increase the probability of widening the breach.

III.

That Russia consented to act in the anti-American concert proposed by France, is true, unless the concert itself is wholly a myth. It was the first unfriendly act of that Government towards the United States, and its unfriendliness was plainly negative. Since Catherine II. had quickly recognized our independence of England, Russia had been not only friendly to America, but had given active and prompt proofs of it. Under all circumstances she remained steadfast, recognizing that in the remote republic, with its well-defined insular policy, there existed no patent rivalry with her own purposes.

She had acted as the determined friend of the United States during the Civil War when France and Great Britain concerted interference in our home affairs. Even then France was the active proposer of interference. When Andrew G. Curtin was United States minister to
Russia, he was shown by Prince Gortschakoff the original autograph letter of Napoleon III. to Alexander II., proposing the action. Alexander, in an autographic reply, declared that "the people of the United States have a Government of their own choice, which they are defending with their best blood and treasure, and I will never do anything to weaken them."* He followed this up by sending a Russian fleet to American waters ready to resist with force any attempt by Great Britain and France to interfere.

In 1898 Russia was involved in serious national distresses. Her gigantic strides towards the Pacific, involving vast works of internal construction and an expansion of military and naval forces, had strained her resources at a time when she was preparing to adopt a gold basis for her currency system. Her rapid progress east had intensified the distrust and hatred of Great Britain, and the possibility of a resort to war had been imminent several years before. In that crisis she looked about for a friend. Germany was not available because of the blood ties between William II. and Victoria. An Anglo-German alliance was more probable than a Russo-German agreement. France, friendly to Russia, committed to enmity against England and Germany, presented an opportunity. She was distressed by isolation. The Franco-Russian alliance was formed, offensive and defensive. When Germany had been induced to seize Kia-Chau, and Russia had followed it up by taking Port Arthur, France supported the movement by sitting down at Hainan.

Now, when France proposed the anti-American concert the obligations of an ally committed Russia to acquiesce. It was the fortune of international politics and European diplomacy, and it must be confessed that Russia's part in the negotiations was mere acquiescence. As soon as the concert failed and the formal diplomatic representation of peaceful wishes had been made at Washington, the Russian Government resumed and maintained its old position of friendly neutrality.

*Jeremiah Curtin, communication published July 22, 1898.
The enthusiastic response of the people of England and the United States to the suggestion of an Anglo-American alliance, was a shock to Russian feeling. A staff correspondent of the St. Petersburg Novoe Vremya, the leading Russian newspaper, who was sent to study the feeling of this country towards Russia and England, said in a published interview: “It cannot be denied that a most painful impression has been produced on Russian public opinion by the language of a part of the American press advocating an Anglo-American alliance against Russia in the Far East. Should the American nation follow such advice there is no doubt that it would be deeply resented by Russia, which is determined not to yield one inch of her legitimate position on the shores of the Pacific.

“Fortunately, the admirable good sense and the clear-headedness of the Americans do not admit a possibility of adopting such a policy. In the Far East, England and the United States, as the two greatest industrial nations, are natural competitors, struggling for a predominance in the Chinese markets. The part of Russia in Manchuria and Korea, as well as in China, is that of a protector of less civilized peoples, which, by their origin and history, are nearer to us than to Western nations. It is generally recognized that Russia has occupied Port Arthur merely in order to counteract the pernicious consequences of Germany’s violent seizure of Kiaochau. Russian policy in the Far East ought to be particularly applauded by the Americans, for it creates a boundless field for American enterprise. Undoubtedly, the development of Russian influence in Manchuria will open a considerable area to American trade and industry. The only necessary condition of fully profiting by these most favorable prospects is the cessation of playing at a policy which might alienate an old and trusty friend without being able to transform a natural and traditional opponent into a disinterested ally.”

It is admitted everywhere that in the exercise of her impenetrable diplomacy Russia has been more successful than she has ever been with arms, and that her diplomacy has been more profitable than the armed successes of some other nations. The declaration of her
journalistic envoy was obviously authoritative. Open political opinions are not proclaimed by Russians except at their peril. This appeal to the old American hostility against Great Britain had been expressed in the St. Petersburg Vedomosti more than a month before, with ingenious and strong arguments to support it, and with bitter warnings to Great Britain.* The general tone of the Russian press was most cordially expressive of friendliness to the United States.

In June the first Russian Ambassador to the United States was presented to the President at Washington. Previous representatives had borne the title of Minister. The Ambassador was Count Cassini, one of the ablest and most accomplished diplomats of the Russian Government. He had long been her representative in China, but had served at important European capitals. His transfer from Pekin to Washington was considered at the time to be significant. In his address to the President he referred to the unbroken friendship between the two countries. The neutrality of Russia, after the first negative act, was full and satisfactory. Indeed, the friendliness of her people remained unchanged.

*"But there is still another point showing the usefulness and expediency of the Russian-American friendship. Let us be candid. Sincere as the assertions of a few Russophiles on the banks of the Thames and Anglophiles on the banks of the Neva may be, our relations with England must inevitably come to a bloody outcome. The war will not break out to-morrow, not after a month, undoubtedly not even after one year, but it is bound to come. The historical march of events tends toward it. The eternal antagonism of Russian and English interests shows it. Show us the nook in which Russia could tender England the hand of friendship without hiding in the other hand, behind its back, the murderous dagger! There is no such nook in existence. Russia advances toward the Pamirs, England does the same; Russia endeavors to extend its influence in neighboring Afghanistan, England sets to work the springs of its immense political mechanism in order to paralyze such influence. Russia occupies Port Arthur; England installs itself at Wei-Hai-Wei. Of Europe, the history of which is full of innumerable Anglo-Russian conflicts, it is needless to speak. In a word, there is no place in the whole world in which, as in a common sea, the course and the tendencies of both empires are merged, and thus, sooner or later, war is inevitable. Once such a war starts, what immense help the United States ports would be to Russia! The sympathetic neutrality of the United States would be for Russia more than a welcome find, and the possibility of even indirect assistance by the American fleet, which is even now pretty strong, and will become more so during the impending war with Spain. We have not yet forgotten the great help given us by the United States in 1878, at the time of the Berlin Congress, when in view of the very probable military conflict, cruisers were manned by Russian sailors in the very ports of the United States."—St. Petersburg Vedomosti, April, 1898.
CHAPTER THE TWENTY-THIRD.

DEWEY AND THE GERMANS.

Very Unfriendly and Hostile Opposition to America by the Emperor and the Agrarian Party — The Commercial Antagonisms that Produced It — Admiral Dewey Receives an Apology from Prince Henry, the Emperor's Brother — The Irritating Interference of the German War Ships at Manila — Dewey Demands that Admiral von Diederichs Shall Answer Whether He Wants Peace or War — The Germans "Called Down" at Last — Diplomatic Explanations and Assurances — Change of Tone of the German Press.

The attitude of the German Empire and the German people towards the United States was expressed in four languages. The diplomatic records will show that it was one of "friendly neutrality to both nations."

The semi-official German press spoke the language of open hostility and enmity. The masses of German people, who have millions of kinsmen in the United States, attracted here by the limitations of life at home, were cordially friendly, and their popular press bore witness to the fact. The court and the Agrarian party, the latter composed of the hereditary landowners, the stiffest-necked aristocracy of continental Europe, were bitterly hostile to us, and through many channels gave vent to their feelings.

There has been a deadly commercial war between the United States and Germany for some years. The tariff theories of the two countries clashed, and Germany was greatly incensed by the adoption of the McKinley tariff in this country. England succeeded to the trade lost to Germany. American farm products, manufactures, provisions, and other articles, could be set down in Germany so cheaply that the landowners complained that America would destroy land values in Germany. The Agrarian party was formed to conduct a tariff policy that would close the German markets to the United States.
The land barons, ever the buttresses of the throne, contrived that court influence should be hostile to the Washington government, while the official record would remain correct throughout.

The United States did not expect or desire sympathy from the German Emperor, but we were fully prepared to stop any effort at intervention. The first intimation of hostility was a curt remark reported to have been made by the Emperor at a mess dinner with a party of officers. "It will not be too bad," he was quoted as having said in substance, "if America shall very soon require Europe to teach her the proper place for her." After some delay the utterance was officially denied with the additional declaration that the Emperor's feeling for the United States was not hostile.

When Dewey sailed from Hong Kong to attack Manila, it was announced by the Spanish Government, unofficially, that Germany had determined to prevent the bombardment of the city because of the large German interests. The annoyances of the German war ships at Manila after the great battle, brought to light a personal incident highly interesting at a time when excitement was high, and also indicative of the German court and semi-official attitude.

A private citizen of good repute and prominence, residing in Chicago, was at Hong Kong in March, when preparations were making for possible war. He had completed a tour of the Orient and was then homeward bound. All the sentiment he had heard expressed was favorable and friendly to the United States, except that coming from German officials and naval officers. These, he said, spoke sarcastically of the United States.

Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the German Emperor, had arrived at Hong Kong shortly before on his mission to represent the German government as Admiral of the navy in affairs growing out of the Kiaochau seizure. Immediately after his arrival, so the story ran, Prince Henry gave a banquet to the representative officers of all the fleets in port. Among those present was Commodore Dewey. After dining Prince Henry proposed the usual national toasts. These are regulated as to order of precedence by etiquette well understood
in the navies. When the Prince reached the place of the United States in the list he passed it for another nation. But when he proceeded to the second omission, it meant wilful intention, ignorance, or gross carelessness. Commodore Dewey left the banquet without ceremony. Finally, just before the entertainment closed, the Prince toasted the United States.

Next morning Prince Henry sent an aide to Commodore Dewey with the explanation that the omission had been wholly inadvertent, and was not meant as a discourtesy to the United States or her representative commander. Dewey thanked the aide for the courteous manner in which he conveyed the message from his Admiral, but in reply requested him to inform Prince Henry that the incident was one that called for a written or a personal apology from the Prince. German sarcasm was thus put to the test. Very soon Prince Henry called in person and apologized, saying that the omission was caused by neglect in writing the American toast in its proper order, and that he had intended to put no slight upon the United States. The Prince later gave a great entertainment, to which Dewey received invitation, but which he did not attend.

Incidents of the character described in the anecdote are considered in official etiquette as having occurred in camera, and the traveler who made it public acknowledged that he understood it was an incident in camera when the facts were related to him by an officer of the American fleet. He made it public in order that, at the critical moment, when the Germans were annoying Admiral Dewey after the battle, and before assistance could reach him, the American people might feel reassured of the quiet and unobtrusive, but very firm and decided, character of the fleet commander representing our forces at Manila. The story was not denied.
II.

The hand of a strong man was undoubtedly needed at Manila after the capture of Cavité. Admiral Dewey was in a position of very great responsibility, requiring the utmost patience, courage, and abilities of the highest order. He had to establish and maintain an effective blockade against a city of 300,000 people, walled, fortified, and well-garrisoned by Spanish troops. He was expected to lend encouragement to and exert restraint upon the insurgent forces just sufficient to keep them up to the attitude of harassing the garrison without storming the city. He was almost cut off from knowledge of Spanish movements elsewhere, and must keep vigilant guard against possible Spanish reinforcements for Manila. It was hopeless to expect troops or ships for his own support short of six weeks' time.

The situation called for tension of nerve and constant watchfulness. And this was aggravated by petty proceedings on the part of German naval commanders calculated to irritate him beyond the point of patience.

There were war ships of Great Britain, Russia, France, Japan, and Austria, in Manila Bay, observing the blockade; but these nations were content to send but one vessel, or, at most, two were sometimes present. But there were five of the Germans constantly in attendance, and occasionally seven, comprising the whole of the German fleet in Asiatic waters. The Deutschland, commanded by Prince Henry, and her sister ship, the Kaiser, the flagship of Admiral von Diederichs, were heavily armored cruisers of 7,700 tons each, carrying eight 10-inch guns, with secondary batteries of 8- and 6-inchers. The other ships were the Kaiserin Augusta, Irene, Princess Wilhelm, Gifon, and Cormoran. In numbers, in armor, and in guns, the Germans were stronger than the Americans whose six vessels were unprotected cruisers and small gunboats.

Upon establishing his blockade, Admiral Dewey drew up a code of regulations which he considered necessary for shutting up Manila
without causing more inconvenience than the conditions required to the foreign vessels. The imaginary line of the blockade cordon was drawn from Cavité across the bay to Malibon harbor, leaving abundant room for foreign ships to enter the bay and observe the blockade.

Among the regulations was one common to all blockade codes. It was that there should be no movement of any foreign vessels or boats about the bay after sunset, without the knowledge and expressed permission of the blockade commander.

The Germans, as soon as their ships arrived, began to ignore and violate the rule. They sent launches out at night as it suited their inclination or whim. Admiral Dewey instructed his patrol launches to turn back the intruders. Admiral von Diederichs protested vigorously. Dewey sent back word with firmness that his regulations must be observed.

But the Germans had no intention of making their presence agreeable. The launches were started off later at night to convey German officers to the clubs in Manila. Dewey turned the searchlights of his ships on that part of the bay and swept it, with the result that the launches were detected and ordered back. Persisting, the Germans began to send one or two decoy launches in one direction, while others moved out under cover of darkness in another. Then Dewey turned his searchlights on the German war vessels and covered them, to prevent any boat leaving at night without his knowledge.

In naval etiquette it is particularly offensive to the pride of a commander to have his ships made the target of a searchlight from another. Admiral von Diederichs sent word to Admiral Dewey that he objected to having the ships of his fleet subjected to indignity. Admiral Dewey returned a courteous message regretting that the conduct of von Diederichs' ships made it necessary to keep their movements at night under observation. He added, with some sarcasm, that perhaps the Germans had not fully understood whether the blockade was maintained by their own or American ships.

This caused a change of tactics. One or two of the German vessels were kept at Mariveles harbor, opposite Corregidor Island, at the
entrance of the bay. The Germans now began to have their ships change position frequently, sending one from the blockade line to Mariveles while another would steam down the bay to replace it. Without knowledge of what Spain could send against him, it was one of the responsibilities of Dewey's situation to guard closely against surprise. The movements of the Germans, therefore, were well calculated to increase the nervous tension of the American commanders.

As soon as it became apparent that the manoeuvres were intended to cause irritation, Dewey directed that a launch or large vessel be sent to meet every incoming ship of the Germans, to speak it and demand to know its nationality, its last port and its destination. Every ship was thus required to heave to and reply to all questions before proceeding further. This is an international rule of warfare.

Von Diederichs protested with much vehemence and asked if Dewey proposed to enforce the right of search. The American Admiral replied that under the rules he had the right to demand the name, nationality, and purpose of every ship that came into the bay while the blockade was in force.

Von Diederichs replied that the Americans knew quite well the character of each of his ships and that the formal enforcement of the right to question was intended to annoy him.

Dewey replied with firmness that the flying of the German flag was not proof that a ship was a German ship, since it was recognized in international law that a warship had the right to fly any colors she desired in war for the purpose of surprising the enemy. To the German flag lieutenant who brought the protest, Admiral Dewey said:—

"Tell Admiral von Diederichs that there are some acts that mean war, and his fleet is dangerously near those acts. If he wants war, assure him that he may have it here, now, or at the time that best suits him."

Von Diederichs regretted that his actions had been misunderstood and disavowed any intention to violate proper usages or to interfere with Dewey's blockade regulations.
He added that he must refer Dewey's letter, which he construed as maintaining the right of search to the commanders-in-chief then in the harbor. Accordingly, he called on Captain Chichester of the British war ship *Immortalité*, senior commander, and asked what were his intentions with respect to obeying the rigorous regulations laid down by Dewey.

Captain Chichester, suspecting an entanglement, concluded to rebuff the German by pretended concealment.

"Admiral Dewey and I," he answered, "have a perfect understanding on that point." Then waiting for a few moments for his caller to enjoy fully the disturbance his reply created, he added: "I will show you, however, as I did Admiral Dewey, the instructions in which I have been ordered to do precisely what Admiral Dewey has been contending you are required to do."

Von Diederichs' last contention was thus destroyed, but he had no intention of ceasing his annoyances. He did not report to Dewey the result of his conference.

When our troop ships arrived at Corregidor channel, the Germans in Mariveles harbor saluted them. The *Kaiserin Augusta* instantly got under way, steamed up the bay, passing closely alongside each transport in turn, and then saluted before the *Olympia* again, running up American colors as she did so. It was ostentatious impertinence, since a single salute would have been sufficient. The irritation was increased by formal applications to permit launches to go ashore after night. Reports came to Admiral Dewey that the Germans were lending material assistance to the Spaniards. They were reported to have landed flour and other supplies, and even to have landed guns. Their officers, it was said, had visited the Spanish front, and inspected Spanish fortifications. The Admiral heard from indisputable authority that the German consul had been told in the club at Manila that the Germans were landing supplies, and that Spaniards of reputation and position were ready to confirm the fact, and the German consul was unable to deny it. Upon this, permission to go ashore at night was refused, to the humiliation of the Germans.
The situation, already very strained, was much inflamed on July 8. The native insurgents had captured a Spanish ship, on which they embarked a number of their troops, and dispatched them to attack the Spanish garrison on Isla de Grande in Subig Bay. The ship returned July 7, and the commander of the troops reported to Aguinaldo that upon arriving at Isla de Grande he found the German war ship Irene close off the island; that the German had not only refused to permit the insurgents' attack, but had compelled the transport to haul down the insurgent colors and run up a white flag. Aguinaldo reported the incident to Dewey.

The moment seemed at hand when the strained cord must break, or one end of it be released. Admiral Dewey instructed the Raleigh and Concord to proceed at once to Isla de Grande, demand its immediate surrender, or to take it by force, at all hazard, if necessary. The garrison consisted of 600 Spanish soldiers.

The Raleigh and Concord sailed at night, and arrived in Subig Bay next morning. With decks cleared for action, the two ships steered for Isla de Grande at 8:15 A.M. As they steamed into the channel on one side of the island, the Irene steamed out on the other side at full speed. The garrison surrendered without resistance, and 623 prisoners, 600 rifles, and a large supply of ammunition, fell into our hands.

As the Irene was returning to Manila, the United States ship McCullough was waiting to speak her. She sent a blank shot across the Irene's bow, and discharged the formal duty of inquiring her name, nationality, and purpose.

The rage of von Diederichs flamed up. He sent a strong protest to Admiral Dewey against the hauling up of his ships as if they were the ships of an enemy.

The response of Dewey was sharp and not to be misunderstood. "I desire to ask," he said, "whether it is peace or war between your country and mine. If there is war I wish to be informed. If there is peace, the conduct of your fleet must be changed. It is not the part of friendly neutrality to obstruct and distress the duty of a
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friendly nation. But the proper way to make war is to clear ship
and go at it."

There could be no mistaking the purport of such a message. In
laconic phrase, the German was "called down" and must meet the issue.
His response was an explanation and an apology. He denied that
the Irene had interfered against the insurgents, but admitted that
she had refused to answer signals until the insurgent ship had sub-
stituted a white flag for the native colors, because to do otherwise
would have had the effect of recognizing the insurgents' flag, which
would have constituted an act unfriendly to Spain.

The German Admiral was now facing the dead-line of conduct.
If he advanced he must take the consequences; if he retired his pride
would be mortified. He resorted to correspondence. Meanwhile, the
news of Cervera's destruction reached Manila a few days later, the
Charleston arrived, the Monterey was approaching, and the Monadnock
was contained in the prospect. Von Diederichs relapsed into sulky
obedience to regulations, and bided his time.

III.

In the United States and Germany, reports of the irritating conduct
of von Diederichs were complicated with frequent declarations through
anti-American or anti-German channels abroad that
Germany was determined to resist acquisition by the United States of the Philippine Archipelago. The Em-
peror, it was said, had instructed von Diederichs to land a force of
marines at Manila under the pretense of protecting German subjects
and German interests. The deduction to be made was obvious. It
would mean that Germany, having gained a foothold in Manila, would
be in position to involve in confusion the claims of the United States
to possession through war. The landing of marines, therefore, with-
out permission from Admiral Dewey under perfectly defined terms,
would be equivalent to an act of war, upon which Dewey would undoubt-
dedly act.
Suggestions were thrown out that Germany and France had made arrangements with Spain by which she conceded to them coaling stations in the Philippines at points beyond the American blockade. But subterfuges of that sort did not deceive the government at Washington.

Reports that Germany's war ships were lending aid and comfort to the Spaniards at Manila, called for interrogatories and replies. The German Ambassador at Washington called on the President and assured him that a firm attitude of friendly neutrality was observed, notwithstanding the flying reports, for which the German Emperor was in no wise responsible. The Foreign Minister at Berlin assured the American Ambassador that such rumors were mere absurdities; that the presence of so many war ships at Manila was necessary to the interests of German subjects, of whom there were more in the city than of any other nation except Spain; that the Subig Bay incident was a mere act of humanity to prevent non-combatants on the island from massacre by insurgents. This did not agree entirely with von Diederichs' explanation, which was that the Irene did not interfere at all. It was affirmed that the German Government had no knowledge that von Diederichs' launches had violated regulations of the port blockade or that any of the petty acts of interference as reported had occurred. If such complaints were true, the government would prevent a recurrence of them.

The tone of the German press changed decisively after the events at Santiago. The semi-official Berlin Post, in answer to an article in a Paris paper urging that it was time the Powers took extreme measures to prevent the proposed dispatch of Commodore Watson's squadron to Europe, and to end the war, uttered the warning that, before summoning Europe to resist the United States, and predicting a quadruple alliance in the Mediterranean, it would be well to ask Great Britain's consent to yoke the European Powers to one car. The Agrarian papers denounced the change of tone in the radical press, and insisted that the Spaniards were thorough artillerists, but had lacked material at Santiago. They considered the surrender of Santiago
unimportant, and spoke of the danger of yellow fever in a tone of
dread that seemed to express great hopes of the ultimate safe burial of
the whole American army.

There was no mistaking the strong and open friendliness of the
great journals of the German people. The Frankfurter-Zeitung, in an
elaborate review of the operations on land and sea at Santiago, de-
clared that they had brought many disillusiones to the despisers of
militia armies. The German newspaper strategists, especially, who
jeered at “the militia generals going into the field in elegant dress,”
had become more cautious in their criticism since the fights before
Santiago. When it was considered under what unfavorable circum-
stances the American soldiers had been obliged to fight, the reviewer
declared that they had exhibited an endurance and bravery that
could not be surpassed by any troops, no matter how well trained.
Dismounted cavalrmen had been employed to storm a strong posi-
tion; a preparation for the infantry attack by artillery fire had been
impossible, as there had been no artillery; the men suffered from
lack of food, because the commissariat had to struggle with great
difficulties of transportation; the preliminary preparations for the care
of the wounded had proved very defective. All this was known to the
soldiers, who, nevertheless, advanced with undiminished courage. The
positions the Americans gained on both days of battle they not only
retained, but later won still more ground.

Continuing, the reviewer spoke thus of the American demonstration:

“The Spanish troops, whose military qualities are valued very highly by the op-
opponents of the militia, were stationed in excellent strong positions, had with them
sufficient artillery, made use of smokeless powder, were superior in number to the
Americans, and were commanded by officers experienced in war. Why did not
these European-trained troops sally out of Santiago and simply drive the Americans
into the sea? Why does not Marshal Blanco, who is said to have at his command
a well-armed army of at least 100,000 men, accustomed to the climate and to fight-
ing, make his superiority felt?”

“The value of troops does not depend merely on the military drill, such as is usual
in Europe. There is militia and militia. A popular army like the Swiss, with its
full equipment ever ready for war, represents a stronger power at the beginning of